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
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THE
FORMS OF DISCOURSE
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THE FORMS OF DISCOURSE

WITH AN

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER ON STYLE

BY

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P R E F A C E.



THIS work is an attempt to present the subject of literary invention in a form suited to the needs of pupils in high schools and colleges. It has been prepared because the author was unable to find, in the many excellent text-books on formal rhetoric, any adequate discussion of this subject that he could use with his own classes. The authors of many recent text-books have assumed that the study of rhetoric is the study of style, and nothing more. If they have treated the forms of discourse at all, they have done so by way of literary analysis, and not in a manner that will prove helpful to young writers.

The study of style is of the greatest importance. It should come first in a course in English, and it may profitably be continued, even by the greatest writers, throughout life ; but it is not a study in which progress can be forced. The reason that so many courses in rhetoric are partial failures is because the pupils have already learned as many rules for style as they can assimilate without further knowledge of invention. The average junior or senior in the high school has been taught the principles of grammar, and something of what is generally known as English composition. He knows what a climax is, and uses it naturally ; he knows the names of the figures of

speech, the uses of loose and periodic sentences, and much more of the same kind. He ought, in spite of slips and blunders arising from immaturity, to write fairly correct and forcible English, when he knows what he wants to say. When asked to prepare a composition he is most troubled, not by matters of diction, but by such questions as: "What subject shall I choose?" "What shall I say about it?" "How shall I express my thoughts to suit this particular occasion?" And these perplexities do not, as some have said, come simply from lack of ideas.

Every teacher must have noticed that a pupil has a better style when he writes on a well-chosen subject and in accordance with a carefully prepared plan.

The study of style should be carried on simultaneously with that of invention. The purpose of the first chapter of this book is to present the essentials of the former subject as briefly as possible. Few illustrations have been given, both because of the limitations of space, and because the author feels that such examples should be chosen by the teacher from the pupil's own work. No matter how full and complete a text-book may be, the errors that it illustrates will often be just those that the pupil does not commit. If the blackboard and modern copying devices are wisely used, the presentation of examples from the written exercises of the class need not add greatly to the work of the teacher.

It has seemed in keeping with the general plan of this book to give reasons and explanations as far as possible. The rules for style have therefore been grouped under the general principles on which they depend. The obvious disadvantage of

this plan is that it scatters under different headings the figures of speech and other groups of subjects that are usually treated together. It is believed, however, that the advantages gained will more than compensate for the loss of the traditional classification. As a review exercise students may be asked to group these scattered topics in different ways.

In the last five chapters especial attention is given to those forms of composition that may be required as practice exercises, or that young writers have most occasion to use. Thus, in the chapter on exposition, the short essay and the thesis are discussed more fully than are the treatise and the text-book.

The selections that follow each chapter have been chosen, not as examples of English classics, but as illustrations of the principles that have been discussed. Some of them are models of style, and may be studied as such; others have serious faults, which the student should point out. In these selections the spelling, capitalization, and punctuation of the respective authors have been followed.

Although the author believes that this text-book differs, in scope and general plan, from any other now before the public, he owns his indebtedness to many writers for matters of detail. An attempt has been made to give credit in all cases of direct borrowing; but many ideas and expressions not credited are obviously derived, in a greater or less degree, from other works. This is especially true throughout the chapter on style. In the succeeding chapters more suggestions have been obtained from Professor Genung's "Practical Rhetoric" than from any other one source.

The author wishes to express his obligations to Prof. D. B. Frankenburger for sympathetic aid not only during the preparation of this work, but throughout his previous studies ; and to Prof. A. A. Knowlton and Mr. W. M. Smith for many helpful suggestions.

W. B. C.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

November, 1896.

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FORMS OF DISCOURSE.



CHAPTER I.

STYLE.

Introductory.—The laws of discourse are of two kinds : those which apply to all composition, no matter what its nature, or the occasion for which it is prepared ; and those that govern special forms of discourse. Since narration, description, exposition, argumentation, and persuasion are distinguished from one another by the subject-matter and by the end for which they are written, the special rules for each apply mainly to the management of material, — that is, to the choice and presentation of ideas for certain readers under certain conditions. The principles that govern all composition, on the other hand, have to do mainly with style, — that is, with choice of words, and their arrangement in phrases, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs. The thought to be expressed should, in practice, be determined upon before the manner of expression ; but in a treatise of this kind it is more natural to discuss first the qualities that all discourse should have, — in other words, the qualities of style.

All readers must have noticed great diversities in manner of expression in works of different authors, and often in different passages by the same author. The subject of style may seem hopelessly complex if the details are considered one by one. It will be found, however, that everything of

practical value on the subject can be grouped under a few general principles. Indeed, the most widely different styles often exemplify the same principle. Thus, the difference in diction between a memorial oration and a reporter's story of a dog-fight is accounted for by the general rule that words should be chosen to fit the subject.

Nature of the Principles. — The principles of style, as may be inferred from the fact that they cover so many different cases, are very general. It should be remembered, also, that they are really principles, not set rules. They are not uniform in their application ; they often conflict ; in short, since they deal with language, the most indefinite and subtle of human products, they have in a great degree the uncertainty that always pertains to human affairs.

Students whose work in rhetoric follows immediately upon their English grammar are likely to feel that the principles of the new study are as fixed and definite as the rules of the old. This notion is wholly incorrect. Grammar and rhetoric do shade into each other. But they differ in that rhetoric aims to distinguish, not the right from the wrong, but the best from the poorer. Any complex idea may be expressed in a number of ways, any one of which is perfectly grammatical. The study of rhetoric aids in choosing the expression that, all circumstances considered, is the best. Grammar does not consider the circumstances. A sentence that is grammatical in one case is grammatical in another, no matter what the subject, occasion, or form of discourse ; but the expression of an idea that is best for one purpose or time may not be best for another. Moreover, grammatical usage is not at all affected by the personal taste or personal bias of the writer ; but there may well be differences of opinion regarding the most effective way of expressing an idea for a given purpose. Indeed, the unconscious effect of personality on form

Differences between
Grammar and
Rhetoric.

of expression is so great that Buffon has said, "The style is the man himself."¹

Sources of Principles. — If we consider why any one form of expression is preferable to another, we shall probably find the reason to be either that it conforms to established usage or that it appeals to the reader in accordance with some law of mind. At bottom, these considerations are really one, since the objection to an unusual expression is that it will not produce the desired effect on the reader. For convenience, however, we may well distinguish between those principles of style that are based on conventional usage and those based on mental laws.

I.

Conventional Usage. — Language is, to most persons, a set of purely arbitrary signs for ideas. The letter "j" stands, to us, for a certain sound because we are used to giving it a certain pronunciation. To an inhabitant of continental Europe its suggestion is different. The word "jam" calls to our minds a preparation of fruit because we are used to associating the word and the idea. To Cicero the same combination of letters meant something entirely different. The only reason most persons can give for saying "The bird flies" rather than "The bird fly" is that they are accustomed to it, and know it to be the ordinary form of expression. Philologists are able to give a rational account of some of the phenomena of language, but a point is soon reached where they, too, must fall back on usage.

The principles based on usage are mostly those that concern the lower, fundamental qualities of style, such as spelling, grammar (in the ordinary sense of the word), the reputableness of words, and the meanings of words.

¹ Every teacher of rhetoric must have been annoyed by the questions of pupils, "Is not this right?" "Is that wrong?" A protest against such a conception of rhetoric is found in Barrett Wendell's "English Composition," chap. I.

These principles are not of equal importance. An analogy might be drawn between the usages of men and women as writers and speakers and the usages of men and women in society. No principle of language has, perhaps, the force of the moral law ; but errors in spelling or grammar are at least as serious, in their field, as are the grosser offenses against good manners, such as personal uncleanness. It is as bad to use the more vulgar slang as to eat with one's knife ; and the use of other questionable expressions, such, for example, as "kid" for "child," while excusable under certain circumstances, might be compared to writing a social note on legal-cap paper, or making a call at seven o'clock in the morning.

Writers on literary usage, like devotees of society, are likely to become over-punctilious. When a well-known author objects to "campus" as a provincialism, and unqualifiedly condemns the verb "to cable," he is applying rules of much the same importance as those which prescribe the exact method of creasing trousers, or the date after which a straw hat must not be worn. It is well to observe such dicta when they do not lead to the sacrifice of more valuable matters ; but when they are considered of first importance, they beget either pedantry or foppishness.

Spelling. — The first and most essential requisite of any written composition is that the words be spelled correctly.

Value of Rules. Spelling as a separate study is generally discontinued early in the school course, and as a result the manuscript of many supposedly educated persons abounds in orthographical blunders. English spelling is undoubtedly more irregular, and harder to learn, than that of many other languages ; but poor spellers generally do not recognize how large a percentage of doubtful cases come under a few simple and easily memorized rules. A thorough mastery of the three pages on orthography in Webster's dictionary would save innumerable mistakes. Even the few selected rules

to be found in most spelling-books are very helpful. In the student exercises that the author reads every year, the rule for dropping the final "e" before a suffix beginning with a vowel is disregarded hundreds of times.

One fruitful cause of poor spelling is carelessness in pronunciation. Startling as it may seem, from thirty to fifty per cent of the students who enter college write "labratory," the omitted syllable being suppressed in pronunciation. "Sophmore" is a less common error of the same class.

Pronunciation and
Spelling.

Confusion in the use of words pronounced alike or nearly alike is very common. "To" and "too," "principle" and "principal," "effect" and "affect," "except" and "accept" are misused by students whose work in all respects but spelling is excellent.

Grammar.—The science of grammar, like that of orthography, is simply the record of what the consensus of literary usage authorizes in language. Its rules and principles have no sacredness in themselves, but hold true only as they are correct inductions from the best spoken and written discourse. Most of them are, however, the statement of usages definitely established, and their violation is an inexcusable fault. In connection with questions of grammatical and ungrammatical usage it is therefore appropriate to use the words right and wrong.

Although no composition can be considered even reputable unless it has grammatical correctness, violations of grammatical rules are not uncommon. Most such errors come from carelessness, but some arise from the misunderstanding of certain principles, or from a failure to recognize that they apply in given cases. A comprehensive review of grammar would be impossible here. A few of the faults that educated persons seem most in danger of committing may be mentioned by way of warning.

1. *Mistakes of number.* — Errors in number are usually violations of rules for the agreement of subject and verb, or of antecedent and pronoun. For instance, singular substantives if connected by "and" are treated as a plural term, if connected by "or" they must be referred to, individually, as singular. For example, "I saw James and John. They were on their way home"; but "I expect James or John. He is to stay with me."

Compound Terms.

When a compound term is used to denote a single substance or object, as "bread and milk," it is treated as singular. Some such terms may be considered as either singular or plural; for example, "cap and gown," "horse and carriage." Care must be taken that the usage is consistent in any composition. A term must not be used as singular in one paragraph and plural in the next.

Errors are also common where nouns singular in form are used to stand for a class; as, "Man is mortal. In this they resemble all other living beings." Here the writer has continually in mind one subject, the *genus homo*; but his form of expression is grammatically inconsistent.

Singular Nouns Used Generally.

Words in "ics."

Most words ending in "-ics," as, "mathematics," "physics," etc., are singular. The weight of authority, however, is in favor of making "athletics" plural.

Difficulty is likely to arise in connection with the use of collective nouns. Such nouns are singular if the idea of grouping is predominant, plural if the individuals are thought of as such. Thus, "The class is dismissed," but "The class have dispersed." In case of doubt it is better to use the singular.

Collective Nouns.

Nouns of Foreign Origin.

Some nouns of foreign origin are troublesome to persons who are unfamiliar with the

languages from which they come. The following table shows the endings of the most common classes of such words :

SOURCE.	SINGULAR.	PLURAL.	EXAMPLES.
Latin	us	i	nucleus, i
"	a	ae	nebula, ae
"	um	a	datum, a
"	is	es	crisis, es
Greek	on	a	phenomenon, a
Hebrew		im	seraph, seraphim
French	eau	eaux	tableau, eaux

Many of these words also have plurals formed according to the regular English usage.

It should be noticed that only a few forms of the verb are inflected for number. In case of doubt which form to use, or when the use of a distinctively singular or a distinctively plural verb would be awkward, it is generally possible to rearrange the sentence.

Common Forms of
the Verb.

This is often desirable when a singular and a plural noun are connected by alternative conjunctions. Instead of saying, "A or his two sons is (are) going," say "A or his two sons will go."

2. *Mistakes of case.*—English grammar recognizes but three cases, and for all nouns and most pronouns two of these have the same form. Errors in the case-forms of nouns can occur only in connection with the use of the possessive.

The possessive case should be used to express only ownership, duration of time (as, a year's study), and in a few other expressions, such as "the law's delay," "the sceptre's power." These are established by long usage and must be learned by observation. Most of them imply a sort of personification, which is generally not definite enough to justify the writing of the noun with a capital letter. The tendency to use the possessive in place of a phrase intro-

Use of Possessive.

duced by "of" is increasing, but should not be encouraged. Such expressions as "the university's progress," "protection's triumph" are not sanctioned by any really good usage.

The double possessive, *i.e.*, the use of the possessive case after the preposition "of," is idiomatic and correct. In most

Double Possessive. instances the more usual construction with the objective may be used if desired; in others, this would change the meaning; as, "a picture of John," "a picture of John's."

Errors are sometimes made in placing the apostrophe in possessive nouns. All nouns, whether single or plural, not ending

Use of the Apostrophe. in "s" form the possessive by the addition of "'s." Plural nouns ending in "s" add the apostrophe after the "s." Usage is divided

in regard to the best form for the possessive of nouns ending in "s" in the singular. The apostrophe may be added alone, or the "'s" as in case of other singular nouns. The former method is simpler and pleasant to the ear, but has the disadvantage of making the possessive singular resemble a possessive plural. Some authorities recommend the addition of the "s" in writing, but not in pronunciation.

The nominative and the objective cases of inflected pronouns are sometimes used incorrectly for each other. The objective

Cases of Pronouns. is so frequently substituted for the predicate nominative after the verb "to be" (as, "It is me") that a few writers have tried to justify the usage. It is not, however, supported by any great weight of authority; the most that can possibly be conceded is that in conversation it is but a venial offense.

The nominative form of a pronoun seems to be the most typical, or to occur to the mind first in connection with the idea for which the pronoun stands. When a noun and a pronoun in the objective are joined by a conjunction, the noun is uninflected, and there is a tendency to use the uninflected, *i.e.*,

the nominative, form of the pronoun. It is not uncommon to hear such expressions as "He spoke to John and I," though no one would be guilty of saying "He spoke to I." This error is especially likely to occur when the pronoun is at some distance from the governing word.

Probably the pronoun whose case-forms are oftenest misused is "who" as relative or interrogative. "Who" introduces its clause. In the normal English sentence or clause the first noun or pronoun is usually the subject, unless some other government is obvious. It seems natural, therefore, to use the nominative form of the relative, no matter what its construction. Occasionally a writer whose attention has been called to this danger will let his caution lead him into the opposite fault, and will use the objective in place of the nominative.

3. *Mistakes of mood.* — The indicative is often used where the subjunctive would be preferable. The subjunctive is being more and more neglected, even by the best authors; so that the persistent use of the indicative perhaps ought not to be called by so strong a term as mistake. But a writer who disregards the subjunctive not only violates the traditions of the language but also sacrifices an important method of expressing finer shades of meaning. The subjunctive is properly used to express a condition contrary to fact, — as, "If I were president, etc.," or to denote uncertainty or doubt. "If John comes" should imply that there was a strong probability that John would or would not come. "If John come" should mean that the coming was wholly uncertain.

4. *Mistakes of tense.* — The most serious misuse of tense is likely to occur in dependent clauses, particularly when the dependent verb is an infinitive. In such a clause the time of the verb is dependent on the tense of the principal clause. In other words, the point from which time is reckoned is not, as in

Use of the Subjunctive.

Tenses in Dependent Clauses.

independent sentences, the moment of speaking or writing, but the time of the principal verb. In the sentences :

- (1) He went to see the lions,
- (2) He goes to see the lions,
- (3) He will go to see the lions,

the present infinitive represents time absolutely past, present, and future, in (1), (2), and (3), respectively. In the sentences :

- (1) He was said to have accomplished his purpose,
- (2) He is said to have accomplished his purpose,
- (3) He will be said to have accomplished his purpose,

the perfect infinitive represents time prior to that denoted by the principal verb. In (1) this is time before other past time ; in (2) any past time ; in (3) any time, past, present, or future, before that represented by " will be said."

Care should be taken in the use of the historical present. The narration of a past event as though it were occurring in present time has a vivifying effect, and is to some extent of the nature of a figure of speech. Like other devices intended to give force, it should be used only when the occasion is important enough to warrant it. The change from one tense to another is so easy that it is likely to be made without good reason. An especially serious fault is that of changing from past to present and back again in the same passage. As a narrative increases in interest the present may replace the past ; but when once it has been introduced it should be kept up until a decided break in the thought is reached, when the narrative may begin again on a lower plane of feeling.

Failure to discriminate between the auxiliaries " shall " and " will," " should " and " would " is closely related to errors in the use of tense. Much of the difficulty that " Shall " and " will." attends the use of these words will disappear if the student keeps in mind the essential meanings of the words. Both " shall " and " will " denote futurity. " Shall "

usually denotes volition or determination on the part of the speaker. "Will" denotes volition, if at all, on the part of the subject of the verb. "He will go" may mean either that he is determined to go, or simply that, so far as human beings can determine the future, there is no doubt that his going will take place. In the sentence "The book will fall" no determination is implied, since the subject is incapable of exercising volition. "He shall go" indicates determination on the part of the speaker to compel the going, if necessary. The same principles hold for the second person.

In the first person, where the subject and the speaker are the same, "will" is used to emphasize the idea of volition, as, "I will go." Since men and women do few things that they do not will to do, "shall" with the active voice generally expresses volition, but does not emphasize it. It may also be used where no volition is implied, as in the sentences "I shall go to prison," "I shall die." The possible usages are shown below :

**DETERMINATION ON
PART OF SPEAKER.**

I will
You shall
He shall

**DETERMINATION ON
PART OF SUBJECT.**

I will
You will
He will

SIMPLE FUTURE.

I shall
You will
He will

In interrogative sentences the form should be used that would be used in the answer. "Shall I?" (answer, "I shall") implies simple futurity. "Will he?" (answer, "he will"), expresses either simple futurity or determination on the part of "he." "Will you?" ("I will"), "Shall he?" ("he shall") imply that the matter in question is to be determined by the person addressed.

"Shall" is also used to express the decrees of destiny : as, "The heavens and the earth shall pass away." "Will" is often used by courtesy to soften the effect of a virtual command : as, "You will report, etc.," in military orders.

"Should" and "would" follow the same rules as "shall" and "will," respectively. They also have a few special uses.

Should and Would. "Should," when emphatic, expresses duty or obligation : as, "He *should* go, but I fear he will not be able." "Would" may denote habitual action : as, "We would all sit about the fire on winter evenings." In the expression "would that" "would" expresses a wish.

5. *Mistakes of reference.* — A frequent error is the use of a pronoun without an antecedent definitely expressed. Some-

Pronouns with No Antecedent Expressed. times a pronoun is made to refer to a word used as an adjective, or to part of a compound word : as, "There are many stone-quarries in Vermont. It is of fine quality for building."

Sometimes the antecedent is still more vaguely implied.

The reference of a pronoun is often obscured by the presence of a noun of the same person, number, and gender as the antecedent. The general rule is that a pronoun refers to the noun of the proper form that immediately precedes it. This applies

Confusion of Antecedents. with especial stringency in the case of the relative. In such an expression as "John Smith, son of the well-known attorney, who, etc.," "who" should refer to "attorney," unless the context shows at once and plainly that this is not the case. Personal pronouns often refer to the most prominent noun that has preceded, especially to the subject of the sentence, as "John Smith, son of the well-known attorney, is visiting his brother. Yesterday he was interviewed by a reporter." Here, though two nouns intervene, there is little real doubt that "he" refers to "John Smith."

The rule that a pronoun should never refer to a noun in the possessive case is based on this fact that an antecedent should be prominent.

Confusion is especially apt to arise when several pronouns of the same person, number, and gender are found, together with

their antecedents, in the same sentence. The following sentence illustrates how perplexing such constructions may be, even in a passage of no great length :

"On his way he visited a son of an old friend who had asked him to call upon him on his journey northward. He was overjoyed to see him, and he sent for one of his most intelligent workmen and told him to consider himself at his service, as he himself could not take him as he wished about the city."¹

In sentences like this considerable ingenuity is necessary to make clear the reference of pronouns without rendering the sentence harsh and cumbersome. The simplest device is always to repeat the antecedent, and if this repetition be accompanied by a change in order, so that the repeated word bears a different emphasis in different clauses, the sentence need not lose smoothness. Sometimes a noun may be put in the possessive case, and thus be made so unemphatic that it will not be mistaken for an antecedent : *e.g.*, in the sentence above, if "a son of an old friend who . . ." be changed to "an old friend's son who . . ." the reference will be plain. Sometimes a mere change of order will make a noun so prominent that it will clearly appear to be the antecedent. In other cases it is possible to change the number of a word without affecting the idea ; thus, there is no difference in meaning between "man is mortal" and "men are mortal" ; and if it is necessary to refer to the subject of this sentence by a pronoun, that form should be chosen that differs from other masculine nouns in the context. Other methods of change will suggest themselves in particular cases.

Too much care can never be taken to make the reference of pronouns unmistakable. The writer, who knows the thought he wishes to convey, will often fail to notice another possible meaning of his words. In matters of great importance it is

¹ From Abbott's "How to Write Clearly," page 48.

best to submit the composition to a person who knows nothing of the line of thought, and ask him to watch for ambiguities. With a little care, however, a writer can usually detect such errors himself.

Another part of speech that needs careful attention is the participle. Participles should not be used unless the substantives with which they agree are clearly expressed. Their misuse is especially common in connection with a pronoun of the first person, implied but not expressed : as, "Going down to the river, our boat was soon launched."

Use of Participles.

The participle is, altogether, a troublesome part of speech. It is more common in some languages than in English, and students of these languages are likely to use it too freely. The absolute construction, while not incorrect, and sometimes highly useful, should be employed sparingly.

The "and which" construction, while not strictly an error of reference, arises from a failure to recognize the relation between words of reference and their antecedents. This error is most common when two facts are stated in regard to the same thing,

The "and which" Construction.

the second in a relative clause, the first in some other form. No one would be likely to say "I saw the book and which was on the table," but it is not infrequent to hear such a remark as "I saw the book — an edition of Shakespeare and which was on the table." Here it seems natural, since two ideas really refer to the same substantive, to connect them by a conjunction. This should not be done for two reasons : (1) because a coördinating conjunction like "and" may be used only between expressions of similar grammatical construction ; (2) because the relative itself performs the office of a connective. Sentences like the one quoted are generally improved by putting the two expressions in the same grammatical form, so that the conjunction may be used.

6. *Mistakes of comparison.* — The general rule governing the use of the comparative and the superlative degrees of adjectives is that the former is used in comparing two objects, the latter in comparing an object with two or more others. When the writer does not know whether the class to which an object belongs contains two or more than two members, the superlative should be used. Indeed, when two terms form a group, and one is compared with the other, the superlative is often used unless the number is to be made prominent. Thus, it is customary to say, "He is the oldest child in the family," though there may be but two children; but, "He is the older of the children," when the fact that there is but one other child is to be emphasized.

Adverbs are governed by the same general rule as adjectives. The comparative degree is regularly followed by "than," the superlative by "of."

Another error is that of comparing adjectives and adverbs that admit of no degree: as, "round," "square," "perfect," "unique," etc. When these words are not used in an exact sense they should be preceded by a limiting adverb: as, "nearly." This adverb may be compared: as, "nearly round, more nearly round, most nearly round."

Words that do not
Admit of Comparison.

Sometimes, by a sort of poetic license, such a word may be compared for the sake of indicating that a characteristic is possessed in a very high degree: as, "the supremest height." The same effect is still more rarely attained by a double comparison: as, Shakespeare's "most unkindest cut of all."

Double Comparison.

Reputableness of Words. — Spelling and grammar are independent branches of study, and are considered in a work on rhetoric only because they are not fully mastered before that subject is taken up. The question of the reputableness of words

belongs wholly to rhetoric. Although one of the most fundamental matters of which that study treats, the principles that govern it are much more flexible than those of orthography or syntax. The great majority of words that any author employs are unquestionably in good usage ; a few that may tempt him are wholly bad, and should never be countenanced ; but most of those concerning which question may arise belong to neither of these classes. They are words not wholly reputable or wholly disreputable, concerning which an author must decide for himself in accordance with particular circumstances.

It is often said that the only test of the reputableness of a word is the usage of the best writers and speakers of the present day. It would perhaps be more accurate, so far as English is concerned, to say that it is the best usage of all writers and speakers who employ the language. Of course the greatest importance is attached to the authority of those great writers whose works are known especially for the quality of their English. But neither in England nor America is there a definite body, like the French Academy, whose members are alone considered competent to determine standard usage. It would be impossible to agree on a list of those whose works should be consulted in disputed cases. The usage of every man, certainly of every educated man, adds a slight something to the weight of authority for or against any expression. Newspaper English, though so often reviled, is often of great importance. Many words have come into the language against the opposition of critics and lexicographers, simply because newspaper writers persisted in using them. The language may not always have gained by the innovation, but this is not the point under consideration.

The best authorities in regard to the use of technical and professional terms are specialists—in law and medicine the writers of the best legal and medical books, respectively. But the “best authors,” who are considered the highest author-

ities in regard to words in the general vocabulary, are those whose works are known for excellence of expression, not necessarily for originality or value of thought.

Since it is impossible for any person who is in doubt regarding the reputableness of a word to read all the writings of

standard authors in order to find their usage,
Dictionaries.

there is need of some work to which reference can be made when questions arise. This need is supplied by the dictionary. Pupils in the early grades of school work often learn to look upon the dictionary as an infallible guide. Really, a dictionary is nothing of the sort. It is simply a compilation made by men who read the standard literature of the language with certain words in mind, and note the way in which these words are employed. The dictionary-maker has no right and no power to pronounce a word reputable or disreputable on his own authority. He can simply make generalizations from the usage of others, as he observes it. If he lets his own prejudices enter into any part of his work, as Dr. Johnson sometimes did, this part is sure to be disregarded.

Though our great dictionaries are compiled with the greatest care, their authors are liable to make mistakes, both in observing and in interpreting facts of usage. Moreover, the language is constantly changing, so that the usage of to-day differs considerably from that of five years ago. No dictionary can, therefore, be infallible, or even approach infallibility.

Though the dictionary and similar compilations are not to be blindly worshiped, it does not follow that they are to be regarded lightly. Such works usually err, if at all, on the side of conservatism; that is, they do not approve words that may, perhaps, really be in good use. If the necessity is great enough to justify the means, no one should hesitate to use an expression that has not its full credentials; but the occasions for doing so are rare. It is generally best to make considerable sacrifice in the way of circumlocutions and awkward

expressions, rather than to use a term that is in the least questionable.

Words concerning which a careful writer will be in doubt are mostly of three kinds: (1) words becoming obsolete; (2) words that are candidates for admission to the language, but that are not yet fully established; (3) technical and foreign terms.

Kinds of Questionable Words.

A writer who wishes to express his thoughts in the simplest and most natural way is not often tempted to use obsolete words. When such words are found in modern English prose they generally indicate affectation or striving after effect. In poetry they may be used more freely, especially if they aid in conforming the work to the exigencies of metre.

Obsolete Words.

Words become obsolete when the ideas for which they stand no longer need expression, or when some other words supplant them. When it is necessary to refer to things long disused, as in history and historical fiction, it is allowable to use their names, no matter whether they still retain currency in the language or not. Care should be taken, however, that the meaning is sufficiently explained, and that unfamiliar terms are not so numerous as to confuse the reader.

Obsolete words that have been replaced by other terms should be employed very rarely. Their only use is to assist in calling to mind the spirit and customs of a former age. Words like "whilom," "yclept," "childe," etc., may be used for this purpose. They would be more valuable if they had not been overworked in writings where they were unnecessary and even inappropriate.

It is impossible to lay down definite rules for determining whether a word is or is not obsolete. A word may be obsolete for one sort of writing when it is not for another. In poetry, history, or historical fiction, any term that will be understood is admissible if it expresses the desired shade of meaning with

more accuracy and force than does a modern word. In other forms of writing, no word should ordinarily be used that is so unusual as to attract attention by its antique flavor.

By far the most troublesome sort of questionable terms are those that have been suggested for admission to the language, but that are not fully established. In regard to these the dictionaries are likely to be unsatisfactory, all dictionaries but the very latest especially so. Often the only authority will be that of newspapers and other periodicals, and this is always hard to estimate correctly. If standard writers obviously avoid a word, this may be taken as authority against it; but the fact that it is not found in their works may signify simply that they have not had occasion to express the idea for which it stands. Clearly it would be nonsense to postpone the acceptance of a term for which there is real need until chance had forced all our best writers to put themselves on record in favor of it.

Words that are proposed for admission into the language are of three kinds : (1) those that express new ideas, as the names of recent inventions and discoveries ; (2) those that have equivalents in the language, but that are simpler or otherwise preferable to these ; (3) new expressions for ideas that can already be expressed just as well.

Words in class (1) may be adopted into the language very quickly. If an entirely new invention or discovery is made, new terms are necessary before it can be talked about. Words like "telephone," "phonograph," etc., come into perfectly reputable use almost at once. If two or more words are proposed for the same idea, the establishment of any one may be delayed until the contest is decided. At the present time the latest sensational discovery in physics is known by the names of "Roentgen rays," "X-rays," etc. For the pictures produced by these rays we have such terms as "radiographs," "shadowgraphs,"

Words not Established
in the Language.

Kinds of New Words.

New Terms for New
Ideas.

etc. It will be some time before any one of these words is firmly established. If the discoverer and those experimenters who immediately followed him had united on names for each of these ideas, they would even now be fixed in the language.

Short and simple terms for ideas that have heretofore been expressed by phrases, or by long and awkward words, must fight their way slowly, but stand a good chance of getting into the language in time. Many of these expressions are formed from words already in the language, and such derivatives are always adopted more readily than entirely new terms. The formation of verbs from nouns is especially common: for example, "to interview," "to burglarize," "to suicide." Writers on diction still condemn the last two, though they have been before the public for several years. While they have hardly established themselves as yet, they will probably do so in time. Their advantage is their brevity. Each takes the place of an expression of two or more words.

Words Coined for the
Sake of Novelty.

New terms whose only merit is their novelty are not likely to find entrance into the language. Many of these are of the nature of circumlocutions: for example, "educationalist" for "educator."

It is often hard to decide how far technical terms should be admitted into ordinary literature. Every science, trade, and profession has a list of terms understood by all members of the craft, but not necessarily by the public. With the constantly widening diffusion of knowledge, these terms are coming into the general vocabulary in either literal or figurative senses. Thus, such words as "cathartic" and "anæsthetic" are employed by the layman in practically the same sense as by the physician; "pi," "sorts" (in the phrase "out of sorts"), have come from the printer's vocabulary, but are generally used figuratively. These terms are now in the language, but many are on the border-line. Prof. Roent-

Technical Terms.

gen's discovery, referred to above, has brought into use the terms "cathode" and "anode," which a few months ago were purely technical terms. To-day it may be questioned whether they are not in the regular English vocabulary.

The advantage of technical terms is that they are shorter and more accurate than other ways of exactly expressing the idea. Their disadvantages are that they may not be understood, that they may repel the reader by their somewhat formidable appearance, or that they may seem affected. By keeping these advantages and disadvantages in mind, a writer can generally determine what his usage should be in any particular case.

Foreign words and phrases used in English discourse are often unintelligible to many readers, and are likely to seem affected. Even when the reader knows the meaning, he realizes it slowly and with conscious effort, because his mind is distracted partly by the unfamiliar appearance of the word, partly by uncertainty as to pronunciation. If a foreign term will be readily understood, and if it expresses a certain meaning more accurately than any English expression, it may safely be employed. But a person with a good English vocabulary will find his own language sufficient for the expression of most ideas. It is often remarked that the writers who use foreign terms most freely are not those of the best education.

The use of foreign quotations is much less common now than formerly. This is owing partly to the dictates of fashion, partly to the fact that not all educated men nowadays can be depended upon to understand any one language besides their own. When Latin was the chief study of a scholar, and French the first accomplishment of a society man, quotations from these languages could be used very freely.

Almost the only foreign words that will tempt a young writer to-day are a few French terms, now pretty generally understood. Such of these as have no good equivalents in English will prob-

ably be Anglicized and adopted: *e.g.*, "*boudoir*," "*esprit de corps*." Those that are not really needed will mostly disappear with other affectations; though fashion may establish a few in place of English words, as "*bouquet*" has supplanted "*nose-gay*" and "*menu*" is crowding out "*bill of fare*."

No discussion of the reputableness of words would be complete without mention of the subject of slang. The word slang covers not only many sins, but sins of many kinds. Using slang is not, therefore, an offense of fixed magnitude, and is sometimes not an offense at all.

Three principal varieties of slang may be noted. The first is the misuse or overuse of words that are perfectly reputable in their place. Such terms as "*lovely*," "*sweet*," "*horrid*," etc., are applied to so many things that their exact meaning is lost sight of. When thus employed they may fairly be called slang. Words of this sort have their seasons in different localities, and then give way to new expressions. Many persons have one or more favorite words that they apply on all occasions without regard to fitness.

The second class of slang consists of words and expressions that have no standing in the language, or that are used in a sense entirely different from their true meaning. Slang of this sort is generally transient. An expression has a violent run for a few weeks or months and then disappears. Sometimes a word or phrase that appeals strongly to the popular fancy may retain currency for a year or two. Examples of such short expressions that have been heard in recent years are "*in the soup*," "*talking through your hat*," "*Would n't that kill you?*" etc. The origin of such phrases is generally unknown, and often no connection can be traced between the literal meanings of the words and the uses to which they are put. Indeed, they are applied in so many different ways that as slang they can hardly be said to have meanings at all.

Another class of terms are commonly known as slang, but are more properly designated cant. These are words that per-

Cant. tain to some sport, trade, or profession, but that are hardly worthy to be dignified by the name of technical terms. Such words as "fly" and "muff" from baseball, "punt" from football, "flunk" from the ordinary college vocabulary, are examples. These words are understood by all persons interested in the game or mode of life to which they belong. They generally present an idea more definitely and accurately than it can be expressed by other terms equally brief. No single words in standard use are exact equivalents of any of the examples given above. They differ from other slang in being as permanent as the occupation with which they are associated. Many of the colloquial terms of any trade have been in use for generations, and are widely diffused, though they would be unintelligible to the general public. These trade terms may occasionally appear in writing, and find their way into technical lexicons; but there is evidence that the "thieves' jargon," a species of cant spoken by the criminal classes, has remained almost unchanged for centuries without ever appearing in print. Within the last half-century story-writers have given currency to a few words from this source, *e.g.*, "swag" (booty), "pal" (accomplice).

This cant should not be confused with other slang that is associated with the same sports and occupations. Every baseball season brings forth a number of transient phrases that belong to the second class of slang, and that serve no useful purpose.

From what has already been said it is evident that the third kind of slang is less objectionable, in its place, than either of the other kinds, or rather that it has a place, within which its use is allowable, while the other forms have not. A baseball reporter would be foolish to write "failed to catch a ball knocked high into the air" instead of the terse phrase "muffed

a fly." The latter expression is shorter and more accurate, and will be understood by any one who would care to read a newspaper account of a ball game. But in spite of its usefulness in a newspaper it would be improper in a serious work intended for general readers. Used out of place, cant expressions are extremely bad. If the reader is anxious to get the writer's exact meaning, they may be obscure ; if not, they will seem affected. Students are perfectly justified in using "college slang" among themselves when it expresses their meaning better than other terms would do ; but the freshman home for vacation who takes occasion to introduce such terms in all his conversation simply shows that he does not appreciate the fitness of things.

Whatever may be said in favor of cant terms, slang of the first two classes mentioned above must be unqualifiedly condemned. Not only is it disreputable in the sense of not being approved by the best writers, but it is objectionable because it tends to limit the working vocabulary of any one who uses it. Let a person acquire the habit of expressing approval or disapproval by "lovely" or "horrid," and the word will always occur to the mind, while more discriminating adjectives can be recalled and applied only by effort. Slang expressions of the second class are often used in regard to all matters, whether pleasant or unpleasant, good or bad, and thus supplant nearly the whole modifying vocabulary of one who is addicted to their use.

Though both classes are bad, the second is the worse, because it is generally the more vulgar, and because in the first class a connection may sometimes be traced between the application of a slang word and its true meaning.

Meanings of Words. — Standard usage determines not only the reputableness of words, but the meanings that they shall bear. The reason why we do not use "lamb" for the young of the horse and "colt" for the young of the sheep is simply that we

know that it is customary to employ them differently. Probably there was originally some logical reason for the meaning given each word. But many of these reasons are wholly lost, and most of the rest are known only to philologists. The study of the history and the derivation of words is both interesting and profitable; it often aids in expounding a term, but it is rarely sufficient by itself to establish the meaning.

Not only are new words being added to the language, but old words are acquiring new meanings. Some meanings of

Changes in the Mean-
ings of Words.

words also become obsolete, though the words remain in the language with other significations. When a new idea is to be expressed it is often better to enlarge the scope of an old word than to burden the language with a new one. Many of the appliances that came in with the steam railway, such as "train," "car," "cab," and "switch" were named in this way. But many of the new meanings given to old words have no such justification. Newspaper writers, especially, are liable to corrupt the language, not because they are uneducated or careless, but because they feel the need of variety of expression. A reporter who must present the same idea a dozen times in the course of a column finds that the ordinary terms in which it is expressed become noticeably frequent. In the hurry of writing for immediate publication he cannot search long for other words, or rearrange his sentences so that repetitions will seem less awkward; he therefore stretches the meaning of a related term and uses it in place of an exact expression. The words "transpire," "quite," "partake," and many others have been treated in this way until their usefulness in their original meanings is almost lost.

This process is particularly insidious because the new meaning generally resembles the old, and in a casual reading the error may pass unnoticed. The novelty of the expression attracts careless writers, and they use it because it seems to have more

distinction than the proper word. This carelessness helps to spread the corruption.

That the results of this sort of inaccuracy are deplorable may be seen when we reflect that the most important part of the connotation of any word is that which is peculiar to itself. Owing to the circumstances of its origin and development, the English language offers many choices of expression for similar ideas. Often three words with the same root-meaning, one Anglo-Saxon, one Norman-French, and one Latin, are in good use ; in very many cases two of these forms are present. Nevertheless there are very few perfect synonyms in the language. Aside from different spellings for the same word and different technical terms for the same object or action, there are almost none. "Begin" and "commence" are often quoted, and are perhaps the best common example of a pair of synonyms ; but even these differ slightly in tone. Most so-called synonyms differ much more widely. If the language is to keep the same flexibility and offer the same chance for the expression of exact shades of meaning as at present, these differences must be preserved. As soon as two words come to mean just the same, there is so little advantage in keeping both that one usually becomes obsolete.

This stretching of the meaning of a term is the most serious offense against the use of words in proper senses. Other faults are more crude. Many mistakes are traceable to carelessness in discriminating terms that resemble each other. Such words as "accept" and "except," "effect" and "affect," "immigrant" and "emigrant" are often confounded.¹

Idioms. — Although usage is the supreme test of the reputation of any expression, there is a constant tendency to reduce all matters of language to rule. It is natural to follow out an analogy, as is shown by the frequency with which children form

Words that Resemble
Each Other in
Form.

¹ See page 55.

the plural of "sheep" and "deer" in "s," and with which older persons put any noun following a verb in the objective case, and say, "It is me." Then, too, the tendency of lexicographers and grammarians is to emphasize uniformity, and to begrudge any exceptions to their rules. In many cases this tendency has worked for good ; but it should not be allowed to crowd out idioms.

The word idiom is variously defined, but for the purposes of this discussion it may be considered to mean any expression, sanctioned by usage, that does not conform in all respects to the analogy of the language, or, in a broader view, to the analogy of language in general. The test is sometimes given that an idiom should be incapable of literal translation into another tongue ; but this will hardly cover all cases.

One class of idioms consist of phrases in which the words used have a special or peculiar meaning, as, "How do you do?" Here the word "do" has nothing of

Kinds of Idioms.

its ordinary sense. Another class form exceptions to the rules of grammar: as the double possessive.¹ These idioms generally have an advantage over other expressions for the same idea. They have been in the language for many centuries, and seem to have a peculiarly close association with the thought that they convey. The very fact that they are anomalous also gives them a certain distinction.

It is especially desirable that the language should preserve its idiom in the broad sense, that is, those forms of expression in which it differs from other languages. The language of any people is a natural growth, and embodies something of the peculiarities of the race that developed it. The mother tongue of any people is thus especially fitted to that people, and any constructions adopted from other languages, excellent as they may be at home, are likely to prove a source of weakness.

¹ See page 8. Students should make out a list of common idioms, and decide in each case in what the idiomatic quality consists.

College students often allow their English to become influenced by other languages that they are studying. From the classics comes the tendency to use infinitive and participial constructions too freely; the German tempts to long and involved sentences; and the French to the opposite fault. The setting over of sentences, word for word, may be as harmful as translation into idiomatic English is beneficial.

II.

Principles of Discourse Based on Laws of Mind.— In order to accomplish its purpose, the language of any discourse should be adapted to the workings of the human mind. In order that this adaptation may be perfect, the writer must consider two things: the general laws of thought, according to which the minds of all sane men work; and the special capabilities, interests, and dispositions of his readers. With regard to the second of these considerations but little need be said. It is obvious that words should be used that will be understood by those for whom the discourse is intended; that in writings intended for children and untrained persons sentence structure should be more simple than in composition addressed to older and more cultured minds; and that the amount of repetition and explanation necessary for clearness is greater in some cases than in others. The more important general principles of mental activity, and the practical cautions which they suggest, will be discussed in the following pages.

It must not be inferred from this division of the subject that the usages already discussed are not in accordance with known mental laws, or that conventionality has nothing to do with the application of the principles about to be laid down. But reasons for grammatical constructions, the meanings of words, etc., are known only to specialists, and but imperfectly to them. The adaptations now to be considered are often made con-

sciously, and if they are not, their connection with mental phenomena can readily be seen.

Herbert Spencer, in his essay on the "Philosophy of Style," explains nearly all the rules and cautions of rhetoric as applications of the principle of mental economy. This principle he states as follows:

"Regarding language as an apparatus of symbols for the conveyance of thought, we may say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more simple and the better arranged its parts the greater will be the effect produced. In either case, whatever force is absorbed by the machine is deducted from the result. A reader or listener has at each moment but a limited amount of mental power available. To recognize and interpret the symbols presented to him requires part of this power; to arrange and combine the images suggested requires a further part; and only that part which remains can be used for realizing the thought conveyed. Hence, the more time and attention it takes to receive and understand each sentence, the less time and attention can be given to the contained idea, and the less vividly will that idea be conceived."

Undoubtedly the principle of economy is a great factor, probably the chief factor, in determining the best form of expression. It seems, however, that in his anxiety to simplify the whole subject, Mr. Spencer has carried his theory a little too far. Most of the cautions given in the following sections may plainly be grouped under the principle of economy. Whether all can be placed there is somewhat doubtful.

Before considering the adaptation of discourse to mental laws, it may be well to note briefly the qualities that such adaptation should insure. These are lucidity or clearness, force, and an æsthetic quality which may be called ease.

Lucidity. — Lucidity is possessed by any composition in proportion to the readiness with which it yields its true idea to an

attentive reader. It is opposed both to ambiguity, or the fault of having two or more possible meanings, and to obscurity, or the fault of yielding no idea without study on the part of the reader. This quality is often called clearness. The only objection to this term is that in its common significance it is opposed only to ambiguity and gross obscurity, while lucidity implies absolute transparency of style.

Lucidity may be sacrificed by carelessness regarding either choice of words or structure of sentences and paragraphs.

Force.—Force is that quality of composition that attracts and holds the reader's attention in the proper degree. In order for a discourse to have force, it is not necessary that all or any of its parts should have strong emphasis; but each part should arouse just so much interest as is desired by the writer and justified by the subject.

Force should rarely, if ever, be sought at the expense of lucidity; but a composition that is lucid without being forcible will be read only on compulsion, or by persons who are so greatly interested in the subject-matter that they need nothing more to hold their attention. A composition that has not force is said to be dull or plodding.

Like lucidity, force is affected by the choice of words and the structure of sentences, and also by the number of words used to express a given idea.

Ease.—The third quality of style is called by many names, of which, perhaps, the best is ease. The words beauty, elegance, etc., by which it is often designated, are likely to imply a quality that is to be striven after, and that impresses the reader positively rather than negatively. Ease is, primarily, the absence of anything that sounds harsh or in any way jars on the reader's sense of fitness. It should generally be felt as an unconscious source of satisfaction, rather than noticed as an excellence. Certain devices that appeal to the ear, such as rhythm, alliteration, etc., may be sought after so far as is pos-

sible without sacrificing lucidity or force; but these are easily used too much, and young writers should be very careful with regard to them.

Of the three qualities, lucidity and force are most closely connected, though one is not necessarily found with the other. Force and ease are very unlike, and when strong are incompatible. A forcible expression may be too harsh to have ease, and an expression noticeable for ease may be too pretty and effeminate to have much force.

In the following pages practical suggestions are grouped under the psychological principles upon which they depend.

The mind is greatly confused and mental energy is wasted if language is used that is capable of two meanings.— This principle should be borne in mind both in choosing and in arranging words.

Care should be taken that every expression used conveys to the reader the idea intended by the writer. It is almost impossible that words should do this exactly. The meanings of words are learned, not by careful study, but by noting them as used by other writers and speakers. They come to the mind colored by their association in the particular passage where they are first met with, and this color is intensified or changed by subsequent use. The more common a word, the more surely will its exact shade of suggestion differ for different people. A writer should consider not only the dictionary-meaning of a word, but its probable associations in the minds of his readers. Often an expression is used so commonly in a special sense that it should be avoided in what was once its natural meaning. For example, "future life" has come to suggest existence beyond the grave, and should hardly be used with relation to earthly affairs. Some terms are so corrupted by being used as slang or with indecent meanings that they must be avoided. Such terms usually re-

Inexactness of
Words.

Temporary Cor-
ruptions.

cover their positions after a time. Certain passages in Shakespeare's plays that were once disgustingly obscene now stand in every expurgated edition, unsuspected except by critical students. They consist of quibbles between the true meanings of words and lewd meanings current in the poet's day, but long since forgotten. Not many years ago the word "daisy" was used so commonly in a slang expression that it could hardly be employed in a serious way. The same has been true at a later date of the phrase "out of sight." The word "kid" has become so corrupted that passages of scripture in which it occurs sometimes raise a smile as they are read in a church service.

In all cases where a choice lies between a word with but one meaning and a word with two or more, the former should be chosen. Thus, "recipe" is preferable to "receipt" in speaking of a formula or prescription. When it is necessary to use a term with two meanings any ambiguity should be guarded against.

Elements of a sentence and sentences in a paragraph should be so placed that there can be no doubt as to their relations with their contexts. Within the sentence, ambiguity of thought will usually be avoided if the grammatical construction is entirely plain. Young writers should make every sentence grammatically clear, whether they can discover ambiguity of meaning or not. If they do so they will guard against obscurities that they do not themselves see. A writer who has his own ideas thoroughly in mind is very likely to pass unnoticed a second meaning of his words.

A common fault is the placing of a modifier in such a position that it may belong either to what precedes or to what follows. This is called a squinting construction. Squinting constructions are likely to occur in connection with prepositional phrases

Choose Words of but
One Meaning.

Make Grammatical
Construction
Plain.

Squinting Construc-
tions.

that may be either adjective or adverbial elements. For example, "The Democrats at least hope for success." Here "at least" may belong either to "Democrats" or to "hope."

Another cause of ambiguity that can be removed by rearrangement is the placing of modifiers at too great a distance from the words to which they belong. As compared with Latin and other inflected languages, English is at a disadvantage in having to show the relations between words almost entirely by position.

Modifiers too far from
their Principals.

A word that is especially liable to be misplaced is "only." Strictly, "only" should be placed immediately before the word that it modifies. Abbott thus comments on the position of "only" ("How to Write Clearly," page 24):

Position of Only.

"The best rule is to avoid placing 'only' between two emphatic words and to avoid using 'only' where 'alone' can be used instead.¹

"In strictness, perhaps, the three following sentences:

- (1) He only beat three,
- (2) He beat only three,
- (3) He beat three only,

ought to be explained, severally, thus :

- (1) He did no more than beat, did not kill, three.
- (2) He beat no more than three.
- (3) He beat three, and that was all he did. (Here 'only' modifies the whole of the sentence and depreciates the action.)

"But the best authors sometimes transpose the word."

Correlative expressions, such as "neither . . . nor," "not only . . . but also," should be followed immediately by the terms that they connect. As "Not only John went, but also James," "John not only went, but also remained," not "John not only went, but also James."

Position of Cor-
relatives.

¹ See on choice of words, page 32.

Several infinitives in the same sentence are likely to be ambiguous unless care is taken to show the construction of each. The sentence, "He said that he wished to take his friend with him to visit the capital and to study medicine,"¹ may have three meanings, according as the second and third infinitives depend on "wished" or express a purpose. In the latter case the words "in order to" will remove the ambiguity.

Ambiguities in the use of pronouns have already been referred to, page 12.

The mind grasps the specific and the familiar more readily than the general and the unfamiliar. — A little self-inspection will show the truth of this statement. The words "dwelling-house," "cable-car" present their ideas to the mind more quickly and more definitely than do the words "tabernacle," "palanquin," and more vividly, if not more quickly, than the words "structure," "conveyance."

One of the most familiar rules of rhetoric is to the effect that specific terms should be used instead of general for force, and often for lucidity. An idea should be presented by as definite terms as can be understood. It is rarely best to say "flower" when one can say "rose" or "violet." The most specific terms are often technical names, and these should not be used unless they are known by the persons for whom the discourse is intended. "*Viola palmata*, Gray," though much more specific than "violet," is not to be preferred for ordinary readers.

General terms are of course preferable to specific for summing up a list, or for expressing general or indefinite ideas. It would be better to say "a bouquet of flowers" than to mention the different varieties of which the group was composed; and a person would be obliged to say "We are going to the woods

¹ Quoted from Abbott.

for flowers " if he did not know what kind of blossoms were to be found.

Even when a statement is to be made concerning a class, an example may be given instead of mentioning the class name ; or a part of a class or object may be used to stand for the whole. This form of expression gives force and sometimes lucidity. When it is used without explanation, so that the specific terms are to be understood in a sense broader than

their literal meaning warrants, the figure of *Synecdoche*. speech is called *synecdoche*. *Synecdoches* are very common : as, " hands " for " workmen," " sails " for " ships," " flowing with milk and honey " for " abounding in food of all kinds." In using a *synecdoche* that part of the object should be chosen that is most noticeable or most important under the circumstances. Thus, men employed at manual labor are spoken of as " hands " ; infantry on the march, as " foot " ; and in solving a puzzle it is often said that " two heads are better than one."

When an object or class is represented, not by one of its parts but by something related to it, the figure is called a *metonymy*. Examples of *metonymy* are such expressions as " a good table " for " good edibles," " the chair " for " the president " or " the chairman," etc.

Force is often added to other figures of speech, such as the simile and the metaphor, by the choice of familiar or specific objects for comparison. For a further discussion of this matter see the next section.

Not only are familiar ideas grasped more readily than unfamiliar, but of two expressions for the same idea the more familiar is more readily recognized. The *Anglo-Saxon and Classical Derivatives*. words learned earliest in childhood and used most commonly in conversation are mostly short and simple. Such terms should be preferred to those that are longer and more complex. On this principle depends

the whole controversy between words of Anglo-Saxon and those of classical origin, which a few years ago attracted so much attention. The common prepositions, conjunctions, etc., the names of household articles, and the verbs that denote familiar actions are largely of Anglo-Saxon origin. Because these terms are simple and familiar—and for no other reason—they are preferable to longer and rarer classical derivatives. When the classical word has become the more common it is an affectation to use the Anglo-Saxon. Idioms, though a puzzle to grammarians, are generally so well known that they are the best expressions for the ideas that they represent.¹

The use of long and high-sounding terms to express simple ideas is called "fine writing." The objections to this are two :

Fine Writing. first, that the less familiar words do not yield their contained idea so quickly as would simpler terms ; second, that the association of commonplace ideas with terms commonly met only in poetry and impassioned prose attracts attention from the thought, and may even seem ludicrous. A mild form of "fine writing" is the use of "bookish" words, *i.e.*, terms that the average reader never uses in conversation, and associates only with formal writing.

The relations of likeness and contrast appeal to the mind with especial force.—Perhaps the simplest illustration of this principle is the fact that an idea so frequently calls to mind something that resembles it or that is its opposite. Whenever any new thought is presented to the mind the first impulse is to compare it with something already known, and note its resemblances and its differences.

Unfamiliar objects are often described and terms expounded by likening them to something else.² When the objects compared belong to the same class, or have much in common, the result is a literal statement.

Simile.

¹ See page 26.

² See page 180.

When they are obviously unlike except in the characteristic to be emphasized, the figure of speech is called a simile. Thus, "Her cheek is like a peach" is a simile; "An apricot is like a peach" is a literal statement. Similes are generally, though not necessarily, expressed by means of the words "like" or "as."

A metaphor is an implied comparison. Its most common form is the assertion that one thing is another when the differences between the two plainly make such a statement absurd except in a figurative sense:

Metaphor. as, "The Lord is my shepherd." Sometimes the assertion of identity is not made but implied in such an expression as "Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer." Sometimes the implication is less definite; instead of comparing the enemies of the Lord to wild beasts, or the spirit of God to water, the Psalmist says, "Thine enemies roar in the midst of thy congregations"; "My soul thirsteth for thee."

All metaphors may be changed to similes by expressing the comparison in full. Similes may be changed to metaphors when the nature of the likeness is such as to make the meaning plain. "He is a donkey" will probably be understood to mean, "He is as stupid as a donkey"; "He is a horse" would be unintelligible, since the quality to be emphasized might be strength, swiftness, or something else.

The chief reason for the effectiveness of the simile and the metaphor is that they call attention to a likeness; but they are especially valuable when they compare an unfamiliar with a familiar object; and they make an idea specific in so far as they restrict attention to the exact point of similarity. Thus, when a man is compared to a lion, only the quality of bravery is considered.

The simile may give both lucidity and force; the metaphor is used especially for force. Of the two, the metaphor is the more forcible if it is easily understood. The reason for

this is not entirely plain. Whately decides that it is "because men are more gratified at catching the resemblance for themselves than at having it pointed out to them." Spencer gives as the reason the greater economy of attention. Prof. A. S. Hill advances a not very intelligible theory based on these two. Whatever the reason, the fact is unquestioned, as may be seen by expanding any forcible metaphor into a simile. "The Lord is my shepherd" really means, "The relation between the Lord and me is like the relation between a shepherd and his sheep."

Personification is usually the ascribing of personality—*i.e.*, of human life—to lower animals or inanimate objects. The

word is also made to cover the process of
 Personification. ascribing to any object any sort of life that it does not possess. This figure also rests to a slight extent on the principle of familiarity and definiteness; but its main strength is derived from the fact that it compares the object personified to a human being. If we say "The trees whispered together" we call attention to certain resemblances between trees and men. Since man stands at the head of all created beings, this comparison dignifies an object.

Since similes, metaphors, and personifications are used, not for themselves, but for the ideas that they signify, they should

not be made too prominent by prolonging the
 Prolonged Figures. comparison, or by so confusing them that they

will be followed with difficulty. The habit of prolonging figures and carrying them out into minor details was common at an earlier period in English literature, but, like other conceits, has gone out of fashion. It attracts attention to the writer's ingenuity rather than to the ideas presented. A work of considerable length that is composed of an extended figure of speech or a group of such figures is known as an allegory. Allegories are seldom written now, and those that are classic in the language, like the "Pilgrim's Progress," are

praised more than they are read. Most modern attempts, such as Tennyson's "Idyls of the King," are so written that they may be read — and by many persons they are read — for the literal meaning without reference to the figurative.

Figures that are not consistent in all their parts, or combinations of figures that follow one another so closely that the

Mixed Metaphors. mind does not pass readily from one to

the next, are called mixed metaphors. For example "All about us we see the footprints of God's hand." The expression "mixed metaphor" is used whether the figures confused are similes, metaphors, or personifications. The mixing of figures arises either from a failure to think out the idea to be presented, or from the use of stock expressions for sound rather than sense. The latter is the more fruitful cause of blunders. It doubtless explains the example quoted above.

The placing in too close proximity of a figurative and a literal statement, especially if the figure precedes, may have much the same effect as a mixed metaphor. For example, "William Shakespeare was the sun among the lesser lights of English poetry, and a native of Stratford-on-Avon."¹

Antithesis, the contrasting of opposed ideas, gives force, and often clearness. This is one of the most common figures of

Antithesis. • speech. The more marked the contrast, the stronger the effect, just as the change from total darkness to intense light is more startling than a transition from one degree of twilight to another.

When words, clauses, or phrases are set over against each other, the structure is said to be balanced. For example:

Balanced Structure. "Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling"; "If they were unacquainted with the works of philosophers and poets, they were deeply read in the oracles of God. If their names were not found in the registers of heralds, they were recorded in the Book of Life."

¹ Quoted from Abbott.

Many short antitheses are expressed in balanced sentences, and the majority of balanced sentences express antitheses ; but there is no necessary connection between the two. One is the opposition of ideas, the other the opposition of elements of structure.

The balanced sentence is easily understood and easily remembered. It is, however, a very artificial form. When the idea to be expressed is not forcible enough to warrant its use, it seems affected. If used to excess it becomes monotonous. One balanced sentence in eight or ten will give a peculiar effect to style.

Another rhetorical device, sometimes called a figure of speech, that is explained by the principle of contrast, is the rhetorical question or interrogation : as, " Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?" This is simply the substitution for a direct statement of a question which the reader is supposed to answer for himself. The answer expected is almost always a negative ; and there is thus a contrast between the idea literally expressed in the author's words and the sense that he intends to convey. The rhetorical question is employed mainly for force, and is very effective if used with moderation. It is likely, however, to become a mannerism, and to be used whether the occasion warrants or not.

The Rhetorical Question.

Closely related to the rhetorical question is irony, or the affirmation of just the opposite of what is intended. This is most common in spoken discourse, where the inflection of the voice can prevent any doubt as to whether the statement is to be taken in a literal sense. In cold print there is no way of showing whether " Brutus is an honorable man " is serious praise or not. Irony is commonly found in covert attacks on a person or an institution, and is often associated with sarcasm. It is used for force, and its chief disadvantage is that it is likely to be too strong, and thus create the impression of prejudice or bitterness.

Irony.

Hyperbole, or a willful exaggeration for purposes of emphasis, gains part of its force from the contrast between the statement made and what the reader would naturally expect. The main caution to be observed in the use of hyperbole is that the exaggeration be great enough so that it cannot be mistaken for literal statement. "There are thousands of flowers in the meadow" may be hyperbole or a serious estimate; "There are countless millions of flowers in the meadow" is evidently hyperbole.

The principle of similarity and contrast applies not only to resemblances between ideas, but to resemblances between thought and language. Words and expressions that by their sound suggest their meaning are both clear and forcible. Such words are called onomatopoeic, or imitative. For examples, and a discussion of the use of such terms in representing sounds, see page 131.

The movement of discourse may be fast or slow, to correspond with the nature of the thought. A rapid movement is appropriate in those parts of a narrative where the action is quick or the excitement is great; in descriptions that are not very important and that are subordinated to something else; in expository and argumentative passages that are of the nature of rapid reviews; and in the more impassioned parts of persuasion. Slow movement generally harmonizes with the more important and weighty passages of any discourse.

Ideas are grasped more readily if the mind has been in some way prepared for them. — On this principle depends the force of climax — the arranging of ideas in a sequence, ascending from the less to the more important. A climax may consist of but two terms, but a greater number of preparatory steps generally add force to the last term and to the whole expression. For example: "The study of astronomy expands and elevates the mind"; or,

"The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
 The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
 Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
 And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
 Leave not a rack behind."

Disregard for the principle of climax leads to bathos : a flatness that spoils the effect of any serious statement. As, "He was a devoted husband, an exemplary parent, an honest man, and a first-rate shot." Bathos may sometimes be produced purposely, for humorous effect ; and a short anti-climax, ending with an entirely unexpected turn, becomes an epigram. The following is a stock example : "The Russian grandees came to court dropping pearls and vermin." Epigram derives its force largely from the contrast between what the reader finds and what he has been led to expect.

A sentence so constructed as to prepare the mind for the closing thought by arousing feelings of expectancy is called periodic. This form is opposed to the loose sentence, which might have ended at one or more places before the close, and still been grammatically complete. The periodic sentence has the advantage of arousing the reader's curiosity, and so holding his attention to the end. On the other hand, it not only stimulates attention, but requires it ; so that if the mind wanders for but a moment, the meaning of the whole will probably be lost.

There are two chief methods of making a sentence periodic : by arrangement of phrases and clauses, and by using correlative terms. Thus, in the sentence, "In camp or on the march, by day or by night, sleeping or waking, his thoughts were with his absent friend," suspense is secured by placing the modifying phrases first ; in the sentence, "Not only did he save his country's honor, but he added to her glory," the words "not only" lead the reader to expect a second clause. Long sentences made periodic by the first method are somewhat arti-

ficial. They are rarely heard in conversation, and a small proportion of them will make a passage sound formal. Even Macaulay rarely uses more than one in five or six. Sentences made periodic by the use of correlative terms may be employed more freely. Such expressions as "neither," "on the other hand," "although," "both," etc., when placed near the first of a sentence lead the reader to expect a clause containing a corresponding term; yet they do not necessitate a change from the natural order of the sentence.

Often the best method of treating a long sentence is to make it partly loose and partly periodic. The period is generally placed first, and carried on until there is danger of too great suspense, when it is completed and other thoughts added loosely. Sometimes the period is placed last. An excellent idea of the effects of the loose and the periodic, and of intermediate methods of arrangement, may be gained from the following sentence, on which Whately, Spencer, and others have expended much ingenuity:

Wholly loose: "We came to our journey's end, at last, with no small difficulty, after much fatigue, through deep roads, and bad weather."

Wholly periodic: "At last, with no small difficulty, after much fatigue, through deep roads and bad weather, we came to our journey's end."

Modified periodic (proposed by Whately): "At last, after much fatigue, through deep roads and bad weather, we came, with no small difficulty, to our journey's end."

Modified periodic (proposed by Spencer): "At last, with no small difficulty, and after much fatigue, we came, through deep roads and bad weather, to our journey's end."

Another way of preparing the mind for a thought is by the use of connectives. Connectives are usually placed near the first of a phrase, clause, or sentence, and show (1) that a relation exists between what

Connectives.

follows and what precedes, (2) the nature of this relation. Thus, "and" indicates a relation of similarity; "but" a relation of diversity or contrast; "therefore" a relation of effect or result. Were it not for connectives, one would generally be forced to read through a clause or sentence before he could tell in what way it was related to the context. This may be illustrated by striking from any good expository or argumentative paragraph the conjunctions and conjunctive phrases used between clauses and sentences, and reading the detached statements.

The most important kinds of connectives are conjunctions, conjunctive phrases, pronouns so used as to call to mind a certain part of what has gone before, and words repeated as connecting links between sentences and paragraphs.

Conjunctions are the simplest connectives. They are used to unite parts of sentences, rarely sentences, and very rarely paragraphs. A common fault is their excessive use to connect sentences. For this purpose conjunctive phrases or clauses are more appropriate: *e.g.*, "On the other hand," "In spite of this," "In addition," "Though this be granted," etc.

A pronoun referring to an antecedent in a preceding sentence often serves as a connective. So the repetition of an idea, either in the same language, or by a summarizing word, or by such terms as "the former," "the latter," is an effective means of showing the relation between what is to follow and what has preceded.

Connectives should be used whenever a change is to occur in the direction of the thought, and whenever the thought is to continue in the same direction though a change would be expected. In the former case it should indicate the nature of the change. The use of connectives in preparing for a thought has already been discussed.

When similar ideas are stated in succession it is natural to express them in the same grammatical construction. To change

the construction unnecessarily is to lose force and often ease ; since the mind is especially shocked when it has been prepared for one form of expression and finds another. Do not say, " He came to attend lectures and for the purpose of using the libraries " ; but " to attend and to use," or " for the purpose of attending and of using."

Change of Construction.

Ideas are grasped most easily if they are presented one by one and if each stands out with distinctness. — Every sentence, paragraph, or composition should have unity ; that is, it should leave on the mind one definite impression.

The idea conveyed by a sentence may be large or small, important or unimportant ; it may be an undivided whole, or a composite of many parts ; but it must impress the mind as a unit. Sentences that contain but one clause necessarily have unity. Complex sentences usually express a central thought, with one or more subordinate ideas grouped around it. Compound sentences express an idea that is the resultant of two or more coördinate ideas ; it may be their sum, or may be derived from them in some other way. It is in connection with compound sentences that questions regarding unity are most likely to arise. A very common fault is that of adding clause to clause by means of the conjunction "and" when there is too little connection of thought to justify such treatment. When a sentence contains ideas that differ too widely it is said to be heterogeneous.

Unity of Sentence.

Unity may also be violated by breaking up an idea into its component parts and putting each in a sentence. This obscures the meaning, since the reader is unable to tell which ideas are of greater and which are of lesser importance. A series of short detached sentences also gives an unpleasant, scrappy effect to the style.

Unity of the paragraph resembles unity of the sentence, except that it is on a larger scale. If an essay were to be suffi-

ciently condensed each paragraph would probably be represented by a sentence. Every paragraph should have one definite subject. Most expository or argumentative paragraphs may, if they have unity, be summed up in a sentence or a phrase.

Unity of a whole composition is on a still larger scale than unity of a paragraph. Any composition should have one subject ; it should also have one theme, or dominant idea ; and both subject and theme should, generally speaking, be visible in every part of the work. The subject may be a very general term while the theme must be a definite idea. The theme is not, however, a part of the subject, but some phase of the whole subject. Thus, if one were assigned the general subject "The United States," he might write on "The United States and representative government," "The United States in commerce," etc.; but not on "New York" or "The Southern States." The definiteness with which a theme may be stated by a reader forms a good test of the unity of a composition.

Ideas naturally follow one another in the mind according to certain fixed laws. — These laws should be observed in planning any kind of discourse. Ideas that call up one another without the aid of external suggestion are generally related in one of the following ways :

1. *By contiguity.* — This is the relation by means of which material objects that have been observed are usually associated. One naturally recalls the houses on a street in the order in which they stand, or the members of a class according to their positions in the recitation room. Some students remember the position that a sentence occupies on the printed page more readily than the thought that it contains.

2. *By continuity.* — This is the most natural way of grouping events. One occurrence will often recall another that happened on the same day, though the two may be widely separated in

place, and have no likeness to each other. An idea is often associated with circumstances that occurred at the time that it was first heard or read.

3. *By likeness or contrast.* — An object or occurrence naturally suggests something else that resembles it or something that is its opposite. This is perhaps the commonest method of association. Most statements introduced in conversation by the remark "That reminds me" are of this sort.

4. *By the relation of cause and effect.* — An effect naturally suggests its cause, and vice versa. This reason for the association of ideas is closely connected with the principle of continuity, but is distinct from it. It is applicable in cases where the idea of time is not prominent.

In planning any composition these principles of association should be kept in mind. They are helpful in arranging the parts of a sentence; and in outlining paragraphs and whole compositions they are indispensable. Descriptive passages are generally arranged according to contiguity; narrative passages according to continuity; exposition, argumentation, and persuasion are built up according to the relations of likeness and contrast, or cause and effect.

Those parts of a sentence that are closely related in thought should be put as near together as possible. This applies to a word and its modifiers, to a verb and its complement, and in a lesser degree to subject and verb. A somewhat strict enforcement of this rule is made necessary in English by the fact that grammatical relations are shown almost wholly by position, not by inflection.

Since the paragraph is the smallest unit of discourse that exhibits the characteristics of a whole composition, its structure is of great importance. As has already been said, narrative and descriptive paragraphs should follow the order

Use of Principles of
Association.

Put Related Ideas
Close Together.

of time and place respectively. Typical paragraphs of other kinds usually state the subject in a more or less definite form near the first. This is followed, in a purely expository paragraph, by an explanation or a definition; in an argumentative paragraph by proof; and in a persuasive paragraph by some application of the subject to practical ends. The following outline of the plan of an ideal paragraph is taken from Genung's "Practical Rhetoric."

Structure of the
Paragraph.

The subject proposed.

I. Whatever is needed to explain the subject.

Repetition.

Obverse.

Definition.

II. Whatever is needed to establish the subject.

Exemplification or detail.

Illustration.

Proof.

III. Whatever is needed to apply the subject.

Result or consequence.

Enforcement.

Summary or recapitulation.

This scheme is useful as giving the usual order of such parts as are present. Probably no paragraph has all the divisions and subdivisions represented. Roughly speaking, the expository part of a paragraph comes under I., the argumentative under II., the persuasive under III. A paragraph of pure exposition, argumentation, or persuasion will all be included under one division. It will be found that, though most good paragraphs follow the order indicated by the three principal headings, the subdivisions under each are often rearranged. Thus, definition may come before obverse statement, or illus-

tration before detail. The arrangement indicated in the scheme is, however, the most natural.

Attention is naturally attracted by anything unusual.

When a series of ideas is presented to the mind the first and the last make the strongest impression. — On these two principles depend most of the devices used for giving emphasis. An idea may be emphasized by expressing it in an unusual construction, if the construction is not so odd as to attract attention to itself rather than to the thought. The rhetorical question (see page 40) derives part of its effectiveness from this principle. Exclamation is another uncommon means of expression. This also derives force from its association with the oral expression of strong emotion.

The most common method of rendering any element of a sentence emphatic is by putting it out of its natural position.

An Element may be
Emphasized by Put-
ting it out of its
Normal Posi-
tion.

Changes of order for emphasis are less frequent in English than in inflected languages like the Latin, because grammatical relations must be shown by the position of words; but inversions may be made so far as clearness

permits. In general, the farther an element is removed from its normal place, the more emphatic it becomes. Thus, in a simple declarative sentence the position of the subject is at or very near the first. If it be removed but a little way toward the end it becomes emphatic. Compare "John went to town" with "It was John that went to town." In prose only the requirement of extraordinary force will justify the removal of the subject to the end: as, "Now falls the brave commander."

The position of an adjective in English is before its noun. If this order is changed the force is greatly increased.

Position of Adjectives.

For example, "The dark and terrible chasm yawned before them," "The chasm yawned before them, dark and terrible." The force of this construc-

tion depends on the customary usage in English. For a discussion of the abstract question which position of the adjective is the stronger, see Spencer's "Philosophy of Style."

Conditional clauses usually come before their principals, and are made emphatic if they follow. Conditional clauses are not, however, often put at the end of a long sentence; if they are given this position the result is bathos if the idea be weak, or great emphasis if the idea be strong.

Position of Conditional Clauses.

A conditional clause placed last also gains force from the second of the principles quoted at the head of this section. This principle applies only when there is at least a slight change from the normal order. Thus, the subject of a simple sentence is not emphasized by being put first, nor the object by being put last. When, however, an element has no fixed place in a sentence, and especially when its place is not at the first or the last, respectively, one of these positions is very strong. Of the two, the end is the stronger, since it leaves the last impression on the mind; the strength that attaches to whatever comes at the beginning is recognized in various proverbial sayings about "first impressions."

The end of a sentence is so important that a reader naturally expects not only that the last idea be strong, but that it be put in a full, well-rounded phrase. A short, abrupt expression at the end of a long sentence is usually weak, no matter how important the idea that it expresses. As, "To work long and steadily at a difficult task, to receive every encouragement that circumstances can give, and then to fail when success seems almost assured, is very disappointing." Here a circumlocution, *e.g.*, "must prove almost an overwhelming disappointment," will add to the effectiveness of the period.

Since words are used to convey thought, and not for their own sake, there should be neither more nor fewer than are necessary. — The use of too condensed an

Abrupt Endings.

expression may cause obscurity if words are omitted that cannot be readily supplied. When the context makes the meaning perfectly clear, the omission of words necessary to the grammatical construction may give force, partly because of brevity, partly because the elliptical structure is uncommon and unexpected. Some words should not, however, be omitted. Of this class is the article before the second of two nouns standing for different things. Thus, "a warrior and statesman" should mean one man to whom both terms may be applied; "a warrior and a statesman" should mean two persons. The best authors occasionally violate this rule when the context admits of no ambiguity: as, "a man and woman"; but the weight of authority is in favor of observing it in all cases.

The verb, or part of the verb, may be omitted when the same form has been used once in the same sentence: as, "Frank went last week and James yesterday," but not "Frank went yesterday and James will [go] to-morrow."

More serious, or at least more common, than the use of too few words is the use of too many. Faults of this sort are known by a variety of terms, which are to some extent used interchangeably. The meanings given below are the most common.

Redundancy, or pleonasm, is the use of words grammatically unnecessary: as, "I have got a book," or "and" in the "and which" construction (see page 14). Redundancy is always inexcusable.

Tautology is the unnecessary repetition of an idea in the same or different words: as, "John, he came," "He conquered and overcame." Repetition in the same words may be valuable for force, as in "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord," or in different words for clearness (see page 192); the word tautology is generally applied only to useless repetition.

The word verbosity is sometimes used to denote any fault arising from the use of unnecessary words ; in a narrower sense

it is a fault that so pervades the discourse
 Verbosity. that it must be cured, not like tautology and redundancy, by striking out useless expressions, but by remodeling the whole sentence. For example, the following should be improved by condensing it to the familiar expression, "Mind your own business" : "An admirable piece of advice to follow is to abstain from interesting yourself in the affairs of others when there is not any request or indication that your services are desired, but to give your earnest attention to what immediately concerns yourself."¹

The unnecessary use of circumlocution and paraphrase may be classed as verbosity. Circumlocution is the use of a long
 Circumlocution. expression in place of a short one: as, "The cup that cheers but not inebriates" for "tea."

A circumlocution may be useful when it suggests a certain aspect of a thought, and so presents it to the reader in a more effective manner than could the simple term. It may also be useful when it is necessary to soften down a harsh expression. In the majority of cases, however, it simply shows affectation.

Paraphrase is saying in a long manner what has already been said briefly. It is very common in repeating scriptural
 Paraphrase. proverbs, etc. As, to cite an extreme case,

"Jesus wept," "Jesus, overcome by grief, gave way to tears." Paraphrase should be used only when it is necessary for clearness. It may sometimes be valuable as a means of exposition, but it always loses force. The improper use of either circumlocution or paraphrase may produce fine writing.

In connection with verbosity may be mentioned
 Prolixity. prolixity, which is, however, a fault in the use of ideas rather than of words. It consists in the

¹ Quoted from Phelps and Frink.

giving of trivial details, which are unnecessary for clearness, and detract from force.

The mind derives pleasure from a moderate variety, both in thought and in expression. — On this principle depend most of the rules that should be observed for the sake of ease. Almost the only one not included is the obvious caution to avoid words and combinations of words that are hard to pronounce, or that grate on the ear.

A writer should desire variety in choice of words or diction ; in length of sentences ; in sentence-structure ; and in kind and length of paragraphs. When it is possible there should also be variety in ideas ; long-continued humor or long-continued pathos soon loses its effect ; and a uniform course of reasoning soon grows tiresome.

Although variety is so desirable, a writer is not likely to succeed very well in gaining it if he makes the attempt consciously. Grace of language is like grace of movement. A person never appears to best advantage when he is thinking of the positions of his hands and feet ; so a writer who chooses expressions for the sake of ease is likely to impress his readers as artificial and perhaps affected. The ability to write with the highest grace and finish is inborn, like any other artistic talent ; but it may be cultivated by practice and the study of the best models.

Too Conscious Attempts to Gain Ease.

Words will generally be varied enough if they are chosen to fit the exact idea that they are intended to convey. Sometimes, however, it will be necessary to change a sentence in order to avoid a group of words that are all long or all short.

Variety in Words.

It is also necessary, in choosing words, to bear in mind the prevailing tone of the discourse. Certain words, and a few grammatical constructions, are always associated with commonplace affairs ; others with formal or impassioned writing.

For example, there are several poems in the language, some of them of at least a fair order of merit, on such subjects as "My mother's old arm-chair," "The spinning-wheel." It would take a genius to introduce in any but a humorous poem "My mother's best bedstead," "The flat-iron." Yet these things are of much the same order of importance in domestic economy. The place of the plow and the plowman in literature could not be taken by the sulky cultivator and its rider. On the other hand, many words that are very common in literature would seem affected in ordinary conversation.

A term differing slightly in tone from the rest of a passage may give a pleasing relief from what would otherwise be monotonous; but if the difference is at all great, it will jar painfully on the reader. In the following sentence from Carlyle there is a change of tone in the last clause: "Those hues of gold and azure, that hush of World's expectation as Day died, were still a Hebrew speech for me; nevertheless, I was looking at the fair illuminated letters, and had an eye for their gilding." This is, on the whole, pleasing; but the same work ("Sartor Resartus") will furnish many illustrations of a change of tone so sudden that it is objectionable to most readers.

The principle of variety determines how far rhythm, alliteration, and similar devices common in poetry may be introduced in prose. So long as they do not become noticeable, and therefore monotonous, they may aid in producing ease; whenever they become so regular that they may be definitely anticipated, they are blemishes. It is sometimes said that prose should have rhythm, but never metre.

It is desirable that variety be secured, not by alternating very long and very short sentences, but by using those of all lengths. There should also be an admixture of loose, periodic, and balanced sentences, and of combinations of these. The

Rhythm, Alliteration,
etc.

Variety in Length and
Structure of Sen-
tences.

balanced sentence will naturally be the most rare, and except in very formal discourse, long periodic sentences should be used sparingly.

Sometimes one form of expression will occur so often as to be painfully noticeable. Most troublesome in this way are prepositional phrases and relative clauses. There is especial danger of an accumulation of phrases introduced by "of," as in this sentence. This can generally be avoided by changing the construction, or by choosing a verb that is followed by some other preposition.

Repetition of Prepositional Phrases.

The construction with the relative may be avoided in a variety of ways.¹ One of these is by the use of the infinitive

Equivalents for the Relative.

"He was the first that came" = "He was the first to come." The participle may also be used when no ambiguity is possible. "The men who row in the crew" = "The men rowing in the crew." In conversation the relative is often omitted: as, "The man [that] I spoke of." Sometimes a clause with "if" may be used in place of the relative, though the construction is longer. Instead of "Students that have excellent class marks may be excused from examination," say, "If a student has . . . he may be, etc." The modifying² relative may be replaced by "and," with a personal or a demonstrative pronoun: as, "He did his best, which was all that could be expected" = ". . . and this was all that could be expected." "What" takes the place of both antecedent and relative, and may sometimes be used interchangeably with "that which." "That which hath made them drunk hath made me bold" might be expressed, "What hath made them, etc."

Miscellaneous. — Some cautions, though they might be grouped under the preceding sections, have something of the force of arbitrary rules. A few of these are given below.

¹ See Abbott, "How to Write Clearly," page 19.

² See next section.

At an early period in the history of the language, "to" and a following infinitive were considered inseparable, so that a modifying word could never be placed between them. It is still the general rule that they should not be separated; but in some cases this may be violated to avoid an awkward construction. Almost every great writer of the present century furnishes illustrations of this violation; but it is justified only for special reasons. For a full discussion of this matter, see Earle's "English Prose," page 182.

Modifiers between
"to" and the
Infinitive.

Many ambiguities would be avoided if all writers would consent to use "who" and "which" when a relative clause has a modifying office, "that" when it is restrictive.

"That" as Restrictive.

The modifying relative gives an added fact with regard to its antecedent; it might be replaced by "and" with a personal or a demonstrative pronoun; the clause that it introduces is parenthetical in nature. For example, "My books, which I prize very highly [—and I prize them very highly—], are mostly in the English language." The restrictive relative limits the inclusion of its antecedent; the clause that it introduces could not be omitted without changing the sense of what remains: as, "The books that were destroyed in the fire were of little value."

Modifying relative clauses, like other parenthetical expressions, should be set off by commas; restrictive relatives are so closely connected with their antecedents that no separation is allowable. Punctuation is, however, too uncertain a matter to be depended upon; and in its absence there is often no way of telling whether a clause is restrictive or modifying. In the sentence, "Students who are required to take algebra are studying hard this term," is the meaning that all students are required to take algebra, and are studying hard, or that some students are required to take algebra, and these are studying hard?

To avoid such ambiguities as this, it is desirable to use "that" for the restrictive relative ; exceptions being made for the sake of euphony. When "that" occurs in the context as pronoun or conjunction, and in some other cases, the uniform enforcement of this rule would lead to harsh sentences ; but in most instances it may be followed. It has by no means the sanction of universal usage, but many of the most careful and exact writers follow it, and its value is very great.

The rule is sometimes laid down that the indefinite pronoun "one" should never be followed by "he" ; as, "One does not know what he may find." It is always desirable to maintain the same construction so far as possible, and in a sentence so short and simple as the one quoted there is no reason for a change. In long and involved sentences, however, the repetition of "one," "one's" becomes extremely awkward, and it seems better to admit the change. Usage is divided on the question, however, and some writers adhere strictly to the rule, no matter how noticeable the repetition may become. Students who make exception should do so with the full knowledge that their sentences would be unqualifiedly condemned by some conservative authorities.

CHAPTER II.

NARRATION.

Introductory. — Narration is that form of discourse that aims to bring before the mind of the reader¹ a series of occurrences. In object it resembles description, since both present facts, especially facts such as are originally apprehended through the senses. Both differ somewhat widely from exposition, which explains and classifies ideas, and from argumentation and persuasion, which aim to influence belief and action, respectively. They are usually found together, and in some pieces of composition it is difficult to say whether the narrative or the descriptive element predominates.

In subject-matter, narration differs from description in that it deals with events or occurrences, not with objects; it recounts, rather than portrays. It therefore takes into account the element of time, which in pure description is wholly wanting.

According to method, narration may be divided into two great classes, narration without plot and narration with plot.

NARRATION WITHOUT PLOT.

Definition. — Narration without plot is the simple recounting of a series of events. Its object is to give information concerning real or imaginary occurrences, either for the reader's instruction or for his entertainment. As the name implies,

¹ Except in the chapter on persuasion the terms writer and reader will generally be used, though the discourse under consideration may be either spoken or written.

it does not present a tangle of events which arouses the reader's curiosity and holds him in suspense until the final unraveling. In structure it resembles description more closely than does other narration, and much description is often mixed with it. In fact it is sometimes called description; as when we speak of the description of a ball game.

This kind of narration is illustrated by most of the news articles in the daily and weekly papers, and it is found to a great extent in social letters. Although not a high literary form, its importance may be seen by considering how great a proportion of the writing and reading of most persons consists of letters and newspapers, respectively. The cruder forms of history and biography are also examples of narration without plot; and some works of higher literary merit, like "Gulliver's Travels" and "Robinson Crusoe," have so little plot that they may fairly be classed under this head.

It should be remembered that the essential difference between narration with plot and narration without plot lies not in the subject but in the method of treatment. Many series of events might be recounted in either way. Thus, the story of a fire, a football game, or a boat-race may have a plot, — that is, the events may be told in such a manner as to arouse curiosity and expectancy regarding the outcome. In an ordinary newspaper account, however, the reader learns the extent of the fire or the score of the game either from the headlines or from the first paragraph of the narrative. He then reads the article in order to learn the details that it contains. The outcome is not necessarily made known at the first of a narrative without plot, but it is not held back for the purpose of arousing interest.

The Chief Requisite. — The greatest requisite of narration without plot is that the subject-matter be interesting. One may read a novel "to see how it comes out," that is, for the sake of the plot; but a news article will hold his attention

only when the events of which it tells are interesting in themselves. The style and manner of presentation may add to his interest, but will rarely create it. In order to decide what subjects will be appropriate for narration without plot, it will be necessary to find what kinds of occurrences interest men.

What Readers will be Interested in.—It will be found that most things in which readers are interested belong to one of four classes :

1. *The familiar.*—Nothing attracts a reader's attention more quickly than news regarding persons, places, or things that he has known. Apart from purely selfish motives, our interest in friends, or in scenes that we have visited, springs mainly from familiarity. Even a slight acquaintanceship may heighten interest. Many persons, particularly those of narrow experience, read eagerly any account of events concerning a noted object that they have seen, or a great man that they have met in the most formal way.

The local and personal columns of newspapers depend on familiarity for their attractiveness. The facts that they relate are seldom of interest to a stranger. Letters often tell of events that concern persons or places familiar to both writer and reader ; in other cases, as in the letters of a college man to his friends at home, the persons and places mentioned may be unfamiliar to the reader, but they gain interest through their relation to the absent son or friend ; they seem familiar because they are connected with him.

2. *Related social and business interests.*—Men are interested in persons and things connected with the same business as themselves, or in any way related to the same kind of life. This is illustrated by the numerous periodicals issued in the interest of particular occupations. The merchant tailors, the confectioners, the underwriters, and many other trades and businesses, as well as the learned professions, have their journals ; and these are read, not so much for the practical in-

formation that they contain, as because of an interest in the craft or profession as a whole. The exchange columns of college papers are read because students are interested in student life wherever found.

Under this head should be included all subjects to which a person devotes special attention, whether they lie in the line of his principal business or not. Those who try to keep posted on the standings of various clubs in baseball or other sports acquire such an interest, even though they may not play the game themselves. Indeed, avocations, since they are always carried on voluntarily, are more likely to stimulate interest than are subjects that have become associated with business routine.

3. *The novel, the romantic, the picturesque, etc.* — Love of the remarkable is an almost universal human characteristic, and accounts for the interest felt in many pieces of narration. Illustrations of this may be found in the popularity of newspaper stories of sea-serpents and other marvels, and of remarkable adventures of men. Most fictitious narratives without plot, like "Robinson Crusoe," attract the reader by the novel and romantic experiences that they relate.

4. *Human life, and things related to human life.* — All persons feel an interest in the lives of others; and animals and inanimate objects seem more important when they suggest human life or are related to it. In the news columns of a daily paper a large proportion of the items narrate actions of men, and almost all the rest deal with matters of property or government — things that intimately concern human rights. Of two fires or railroad accidents in which the destruction of property is equal, one that involves loss of life will be given far greater prominence than one that does not. A line of action in which human beings are not directly concerned may sometimes be given great interest by showing its connection with human life.

Students should select from contemporary newspapers examples of narration without plot, and decide to what readers each would be interesting, and for what reasons. More than one cause can be found for many, perhaps for most, articles.

Choice of Subject. — Most events that are intrinsically interesting will be found to come under one of the four classes just enumerated. In case a subject proposed for narration without plot belongs to none of them, a writer will do well to assure himself that there is some special reason why it will be interesting to his readers. In this connection one or two cautions are necessary. The friends and acquaintances of a writer, particularly those of a young writer, are likely to show an interest in his work, no matter what the subject may be ; and their criticisms and suggestions more often concern the manner of expression than the matter. Students are therefore likely to infer that the subject makes little difference so long as the story is well told ; and this idea may be unintentionally encouraged by the relative amount of attention given to diction in some courses in rhetoric. Such an impression is a false one. Not only will an interesting subject attract those who care nothing for the writer, but it will be more highly appreciated by friends, whose attention is already assured.

Another common mistake is that of supposing that whatever interests the writer will interest the reader. When asked to write a narrative essay, a student is often tempted to give an account of some picnic or camping trip that has left a vivid impression on his memory. Such a subject will be good if the occurrences are so remarkable as to be really novel or picturesque, or if all the readers or hearers are well acquainted with the persons concerned. In other circumstances the essay will fall flat, the more, perhaps, because the author has written with enthusiasm born of his own interest in the subject.

In no other form of discourse is it so necessary to keep in mind those for whom the composition is intended. Subjects

that depend for their interest on familiarity, or on their connection with some particular business or kind of life, are suited to only a limited class of readers. They serve admirably for private letters, for articles in local papers or those circulating among the members of a certain trade or profession, and for addresses to be delivered before a local audience or one assembled because of a common interest in some subject. When the audience is heterogeneous, or the paper in which the article is to be published has a general circulation, the events told should appeal to a love of the remarkable, or have a human interest.

All exercises in narration without plot should be assigned with reference to the readers for whom they are intended. The student should choose subjects and write articles for the members of his class, for the residents of a certain district of the city, or for persons engaged in some particular business ; also for general readers. He should also write different accounts of the same transaction for different readers, paying careful attention to the choice and number of details in each instance.

Choice of Details. — The details to be given in any piece of narration without plot should be submitted to the same test as is the subject, — that of interest. The readers should be kept in mind throughout, and their demands complied with as far as possible. In general those particulars should be mentioned that are most important, most typical, or most striking. In articles designed to give accurate information, the most important details should usually be chosen. In estimating their importance the purposes and circumstances of the narration should be borne in mind. If space or time is limited the most typical occurrences may sometimes be selected, even if they are not the most important, because they will suggest much that cannot be expressed. If the aim is entirely to entertain, or if the subject is one in which the interest of the reader will be held with difficulty, striking inci-

dents may be given, even though they are trivial. This plan is followed in various popular young people's histories. Striking details may sometimes be given first to secure attention and more important matters told afterward.

If the discourse is intended for a certain definite class of readers, details may be chosen in accordance with their tastes and capabilities.

Thus, a newspaper of general circulation, in publishing the doings of Congress, would choose incidents according to their importance ; but a journal whose readers were all in one district would report fully a speech by the local congressman, even though it were relatively unimportant. In writing for children, different details should be selected from those that would be given in telling of the same occurrence for developed minds.

Number of Details. — The number of details given in any piece of narration without plot should also be determined by the probable interest of the reader. One may plod through the dull parts of a novel for the sake of the *dénouement*, but there is no incentive to finish a news article after it becomes tiresome. In letter-writing the tastes of the reader will generally be known, and the writer can easily determine the proper length for any part of the discourse. In writing for the press it is sometimes hard to estimate the average reader. For example, a report of a football game could hardly be too full for a lover of the sport, or too brief for a hurried business man with no interest in athletics. An account of a game in an ordinary newspaper should be written for neither of these readers, but for the average of those among whom the paper circulates. It should answer, so far as possible, all questions that any one not an enthusiast would ask, and still be so brief that few readers would skip it.¹

¹ Of course this does not apply to articles in a department that is supposed to be read only by those interested in sporting matters.

In recording events of general interest, it should be remembered that the distance of the occurrences from the reader affects their apparent importance. A great disaster in a neighboring city, even though all the persons and places concerned are unknown, attracts more attention than a similar accident 5000 miles away. The daily press is usually a good index of public interest, because it responds to public demands; it will be found that in a newspaper the amount of space devoted to similar occurrences varies inversely as their distance from the place of publication, measured in miles or in ease of communication.

Order of Details. — In narration without plot, occurrences are usually told in strictly chronological order. This is the most natural arrangement, and therefore the one least likely to distract the attention from the subject-matter. Sometimes it is desirable to give effects immediately after their causes, and then recur to intervening events. Rarely the story may be begun at some important point, and the preceding occurrences given later. This plan is not to be commended in narration without plot, because all appearance of artificiality should be avoided, and because the reader is likely to lose interest when he comes to less striking details.¹ As has already been said (page 59), it is not uncommon for the first paragraph of a news article to give a summary of important results — the victors in a contest, the loss of property in a fire, or of life in a railroad accident, etc.

The following paragraph was used to introduce a newspaper report of several columns:

"DES MOINES, IOWA, May 25. — A cyclone swept through Polk and Jasper counties last night at 11 o'clock, killing twenty-seven persons, fatally injuring three, seriously injuring nineteen, and demolishing a large part of five towns — Valeria, Bondurant, Santiago, Mingo, and Ira."

¹ See on the order of details in narration with plot, page 88.

Presentation from Different Points of View. — Sometimes, especially when recounting a complicated series of events, it is desirable to tell of the same occurrences as seen from different standpoints. It is often better to give two or more simple accounts, one following the other, than to change the point of view within the narrative. When the transaction is exciting it will frequently be difficult to get a correct idea of what happens, since the stories of eye-witnesses will differ greatly. In such cases newspapers often publish interviews with several persons, even if all saw the occurrence from the same material point of view.

Diction. — In narration without plot the style should generally be plain, straightforward, and unobtrusive. The main consideration in this form of discourse is matter, and the manner should not be such as to divert the attention. In letter-writing, circumstances vary too widely to permit of rules. In news articles, any attempt at lofty diction or embellished style is almost always felt to be ridiculous. This may be true when the manner is not in itself really objectionable ; for few persons, while reading a newspaper, are in a proper mood to appreciate the beauties of poetic prose that in other associations might seem excellent. It is safe to say that had the well-known peroration to Webster's reply to Hayne first appeared as part of a political editorial most persons would have laughed at it. Most departures from a plain, straightforward style in news articles are, however, rather highflown than poetic. The forms of history and biography that come under the head of narration without plot are such as rarely call for anything but the plainest diction. It should be remembered, however, that to be plain, simple, and straightforward is not necessarily to be bald.

When narration without plot is used to recount an episode within other narration, or to relieve the monotony of description, it may be as spirited in style and diction as the nature of the occurrence warrants.

In newspaper reporting, more often perhaps than in any other form of composition, a writer is troubled by doubts concerning the reputableness of words. For a discussion of the principles that should be taken as a guide, see page 18. In so far as newspaper reports are intended for the day only, and are not literature in the higher sense of the term, they allow more freedom than do other forms of composition. But the hurry of rapid writing, and the desire for novelty and for something that will hit the popular taste, make it hard to take advantage of this legitimate liberty of expression without carrying it over into license. Very few, even of our best American newspapers, are wholly free from words and phrases that must be condemned, not only by purists, but by all cultured persons. Especial attention should be paid to the difference between cant, or those questionable expressions that have definite, permanent meanings, and the slang of the street that comes and goes with every change of season. The baseball, insurance, or marine columns of any paper would often be ludicrously pedantic if they avoided every term that would be out of place in a polite essay; but even when treating subjects of this kind a writer should feel that he is taking a liberty whenever he uses a term not approved by the most conservative authorities. The unconscious use of slang is especially dangerous.

NARRATION WITH PLOT.

Meaning of the Word Plot. — The word plot may be defined, broadly, as the choice and arrangement of occurrences in such a way that all parts of the narrative work toward and center in a final outcome or culmination. A simple narrative — *i.e.* a narrative with but one line of events — may be said to have a plot when occurrences are so arranged as to arouse and sustain curiosity as to the outcome. In complex narratives, such

as novels, most histories, etc., the plot may be compared, as the derivation of the word indicates, to a knot which is tied and drawn hard, and then cut or untied at the end. If the fortunes of each character be compared to a thread, it will be readily seen how these threads cross and entwine with one another; how some of them will become lost in the tangle only to reappear in an unexpected position several chapters later; and how, in most plots, such threads as remain at the end run smoothly and parallel. In history the threads may represent, not persons, but nations, political parties, or departments of national life.

Unfortunately, there is no word of English origin that exactly denotes the ending of a plot. The words climax, culmination, etc., which are often used, are likely to be misleading. The French term *dénouement* just fits the idea, and is often employed.

Distinction between Narration with Plot and Narration without Plot. — The distinction between this form of narration and that discussed in the first part of the present chapter is not definitely marked, and it will be difficult to assign some pieces of composition to either class. In their typical forms, however, they differ widely. As has been said before, narration without plot is read for the subject-matter. The incidents are valuable for themselves, and each, if it is of such a nature as to be understood, would be of some interest if it stood alone. Narration with plot is read, partly at least, for the purpose of arriving at the *dénouement*; the incidents may be of little account in themselves, and still be of great use in helping the story forward.

Where Found. — Narration with plot makes up a considerable part of polite literature. It includes the drama, the novel, and other kinds of fiction, and the greatest works of history and biography. In the discussion of general principles, examples and illustrations will be taken mostly from fiction, since this form is the freest and least limited by circumstances. A

brief consideration of history and biography will be given afterward.

Kinds of Interest.—The interest felt by the reader in narration with plot may be of three kinds.

1. *Interest in the scenes and incidents.*—This is the same in nature as the interest in narration without plot. It is aroused by the separate occurrences, taken in themselves, independently of their relation to the *dénouement*; or by the description of scenes and characters given as incidental to the story. This kind of interest is of great importance, especially in gaining the attention of the reader before he has gone far enough with the story to become interested in the plot. It is relied on to a great extent in narration with little plot—that which stands near the border line between the two classes. What has been said concerning interest in connection with narration without plot will apply equally well here. Further consideration of the subject will be given in discussing the requisites of a plot.

2. *Interest in the plot.*—This is aroused by the interweaving of the lines of action into their various complications, and especially by the expectation of the *dénouement*. Many persons read a story almost entirely “to see how it comes out”; and to all, this kind of interest is an important consideration. It is not confined to any class of works, but is essential to the highest as well as to the lowest types. In the so-called psychological novel, for example, many of the details may be in themselves trivial, yet if each helps in showing the development of a character, the plot will be sufficiently attractive.

3. *Interest in purpose.*—The word purpose as used here is misleading, but will be employed for want of a better. By it is meant that indefinable characteristic of a piece of narration that makes it worth the while of a writer and of a reader. Every narrative should have some reason for its existence, and earnest critics feel that this reason should be something more

than a desire on the part of the author to make money, or to furnish his readers with a means of killing time. If there is such a reason, then the narrative has a purpose.

The purpose may sometimes take the form of a moral so obvious as to force itself upon the reader's attention. Examples of books in which this is done are "Uncle Tom's Cabin," "Looking Backward." In others, like "Silas Marner" or "Vanity Fair," the purpose is not so obviously brought forward but may be plainly seen. In others, like "Ben-Hur," or the "House of the Seven Gables," it is too vague to be put in definite form by either writer or reader, yet both feel that it exists. In whatever form it is found it should be a source of interest.

The presence of this kind of interest is not always consciously recognized, but a lack of it will be keenly felt by any thoughtful reader. Most persons know the feeling of dissatisfaction with which they finish a story that, while it may have interesting details and a well-planned plot, seems to lead nowhere — to leave no worthy impression. The difference between such a work and one that is laid down with a feeling of pleasure and satisfaction lies usually in the purpose.

Since the word purpose is so easily misunderstood, it may be well to repeat that what has been said on this subject is not intended to favor or oppose didacticism in fiction. The question of the end and mission of the novel is too broad to be discussed here. It is safe, however, to say to students that first attempts at story-writing are more likely to succeed if they do not teach too obvious a moral.

Subjects of Narration. — Most pieces of narration with plot are intended for general readers, and the subject-matter should be of general interest. It will, therefore, be extraordinary or romantic, or it will concern human life and character.¹ The

¹ See page 61.

theme of a romance belongs to both of these classes ; that of a novel mainly to the latter. Biography and history in the ordinary sense—that is, the story of men or of nations—deal directly with human beings. Histories of arts, sciences, etc., are interesting because of the relation of the subject to human life ; such works appeal with additional force to readers with whose business or social life they are related.¹

In works of fiction of any importance human interest is necessary. Stories of considerable length in which the heroes are lower animals have never been very successful; and they have usually depended for interest partly on the teaching of a lesson, partly on a treatment that made the animals resemble men in their actions and feelings. Many things besides human life will be introduced in any work of fiction ; but they must be treated as human,—that is, made to act like men or given human attributes,—or they must be treated in their relation to the human characters.

The animals in “Æsop’s Fables” are made to talk and reason like men. Robinson Crusoe’s dog is of interest because he was the companion and friend of his master. The dog and the horse in “Rab and his Friends” are interesting partly because of their relation to the human characters, partly because their actions are presented in such a way that we feel that they have almost human intelligence and affection. Except in fables, inanimate objects—houses, streams, trees, etc.—are rarely introduced in fiction unless they have at least a remote connection with the men and women of the story.

The Scene and Setting.—Our interest in any work of fiction, and indeed in any piece of narration with plot, may be greatly enhanced by a properly chosen scene and setting, — that is, by those circumstances of time and place that accompany the action. While readers of fiction are growing intolerant of long introductions, and of minute descriptions that interrupt

¹ See page 60, sec. 2.

the story, the importance of the scene and setting is by no means decreasing. The problem is often how much of the circumstances may be given without cumbering the movement of events. The scene and setting may be of use in several ways :

1. They may make an improbable, and even an impossible, plot seem probable. This is a very important use, and will be considered more fully under the head of the plot.¹

2. They may emphasize action either by harmony or by contrast. The accessories of weather, landscape, etc., which are at the disposal of the novelist are often used to impress with greater vividness a particular incident ; or the scene may make more vivid a whole novel. An unwise introduction of details for this purpose may become melodramatic, and even ridiculous ; but the greatest masters of fiction have employed this method of emphasizing action.

For examples of emphasis by harmony, note the storms in "Macbeth" and "King Lear" ; the death of Judge Pyncheon in the "House of the Seven Gables" ; also the catastrophe of the "Mill on the Floss," where the fitness of the circumstances is not so obtrusive, but is just as clearly felt. For emphasis by contrast, see the killing of the heroine in Kingsley's "Hypatia," and the reference to the bird in Dickens's account of the death of Little Nell. Less striking harmonies and contrasts are to be found scattered through every artistic work of fiction.

3. They may be of historical value. In all historical novels the scene and setting are of the greatest importance. In such works the author's object is to carry the reader back into the past, so that he may live the lives of the characters, or at least understand and sympathize with them. This is accomplished not so much by what the leading personages say and do as by descriptive touches and the acts of minor characters, introduced to give a lifelike air to the story. Such works are usually read, in part at least, for the purpose of gaining information, and

¹ See page 75.

extended descriptions will be tolerated in them somewhat more than in other works of fiction.

Any good historical novel will furnish numerous illustrations of this use of the scene and setting. Much of the charm of "Ben-Hur" is due to the vivid descriptions, a few of them of some length, most of them brief, that carry the reader back to the time in which the plot is laid. Among these may be mentioned those of the desert, of the Joppa gate at Jerusalem, of the galleys, of the course for the chariot race. The briefer portrayals that accompany nearly every action do fully as much to make vivid the scene as do these more finished pictures. The first book serves to imbue the reader thoroughly with the spirit of the age. The three wise men and the various persons of whom we are given a glimpse at the Joppa gate serve little other purpose in the story.

4. They may introduce us to interesting modes of life. Even when the time of the action is in the present, the scene and setting may be such as to show the habits and modes of life of classes of persons with whom the reader is little acquainted. Many odd communities exist, whose peculiarities and local customs afford much attractive material to the novelist. The different trades and professions, especially those in which the minutiae of the work are seldom seen and little understood, may often furnish a valuable background for a short story; or a character belonging to such a calling may be introduced in a novel, and with him a brief account of his surroundings and work.

Stories of this kind may really be as valuable as historical novels, but they are likely to be read more for pleasure, and hence the caution against long descriptions must be more carefully observed.

Examples of works in which the scene and setting have this use are George Eliot's studies of English village life, George W. Cable's stories of Creole society, and J. M. Barrie's Scottish novels. Among stories that introduce us to particular occupa-

tions may be mentioned "Gallegher" (Scribner's M. 8 : 156) and "Her First Appearance" (Harper's M. 84 : 104), by Richard Harding Davis, — the scene of one being laid in a great newspaper office, that of the other behind the scenes of an opera house on a "first night"; "Rab and his Friends," by Dr. John Brown, a surgeon's story; many tales of sailor life; and the numerous detective stories which, while not to be imitated, show by their popularity how attractive a calling little understood may become in the hands of a novelist.

The Plot. — The first requisite of a plot for a work of fiction is that it should seem plausible. By this is not meant that the outline, plainly told, may not seem absurd, or that the reader may not at all times really know that the story is impossible; but that while he is reading he should feel no sense of improbability. It is an oft-quoted remark that "An improbable plot that seems probable is better than a probable plot that seems improbable." This is true, because the slightest feeling of improbability places the reader in a critical attitude that at once dispels all illusion. If a work of fiction is to be read with pleasure, it should not, for the time being, be questioned. It must be noted that the sense of probability here referred to is merely a *feeling*, and *for the time being*. It is independent of what the reader may really know concerning the truth or even the possibility of the story.

The question whether an improbable plot should ever be chosen involves the whole question between realism and romanticism, and cannot be discussed here. Young writers may, however, be cautioned, when preparing exercises in narration, against adopting plots of the extreme, or what may be called the Jules Verne, type. Stories in which the author cuts loose from fact and nature may at first thought appear easier than those that aim at realism; but the art necessary to make such a plot seem natural is rarely in the possession of a beginner. More experienced writers, or those who know their own abili-

ties, will choose plots according to their ideas of fiction, its uses and aims. If an improbable plot is chosen, it may be made to appear probable in one or more of the following ways :

1. *By proper choice of the scene and setting.*— It is much easier to believe tales of marvels if they are supposed to have occurred in a far-off time and place than it is if they are located among familiar scenes. Story-writers often take advantage of this fact, and lay their plots in the mythical or semi-mythical past, or in unexplored regions. If the time and place are not remote the local setting may serve the same purpose. A ghost story may seem plausible if the manifestations are said to have occurred at midnight in a lonely and deserted house, though it would be ridiculous if the scene were laid in a busy street during daylight.

Thus, the Arabian Nights tales are placed in a remote past, and, for us, in a distant country. Edward Bellamy's "Looking Backward" is a story of the next century ; but in such a work the sense of impossibility is almost too strong to be overcome. Poe's "Narrative of A. Gordon Pym" is a tale, so far as the marvelous parts are concerned, of the unexplored Antarctic regions. H. Rider Haggard has laid the scenes of several of his stories in central Africa.

2. *By telling the story with great vividness and minuteness of detail.*— In recounting improbable events a writer may gain credence by affecting great frankness and regard for the truth ; or by introducing minor circumstances that are in themselves natural and that are not such as an ordinary mind would be likely to invent ; in short, by telling the story exactly as an honest observer would have told it if he had been an actual witness of the marvels recorded.

In Robert Louis Stevenson's "Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" the scene is laid in a locality most unfavorable for preternatural occurrences, and the story is made plausible simply

by the minuteness of the details and the apparent candor and wonder of the writer. Many of Poe's prose tales will also serve as illustrations : *e.g.* "The Gold Bug." The paragraph of description on p. 143 will illustrate the minute method in this tale. In the "Narrative of A. Gordon Pym" this method supplements that of placing the scene in an unexplored region.

The following paragraph, from Macaulay's Essay on Milton, brings out by contrast the two ways, already discussed, of rendering a plot plausible :

"The Divine Comedy is a personal narrative. Dante is the eye-witness and the ear-witness of that which he relates. He is the very man who has heard the tormented spirits crying out for the second death, who has read the dusky characters on the portal within which there is no hope, who has hidden his face from the terrors of the Gorgon, who has fled from the hooks and the seething pitch of Barbariccia and Draghignazzo. His own hands have grasped the shaggy sides of Lucifer. His own feet have climbed the mountain of expiation. His own brow has been marked by the purifying angel. The reader would throw aside such a work in incredulous disgust were it not told with the strongest air of veracity, with a sobriety even in its horrors, with the greatest precision and multiplicity in its details. The narrative of Milton in this respect differs from that of Dante as the adventures of Amadis differ from those of Gulliver. The author of Amadis would have made his work ridiculous if he had introduced those minute particulars which give such a charm to the work of Swift, — the nautical observations, the affected delicacy about names, the official documents transcribed at full length, and all the unmeaning gossip and scandal of the court, springing out of nothing and tending to nothing. We are not shocked at being told that a man who lived, nobody knows when, saw many strange sights, and we can easily abandon ourselves to the illusion of the romance. But when Lemuel Gulliver, surgeon, resident at Rotherhithe, tells of pygmies and giants, dying islands and philosophizing horses, nothing but such circumstantial touches could produce for a single moment a deception on the imagination."

3. *By showing an allegory.* — A narrative does not, perhaps, really seem more credible because it contains an allegory ; but it is more readable, since one feels that the story is true in the spiritual significance if not in the literal. The taste for allegories is fast dying out, and this remark is perhaps of historical, rather than of practical, interest.

Many parts of the "Pilgrim's Progress," such as the combat with Appolyon, would seem forced if we did not remember the spiritual meaning of the bluntly told story. The same is true of those passages in the "Faery Queene" that tell of enchantments and monsters.

Other Requisites of a Good Plot. — Each author's idea of the requisites of a good plot will depend largely on the school of fiction that he favors. Some general remarks are all that will be attempted here.

Mr. Henry James's only rule for a novel is that it must be interesting. Even those who differ with Mr. James will admit that this is an important requisite. The interest in incident and the interest in purpose have already been discussed. In order to secure the proper interest in the plot itself a few cautions must be observed.

1. *The story must not have too many characters.* — Every person introduced makes an additional draft on the reader's attention and mental energy ; and this, even with the most vivid portrayal, is greater than is required to form the acquaintance of a person in real life. The principle of economy will dictate that the reader should not be asked to put forth more exertion for this purpose than is necessary.

The more characters, the greater the danger of confusion. Nothing is more depressing to a novel-reader than the failure to recognize a character by name the second time he is referred to. Characters should not be introduced simply to help over

an emergency and then dropped. A story-writer is not obliged to have all his personages dead or married before the book ends; but he should dispose of each one that he introduces in such a way that the reader will feel the acquaintance to be worth his while.

2. *The story must not cover too long a time.* — On this point only the most general considerations can be given. Some great novels recount the events of a lifetime; and a few have attempted to cover a longer period, though with more doubtful success. Those that deal with the development of character necessarily extend over a period long enough to allow tendencies and forces to produce their effects. Others may deal with the events of but a few months, or even weeks.

In short stories, such as students are likely to write for practice, there is a temptation to include too much. For further discussion of this matter, see the paragraphs on the short story.

3. *The plot should not be too involved.* — One objection to a highly complicated plot is the same that has already been brought against too many characters, — it requires a wasteful expenditure of mental energy on the part of the reader. The intricacies become confusing. Another serious objection to such a plot is that it is likely to seem improbable; and the improbability will be of such a nature that it cannot be readily overcome.

In applying all the cautions just given, the length of the story must always be taken into consideration.

The Short Story. — During the last few years the short story has been gaining in importance, especially in the United States. Various reasons are given for this, including the haste of the American people, which prevents them from reading long novels, and the growth of high-grade American magazines, which offer a chance for the publication of good short stories. Whatever the cause, this form of fiction seems to be

assuming more than a transient place in our literature ; and the fact that it is the form in which young writers often make their first appearance before the public, as well as that in which college exercises in narration are likely to be required, justifies a brief separate treatment.

The same principles that govern fiction in general apply to the short story, but with some modifications, due not only to the requirements of length, but to other considerations. Such stories are usually read for entertainment, and rarely receive the close study often given to other forms of fiction. If written with a didactic purpose they must, therefore, make their lessons plainly evident, or, much better, so express them that the reader will feel the effect without recognizing that he is being taught. The length of the story prohibits long descriptive passages, and the scene and setting must be given by brief touches. For this reason, those improbable plots that depend on the setting for plausibility are not well adapted to this kind of fiction ; though ghost stories and other tales of the mysterious seem to succeed fairly well.

A complete classification of short stories would be difficult, if not impossible. A few of the kinds best adapted for study and for practice in writing are given below.

1. *The condensed long story.* — In this form of story the plot covers a sufficient time and includes enough characters for a novel. In fact, such narratives might often be expanded into novels by giving more details, and filling in the events of periods that are gone over rapidly. As a rule, stories of this kind are not highly successful, though there are many exceptions. The history of many characters for a long time is likely to be confusing if told in short compass, and the necessary omission of all but the most important facts will sometimes leave a sense of incompleteness.

"Silas Marner" is sometimes called a short story, and if so must be considered a successful example of this class ; but its

length must rather, according to modern ideas, give it a place with the novel. Many of the stories that fill the patent insides of country newspapers are of this kind. Typical examples are not so common in the better magazines as they were thirty or forty years ago, before the short story had reached its present development. Good illustrations may be found in the early volumes of the *Atlantic Monthly*: among them, "Pendlam, A Modern Reformer," vol. 1, p. 70.

2. *Stories that portray character.* — All narratives that have a human interest deal more or less with the characters of the persons that are represented in them; but those included in this class are interesting mainly on account of the characters, not on account of the action. They aim to give, not a study in development, as is the case with the novel of character, but simply a portrayal. In form they are narrative, but in effect largely descriptive. In a story of this kind only a few types of character can be treated — sometimes but one. There must be plot-interest, but the incidents are all chosen to show the leading personages in the light in which the author wishes to present them. The individuals selected for portrayal must have some peculiarities, or the story will be commonplace; they must not be too peculiar, or it will seem improbable.

Many of Miss Mary E. Wilkins's stories are of this class. For example: "A Poetess" (*Harper's M.* 81: 197); also, though with more plot-interest, "A New England Prophet" (*Harper's M.* 89: 601); and "Emmy" (*Century*, 19: 499).

3. *Stories that are read largely for the setting.* — In narration of this kind the interest is largely of the sort mentioned under The Scene and Setting, section 4. Sometimes the events are represented as happening in a time or place interesting on account of historical or other associations. More frequently they call up some profession, trade, or sport, and attract those who are familiar with the kind of life portrayed, or else those who are unfamiliar but have a curious interest. The plot may

be of comparatively slight importance, or even almost wanting, if sufficient interest is supplied by the accompaniments of the action.

Examples of stories of this kind have been given under The Scene and Setting, section 4, page 73. For a variety of them, see "Vignettes of Manhattan," by Brander Matthews, first published in Harper's M. vol. 89.

4. *Stories that narrate critical episodes.*—The occurrences recounted in stories of this class are the events of a crisis—a time when separate lines of life and action converge and intertwine, and, it may be, diverge again. By such a choice of subject a skillful writer may give, in a story that occupies a few pages of a magazine, and covers the events of less than an hour, what seems to be a thorough acquaintance with several characters. In such a story the events chosen must imply almost all that the reader will care to know about the characters,—their personalities, their history, and their subsequent life. If additional facts are necessary to a complete understanding of the plot, they must be told in such a way as to form part of the story itself,—either by the characters, or by brief suggestive expressions introduced incidentally. The reader should not be allowed to feel that anything is put in solely for explanation.

This form of story is powerful largely because of its suggestiveness. It will not appeal to those critics who want all particulars given, even to the details of weddings and funerals at the end; but it allows the reader to estimate character as he is often called upon to estimate it in real life,—from the experiences of a few striking moments. In the hand of a master it is the highest development of the short story that has yet appeared.

Excellent examples of this kind of story are "The Other Woman" (Scribner's M. 9: 385), and "An Unfinished Story" (Harper's M.

83 : 727), both by Richard Harding Davis. Of these the former is especially valuable as illustrating how, by narrating the events of a few minutes, with but little description and hardly a word of the past or the future, a writer may convey an idea of the lines of life and action that have converged to form his crisis, and also of those that diverge from it.

The classes of short stories just discussed are among the latest and most familiar forms, and students will very likely choose from among them for practice. Among other forms of great literary importance are adaptations of old myths, as in Hawthorne's "Twice Told Tales"; allegorical stories like the "Snow Image," by the same author; and tales of the weird and the supernatural, like many of Poe's. There are also many combinations of the forms here given, and various novelties in construction, the success of which is doubtful. Among the latter may be mentioned those made up of letters and entries in diaries.

Other Forms than Fiction. — Fiction is the most typical form of narration with plot, because the story-writer is at liberty not only to arrange, but to make, incidents, and to add or exclude as the artistic exigencies of the occasion may demand. Examples to illustrate the foregoing paragraphs have, therefore, been chosen from fiction. Other important forms of narration with plot will now be considered briefly.

History. — In its earliest and crudest forms, history consisted of chronicles, — the bare record of events in the order of their occurrence. This was narration without plot. Modern ideas demand that the historian should not only record facts, but that he should tell them in such a way as to bring out their relations with each other, — particularly the relation of cause and effect. This necessitates important changes from the old method of writing history.

1. *History must be treated by epochs.* — The old monks divided their records (annals) into the events of a year, or

other artificial period of time. The modern historian divides according to the course of the events themselves. In treating of each epoch he discusses not only events, but their causes, or refers to a preceding section where the causes were themselves discussed as events. The results should also, when possible, be indicated, unless the plan of the work makes evident that they will be found in a succeeding chapter.

Thus the period of the Civil War is an epoch in the history of America. In Ridpath's history of the United States events are traced up to the time of the attack on Fort Sumter, and a short chapter is then devoted to the causes of the war, most of which are recapitulated from the story of preceding epochs.

Bryant, in his history of the United States, keeps the war in mind while tracing the previous narrative, and can indicate his opinion of the causes by saying: "This volume has missed its aim if it has not shown the central fact of the history of the U. S. to be, from the beginning of the century to the beginning of the slave-holders' rebellion, a determination of a class to get possession of the government for its own purposes." After two paragraphs mostly taken up with the amplification and explanation of this idea, the chapter on the Opening of the War proceeds without further introduction.

Rossiter Johnson, in his "Brief History of the War of Secession," opens with a chapter on the causes, in which he briefly considers related events, beginning with the introduction of slaves into the colonies.

In Jefferson Davis's work, the "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Part I. gives something of the history of the United States to the opening of the war; Part II. treats of the constitution; Part III. of the preliminaries of secession and confederation; and the war is not reached till Part IV.

2. *In complex narration, parallel lines of events must be treated separately.* — In chronicles events are told in just the order in which they occur. One incident may be political in nature, the next literary, the next social. In true history each

of these classes of occurrences would be treated separately, though with due regard to their interrelations. Events of the kind that are most important from the standpoint of the work will first be traced until a natural break in the line of action is reached. Occurrences of other kinds will then be followed through the same period, and after all have been given, the main line will be resumed for another epoch. Thus, most general histories of nations make political events of first importance and divide into periods accordingly. In order to simplify the plan it is customary to give the different lines in the same order in each epoch.

In Labberton's "Outlines of History," the general subject of the European Revolution of 1848 is discussed separately for the four countries, France, Austria, Germany, Italy, in the order named. Each of these discussions is divided into three sections: I. General Causes; II. The Revolution; III. The Reaction. Section II., The Revolution, is subdivided according to the events in each country.

An interesting treatment is shown in Freeman's "Outlines of History," where successive chapters, covering successive periods, bear the titles, The Greatness of Spain, The Greatness of France, The Rise of Russia, The French Revolution. Each of these chapters considers all the important nations of the world, but the narrative is arranged with reference to the one most prominent for the time being.

It will be seen that history told in the modern fashion is narration with plot; that is, the incidents told are looked at as related events, all tending toward an end, or *dénouement*. The occurrences are of course real, and the conscientious historian cannot withhold or modify facts for the sake of effect. But the plot always exists, and is often evident enough to be of absorbing interest.

The plot of history is usually more complicated than that of fiction. In the history of any country, each kind of events—

political, literary, etc. — has a plot of its own, which is entwined with all the others to make up the general story. Each epoch also has a plot with a more or less definite *dénouement*; and this is but an incident in the greater plot that works out the fate of the nation.

Macaulay has probably succeeded better than any other writer in making plain the plot-interest in history. The most serious criticism on his work is that he sometimes sacrificed truth to the artistic needs of the story, not by direct falsification, but by misrepresenting the relative importance of events, or by adopting an unfair point of view. Any author who has a sense of form and who aims to make his history interesting will be tempted to fall into these errors, and should guard strenuously against them.

A careful study of the table of contents of any well-planned history will furnish illustrations of what has been said concerning this kind of narration.

Biography. — Like history, biography may be either narration without or narration with plot. It will be classed with the former if it simply includes bare facts told in chronological order; with the latter if it shows how environment, circumstances, hereditary tendencies, genius, etc., assisted in working out a character. Ordinarily the plot is less distinct than in history. The end in view — the development of a character — is a less typical *dénouement* than the fate of a nation, or even the outcome of a great political crisis. Sections of the story — as those that culminate in the achievement of some great end — often have a more obvious plot than does the whole life-history.

There are two principal ways of writing biography. In the first, the author tells the story in his own words, usually giving more or less comment and interpretation; in the second he depends largely on letters, extracts from journals, etc., and intersperses only enough original narrative to make the work a connected whole. The first form has more unity and more plot-interest; the second enables the reader to draw his own

conclusions from the material given, and is less likely to be affected by the unintentional bias of the writer. Autobiography naturally belongs to the first class.

Biographical sketches in encyclopædias and similar works of reference are usually narration without plot. Most of the biographies in the "American Men of Letters" and the "English Men of Letters" series are narratives told mainly in the words of the author. Good examples are Woodbury's "Life of Poe" (Am. M. L.) and James's "Life of Hawthorne" (Eng. M. L.). Boswell's "Johnson," Cross's "Life of George Eliot," and Francis Darwin's life of his father Charles Darwin, are largely made up of letters, journals, etc.

Drama. — This form of discourse lies beyond the scope of the present work. Instruction in its principles should be sought in works on literary criticism. Valuable suggestions concerning other forms of narration may, however, be derived from a study of the drama. The exigencies of the stage require simplicity and definiteness of structure. Plots of dramas are therefore easy to grasp and to analyze, and form excellent standards by which to judge the plans of more complex works.

How to Begin. — In any kind of discourse it is often a puzzle how to begin. This is especially true of narration. In narration without plot the events are generally given in strictly chronological order, starting — perhaps after a brief descriptive introduction — with the first of the series. In narration with plot the story may begin in various ways.

1. *With the scene and setting.* — This method was a favorite with the older novelists, and in history and historical fiction is sometimes almost a necessity. Its advantage is that it presents at once the circumstances necessary for an understanding of the story. Its disadvantage is that the reader is likely to tire of descriptions of persons and places in which he has not

become interested ; and will often throw aside the book before he reaches the story, or else skip the introduction, thus rendering himself unable to appreciate what follows.

This method of beginning a story is a favorite with Scott. It is also illustrated in "Tom Jones," and "Tom Brown at Rugby." In "Hypatia" the preface, and in "Romola" the proem, though not long, give facts necessary to the understanding of what follows.

2. *At the beginning of the story.* — This plan can be followed when the circumstances necessary to an understanding of the plot are few, or can be told in brief descriptive passages scattered through the work. It is advantageous because the reader at once acquires an interest sufficient to carry him through subsequent explanations.

Among novels that begin in this way are "David Copperfield," "Vanity Fair," and "The Last Days of Pompeii." The last named is noticeable because it is a historical novel, and something of the scene and setting would naturally be expected first.

3. *In medias res.* — The plan, supposed to be especially adapted to epic poetry, of beginning at the middle of a story, and afterwards bringing the narrative up to the starting-point, is sometimes employed by prose writers. Its advantage is that, as an exciting part of the story is selected for the opening, the reader is sure to be interested at once. The disadvantages lie in the danger that the inserted passage which tells the first part of the story may become tiresome ; or that if it is told, as often happens, by one of the characters, so long a speech will seem artificial.

Among novels that begin in this way is Miss Muloch's "John Halifax, Gentleman." There is also a brief reversion of time in the first chapter of "Silas Marner." Many short stories begin with a conversation, and afterward describe the speakers and explain the circumstances in which they are placed.

Order of Events. — The natural order in which to recount events is that in which they occur. Any change from chronological sequence has its disadvantages, and should be made only for sufficient reason.

1. In simple narrative the most frequent reason for departing from the observed order of events is for the purpose of showing relations of cause and effect. It may sometimes be better to give results in close connection with their causes than to recall the mind to the causes after intervening incidents have been given. If such an arrangement is adopted, great care should be taken to make plain the chronological position of those happenings that are crowded out of their natural place. The use of a single unemphatic expression, as "meanwhile," is often not sufficient to call attention to the reversion of time.

2. In complex narration, as has already been pointed out,¹ parallel lines of events are given separately. In such discourse the problem is how to synchronize the different accounts, — that is, how to keep before the mind of the reader the time-relation between different occurrences. Dates are of assistance in doing this, but can be depended upon only in works that will be carefully studied. Whenever possible, it is best to connect events at short intervals through the story with persons or occurrences that have been discussed in a previous narrative. To do this successfully, the writer, while planning the first line of events in any epoch, should keep in mind contemporary occurrences of other kinds, and if necessary arrange points of attachment for subsequent narratives.

For example, in synchronizing the literary history of the United States with a previous narrative of the political events, use might be made of the college friendship between Hawthorne and President Pierce, and Hawthorne's subsequent appointment as custom-house inspector ; of Whittier's relation to the anti-slavery movement ; of the political influence of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," of Low-

¹ See page 83.

ell's ministry to England, etc. Such cross-references will establish the position of a book or an author, not so accurately as a date but far more vividly.

3. In closely interwoven plots, like those of a novel, the different lines of events will cross each other, or for a time be intertwined. The points of union may be used to measure from in synchronizing events when the lines are separated.

Choice and Number of Details.—The number and the nature of the details that should be given in narration with plot will depend largely on the kind of interest that predominates. If there is little plot, and the main interest is that of incident, then such parts of the action will be told at length as are entertaining in themselves. In didactic novels those incidents that bring out the lesson to be taught will often be given most prominence ; but such treatment is likely to sacrifice artistic effect. In history the important requirement is strict conformity to facts, and this forbids any treatment that might be misleading, such as the omission of particulars as important as others that are given, or distortions from the true proportion of events. In writing for popular readers, a historian may introduce novel or entertaining facts of small intrinsic importance, but he should be careful not to mislead with regard to their true value.

In works in which the plot-interest predominates, details should be chosen, not for themselves, but for the sake of the action of the story. Any incident that does not tend in some way toward the *dénouement* of the story will usually be felt to be an intrusion, no matter how interesting it may be in itself. Occurrences will therefore be chosen and given prominence according to one of two considerations.

1. *Their significance.*—By this is meant their importance with relation to the plot. Choice and arrangement of details according to their significance will give strength and proportion to the story.

2. *Their suggestiveness.* — Incidents that are not important in themselves may be valuable for the aid they give in judging character, or the light they throw on the circumstances of the action. The subtle effects that distinguish a truly artistic work of fiction from a cruder attempt are largely due to suggestive details.

Movement. — Much of the effectiveness of any narrative depends on the adaptation of the movement to the thought. A narrative that moves rapidly where the reader desires minute information, leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction and incompleteness; and a slow prolix treatment of unimportant events will be wearisome, no matter what the other excellences of the story may be. Of the two faults, that of extreme slowness is the more common and the more serious.

Narration may be made rapid by omitting all but the essential facts. The effect of rapid movement may also be gained, even when many details are given, by using short, brisk sentences, and by choosing words that are associated with rapid motion. Slow movement is secured by the opposite devices — giving many details, full descriptions, comments, explanations, etc.

The movement of any part of a narrative should be determined by two considerations — the nature and the importance of the action. Other things being equal, rapid action should be recounted in rapid style. If this is not done, the lack of harmony will be especially noticeable. Nothing takes the life out of a narrative more surely than does the use of long, loose sentences, the clauses of which are all connected by "and." The rapidity demanded by quick action is, however, a briskness of style rather than a condensation of detail. The amount of time or space to be given to an occurrence will be determined mainly by its importance. Occurrences that are of great moment, either for themselves or for their connection with the plot, should be given fully, both because the reader will be

curious in regard to them, and because the detailed treatment will give them prominence and emphasis.

Two nearly opposite classes of events should be related rapidly : first, those that are relatively unimportant, and therefore not deserving of great attention ; second, those that are so exciting, or stand in such relation to the *dénouement* that the reader will become impatient, and perhaps be tempted to skip to the end. These two classes of passages should be made rapid in different ways. The former may be told in general summarizing terms, such as are best adapted for giving information in brief compass ; the latter should be rapid in diction as well as in treatment. They should abound with specific, vivid terms, and may make use of such figures of speech as synecdoche, metonymy, metaphor, etc. By suiting the language to the action, interest may be kept up much longer than would be possible by a matter-of-fact presentation.

Diction. — The subject of diction in narration is too broad to admit of much profitable general discussion. The preceding pages will suggest much in regard to style. In general, the diction should correspond with the subject-matter.

An especially difficult part of narration is that which reports conversations. In order to make his characters appear to speak naturally, a writer should first of all study actual conversations between men who speak freely and without self-consciousness. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that a *verbatim* reproduction of what men would say under any given circumstances would appear lifelike. Such a report, introduced in a novel, might come as far from giving the appearance of reality as an instantaneous photograph of a horse in motion would fail of reproducing the impressions of a race. The facts must be idealized, sometimes almost caricatured, before they will produce the desired result. The ability to make narrated conversations appear lifelike is largely a matter of talent, but even talent can rarely succeed without practice.

ILLUSTRATIVE SELECTIONS.

No attempt is made in the following pages to furnish all the material needed for a careful study of narration. Narration without plot is fairly well illustrated in every newspaper, and students will find more interest in noting the treatment of current events than in studying selected accounts of old occurrences — even if the form of the latter be more excellent. The organization and development of the plot must be seen in works too long to be reprinted here. For the first study of this subject the drama has some advantages of simplicity and distinctness. Often a class will be reading some of Shakespeare's plays at the same time that the course in rhetoric is being carried on, and these may be used to advantage. If time permits, the plots of novels by standard authors may be studied with profit. Many of these may now be procured in very cheap form for class use.


An interesting method of presenting the results of such study is by diagramming the plot of a play or story, representing the different characters by lines of different colors. These lines should diverge, converge, or intertwine as the characters are far apart or in close relations with each other.

The relations of the principal characters of "Silas Marner" during the first twelve chapters of the story are thus shown on p. 93. Light lines indicate that a character is not mentioned in the part of the story that they represent. Students might fill in the minor characters in connection with this outline, and carry on the plot for the rest of the story ; or, better, take some other novel, and work from the beginning.

The selections reprinted here are intended to illustrate some of the simpler matters that have been discussed in connection with narration : such as choice of details, movement, etc. Like the other selections in the book, they may, if desired, be used to illustrate the subject of style.

CHAPTER

- I. Introduction. Marner at Lantern Yard.
- II. Marner at Raveloe.
- III. Conversation between Dunstan and Godfrey.
- IV. The hunt. The robbery.
- V. The group at the tavern.
- VI. Marner at the tavern.
- VII. Gossip. Godfrey hears of the accident.
- VIII. Godfrey and his father.
- IX. Neighborhood interest in Marner.
- X. The Christmas party.
- XI. Godfrey's wife dies. Eppie.
- XII. Godfrey called from the party.
- XIII. Eppie and Marner.



KEY.

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------------|
| —— 1. Marner. | — · — 4. The tavern group. |
| - - - 2. Godfrey. | - - - - 5. Dolly Winthrop. |
| · · · · 3. Dunstan. | - - - - 6. Nancy. |
| | - - - - 7. Eppie. |

I.

The first two selections, both from Robert Louis Stevenson's "Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," illustrate the way in which short narratives reasonably complete in themselves may be introduced in a longer story. The first is pure narration without plot. The headline and the first sentence make plain the important facts. The order and, in the main, the choice of details do not differ from those that would be used in a newspaper report. Are there any respects in which choice of details does differ? Is there any difference in diction, and if so, is it accounted for by the exigencies of the longer narrative, or by the personality of the author? Can the facts be arranged to make narration with plot? Try it.

The second selection is similar in nature, but is told in a somewhat different manner. It is almost on the border-line between narration without plot and narration with plot. The events are told simply and in chronological order; but the reader knows nothing of the outcome until he reaches it, and most readers probably feel something of curiosity arising from plot-interest. Why was not this plot-interest made stronger? Transform this account into pure narration without plot.

In these selections are the details chosen for significance or suggestiveness? Is there any difference between the two selections in this respect? To what extent do they show the uses of the scene and setting? Try to illustrate the subject of movement from the second selection.

A.

THE CAREW MURDER CASE.

Nearly a year later, in the month of October, 18—, London was startled by a crime of singular ferocity and rendered all the more notable by the high position of the victim. The details were few and startling. A maid-servant, living alone in a house not far

5 from the river, had gone upstairs about eleven. Although a fog rolled over the city in the small hours, the early part of the night was cloudless, and the lane, which the maid's window overlooked, was brilliantly lit by the full moon. It seems she was romantically given, for she sat down upon her box, which stood immediately under the window, and fell into a dream of musing. Never (she used to say, with streaming tears, when she related that experience), never had she felt more at peace with all men or thought more kindly of the world. And as she so sat she became aware of an aged and beautiful gentleman, with white hair, drawing
15 near along the lane ; and advancing to meet him, another and very small gentleman, to whom at first she paid less attention. When they had come within speech (which was just under the maid's eyes) the older man bowed and accosted the other with a very pretty manner of politeness. It did not seem as if the subject of
20 his address were of great importance ; indeed, from his pointing, it sometimes appeared as if he were only inquiring his way ; but the moon shone on his face as he spoke, and the girl was pleased to watch it, it seemed to breathe such an innocent and old-world kindness of disposition, yet with something high, too, as of a well-
25 founded self-content. Presently her eye wandered to the other, and she was surprised to recognize in him a certain Mr. Hyde, who had once visited her master, and for whom she had conceived a dislike. He had in his hand a heavy cane, with which he was trifling ; but he answered never a word, and seemed to listen with
30 an ill-contained impatience. And then all of a sudden he broke out in a great flame of anger, stamping with his foot, brandishing the cane, and carrying on (as the maid described it) like a madman. The old gentleman took a step back, with the air of one very much surprised and a trifle hurt ; and, with that, Mr. Hyde
35 broke out of all bounds and clubbed him to the earth. And the next moment, with apeline fury, he was trampling his victim under foot, and hailing down a storm of blows, under which the bones were audibly shattered, and the body jumped upon the roadway. At the horror of these sights and sounds, the maid fainted.
40 It was two o'clock when she came to herself and called for the police. The murderer was gone long ago ; but there lay his victim

in the middle of the lane, incredibly mangled. The stick with which the deed had been done, although it was of some rare and very tough and heavy wood, had broken in the middle under the
45 stress of this insensate cruelty ; and one splintered half had rolled in the neighboring gutter—the other, without doubt, had been carried away by the murderer. A purse and gold watch were found upon the victim ; but no cards or papers, except a sealed and stamped envelope, which he had probably been carry-
50 ing to post, and which bore the name and address of Mr. Utterson.

B.

I was coming home from some place at the end of the world, about three o'clock of a black winter morning, and my way lay through a part of town where there was literally nothing to be seen but lamps. Street after street, and all the folks asleep—
55 street after street, all lighted up as if for a procession and all as empty as a church—till at last I got into that state of mind when a man listens and listens and begins to long for the sight of a policeman. All at once I saw two figures : one a little man who was stumping along eastward at a good walk, and the other
60 a girl of maybe eight or ten who was running as hard as she was able down a cross street. Well, sir, the two ran into one another naturally enough at the corner ; and then came the horrible part of the thing ; for the man trampled calmly over the child's body and left her screaming on the ground. It sounds nothing to hear,
65 but it was hellish to see. It was n't like a man ; it was like some damned Juggernaut. I gave a view halloo, took to my heels, collared my gentleman, and brought him back to where there was already quite a group about the screaming child. He was perfectly cool and made no resistance, but gave me one look, so ugly
70 that it brought out the sweat on me like running. The people who had turned out were the girl's own family ; and pretty soon the doctor, for whom she had been sent, put in his appearance. Well, the child was not much the worse, more frightened, according to the Sawbones ; and there you might have supposed would
75 be an end to it. But there was one curious circumstance. I had taken a loathing to my gentleman at first sight. So had the child's

family, which was only natural. But the doctor's case was what struck me. He was the usual cut and dry apothecary, of no particular age and colour, with a strong Edinburgh accent, and about
80 as emotional as a bagpipe. Well, sir, he was like the rest of us ; every time he looked at my prisoner I saw that Sawbones turn sick and white with the desire to kill him. I knew what was in his mind, just as he knew what was in mine ; and killing being out of the question, we did the next best. We told the man that we
85 could and would make such a scandal out of this as should make his name stink from one end of London to the other. If he had any friends or any credit, we undertook that he should lose them. And all the time, as we were pitching it in red-hot, we were keeping the women off him as best we could, for they were as wild as
90 harpies. I never saw a circle of such hateful faces ; and there was the man in the middle, with a kind of black, sneering coolness — frightened, too, I could see that — but carrying it off, sir, really like Satan. "If you choose to make capital out of this accident," said he, "I am naturally helpless. No gentleman but
95 wishes to avoid a scene," says he. "Name your figure." Well, we screwed him up to a hundred pounds for the child's family ; he would have clearly liked to stick out ; but there was something about the lot of us that meant mischief, and at last he struck. The next thing was to get the money ; and where do you think he
100 carried us, but to that place with the door ? — whipped out a key, went in, and presently came back with the matter of ten pounds in gold and a cheque for the balance at Coutt's, drawn payable to bearer and signed with a name that I can't mention, though it's one of the points of my story, but it was a name at least very
105 well known and often printed. The figure was stiff, but the signature was good for more than that, if it was only genuine. I took the liberty of pointing out to my gentleman that the whole business looked apocryphal, and that a man does not, in real life, walk into a cellar door at four in the morning and come out of it
110 with another man's cheque for close upon a hundred pounds. But he was quite easy and sneering. "Set your mind at rest," says he ; "I will stay with you till the banks open and cash the cheque myself." So we all set off, — the doctor, and the child's father, and

our friend, and myself, — and passed the rest of the night in my
115 chambers ; and the next day, when we had breakfasted, went in a
body to the bank. I gave in the cheque myself, and said I had
every reason to believe it was a forgery. Not a bit of it. The
cheque was genuine.

II.

The next three selections are all accounts of the same occurrence. They are from the histories of the French Revolution by Carlyle, Stephens, and Gardiner, respectively. With them may be compared the corresponding passages from Guizot and other historians.

Selection A, as a whole, furnishes an excellent example of slow movement. Find examples of different methods of retardation, — by description, exposition, comments, etc. Why is the movement especially slow in lines 46–82 ? Why is it rapid in lines 135–145 ? How does Carlyle's style of sentence structure fit the movement in each case ? Who is the central figure in Sel. A ? Sel. B ? Sel. C ? In which does the central figure stand out most prominently ? Note the ways of beginning. At what point is Marat first mentioned in each ? What effect would this have on the interest of a reader who did not know what was coming ? Comment especially on the introduction to Sel. A.

In each, are details chosen mainly for significance or for suggestiveness ? What is the effect of this choice ? How far is the difference in choice between Sels. A and B accounted for by the fact that the writers take opposite views of the act ? Is there any essential contradiction as to facts ? The method of treatment in these two cases may show how narration can be used effectively in persuasion. Study carefully the scene and setting in Sel. A, lines 60–90.

All these selections give the important details of the assassination. Sel. A is about five times as long as Sel. C. Which holds the interest best ? Why ? Could Sel. A be made more interesting

by cutting it down? In which is the human interest greatest? The means used to secure this interest will repay careful study.

A.

Amid which dim ferment of Caen and the World, History specially notices one thing : in the lobby of the Mansion *de l'Intendance*, where busy Deputies are coming and going, a young Lady with an aged valet, taking graceful leave of Deputy Barbaroux. 5 She is of stately Norman figure ; in her twenty-fifth year ; of beautiful still countenance : her name is Charlotte Corday, heretofore styled D'Armans, while Nobility still was. Barbaroux has given her a Note to Deputy Duperret, — him who once drew his sword in the effervescence. Apparently she will to Paris on some errand? 10 ' She was a Republican before the Revolution, and never wanted energy.' A completeness, a decision, is in this fair female figure : ' by energy she means the spirit that will prompt one to sacrifice himself for his country.' What if she, this fair young Charlotte, had emerged from her secluded stillness, suddenly like a Star ; 15 cruel-lovely, with half-angelic, half-dæmonic splendour ; to gleam for a moment, and in a moment be extinguished : to be held in memory, so bright complete was she, through long centuries ! — Quitting Cimmerian Coalitions without, and the dim-simmering Twenty-five millions within, History will look fixedly at this one 20 fair Apparition of a Charlotte Corday ; will note whither Charlotte moves, how the little Life burns forth so radiant, then vanishes swallowed of the Night.

With Barbaroux's Note of Introduction, and slight stock of luggage, we see Charlotte on Tuesday, the 9th of July seated in the 25 Caen Diligence, with a place for Paris. None takes farewell of her, wishes her a good journey : her Father will find a line left, signifying that she has gone to England, that he must pardon her, and forget her. The drowsy Diligence lumbers along ; amid drowsy talk of Politics and praise of the Mountain ; in which she 30 mingles not ; all night, all day, and again all night. On Thursday, not long before noon we are at the bridge of Neuilly ; here is Paris, with her thousand black domes, the goal and purpose of thy

journey ! Arrived at the Inn de la Providence in the Rue des Vieux Augustins, Charlotte demands a room ; hastens to bed ;
35 sleeps all afternoon and night till the morrow morning.

On the morrow morning she delivers her Note to Duperret. It relates to certain Family Papers which are in the Minister of the Interior's hands : which a Nun at Caen, an old Convent-friend of Charlotte's, has need of ; which Duperret shall assist her in
40 getting : this then was Charlotte's errand to Paris ? She has finished this in the course of Friday ; — yet says nothing of returning. She has seen and silently investigated several things. The Convention in bodily reality, she has seen ; what the Mountain is like. The living physiognomy of Marat she could not see ; he is
45 sick at present, and confined to home.

About eight on the Saturday morning, she purchases a large sheath-knife in the Palais Royal ; then straight-way in the Place des Victories, takes a hackney-coach : " To the Rue de l'École de Médecine, No. 44." It is the residence of the Citoyen Marat ! —
50 The Citoyen Marat is ill, and cannot be seen ; which seems to disappoint her much. Her business is with Marat, then ? Hapless, beautiful Charlotte ; hapless, squalid Marat ! From Caen in the utmost West, from Neuchâtel in the utmost East, these two are drawing nigh each other ; they two have, very strangely, business
55 together. — Charlotte, returning to her inn, despatches a short note to Marat ; signifying that she is from Caen, the seat of rebellion ; that she desires earnestly to see him, and ' will put it in his power to do France a great service.' No answer. Charlotte writes another Note, still more pressing ; sets out with it by coach,
60 about seven in the evening, herself. Tired day-laborers have finished their Week ; huge Paris is circling and simmering, manifold, according to its vague wont : this one fair figure has decision in it, drives straight, — towards a purpose.

It is yellow July evening, we say, the thirteenth of the month ;
65 eve of the Bastille day, — when ' M. Marat,' four years ago, in the crowd of the Pont Neuf, shrewdly required of that Besenval Hussar-party, which had such friendly dispositions, " to dismount, and give up their arms, then " ; and became notable among Patriot men. Four years : what a road he has travelled ; — and sits now,

70 about half-past seven of the clock, stewing in slipper-bath ; sore afflicted ; ill of Revolution Fever, — of what other malady this History had rather not name. Excessively sick and worn, poor man : with precisely eleven-pence-halfpenny of ready-money, in paper ; with slipper-bath ; strong three-footed stool for writing on the while ;
 75 and a squalid Washerwoman, one may call her : that is his civic establishment in Medical-School Street ; thither and not elsewhere has his road led him. Not to the reign of Brotherhood and Perfect Felicity, yet surely on the way toward that ? — Hark, a rap again ! A musical woman's voice, refusing to be rejected : it is
 80 the Citoyenne who would do France a service. Marat, recognizing from within, cries, Admit her. Charlotte Corday is admitted.

Citoyen Marat, I am from Caen, the seat of rebellion, and wished to speak with you. — Be seated, *mon enfant*. Now what are the Traitors doing at Caen ? What Deputies are at Caen ? —
 85 Charlotte names some Deputies. " Their heads shall fall within a fortnight," croaks the eager People's-friend, clutching his tablets to write. *Barbaroux*, *Pétion*, writes he with bare shrunk arm, turning aside in the bath. *Pétion* and *Louvet*, and — Charlotte has drawn her knife from the sheath ; plunges it, with one sure stroke, into the
 90 writer's heart. "*À moi chère amie*, Help, dear !" no more could the Death-choked say or shriek. The helpful Washerwoman running in, there is no Friend of the People or Friend of the Washerwoman left ; but his life with a groan gushes out, indignant, to the shades below.

95 And so Marat People's-friend is ended ; the lone Stylites has got hurled down suddenly from his pillar, — *whitherward* He that made him knows. Patriot Paris may sound triple and tenfold, in dole and wail ; reëchoed by Patriot France ; and the Convention, ' Chabot pale with terror, declaring that they are to be all
 100 assassinated,' may decree him Pantheon Honors, Public Funeral, Mirabeau's dust making way for him ; and Jacobin Societies, in lamentable oratory, summing up his character, parallel him to One whom they think it honor to call ' the good Sansculotte,' — whom we name not here ; also a chapel may be made for the urn
 105 that holds his heart, in the Place du Carousel ; and new-born children be named Marat ; and Lago-di-Como hawkers bake

mountains of stucco into unbeautiful Busts ; and David paint his Picture or Death-Scene ; and such other Apotheosis take place as the human genius, in these circumstances, can devise : but Marat
 110 returns no more to the light of this Sun. One sole circumstance we have read with clear sympathy, in the old *Moniteur* Newspaper : how Marat's Brother comes from Neuchâtel to ask of the Convention 'that the deceased Jean-Paul Marat's musket be given him.' For Marat too had a brother and natural affections ; and
 115 was once wrapped in swaddling-clothes, and slept safe in a cradle like the rest of us. Ye children of men ! — A sister of his, they say, lives still to this day in Paris.

As for Charlotte Corday, her work is accomplished ; the recompense of it is near and sure. The *chère Amie*, and neighbors of
 120 the house, flying at her, she 'overturns some movables,' entrenches herself till the gendarmes arrive ; then quietly surrenders ; goes quietly to the Abbaye Prison : she alone quiet, all Paris sounding in wonder, in rage or admiration, round her. Duperret is put in arrest, on account of her ; his Papers sealed — which may lead to
 125 consequences. Fauchet, in like manner, though Fauchet had not so much as heard of her. Charlotte, confronted with these two deputies, praises the grave firmness of Duperret, censures the dejection of Fauchet.

On Wednesday morning, the thronged Palais de Justice and
 130 Revolutionary Tribunal can see her face ; beautiful and calm : she dates it 'fourth day of the Preparation of Peace.' A strange murmur ran through the hall at sight of her ; you could not say of what character. Tinville has his indictments and tape-papers : the cutler of the Palais Royal will testify that he sold her the sheath-
 135 knife ; "All these details are needless," interrupted Charlotte ; "it is I that killed Marat." By whose instigation ? "By no one's." What tempted you, then ? "His crimes. I killed one man," added she, raising her voice extremely (*extrêmement*), as they went on with their questions, "I killed one man to save a hun-
 140 dred thousand, a villain to save innocents ; a savage wild-beast to give repose to my country. I was a Republican before the Revolution ; I never wanted energy." There is therefore nothing to be said. The public gazes astonished : The hasty limners sketch

her features, Charlotte not disapproving : the men of law proceed
 145 with their formalities. The doom is Death as a murderess. To
 her Advocate she gives thanks ; in gentle phrase, in highflown
 classical spirit. To the Priest they send her she gives thanks ;
 but needs not any shriving, any ghostly or other aid from him.

On this same evening, therefore, about half-past seven o'clock,
 150 from the gate of the Conciergerie, to a city all on tiptoe, the fatal
 cart issues ; seated on it a fair young creature, sheeted in red
 smock of Murderess ; so beautiful, serene, so full of life ; journey-
 ing towards death, — alone amid the World. Many take off their
 hats, saluting reverently ; for what heart but must be touched ?
 155 Others growl and howl. Adam Lux, of Mentz, declares that she
 is greater than Brutus ; that it were beautiful to die with her ;
 the head of this young man seems turned. At the Place de la
 Révolution, the countenance of Charlotte wears the same still
 smile. The executioners proceed to bind her feet ; she resents,
 160 thinking it meant as an insult ; on a word of explanation she sub-
 mits with cheerful apology. As the last act, all now being ready,
 they take the neckerchief from her neck ; a blush of maidenly
 shame overspreads that fair face and neck ; the cheeks were still
 tinged with it when the executioner lifted the severed head to
 165 show it to the people. 'It is most true,' says Forster, 'that he
 struck the cheek insultingly ; for I saw it with my eyes ; the police
 imprisoned him for it.'

In this manner have the Beautifulest and the Squalidest come
 in collision, and extinguished one another. Jean-Paul Marat and
 170 Marie-Anne Charlotte Corday both, suddenly, are no more. 'Day
 of the Preparation of Peace ?' Alas, how were peace possible
 or preparable, while, for example, the hearts of lovely Maidens, in
 their convent-stillness, are dreaming not of Love-Paradises and the
 Light of Life, but of Codrus'-sacrifices and Death well-earned ?
 175 That Twenty-five million hearts have got to such temper, this *is*
 the Anarchy ; the soul of it lies in this : whereof not peace can be
 the embodiment ! The death of Marat, whetting old animosities
 tenfold, will be worse than any life. O ye hapless two, mutually
 extinctive, the Beautiful and the Squalid, sleep ye well, — in the
 180 Mother's bosom that bore you both.

This is the History of Charlotte Corday ; most definite, most complete ; angelic-dæmonic : like a Star ! Adam Lux goes home, half-delirious ; to pour forth his Apotheosis of her, in paper and print ; to propose that she have a statue with this inscription,
185 *Greater than Brutus*. Friends represent his danger ; Lux is reckless ; thinks it were beautiful to die with her.

B.

The Ami du Peuple had been confined to his house in the Rue des Cordeliers by a severe skin-disease, and had not been able to attend the sittings of the Convention since June 8. His health was so very bad that, in spite of the loving care of Simonne Évrard,
5 whom he had married, to quote his own words, "before Heaven," he was gradually sinking, and could only find relief by sitting in a hot bath. He had been unable to publish his journal with his usual punctuality, and had received the condolences of a deputation of the Jacobin Club on the state of his health. His last pub-
10 lic act in the convention had been to try to save the lives of Ducos, Lanthenas, and Dusault, and he knew as a medical man that his end was fast approaching. The fact of his dying condition, however, was not known to the departments, and he was believed to be the leader of the Mountain. As has been said, his influence
15 had never been great in the convention, and his bad state of health made it slighter than ever. Yet his bitter taunts in former days had exasperated the Girondins more than the serious attacks of their more determined enemies, and they hated him with a bitter hatred. This hatred exhaled in the conversation of the escaped
20 Girondin deputies at Caen, and a young girl was excited by it to a desire to murder their enemy. Marie Anne Charlotte de Corday d'Armont, a descendant of the great dramatist Corneille, was born in 1768, and was therefore twenty-five when she met these escaped Girondins at Caen. She had been brought up in much
25 the same way as Madame Roland, whom she resembled in many ways, and had made Plutarch her favorite author. Many lovers have been attributed to her, from the Comte de Belzunce, murdered at Caen in a riot in 1789, to Barbaroux, the Girondin leader;

but the latest investigator of the subject has successfully disproved
30 all these legends, and has shown nearly with certainty that she was
in love with Charles Henry Bougon Longrais, an avocat and
native of Caen, who had been elected procureur-generalsyndic of
the Cavaldos in 1792, and was a Federalist. She was at Caen
when the Girondin deputies took up their abode there, and thought
35 it would be a noble deed to murder the man whom she heard them
abuse the most. She decided to go to Paris without informing any
one of her purpose, and obtained a letter of introduction from
Barbaroux to his friend and compatriot, the deputy Lauze-
Deperret. On arriving in Paris she went to see both Lauze-
40 Deperret and Fauchet, and got them to take her to the Conven-
tion, where, however, she failed to see the object of her hatred.
She then obtained his address, and purchased a knife in the Palais
Égalité, with which to slay her victim. She wrote a letter to
Marat, stating she had important news about the escaped deputies
45 to give him, to which she received no answer, and when she called
at his house on that and the following day, Simonne Évrard refused
to admit her. She then wrote to him a second time on July 13 :
"Citizen, I wrote to you yesterday and presented myself to your
door this morning. Did you receive my letter? If you have
50 received it I hope that you will not refuse to see me. I repeat to
you that I have important secrets to reveal to you, and can put
you in the way to serve the Republic. Further, it is enough for
me to inform you that I am unhappy, in order to hope that your
kind heart will not be insensible, and to have a right to your jus-
55 tice." This touching letter had its effect. When Charlotte Cor-
day called in the evening, Marat, sitting in his bath as he was
usual, ordered her to be admitted, and while he was writing down
the names of the deputies at Caen, she stabbed him in the throat
without speaking a word, and after one cry to Simonne Évrard for
60 assistance, he died.

This is the true story of the murder of Marat. Charlotte Cor-
day has been treated as a martyr; she was really guilty of a most
cold-blooded murder, which was productive of good to no one. . . .
She was tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal, found guilty, and
65 executed, on July 17, 1793, and was three months later followed

to the guillotine by Adam Lux, a young deputy for Mayence, who openly declared his admiration for her deed.

C.

Amongst those who had placed faith in the Girondists and their ideals was a young woman of Normandy, Charlotte Corday. Like them she had dreamed of the establishment of a republic founded on the political virtue and intelligence of the people; and when
5 the mob of Paris rose and drove with insult from the Convention those who in her eyes were the heroic defenders of the universal principles of truth and justice, she bitterly resented the wrong that had been done not only to the men themselves, but to that France of which she regarded them as the true representatives. Owing to
10 Marat's persistent cry for a dictatorship and for shedding of blood, it was he who, in the departments, was accounted especially responsible both for the expulsion of the Girondists and for the tyranny which now began to weigh as heavily upon the whole country as it had long weighed upon the capital. Incapable as all then were
15 of comprehending the causes which had brought about the fall of the Girondists, Charlotte Corday imagined that by putting an end to this man's life she could also put an end to the system of government which he advocated. Informing her friends that she wished to visit England, she left Caen and travelled in the diligence to Paris. On her arrival she purchased a knife, and after-
20 ward obtained entrance into Marat's house on the pretext that she brought news which she desired to communicate to him. She knew that he would be eager to obtain intelligence of the movements of the Girondist deputies still in Normandy. Marat was
25 ill at the time, and in a bath when Charlotte Corday was admitted. She gave him the names of the deputies who were at Caen. 'In a few days,' he said, as he wrote them hastily down, 'I will have them all guillotined in Paris.' As she heard these words she plunged the knife into his body and killed him on the spot (July
30 13). The cry uttered by the murdered man was heard, and Charlotte, who did not attempt to escape, was captured and conveyed to prison amid the murmurs of an angry crowd. It had been from

the first her intention to sacrifice her life for the cause of her country, and glorying in her deed, she met death with stoical indifference. 'I killed one man,' she said, when brought before the revolutionary court, 'in order to save the lives of 100,000 others.'

III.

The following little tale from Hans Christian Andersen illustrates some of the methods of making an improbable plot seem plausible. It also shows how a simple narrative may have an obvious plot. Notice that the point of view is all the time that of the storks, and that the boys are referred to in the briefest manner. The story has practically but one line of events. Note the regular development of the feelings that really form the basis of the plot: first fear, passing into a desire for revenge, which is intensified until it is suddenly changed in the *dénouement*. Observe how the real nature of the outcome is concealed until the climax is reached, line 165.

In order to understand the story it is of course necessary to know that in Denmark a child is told that its new brother or sister has been brought by the storks, and that all the storks are called Peter; also that the "grand review," and other stork-customs referred to in the story, have an existence in fact.

THE STORKS.

On the roof of a house situated at the extremities of a small town a stork's nest had been built. The Mamma Stork sat in the nest with her four little ones, who stretched out their heads with their little black beaks; for as yet they had not grown red. Not
5 far off, on the ridge of the roof, stood stiff and proud the Papa Stork; one leg he had drawn up under his body, so that one might suppose he was really a little tired with standing sentry. You would have thought he was carved out of wood, so still did he stand.

10 "It looks very consequential for my wife to have a sentry before the nest," thought he to himself; "for the people, of course, don't know that I am her husband, — they think, no doubt, that I have been ordered here as sentinel. And it looks so very grand!" And so he continued standing on one leg.

15 In the street below a whole troop of children were playing; and when they observed the Storks, one of the wildest of the boys began to sing the old song about young Storks which the children in Denmark sing, and all the rest immediately joined in chorus; but they did not repeat the words very correctly, and only just as
20 they could remember them:

Stork, Stork, long-legs,
What are you about?
Fly home to your eggs,
Your wife is in her nest here,
25 Your young are peeping out.
One we'll hang,
Then burn his brother;
We'll stick the third upon a spear,
And then we'll shoot the other."

30 "Only hear what the boys are singing!" said the little Storks; "they say we are to be burned and hanged!"

"Don't care what they say," said the Mamma Stork. "You need not to listen to them and then they will do you no harm."

But the boys kept on singing, and pointing at the Storks; one
35 boy only, whose name was Peter, said it was wicked to make fun of animals, and would have nothing to do with the matter.

The mamma consoled her little ones, and said, "Don't care about it; only look how quietly your father stands; and that, too, upon one leg!"

40 "But we are so frightened!" said the young Storks; and they drew their heads as far into the nest as they could.

The next day, when the children met again at play, they began the old song, as soon as they saw the Storks:

"One we'll hang,
And we'll burn his brother!"

"Shall we really be burned and hanged?" asked the little ones.

"What nonsense!" said the mother. "You shall learn to fly, and I will drill you. Then we'll go into the meadows and pay the frogs a visit. They bow to us in the water, and sing 'croak,'
50 croak'; and then we eat them. Oh, it will be so amusing!"

"And what then?" asked the little ones.

"Why, then all the storks of the whole neighborhood assemble, and the autumn manœuvres begin. One must be able to fly well then; for if one cannot, then comes the General and strikes it dead
55 with his beak. So pay attention when the drill begins, in order that you may learn something."

"Oh, then, we shall really be murdered," as the boys said! Oh, do hear! now they are singing it again!"

"Listen to me and not to them," said the Mamma Stork.
60 "After the great manœuvre, we fly away to the warmer countries; far, far from here, over the woods and the hills. We shall fly to Egypt, where the three-cornered stone houses are, whose tops reach the clouds. They are called Pyramids, and are older than any Stork can think. A river is there that overflows its banks, so
65 that the whole country is like a morass. Then one goes into the mud and eats frogs."

"Oh!" said all the little ones.

"Yes, that is so delightful! the whole day one does nothing but eat; and while we lead such a nice life, here in this country there
70 is not a green leaf on the trees. It is so cold here that the clouds freeze, and crack, and fall down in little white rags."

It was the snow she meant; but she could not express herself more plainly.

"Do the little naughty boys freeze and crack into bits, too?"
75 asked the young Storks.

"No they do not crack into bits quite, but very nearly; and they are obliged to stay in dark rooms, and sit in the chimney-corner. You, on the other hand, all that time can fly about in a foreign land, where there is warm sunshine, and where there are
80 flowers."

Some time had now passed, and the young ones were so large that they could stand up in the nest and look around. And Papa

Stork came every day with the very nicest little frogs, with snails, and all the tidbits that Storks like, which he could find. Oh, it
85 was extraordinary, what delicious morsels he got for them, and it was so droll to see him showing off his tricks. He put his head back quite on his tail, and made a noise with his bill like a rattle ; and then he told some pretty stories ; all stories about the marshes.

"Hark ye ! you must now learn to fly !" said the Mamma Stork
90 one day. On which all the four little ones were obliged to get out of the nest on the ridge of the roof. How they tottered ! how they balanced themselves with their wings ! and yet they very nearly tumbled down.

"Only look at me !" said their mother. "You must hold your
95 head so ! And put out your leg so ! And thus must you set your wings !. Now then ! One, two ! One, two ! That is what will help you on in the world !" And then off she flew a little way ; and the young storks made a little awkward jump, when — plump ! — there they lay ; for their bodies were so heavy.

100 "I don't want to fly, I cannot, it's no use trying," said one, and crept back again into the nest. "I do not care about seeing the warm countries."

"Will you, then, stay here and freeze to death when winter comes ? Shall the boys come and hang and burn and shoot you ;
105 just wait a minute till I go and call them !"

"Oh, don't !" said the little Stork, and began to hop about the roof like the others.

On the third day they really were able to fly a little ; and then they thought they could sit and rest in the air ; but — plump —
110 down they went, and were obliged to make use of their wings. Just then the boys went down the street, and sang the old song :

"Stork, Stork, long-legs !"

"Shall we fly down and pick out their eyes ?" said the young ones.

115 "No, leave them alone," said their mother. "Listen to me, that is much more important ! One, two, three ! To the right about, face ! One, two, three ! To the left about, face ! Round the chimney-pot ! You see, that was very well ! The last flap of

your wings was so exact, and so nicely done, that I will allow you
120 to go with me to-morrow to the marsh. Many highly respectable
Stork-families come there with their children ; now let me have the
satisfaction of hearing that mine are the nicest and best behaved
of all ; and stand upright, your chest forwards ! So ! — that looks
well and gives a sort of dignity ! ”

125 “ But are we to have no revenge at all on the wicked boys ? ”
asked the young Storks.

“ Let them sing as much as they like ! Why, you fly up to the
clouds, don’t you ? You go to the land of the Pyramids, while
they must freeze, and have neither a sweet apple nor a green leaf.”

130 “ But we will be revenged, though ! ” whispered they to each
other ; and then the drilling began again.

Of all the boys in the street, there was not one more naughty
in singing jeering songs than he who was the beginner of it all ;
and that was a little shrimp of a fellow not more than six years
135 old. The young Storks thought of course that he was a hundred
years old, for he was much bigger than their father or mother ;
and what did they know how old a child might be, or grown-up
people either ? All their rage was to fall on this boy, who had
begun to tease them, and always kept on singing his old song.
140 The young Storks were much excited ; and the bigger they grew,
the less could they put up with it ; so that at last their mother was
obliged to promise that they should have their revenge, but not
before the last day of their stay in the land.

“ We must first see, you know, how you go through the grand
145 review. If you behave ill so that the General sends his beak
through your body, then the boys will be right in one sense, after
all. Now let us see ! ”

“ You shall see,” said the young Storks ; and now, for the first
time, they really took pains ; they practiced every day, and flew
150 so lightly and prettily that it was quite a pleasure to see them.

Autumn came at last, and all the Storks assembled to fly away
to warmer lands while it is winter with us. That was a manœu-
vre. They stretched away over the fields and the woods, over
towns and villages, only to see how well they could fly ; for they
155 had a long journey before them. The young Storks got on so

capitally that on their testimonials was put, not only "praiseworthy," but "snake-and-frog-worthy" also. This was the best character they could have ; and now they might eat snakes and frogs, and they did so too.

160 "Now we will have our revenge," said they.

"Leave off talking of revenge," said the mother. "Listen to me, which is a great deal better. Do you not remember the good little boy who said, when the others sung, 'that it was a sin to make fun of the Storks' ; let us reward him, that is better than having

165 revenge."

"Yes, let us reward him," said the young Storks.

"He shall have, next summer, a nice little sister, such a beautiful little sister as never was seen ! Will not that be a reward for him ?" said the mother.

170 "It will," said the young ones.

"A sweet little sister he shall have," continued the mother.

"And as his name is Peter, you shall all be called Peter, too."

"Yes, but what shall we do with the good-for-nothing boy who began to jeer at us ?" cried all the young Storks at once.

175 "To him we will bring neither brother nor sister. What I have fixed on is best. I know where all the little babies lie till the Storks come and carry them to their parents. The nice little children sleep and have such beautiful dreams as they never have again. Now every parent wishes to have such a little child, and
180 all children wish for a brother or sister. We will fly to the pond, and for each of the children that did not sing the song nor laugh at the Storks, we will fetch one."

And what she said happened ; the little boy had the loveliest of little sisters next year ; and from that time all the Storks in
185 Denmark were named Peter, and they are called so to this very day.

CHAPTER III.

DESCRIPTION.

Definition. — Description is portrayal by means of language. In this definition the word portrayal is used in its primitive sense, *i.e.*, picturing. But, while only material objects can be pictured to the eye, description may present other subjects, chief among which are characters and mental states.

Description is more closely related to narration than to any other form of discourse.¹ One essential point of difference is that the element of time is present in narration but not in description. As strict portrayal, description can deal with an object only as it exists at one instant of time ; though processes of change are sometimes represented in pieces of discourse that must still be classed as description. Typical examples of narration and description differ widely : as, a novel, and the portrayal of a cathedral in a book of travels. In some cases, however, the two shade into each other. Narration may be employed as a means of description ; and description is necessary to the proper understanding of most narratives. It therefore happens that a piece of composition may sometimes seem to belong about equally to each. In such a case the question should be asked, What is the purpose of the work ? Did the writer intend primarily to create pictures in the minds of his readers, or to recount events ?

Where Found. — For reasons that will be seen later, description is not so important an independent form of discourse as narration. Very few, if any, works of great length are made up entirely of description. Its especial value is in combination

¹ See page 58.

with other forms. It is an indispensable adjunct of narration, and descriptive passages are common in works of exposition, argumentation, and persuasion. It makes up the greater part of books of travel, and such works are often classed as description. Short articles, perhaps the best types of pure description, are to be found in the literary magazines.

Of this class were the numerous articles on the art, architecture, etc., of the World's Fair ; also articles on cities, public buildings, and similar subjects.

Correspondence between Description and Painting. — The definition of description suggests those arts in connection with which the word portrayal is more commonly used. A comparison with one of these, while it can readily be pushed too far, may be valuable in showing the limitations of this form of discourse. Description resembles painting in several respects.

1. *Both deal with particular objects.* — A painting can represent, not oak trees or men in general, but a particular oak or a particular man. The same is true of description. Catalogues of general characteristics, such as are found in encyclopædias and scientific text-books, are often popularly called description, but are really exposition. (See page 170.)

This does not mean that an object described must have an exact counterpart in nature. Either the painter or the writer may conceive ideals and perpetuate them by means of his art ; but these, when expressed in colors or words, are as truly individuals as if they really existed.

2. *Both require attention to the point of view.* — In looking at any object, only part of its details can usually be seen from one standpoint, and from different standpoints the same details will appear differently, or in different proportions. Care should be taken in description as in painting to give no details that cannot be seen from one point of view, or else to make

clear the observer's change of position. The same object may of course be described several times, as when both exterior and interior views of a house are given ; but the separate pictures should be as distinct as so many photographs, and the changes in the point of view should be made perfectly plain.

Description allows of more freedom than painting, in that it may adopt a shifting point of view, as in describing the scenery along a stream or a road. This expedient generally interferes with vividness, and should be used only when treating an object so large or so peculiarly situated that it cannot be seen from any one point. Unless the observer moves in a straight line, it is almost impossible to make plain the relative positions of objects, and even in this simple case it is hard to give an accurate idea of relative distances. For this reason a shifting point of view is of most use in dynamic and suggestive description,¹ where the aim is to call to mind characteristics without reference to exact position and value.

Although the reader should always know the point of view, it is generally unnecessary to announce it definitely. It may be implied or hinted at, or left to be gathered from the description itself, as it is gathered from a painting.

Not only material objects, but characters and mental states, are looked at from certain points of view. This is recognized by the figurative use, in connection with immaterial things, of many expressions, such as "standpoint," "position," "view," "side" of a man's nature, etc. Thus, a description of a man's character from the standpoint of a business associate would speak of his habits of promptness and accuracy, his honesty, and his business foresight and judgment, — it would not deal with his religious beliefs or his minor morals, though these would be important from the standpoint of his pastor ; or with his domestic affections, his literary and artistic tastes, and other traits important in other connections.

¹ See pages 143-4.

What has been said on the point of view applies best to description that conforms closely to the definition, *i.e.*, that aims to present a picture of something to the mind. Descriptive writings intended solely to give matter-of-fact information sometimes consist of an enumeration of details, without reference to the observer's standpoint. Even in cases of this kind, the exception is often more apparent than real. The subjects of such descriptions are usually large or complex objects, and often, as in bounding and describing a state, both writer and reader will have in mind, not the object itself, but a map or chart of it ; or, as in case of a complex machine, the description will imply a continually changing point of view, such as would be adopted by one actually examining such an object. When the aim of the writer is to produce the impression of a bewildering confusion, the point of view is purposely disregarded.

In the following, which illustrates the use of a shifting point of view, note that no accurate or complete representation of the country is attempted. The details chosen are largely suggestive incidents of the journey, and they give only a general idea of the changes in the desert scenery, and no full picture of the view at any one place, except at the very outset where the point of view is fixed.

"Before him was the sun, half curtained in fleecy mist ; before him also spread the desert ; not the realm of drifting sands, which was farther on, but the region where the herbage began to dwarf ; where the surface is strewn with boulders of granite, and gray and brown stones, interspersed with languishing acacias, and tufts of camel-grass. The oak, bramble, and arbutus lay behind, as if they had come to a line, looked over into the well-less waste, and crouched with fear.

"And now there was an end of path or road. . . . Dried leaves in occasional beds rustled under foot. Sometimes a perfume like absinthe sweetened all the air. Lark and chat and rock-swallow leaped to wing, and white partridges ran whistling and clucking out of the way. More rarely a fox or a hyena quickened his gallop to study the intruders at a safe distance. Off to the right rose the hills of the Jebel, the pearl-gray veil resting

upon them changing momentarily into a purple which the sun would make matchless a little later. Over their highest peaks a vulture sailed on broad wings into widening circles. . . .

"As one of the results of the rapid advance, the face of the landscape underwent a change. The Jebel stretched along the western horizon like a pale-blue ribbon. A *tell*, or hummock of clay and cemented sand, arose here and there. Now and then basaltic stones lifted their round crowns, outposts of the mountains against the forces of the plains; all else, however, was sand, sometimes smooth as the beaten beach, then heaped in rolling ridges; here chopped waves, there long swells. So, too, the condition of the atmosphere changed. The sun, high risen, had drunk his fill of dew and mist, and warmed the breeze that kissed the wanderer under the awning; far and near he was tinting the earth with faint milk-whiteness and shimmering all the sky.

"Two hours more passed without rest or deviation from the course. Vegetation entirely ceased. The sand, so crusted on the surface that it broke into rattling flakes at every step, held undisputed sway. The Jebel was out of view and there was no landmark visible."

3. *Both need attention to perspective.* — In viewing a complex object from any position, some details will stand out more prominently than others. Some will be indistinct in the background, some clear in the foreground; some obscure in shadow, some plain in high light. The painter will represent the most noticeable parts with great care and faithfulness; but he will also give the more obscure parts in their relative importance. A writer of description should, if possible, do the same. He can necessarily give but few things minutely, and he should be certain that his selections are wisely made. In a full and complete description he should also introduce, though in a hurried and indistinct way, the less important features, — those that make the background of the scene. If he fails to do this, the reader will see only a few scattered high lights — no complete picture; or he will be compelled to fill in the details from his

own imagination. But since the limitations of description are so great, these lesser details must often be omitted, and the laws of perspective applied only in the choice of particulars. Often the less important parts may be suggested by those that are given. In describing a character, traits that would not necessarily be thought of in viewing a person from the standpoint chosen may give an effect resembling that of the background to a picture.

In the description on page 116 note how, in the first paragraph, the setting is given by the reference : "the realm of drifting sands, which was farther on," and "The oak, bramble, and arbutus lay behind." Even in the more hurried parts of the description, where the details are all chosen from the immediate foreground, reference is three times made to the Jebel in the background.

Differences between Description and Painting. — Although there are many points of similarity between description and painting, there are also important differences. These are due to differences in the media employed for conveying the impression to the mind, — language and color. When we look at a painting, we see it all at once. We may take in the general effect by a comprehensive view, or we may study part by part and return at will to features that have been previously considered. In description, on the other hand, but one sentence or section of a sentence can be before the mind at any one instant; and a part of the picture can be reinspected only by recalling it through the memory or, if the discourse is written, by the unsatisfactory process of rereading. It is evident, therefore, that description can utilize only so many details as the reader can hold in mind at once and build into a picture. Some critics have held that the restrictions imposed on description are so severe that a writer should never attempt portrayal except by indirect methods, such as suggestion or narration. This position is extreme; but the limitations of description as

compared with other arts should be carefully borne in mind. For a critical discussion of this matter the student is referred to Lessing's "Laocoön."

A comparison between the impressions formed by description and those produced by painting shows the following points of difference :

1. *The impressions produced on the mind by description are less vivid.* — The power to see with the mind's eye depends on the strength of the imagination, and varies greatly with different individuals. Not all persons can realize a vivid picture even from the remembered details of a familiar object, and most will find the images called up by description somewhat vague. Even when these seem vivid, they will often be dispelled by an attempt to analyze the pictures or consider their details.

2. *The pictures produced by description are less true and distinct in detail.* — A painting of any object, as a building, gives as many and as minute details as can be seen from the point of view chosen by the artist. A description of the same object can give only a few important particulars. The minor details, such as the number of panes in the windows, or the peculiar curves of the cornice, must be supplied, at least in a vague and indistinct way, before the picture can be at all complete. They will, in the absence of definite knowledge, generally be filled in from similar features of other buildings familiar to the reader, and will more likely be wrong than right. If, on the other hand, an attempt is made to give these details in the description, the result will be a confused jumble.

3. *Description can portray some things impossible in painting.* — Painting is absolutely confined to the representation of objects as they are at one instant of time. It can give the effect of motion only by some artifice, often a conventional one. Thus, the attitude of an animal may show that it is running; the smoke streaming back over a train, or animals in the act of running before it may suggest that it is moving. Description, however,

may convey the idea of motion by referring to the movement itself ; and in case of some subjects, such as a falling body or a ball thrown through the air, its superiority over painting is very great.

Description can also succeed better than painting in calling to mind the existence of invisible objects or hidden causes. While portrayal includes, strictly, the mention of only those things that can be seen from the writer's standpoint, it may fairly hint at an explanation of the phenomena that it presents. If a writer pictures a swaying curtain, he may give the cause of its motion, and thus suggest what it conceals.

While painting can represent only those characteristics of an object that are perceived by the eye, description may give those that appeal to hearing and the lower senses. From the nature of the sensations, and the limitations of the vocabulary by which they are expressed, descriptions of flavors, odors, and perceptions of touch must usually be brief and general. Characteristics of this kind may be valuable accessories to a portrayal of visible characteristics ; but the advantage of description in being able to represent them is not so great as might at first be thought.

Painting and description are on common ground only when representing material objects. In the portrayal of characters or mental states, description has great advantages over unaided painting.

The superiority of description to other arts is most noticeable in those forms that approach nearest to narration or that are mingled with it.

Subjects better Suited to Painting than to Description. — From the differences just discussed we may infer that some subjects are better adapted for painting than for description, and should, if possible, be avoided by writers. Such are material objects that require the enumeration of many details or great accuracy in the representation. The free use of pictures

and diagrams in scientific works is due to the fact that descriptions of a complex body are very unsatisfactory.

Subjects better Suited to Description than to Painting. — Some classes of subjects are better suited to description than to painting. Such are :

1. *Those that would repel if too vivid.* — Horrible or disagreeable objects, if accurately represented in a painting, may be disgusting. In the less vivid presentation afforded by description, they may still be painful, but only painful enough to be fascinating, and so interest the reader in the purpose for which they were told. It is possible for even descriptions of such objects to be too vivid.

Such are scenes of torture, intense suffering, degradation, etc. If told with only the proper degree of vividness, the horror rouses our indignation or sympathy. The sight of the objects themselves, or of a lifelike painting of them, might call forth such strong abhorrence or disgust as to exclude all other emotions. To many persons, paintings and carvings of Christ on the cross, and especially of the *pietà*, are somewhat repulsive ; but no such effect is produced by the account of the crucifixion in the gospels.

When the offensive characteristics appeal, not to sight, but to hearing, smell, or taste, description may be more vivid than painting, and a writer must be careful not to shock his readers too severely. This caution is disregarded in some of Poe's prose descriptions, to which it is not necessary to refer more definitely.

2. *Those that would lose poetic beauty or grandeur if too vivid.* — Some imaginary or poetic conceptions depend for their power on their vagueness. Any attempt to give them definite limitations of form, size, or color is fatal. Such subjects are admirably adapted for portrayal by language. Descriptions of them, as of objects that would be disgusting, may be made too vivid.

Among objects of this kind are fairies, angels, and other imaginary or supernatural beings which are supposed to be beau-

tiful or pleasing. The fairy folk in "Midsummer Night's Dream" may serve as an example. In regard to their size, we are told that

" . . . all their elves, for fear,
Creep into acorn-cups and hide them there " ;

among the occupations of fairies mentioned are to

" . . . hang a pearl in every cowslip's ear,"

and to

" . . . kill cankers in the musk-rose buds,
Some, war with rere-mice [bats] for their leathern wings
To make my small elves coats " ;

and Oberon says :

" . . . the snake throws her enamell'd skin
Weed wide enough to wrap a fairy in."

On the other hand, Titania, queen of the fairies, has as her attendant,

" A lovely boy stol'n from an Indian king."

She is jealous of her husband, Oberon, and "the bouncing Amazon" Hippolyta ; and she herself can hold Bottom's head in her lap, though at the same time she orders for his refreshment "the honey-bags from the humble-bees." These passages are so scattered through the dream-like story of the play that they arouse no protest on the ground of inconsistency, and may pass almost unnoticed. A painting of the fairies would necessarily represent them as of some definite size, either large or small, and in connection with some references in the play would seem ridiculous. It may be remarked, in passing, that the same objections apply to a representation of this play on the stage.

Supernatural beings calculated to inspire a vague sense of terror or admiration, or those that possess extraordinary attributes, generally lose by a tangible representation. Thus, mediæval pictures of the Devil seem rather ridiculous than awe-inspiring. Illustrations of Milton's "Paradise Lost" are often criticised for attempting the impossible. See also, on paintings of the gods in Homer, Lessing's "Laocoön," chap. XII.

The appearance of fictitious heroes and heroines may also be mentioned in this connection. It has been said that if Homer had left us an exact picture of Helen as he conceived her, we might not find the *Iliad* so interesting as it is now ; but he has given only a few general descriptive terms, and each succeeding age has imagined her a woman beautiful according to its own standards.

3. *There are some classes of objects for whose representation description is so obviously superior to painting that it is hardly necessary to mention them.* — Such are characters, mental states, moving objects, unless the motion is one that painting can suggest by some conventional device, and those that require an appeal to senses other than sight. In treating the last-named class, when exact information is required, a picture or diagram is often presented, and the characteristics of sound, odor, taste, or touch are given in an accompanying description. Examples of this may be found in many scientific works.

Problems of Description. — In some respects description is the most difficult form of discourse. In any attempt to portray an object by means of language, various problems will arise, some of the most common of which will be considered in the following pages. For convenience, they will be discussed in three groups, corresponding to the kinds of subjects that may be chosen for description, *i.e.*, material objects, characters, mental states.

Material Objects. — In describing material objects there may arise (1) problems of extension, (2) problems of form and position, (3) problems of color, light and shade, and (4) problems of sound, touch, odor, and taste.

1. *Problems of extension.* — In description, difficulty will sometimes be found in giving ideas of distance or of size.

In representing ordinary distances, that is, such as are often seen and judged by the readers, the best way is generally to

give the measure in linear units. The unit employed should, if possible, be the one most familiar to the readers. A distance that a rifleman would estimate in yards would be best comprehended by a farmer if expressed in rods, or by a railroad engineer if given in feet.

Familiar dimensions may be hard to realize if the circumstances are peculiar, or the directions are unfamiliar. Distances on the water are misleading to one who has estimated them only on the land. Before the World's Fair it was difficult for many persons to realize how long the Manufactures Building would really seem, when told that it would measure one-third of a mile, though they could easily realize one-third of a mile along a road. Considerable distances are hard to imagine if measured vertically, though they give no trouble horizontally. In such cases dimensions are best expressed, whenever possible, by comparison. Thus, one church-spire may be compared with another, better known, or the width of a river with that of a stream near at hand.

In speaking of distances traveled, the length of time taken to traverse them by some familiar means of locomotion may be given. This was the old way, but the "day's journey" has largely been superseded by more exact units. In telling of a view, the appearance of remote objects may be used to give an idea of long distances.

The most difficult distances to represent are those so great as to be beyond human experience. Modern facilities for communication have made it possible to conceive distances on the earth's surface, if not in miles, at least in days or weeks of travel; but the immense depths of space are entirely outside experience. One way of representing these distances is to give their measurements in terms of a long unit, such as the radius of the earth's orbit, or the distance to the nearest fixed star. This is the usual method in scientific works. In popular writings it is necessary to stimulate the imagination as much as

possible. This is often done by supposing the distance to be traveled by something, — as an express train, a cannon-ball, or an electric impulse.

The following, from a newspaper report of a popular lecture, illustrates how such an appeal to the imagination may be made :

“ The sun is a long way off, 93,000,000 miles. Now multiply this by 200,000 and the result is, roughly speaking, 20,000,000,000,000; and this is the distance we are from Alpha Centauri [the nearest fixed star]. Take the speed of an electric current, which is nearly the same as that of light — 180,000 miles a second ; suppose a message to be sent at this speed from a point on the earth’s surface, it would go seven times around the earth in one second. Again, let it be supposed that messages were sent off to the different heavenly bodies. To reach the moon at this rate it would take about one second. In eight minutes a message would get to the sun, and, allowing for a couple of minutes’ delay, one could send a message to the sun and get an answer back all within twenty minutes. But to reach Alpha Centauri it would take three years ; and as this is the nearest of the stars, what time would it take to get to the others ? If, when Wellington won the battle of Waterloo in 1815, the news had been telegraphed off immediately, there are some stars so remote that it would not yet have reached them. To go a step farther, if in 1066 the result of the Conquest had been wired to some of these stars, the message would still be on its way. If the tidings of the first Christmastide in Bethlehem had been sent to the stars, there are some orbs, situated in the furthest depths of space, which could not receive the message for a long time yet.”

The size of regular surfaces may be expressed in linear measure ; as one may speak of a table two feet by four, or a circle three inches in diameter. Units of square measure may sometimes be used, — especially the acre, which has no linear equivalent, — but are less familiar, and produce much less vivid effects. “ A circle containing ten square inches,” to most persons calls up a picture only after a mathematical computation. Cubic

measure is, on the whole, still less familiar, though some units of contents, such as the quart, gallon, bushel, etc., are well known. Multiples of these units are not easily realized, except by those who have had much practice with them. A farmer or a grain-dealer might get a definite idea from the description, "a cubical box that would hold twenty bushels," but it would be clearer, if not so exact, to say, "a box three feet on each side"; even though most persons know the size of a single bushel. The dimensions of a regular solid should usually be given in linear measure.

In describing an irregular surface or solid, recourse should be had to comparison. This is a common way of expressing size, as will be seen by recalling such phrases as "the size of a hen's egg," "as large as my hand." The object chosen for comparison should be familiar to the readers, and will serve the purpose best if its form resembles that of the object compared.

While the most difficult distances to represent are those too great for easy comprehension, the hardest dimensions of size are those too small to be readily conceived. We can judge of objects that can be seen by the naked eye, but below this limit most persons have little conception of size. Minute dimensions may be given in fractions of an inch, but comparisons that appeal to the imagination are more forcible. Favorite methods are to tell how many objects may be picked up on the point of a needle, how many placed side by side would make up the breadth of a human hair, etc.

In the following descriptions of bacteria, though no special devices for stimulating the imagination are used, note how much more forcible is the method of expressing size than a simple fraction would have been.

"It would require 25,000 of these spherical cells placed in a row, or the same number of longer ones placed side by side, to make up a chain or band one inch in length."

"Little, colorless, rod-like plants so small that even many thousands of them piled together would make a heap still far too small to be visible to the naked eye."

2. *Problems of form and position.* — A few common regular forms, such as the square and the circle in plane figures, and the cube and cone in solids, are known by their names. Less common terms, such as rhombus or trapezoid, can be safely used only when writing for a select class of readers. In most cases the best way to express form is by comparison with some known object. This method is so common that many compound adjectives, such as egg-shaped and kite-shaped, have become established in the language.

It is often difficult to express clearly and correctly the relative positions of objects. When they form the outline of any regular figure the problem is simple ; but often it is difficult to find any familiar outline with which they may be compared. Even a slightly strained comparison is, however, better than a continued use of the terms above and below, right and left, north and south, etc. A free use of these terms of direction may give the information necessary to draw a map or chart, but it will generally be so confusing that the chart cannot be constructed mentally.

An exercise that will illustrate the foregoing is to drop five or six beans or other small objects on a level surface, or to make the same number of dots at random on the blackboard, and describe their relative positions, using only adverbs and other words of relation ; then describe again, trying to find apt comparisons for the outline formed.

A famous example of the representation of position by comparison is Victor Hugo's description of the battlefield of Waterloo, which he likens to a capital letter *A*.

3. *Problems of color, light and shade.* — In attempting to describe the color of an object, especial regard must be had to

the readers for whom the work is intended. Many tests show that among the male population of this country knowledge of colors is extremely slight. The terms green, red, blue, and yellow are generally understood ; but probably the other colors of the spectrum, and certainly other shades and tints, cannot safely be designated by name in a work intended for average readers. Women are much better educated in the matter of color than are men, mainly, no doubt, on account of their habits of dress. In a work intended exclusively for them, such as an article in a fashion magazine, a freer use of the names of colors might be made. When a color cannot be designated by name it may be expressed by a combination of familiar terms, — as, a reddish yellow, a greenish brown ; or a comparison may be made with the color of something well known. The last-named method is very effective if a good object for comparison can be found.

Important as light and shade are in painting, they can receive but little attention in description. This is due, partly to the fact that they are really something apart from the object, and hence, in the analysis implied by description, unnecessary ; partly to the difficulty of describing them. General effects, as of darkness or of moonlight, may be suggested, but the details of alternating light and shade, so effective in painting, should not be attempted in description. The same is true of color when there is a complex variegation.

In the following vivid description of a suite of apartments, notice how simple are the means of presentation employed. Colors are represented only by the words blue, purple, green, etc. ; details of light and shade are left to the imagination of the reader, who is able to judge of them by knowing from what direction the light comes. The writer aims, by great plainness, and by stimulating the imagination in various ways, to portray general effects, and succeeds. Even a few minor details would probably have rendered the picture confusing.

"To the right and left, in the middle of each wall, a tall and narrow Gothic window looked out upon a closed corridor, which pursued the windings of the suite. These windows were of stained glass whose color varied in accordance with the prevailing hue of the decorations of the chamber into which it opened. That at the eastern extremity was hung, for example, in blue—and vividly blue were its windows. The second chamber was purple in its ornaments and tapestries, and here the panes were purple. The third was green throughout, and so were the casements. The fourth was furnished and lighted with orange—the fifth with white—the sixth with violet. The seventh apartment was closely shrouded in black velvet tapestries that hung all over the ceiling and down the walls, falling in heavy folds upon a carpet of the same material and hue. But in this chamber, only, the color of the windows failed to correspond with the decorations. The panes here were scarlet—a deep blood color. Now in no one of the seven apartments was there any lamp or candelabrum, amid the profusion of golden ornaments that lay scattered to and fro, or depended from the roof. There was no light of any kind emanating from lamp or candle within the suite of chambers. But in the corridors that followed the suite, there stood, opposite to each window, a heavy tripod, bearing a brazier of fire that projected its rays through the tinted glass and so glaringly illuminated the room. And thus were produced a multitude of gaudy and fantastic appearances. But in the western or black chamber, the effect of the firelight that streamed through the blood-tinted panes was ghastly in the extreme."

In the following, more details of varying light and shade are given than is usual, and also much of color. The writer seems to imply that the physical features of the landscape are known to the reader, and really describes little else than the play of light and color. In spite of the word-painting and other stimulants to the imagination, one who is not familiar with the Roman Campagna will probably find the picture somewhat confusing.

"It had been wild weather when I left Rome, and all across the Campagna the clouds were sweeping in sulphurous blue, with a clap of thunder or two, and breaking gleams of sun along the

Claudian aqueduct, lighting up the infinity of its arches like the bridge of chaos. But as I climbed the long slope of the Alban Mount, the storm swept finally to the north, and the noble outlines of the domes of Albano, and graceful darkness of its ilex grove, rose against pure streaks of alternate blue and amber ; the upper sky gradually flushing through the last fragments of rain-cloud in deep palpitating azure, half ether and half dew. The noon-day sun came slanting down the rocky slopes of La Riccia, and its masses of entangled and tall foliage, whose autumnal tints were mixed with the wet verdure of a thousand evergreens, were penetrated with it as with rain. I cannot call it color, it was conflagration. Purple, and crimson and scarlet, like the curtains of God's tabernacle, the rejoicing trees sank into the valley in showers of light, every separate leaf quivering with buoyant and burning life ; each, as it turned to reflect or to transmit the sunbeam, first a torch and then an emerald. . . . Every glade of grass burned like the golden floor of heaven, opening in sudden gleams as the foliage broke and closed above it, as sheet-lightning opens in a cloud at sunset ; the motionless masses of dark rock — dark though flushed with scarlet lichen, — casting their quiet shadows across its restless radiance, the fountain underneath them filling its marble hollow with blue mist and fitful sound, and over all — the multitudinous bars of amber and rose, the sacred clouds that have no darkness, and only exist to illumine, were seen in fathomless intervals between the solemn and orbed repose of the stone pines, passing to lose themselves in the last, white, blinding lustre of the measureless line where the Campagna melted into the blaze of the sea."

4. *Problems of sound, touch, odor, and taste.* — It has already been said that description is able to represent those characteristics of an object that appeal to senses other than sight. Of these sound is the most important, and is capable of the most effective treatment.

In simple sounds we may distinguish loudness or intensity, pitch, and quality ; sounds also have length, or duration ; and when two or more tones are heard together there is harmony

or discord. The vocabulary for representing these characteristics, and especially varieties of intensity, pitch, and quality, is very complete, and may be enlarged somewhat indefinitely by using words in figurative senses

Sounds are more easily described than visible objects, because the medium employed (language) itself appeals to the sense of hearing. A great proportion of the words that represent sounds or qualities of sounds have an imitative effect; such are bang, crash, murmur, hum, whisper, etc.; and by skillful collocation imitative phrases and clauses may be formed. The best examples of these are to be found in poetry, but they are also common in prose.

Although it is possible to portray any sound with a fair degree of accuracy by simply using descriptive nouns and adjectives, this method may be varied or supplemented by comparisons. Some few stock expressions are to be carefully avoided, however. To liken every loud noise to thunder, or "the roar of battle" is to weaken rather than strengthen the effect.

The most striking and effective representations of sound are mostly to be found in poetry. In prose such descriptions are generally short and suggestive. Those that follow are taken from two pages of the "Autocrat of the Breakfast Table." They are chosen as typical, rather than as showing how powerful such presentations may be. Markedly imitative words are italicized.

"The *pulsating lullaby* of the evening crickets . . . the *purring* of these little creatures, which mingled with the *batrachian hymns* from the neighboring swamp."

"A deep *muffled roar*, which *rose* and *fell*, not *loud*, but *vast*, a whistling boy would have drowned it for his next neighbor, but it must have been heard over the space of a hundred square miles. . . . Could it be the *roar* of the thousand wheels and the ten thousand footsteps *jarring* and *tramping* along the stones of the neighboring city?"

"*Mingling* with these inarticulate sounds in the *low murmurs of memory*, are the echoes of certain voices I have heard at rare intervals."

"Voices at once *thin* and *strenuous* — *acidulous* enough to produce effervescence with alkalis, and *stridulous* enough to sing duets with the katydids."

The next selection illustrates the use of apt comparison. Examples of this method are very common where brief representations of sound are introduced in narration.

"Through the open ports, as we lie down to sleep, comes a great whispering — the whispering of the seas: sounds *as of articulate speech under the breath, as of women telling secrets.*"

Some qualities revealed by touch — as form and size — can also be perceived by sight; others, as smoothness, hardness, moisture, or temperature, may or may not be perceptible to the eye. Sensations of touch can generally be indicated by adjectives applicable to the object felt. Comparisons may also be used.

The simple terms that describe odors are very few. The most common classification is into agreeable and disagreeable. There are also a few rather comprehensive adjectives, such as fetid or pungent, that may be used. The most common and most satisfactory way of representing the odor of any substance is by comparing it with that of something else. Both literature and ordinary conversation furnish so many examples of this that illustrations are unnecessary.

The following illustrate methods of representing odors, and also the limitations of these methods. The second example seems especially unsatisfactory, yet there is probably no better way of describing an unfamiliar odor than that employed by the writer.

"These green oranges have a delicious perfume and an amazing juiciness. Peeling one of them is sufficient to perfume the hands for the rest of the day, however often one may choose to use soap and water. We smoke Porto Rico cigars, and drink West Indian

lemonades strongly flavored with rum. The tobacco has a rich, sweet taste ; the rum is velvety, sugary, with a pleasant, soothing effect : both have a delicious aroma. There is a pleasurable originality about the flavor of these products — a uniqueness which certifies irrefutably to their naïf purity: something as opulent and frank as the juices and odors of tropical fruits and flowers.”

“ And everywhere and always, through sunshine or shadow, comes to you the scent of the city, the characteristic odor of St. Pierre, a pleasant smell that reminds you in some indefinable way of the *taste* of asparagus — a compound odor suggesting the intermingling also of sugar and garlic in those strange tropical dishes which Creoles love.”

To many persons, odors have a greater power of suggestiveness than do the qualities that affect the other senses. Conversely, reference to the things with which particular odors are associated may make it easier to recall the odors themselves. As these associations are mainly individual matters, it is not often possible to take advantage of them in writing for general readers.

Such an appeal to possible associations seems to be made in the following stanza — with what success different readers must judge for themselves. The stanza is often praised. Notice that the perfume is not described by any adjective except *shredded*, and that the comparison is not one that would be likely to appeal to the reader's experience.

“ And strew faint sweetness from some old
Egyptian's fine, worm-eaten shroud
Which breaks to dust when once unrolled ;
Or shredded perfume, like a cloud
From closet long to quiet vowed,
With moth and dropping arras hung,
Mouldering her lute and books among,
As when a queen, long dead, was young.”

Flavors are classified with little more definiteness than odors. Those commonly recognized are sweet, sour, salt, and bitter. As with odors, they are best designated by comparison.

Neither odors nor flavors can readily be imagined unless they have been experienced ; and then they are generally remembered as attributes of the subject to which they belong, not as independent sensations. Any attempt to portray them by combinations of descriptive terms is likely to be useless.

Characters. — Descriptions of characters are much more difficult than those of material objects. This is due partly to the vagueness and inaccuracy of the vocabulary that must be used, partly to the nature of the subject itself. The character of any person is not perceived directly by the senses, as is a material object, but is inferred from many signs. Probably no man ever lived concerning whose character all his acquaintances would exactly agree. The same difficulties that make it hard to judge character also lie in the way of clearly expressing it. Since the problems of character-description differ in almost every case, and cannot well be classified, the subject will be discussed with reference to methods of portrayal. The following are the principal ways in which character may be described :

1. *By descriptive terms.* — If the vocabulary that could be used were exhaustive and exact, this would be the best way of describing character ; but the words that express mental and moral qualities and attributes of men are among the vaguest in the language. Such terms as noble, generous, or treacherous are not only so inclusive as to cover widely differing grades of characteristics, but they may mean different things to men with different standards. This method should, therefore, be depended upon only when a brief indication of character is all that is required.

When a person is referred to for the first time in history, fiction, or other discourse, a few descriptive adjectives are often prefixed to the name, or an appositional or relative clause is added to give an indication of his character. Examples of this are too common to quote. The following selections will give an idea how

this method is used in the body of a discourse. The first is very brief, the others somewhat more extended. In all these cases the portrayal is completed, either immediately or in a later part of the work, by details of other kinds.

"Col. Pyncheon, as we gather from whatever traits of him are preserved, was characterized by an iron energy of purpose. Mathew Maule, on the other hand, though an obscure man, was stubborn in the defense of what he considered his right."

"Endowed with common-sense, as massive and hard as blocks of granite, fastened together by stern rigidity of purpose, as with iron clamps, he followed out his original design, probably without so much as imagining an objection to it. On the score of delicacy, or any scrupulousness which a finer sensibility might have taught him, the Colonel, like most of his breed and generation, was impenetrable."

"In that part of the western division of this kingdom which is commonly called Somersetshire there lately lived, and perhaps lives still, a gentleman whose name was Allworthy, and who might well be called the favorite of both nature and fortune ; for both of these seem to have contended which should bless and enrich him most. In this contention, nature may seem to some to have come off victorious, as she bestowed on him many gifts, while fortune had only one gift in her power ; but in pouring forth this, she was so very profuse, that others perhaps may think this single endowment to have been more than equivalent to all the various blessings which he enjoyed from nature. From the former of these, he derived an agreeable person, a sound constitution, a solid understanding, and a benevolent heart ; by the latter, he was decreed to the inheritance of one of the largest estates in the county."

2. *By describing personal appearance.*— This method is insufficient in itself, but is very valuable in connection with other ways of portraying character. Its importance should be approximately the same as is ascribed to personal appearance when an estimate of character is to be formed in real life. If the character and the personal appearance do not correspond,

the latter may be given, and the unexpected traits emphasized by contrast.

Under personal appearance are included not only stature and facial expressions, but dress, ornaments, etc. The value of these is expressed in the remark of Ruskin, "Tell me what you like and I'll tell you what you are." Other things chosen by a person, such as the furnishings of his home, may be useful in the same way.

Any novel will furnish examples of more or less extended descriptions of physical appearance, introduced mainly to give the reader an opportunity to judge of the characters of persons in the story. New persons are generally introduced with such a description, which is followed and completed by an account of actions and words. For examples, see the note to the next paragraph.

The names of persons in fiction are sometimes chosen to convey an impression of their characters — as, Hotspur, Gradgrind.

3. *By narrating actions or quoting words.* — This plan, like the preceding, describes character by giving the reader the facts from which he would judge a person in real life, and letting him draw his own inferences. The actions chosen may be habitual, illustrating the ordinary workings of mind and conscience ; or they may be unusual, showing unsuspected traits of character that could be brought out only by extraordinary occasions.

In Shakespeare's tragedy of "Othello" the nobility of the Moor and the generous and kindly qualities of Cassio are shown by their habitual acts ; the jealous disposition of the former is unsuspected, till it is brought out by the extraordinary circumstances that result in extraordinary actions ; and the weaknesses of the latter are developed only in the drinking scene. Dickens was so much in the habit of making prominent the habitual actions of his characters, that it has been said that each person is labeled with a trade-mark.

More analytical novelists, like Hawthorne, or George Eliot when dealing with her leading characters, present unusual actions, showing latent and unsuspected traits. See the presentation of Rev. Dimmesdale in the "Scarlet Letter," or Tito in "Romola."

The following selections illustrate a combination of methods in which personal appearance is given first and actions and words—here habitual—afterward. This is a very common treatment, and corresponds in arrangement to the order of events in meeting a new acquaintance and judging of his character.

In the first quotation the aim is to give a semi-humorous effect, and only a list of characteristics is given. The second takes the more common form. Portrayal of character is not the sole object of this description.

"My landlady's daughter. Aet. 19+. Tender-eyed blonde. Long ringlets. Cameo pin. Gold pencil-case on a chain. Locket. Bracelet. Album. Autograph book. Accordion. Reads Byron, Tupper, and Sylvanus Cobb, Jr., while her mother makes the puddings. Says 'yes?' when you tell her anything."

"She was not more than fifteen. Her form, voice, and manner belonged to the period of transition from girlhood. Her face was perfectly oval, her complexion more pale than fair. The nose was faultless; the lips, slightly parted, were full and ripe, giving to the lines of the mouth warmth, tenderness, and trust; the eyes were blue and large, and shaded by drooping lids and long lashes; and, in harmony with all, a flood of golden hair, in the style permitted to Jewish brides, fell unconfined down her back to the pillow on which she sat. The throat and neck had the downy softness sometimes seen, which leaves the artist in doubt whether it is an effect of contour or color. To these charms of feature and person were added others more indefinable—an air of purity which only the soul can impart, and of abstraction natural to such as think much on things impalpable. Often, with trembling lips, she raised her eyes to heaven, itself not more deeply blue; often she crossed her hands upon her breast, as in adoration or prayer; often she raised her head, like one listening eagerly for a calling voice."

4. *By giving personal history.* — By this is meant the recounting of such facts regarding ancestry, education, and experience as will be helpful to the reader in forming an estimate of character, especially by enabling him to interpret correctly personal appearance and actions. This is another method that has its counterpart in the processes by which we judge of persons in real life. It may be used in combination with any or all of the other methods that have been discussed. It is the prevailing plan in those sketches that lie on the border-line between biography and description — in which much is told of history and actions, but for the purpose of showing character and its development.

The following sentences from the introduction to the "Scarlet Letter" are interspersed with other details of personal appearance, actions, etc. Taken alone, they would give little real idea of the character, but in their context they are very valuable.

"The father of the Custom House — the patriarch, not only of this little squad of officials, but, I am bold to say, of the respectable body of tide-waiters all over the United States — was a certain permanent Inspector. He might truly be termed a legitimate son of the revenue system, dyed in the wool, or rather, born in the purple; since his sire, a Revolutionary colonel, and formerly collector of the port, had created an office for him and appointed him to fill it, at a period of the early ages which few living men can now remember. This Inspector, when I first knew him, was a man of four-score years, or thereabouts, and certainly one of the most wonderful specimens of winter-green that you would be likely to discover in a lifetime's search. . . . The careless security of his life in the Custom House, on a regular income, and with but slight and infrequent apprehensions of removal, had no doubt contributed to make time pass lightly over him. . . . He had been the husband of three wives, all long since dead; the father of twenty children, most of whom, at every age of childhood or maturity, had likewise returned to dust. Here, one would suppose, might have been sorrow enough to imbue the sunniest disposition through and through with a sable tinge. Not so," etc.

5. *By describing the direct influence of one person on another.*—

A personality, especially a strong one, sometimes impresses another directly,—that is, independently, so far as can be seen, of personal appearance, actions, words, etc. This peculiar influence explains many friendships and hatreds that seem strange. Such impressions are often mere prejudices, and should not be trusted very far ; but rarely, strong or peculiar characters may be portrayed by showing how they affect others susceptible to their influence.

For an illustration, see the selection from Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, page 96. This is an extreme example, since the character introduced in this passage is represented as wholly devoid of moral qualities.

Mental States.—Mental states are the most difficult subjects for description. The reasons for this are similar to those that make descriptions of character hard. The whole popular psychological vocabulary is confusing and inexact. This is due in part to the nature of the subject. No one can really know of the mental processes of any one but himself. Such words as joy or anger may not mean the same to any two persons. We can judge only from indications, such as similarity in the causes and in the resulting actions, that the mental experiences of other persons resemble our own. Moreover, mental phenomena are very difficult of classification, and the terms that are popularly understood are so inclusive that they cannot be either vivid or exact; while many of those that are used in technical or restricted senses are defined differently by different writers.

Descriptions of mental states can rarely be full, and usually should be only brief, happily worded suggestions. The chief ways in which such states may be described are:

1. *By descriptive terms.*—The foregoing remarks on vocabulary will indicate the disadvantages of this method. It must,

however, often be employed when the intention is to give only a brief, reasonably plain, but not accurate or vivid, picture.

2. *By attitudes, including facial expression.* — The connection between the mind and the body is so close, that emotions usually reveal themselves in the attitudes of the body, and especially in the expression of the face. It is often by these physical signs that we form ideas of the emotions of our friends and companions ; and a faithful description of the signs gives the reader the same opportunity to infer the cause. The description should not be so minute as to draw attention from the mental to the physical. The writer will sometimes find it necessary to hint at the explanation of the appearance described, in order to make sure that the reader will draw the right inferences.

3. *By actions and words spoken.* — This method of indicating mental states is similar to the preceding. It will be effective only when the actions are the spontaneous expression of feeling, and is especially valuable in picturing emotions so strong as to make a person forget himself, or lose his self-control.

In almost any report of a conversation, the mental states of those speaking are told both by their words and by little indications of their manner. Most of these representations need the rest of the story to make them plain, and lose force if quoted. The student can pick them out from conversations in his favorite novels. In the following selection, the first paragraph represents emotion — the return of overwhelming grief — by describing the appearance of the face. The cause (see next section) has been shown by the remarks referred to in the first sentence quoted. The second paragraph describes idle half-attention by attitudes and actions.

"I wish I had not said all this then and there. I might have known better. The pale schoolmistress, in her mourning dress, was looking at me, as I noticed, with a wild sort of expression. All at once the blood dropped out of her cheeks as the mercury drops from a broken barometer tube, and she melted away from

her seat like an image of snow; a slung-shot could not have brought her down better. God forgive me!

"After this little episode, I continued, to some few that remained balancing teaspoons on the edges of cups, twirling knives, or tilting upon the hind legs of their chairs until their heads reached the wall."

In the next example, note how almost every word and phrase gives a hint of restrained anger. Here, too, the cause has been given in the preceding paragraphs.

"Van Bibber had flushed at Mr. Caruthers's first words, and had then grown somewhat pale, and straightened himself visibly. He did not move when the elder man had finished, but cleared his throat, and then spoke with some little difficulty. 'It is very easy to call a man a fool' he said slowly, 'but it is much harder to be called a fool and not throw the other man out of the window. But that, you see, would not do any good, and I have something to say to you first.'"

4. *By the causes.* — An emotion may sometimes be portrayed by showing the causes that aroused it. This method would be more valuable if all persons were influenced in the same way under the same circumstances. The peculiar temperament of the person under consideration must be shown, in order that the effect of the cause may be correctly estimated. Even when this is done, some other description of the emotion will often be necessary.

This plan is best adapted to the representation of those emotions that the reader himself is likely to have experienced. Few persons have sufficient dramatic sympathy to imagine the feelings of another in wholly unfamiliar circumstances.

In "Othello," the character of the Moor is well painted by representing his habitual actions, and when the causes of his jealousy are given we can readily imagine the feelings of such a man in such a position. The picture of his emotions is completed by showing us his words and actions. This is a common method of treatment in both the drama and the novel. In "Ben-Hur," note

how skillfully the author keeps the hero's wrongs before the mind of the reader whenever he wishes to explain any of the emotions that they arouse, — for example, the feelings that incited him to victory in the chariot-race.

5. *By the aspect of other things.* — In describing a mental state from a subjective point of view, use may be made of the aspect of other things while the state of mind continues. Some emotions, such as joy or despair, seem to change the appearance of the whole world, and this change is sometimes the best indication of the prevailing state of mind.

The following is an expression of the narrator's feelings on learning, unexpectedly, of the death of an old and very dear friend. It is, perhaps, a little overdone.

"The clock ticked mournfully, and the winds were sighing, but I did not hear them any longer. . . . Bella — Sweet Bella was dead! It seemed as if with her, half the world were dead — every bright face darkened, — every sunshine blotted out, — every flower withered, — every hope extinguished!"

Kinds of Description. — According to the effects produced on the mind of the reader, and the methods of treating details, description may be divided into three classes — circumstantial, dynamic, and suggestive.¹

1. *Circumstantial description.* — This is perhaps the most typical form. Its object is to present a complete picture. In writing circumstantial description, details should be chosen according to their importance, and no preference should be given to any one class of particulars. This kind of description is especially valuable in works designed to give information.

Circumstantial description, though it should tell something of all important characteristics of the subject, is not necessarily lengthy, or minute in its particulars. The following selections

¹ This classification, and the terms circumstantial and dynamic are borrowed from "Genung's Practical Rhetoric."

are both brief. Note that in each of the descriptions, something is told of all the principal characteristics—form, size, and, in the first and second respectively, physical features and color.

"This island is a very singular one. It consists of little else than the sea sand, and is about three miles long. Its breadth at no point exceeds a quarter of a mile. It is separated from the mainland by a scarcely perceptible creek, oozing its way through a wilderness of reeds and slime, a favorite resort of the marsh-hen. The vegetation, as might be supposed, is scant, or at least dwarfish. No trees of any magnitude are to be seen. Near the western extremity, where Fort Moultrie stands, and where are some miserable frame buildings, tenanted during summer by fugitives from Charleston dust and fever, may be found, indeed, the bristly palmetto ; but the whole island, with the exception of the western point, and a line of hard white beach on the sea-coast, is covered with a dense undergrowth of the sweet myrtle, so much prized by the horticulturalists of England. The shrub here often attains a height of fifteen or twenty feet, and forms an almost impenetrable coppice, burthening the air with its fragrance."

"The chair in which Grandfather sat was made of oak which had grown dark with age, but had been rubbed and polished till it shone as bright as mahogany. It was very large and heavy, and had a back that rose high above Grandfather's white head. This back was curiously carved in open-work, so as to represent flowers, and foliage, and other devices, which the children had often gazed at, but could never understand what they meant. On the very tip-top of the chair, over the head of Grandfather himself, was a likeness of a lion's head, which had such a savage grin that you would almost expect to hear it growl and snarl."

2. *Dynamic description.*—The aim of this form is to bring out the most striking impression produced on the mind by the object described. For example, the height of a building or the perseverance of a character may be the most noticeable features of each respectively. Dynamic description would aim to impress these characteristics on the mind of the reader, and would omit as irrelevant all details that did not tend to inten-

sify these impressions. Compared with circumstantial description, dynamic lacks completeness, but may be made much more vivid. It is common in descriptive passages introduced in narration or exposition. Care should be taken that it does not become caricature.

In the following selection only those details are chosen that help to strengthen the impression of weirdness.

"I was taking a walk in this place last night between the hours of nine and ten, and could not but fancy it one of the most proper scenes in the world for a ghost to appear in. The ruins of the abbey are scattered up and down on every side, and half covered with ivy and elder bushes, the harbours of several solitary birds, which seldom make their appearance till the dusk of the evening. The place was formerly a churchyard, and has still several marks in it of graves and burying-places. There is such an echo among the old ruins and vaults, that if you stamp but a little louder than ordinary, you hear the sound repeated. At the same time the walk of elms, with the croaking of the ravens, which from time to time are heard from the tops of them, looks exceedingly solemn and venerable. These objects naturally raise seriousness and attention; and when night heightens the awfulness of the place, and pours out her supernumerary horrors upon everything in it, I do not at all wonder that weak minds fill it with spectres and apparitions."

The description of character by personal appearance and actions, page 137, is also dynamic, the prominent idea being purity.

3. *Suggestive description.*— This form of description gives few details, but chooses these in such a way that they help the reader to supply the rest of the picture. The problem is to find one or two epithets that will carry with them the many unmentioned characteristics. The ability to make a few words do the work of many is an evidence of talent, and requires deep insight into human nature, and a full appreciation of the things described.

Suggestive description is best adapted to subjects that are familiar or that belong to a familiar class. If the particular objects described are well known to both writer and reader, a suggestive phrase will often call up a more vivid and more exact picture than will a lengthy catalogue of details. If the object is one of a familiar class, a suggestive expression will produce on the minds of different readers, not the picture that the writer had before him, but others that come from their individual experiences. Thus, a suggestion of a home scene or of a bustling city street will recall each reader's own home, or some street with which he is familiar. The scene presented to any reader will differ widely from that which prompted the description ; but what is lost in exactness may be gained in vividness. The picture formed by each reader will have the associations, pleasant or unpleasant, of his own home, or of the street that he recalls. Thus a writer may really make use of facts that are known only to his individual readers.

A method of treatment that is suggestive in its nature, though it may be used in other forms of description, is to indicate the effects of an object on those who see it. A familiar example is the passage in the Iliad where Homer makes even the gray-bearded elders pause in their deliberations to pay homage to Helen's beauty. No minute description of her personal charms could have been so effective.¹

It is difficult to find a name for this kind of description that will not be misleading. It has been called portrayal without detail ; but the portrayal is, on the contrary, usually by means of details, which, however, stand for much besides themselves. It should not be inferred from the name used in this work that other forms of description have not *suggestiveness*. This is a quality that should, if possible, belong to all description. But in this form other methods of presentation are reduced to a minimum.

¹ See Lessing's "Laocoön," chap. XXI.

The briefest and simplest illustrations of suggestive description are the well-chosen epithets that, once applied to any object or person, are recognized as so appropriate that they pass at once into current usage. Several such terms were proposed in connection with the recent World's Fair, the best of which were, probably, "the white city" and "the dream city." The suggestiveness of one or both of these expressions will be felt by almost any one who was an appreciative visitor to the Exposition. Similar expressions applied to character are "the thousand-souled Shakespeare," "rare Ben Jonson." A longer suggestion of an unimaginative person is the following :

"Who does not know fellows that always have an ill-conditioned fact or two that they lead after them into decent company like so many bull-dogs, ready to let them slip at every ingenious suggestion, or convenient generalization, or pleasant fancy." This calls to mind another famous portrayal by the same means,—

"A primrose by a river's brim,
A yellow primrose was to him,
And it was nothing more."

The next selection, though much longer, must be ranked as suggestive description. Note that the scene is laid in no particular place, and no point of view is taken. The writer's object is evidently to call up in the minds of lovers of nature, pictures familiar to them, or at most free combinations of such pictures. The same details given with more definiteness of number, position, distance, etc., would be circumstantial description.

"The island is where? No matter. It is the most splendid domain that any man looks upon in these latitudes. Blue sea around it and running up into its heart, so that the little boat slumbers like a baby in lap, while the tall ships are stripping naked to fight the hurricane outside, and storm-stay-sails banging and flying in ribbons. Trees, in stretches of miles; beeches, oaks, most numerous; many of them hung with moss, looking like bearded Druids; some coiled in the clasp of huge, dark-stemmed grape-vines. Open patches where the sun gets in and goes to sleep, and the winds come so finely sifted that they are as soft as

swan's-down. Rocks scattered about—Stonehenge-like monoliths. Fresh-water lakes ; one of them, Mary's lake, crystal-clear, full of flashing pickerel lying under the lily-pads like tigers in a jungle."

Management of Details.— In planning description, an author should keep constantly before him the object of his work, *i.e.*, to produce on the reader's mind a picture, vivid, and as complete and accurate as possible. He should also consider his readers, and estimate as closely as he can their mental qualifications, and the amount of attention and thought that they will be likely to bestow upon his work. By so doing he will be able to answer most of the questions that arise in connection with the management of details. The discussions that follow apply especially to circumstantial description, as this is the most typical form. It can easily be seen where a dynamic or a suggestive treatment will necessitate exceptions.

Number of Details.— In order to understand a description of an unfamiliar object, a reader must carry on two important mental processes : he must hold in mind until the end all the details given ; and he must combine these details into a consistent picture. If too many particulars are given, his mental energy will all be expended in remembering them, and they will be but loosely combined, forming an indistinct picture ; or some of them will be forgotten, and the rest will produce but an incomplete patchwork conception. If too few details are given, the picture will be incomplete, and perhaps indistinct. The ideal plan is to give as many details as the reader can hold in mind without straining his memory ; and not one more. Of the two extremes, the fault of giving too many particulars is the more common — especially with inexperienced writers — and the more serious.

Choice of Details.— In looking at any object not the very simplest, many more particulars will be seen than can be men-

tioned in a description. The choice of the details to be given is a difficult and an important matter.

In describing any object, nothing need be given that is connoted¹ by the class name. Thus the word *house* connotes walls, a roof, etc., and the presence of these need not be mentioned in the description of any particular house. There are other characteristics not essential to houses, but so generally found that their absence would occasion surprise; such as windows, and, in this climate, a chimney. These particulars may also be omitted from a description, but if one of them is wanting, the fact should be noted. Roughly speaking, the descriptive value of characteristics otherwise equally important is in inverse proportion to the number of individual objects in which they are found; those being most valuable in which one object differs from all others of the species.

Usually not all the individual details of an object — that is, all the characteristics not implied in the class name — can be told. When a choice must be made, such details must be given as are most suggestive, most striking, or intrinsically most important.

In matter-of-fact descriptions, such as those in which a piece of property is advertised for sale, preference will naturally be given to facts of intrinsic importance. When the object is to attract and hold the attention, striking details may be given. But, on the whole, the characteristics of any object most valuable for purposes of description are those that suggest much besides themselves. Suggestive details are often at the same time striking, and they may also be important on their own account.

Subjective and Objective Description. — Description is sometimes divided into subjective and objective. Strictly speaking, objective description is that which represents objects literally, just as they are; while the subjective form is colored by the personal feelings of the author — feelings that may or may not

¹ See page 173.

be aroused by the object described. Thus, a description of a horse for sale, or an architect's notes on a building, would be objective. The subjective form would be typified by most poetical representations of nature, and particularly by those that imply a personification, as "laughing water," "trees bowing before the wind." As a matter of fact, there is little description in literature that has not some of the subjective element; but the term is generally applied only to discourse in which the entrance of the author's feelings is obvious.

To this introduction of personal feeling in such a way that an object is represented with characteristics that it does not possess, Mr. Ruskin has given the name "pathetic fallacy." Mr. Ruskin's whole treatment of this question is of an *a priori* nature. That is, he has laid down certain rules to which literature must conform, rather than derived principles from works accepted as excellent; and he has virtually begged his question by the use of the word "fallacy." His remarks, however, contain a considerable truth; and they have been so widely discussed that they could hardly be ignored in a treatment of description. A brief quotation may show exactly what is meant by "pathetic fallacy."

"'The spendthrift crocus, bursting through the mould
Naked and shivering with his cup of gold.'

"This is very beautiful, and yet very untrue. The crocus is not a spendthrift, but a hardy plant; its yellow is not gold, but saffron. How is it that we enjoy so much the having it put into our heads that it is anything else than a plain crocus? . . .

"It will appear also, on consideration of the matter, that this fallacy is of two principal kinds. Either, as in this case of the crocus, it is the fallacy of wilful fancy, which involves no real expectation that it will be believed, or else it is a fallacy caused by an excited state of the feelings, making us for the time more or less irrational. . . .

"'They rowed her in across the rolling foam—
The cruel, crawling foam.'

"The foam is not cruel, neither does it crawl. The state of mind which attributes to it these characters of a living creature is one in which the reason is unhinged by grief. All violent feelings have the same effect. They produce in us a falseness in all our impressions of external things, which I would generally characterize as the 'pathetic fallacy.'" ¹

Mr. Ruskin then ascribes this fallacy to "the second order of poets." The justice of this may well be questioned. There is a time for literal statement and a time for figurative; and the writer of taste must know when to employ each. Moreover the tendency of the day seems to be toward the literal method of statement, as is witnessed by the fact that many of Shakespeare's conceits strike the modern mind so strangely that they would be tolerated in no one but Shakespeare himself. It is certainly foolish to say, however, that only the second order of writers are influenced, in the choice and presentation of ideas, by their emotions.

The most important part of Mr. Ruskin's discussion is that in which he insists that writers should not force into a passage the wrong emotion, — that is, an emotion clearly out of harmony with the object described, or the circumstances. In regard to this he cites an example from Homer and Pope.

"Without the knowledge of Ulysses, Elpenor, his youngest follower, has fallen from an upper chamber in the Circean palace, and has been left dead, unmissed by his leader or companions, in the haste of their departure. They cross the sea to the Cimmerian land, and Ulysses summons the shades from Tartarus. The first which appears is that of the lost Elpenor. Ulysses, amazed, and in exactly the spirit of bitter and terrified lightness which is seen in "Hamlet," ² addresses the spirit with the simple startled words :

¹ Ruskin, "Modern Painters," vol. 3, part IV. chap. XII.

² "Well said, old mole! canst work i' the ground so fast?"

"'Elpenor! How camest thou under the shadowy darkness? Hast thou come faster on foot than I in my black ship?' Which Pope renders thus :

"'O, say, what angry power Elpenor led
To glide in shades, and wander with the dead?
How could thy soul, by realms and seas disjoined,
Outfly the nimble sail, and leave the lagging wind?'

"I sincerely hope the reader finds no pleasure here, either in the nimbleness of the sail, or the laziness of the wind! And yet how is it that these conceits are so painful now, when they have been pleasant to us in the other instances?

"For a very simple reason. They are not a *pathetic* fallacy at all, for they are put into the mouth of the wrong passion — a passion which never could possibly have spoken them — agonized curiosity. Ulysses wants to know the facts of the matter; and the very last thing his mind could do at the moment would be to pause, or suggest in any wise what was not a fact. The delay in the first three lines, and the conceit in the last, jar upon us instantly like the most frightful discord in music. No poet of true imagination could possibly have written the passage."

To sum up the whole matter : purely objective description, *i.e.*, description wholly uncolored by the author's emotions, is too dry and matter-of-fact to give much pleasure ; but the introduction of the wrong emotion jars on the mind ; and a show of too much emotion, even of a natural sort, is weak. Perhaps young writers are most in danger of committing this last-named fault, — that is, of indulging in "gush" and poetic vaporings, when the occasion warrants only a quiet expression of appreciation.

Arrangement of Details. — Proper arrangement in description may make details easier to remember, and easier to combine. That order of particulars will be the best that seems most natural. If the details to be given are of nearly the same relative importance, the best plan is usually to give them in consecutive order, beginning at the point that would naturally

occur first to the mind. In descriptions of characters and mental states there is no material sequence that can be followed ; but if the subject has been thoroughly thought out, there will almost always be a logical starting-point and a logical sequence, depending on the way in which the subject is approached, and the purpose of the description.

In extended circumstantial descriptions of complex objects, or in cases where some details are much more prominent than others, it may be best to select the most important features and arrange them in such a way as to give a sketch, or outline, of the whole. More minute characteristics may then be filled in, and can be better understood, since their relative positions in the general picture have been made plain.

Description and the Imagination. — The process of combining separate details and realizing a picture from them is carried on by means of the imagination. Anything, therefore, that acts as a tonic or stimulant to this faculty will prove a valuable aid in description.

1. *The imagination may be excited by an appeal to the memory.* — Things previously known or seen are more easily brought before the mind than are those that must be constructed from the details given ; and unfamiliar objects can be conceived more easily if they are compared with something well known. The objects chosen for comparison must, however, be so familiar that the reader will picture them fully and without effort ; otherwise his mental energy will be distributed in trying to comprehend two objects instead of one.

The figures of speech most used in description — simile, metaphor, and personification — are all useful in connecting the object pictured with something else more familiar or more striking. They may also stimulate the imagination in other ways, for a brief discussion of which, see chap. I.

2. *An intimate relation exists between the imagination and the appetites and desires, physical and mental.* — Passions may be

aroused by suggestions of objects that will gratify them, and reacting on the imagination make more vivid the conceptions of those objects. This fact is well known to writers of the baser sort of literature, who prostitute their knowledge to low ends ; but such a stimulant may be used legitimately, particularly in case of an appeal to the mental desires.

3. *A connection, perhaps not so close as that just discussed, exists between the imagination and the moral and æsthetic tastes.*— In some works of description, particularly those intended for more cultured readers, advantage may be taken of this relation to increase the vividness of a mental picture.

Diction.— The most important characteristics of style to be sought for in description can be summed up by the word *suggestiveness*. It should not be forgotten that in description, language is being put to a use for which it is not well adapted. Words following words, and sentences following sentences are admirably suited to the presentation of events, because events follow each other: or of a train of thought, because ideas come to the mind in a sequence; but symbols that stand in succession can with difficulty represent details that are to be held in mind simultaneously. Any style, therefore, in which few words do the work of many, will be especially adapted for description.

Next in importance to the qualities that gain brevity, are those that act as stimulants to the mind, and make the details given easier to remember and to combine. Many examples of description possess both qualities.

Figures of speech are especially appropriate in description. The simile often gives brevity; and other figures, such as the metaphor, personification, etc., act as mental stimulants. Antithesis, and contrast generally, are useful for both purposes. Epithets are a valuable means of terse description, but must be chosen with care and taste.

Although there is no necessary conflict between suggestiveness and accuracy, many suggestive expressions give an inexact

picture. This should be borne in mind when accurate practical information is the end sought ; as, for example, in giving working directions by which a piece of furniture is to be made. Such descriptions are rarely works of literature. They must often be re-read several times before the details can all be grasped and combined. Whenever possible, they should be accompanied by diagrams, drawings, etc.

In descriptions such as are generally found in literature, minute accuracy must yield somewhat to vividness ; and not only the details given, but the diction employed should be such as to combine these two qualities in the proportions best suited to the purposes of each piece of discourse.

ILLUSTRATIVE SELECTIONS.

Since the length of descriptions is limited by the nature of language and the capacity of the reader, illustrations are easily found, and when they occur as parts of a longer discourse are easily excerpted. The few selections appended to this chapter will illustrate most of the problems and methods of treatment that have been discussed. The work of the student should not be confined to these, but he should find and analyze other passages from fiction, history, etc., and from shorter articles in current periodicals. One kind of description cannot well be illustrated by means of short selections. This is the complete presentation of character. This can be seen to best advantage by going through a novel by some author known for ability in psychological analysis, and marking every passage that in any way helps to give an idea of the character of some leading personage. Care should be taken to discriminate whether these details trace a development of character or simply add to a true portrayal.

I.

The first selection, from "Adam Bede," chap. II., shows, among other things, careful treatment of point of view, both permanent and shifting. It gives an example of the liberty that description may take in this respect as compared with painting, and also the disadvantages at which this liberty puts description. How clear a picture does this passage give at one casual reading? How clear after careful study? How are problems of relative position managed? Can the treatment be improved on in this respect?

Note the choice of suggestive details throughout, especially in the character-descriptions in the last part. To the minds of English readers, for whom it was intended, would the selection stimulate the imagination in any of the ways mentioned, page 152?

The green lay at the extremity of the village, and from it the road branched off in two directions, one leading farther up the hill by the church, and the other winding gently down towards the valley. On the side of the green that led towards the church,
5 the broken line of thatched cottages was continued nearly to the churchyard gate; but on the opposite, north-western side there was nothing to obstruct the view of gently-swelling meadow, and wooded valley, and dark masses of distant hill. That rich undulating district of Loamshire to which Hayslope belonged, lies close
10 to a grim outskirts of Stonyshire, overlooked by its barren hills as a pretty blooming sister may sometimes be seen linked in the arm of a rugged, tall, swarthy brother; and in two or three hours' ride the traveller might exchange a bleak, treeless region, intersected by lines of cold, grey stone, for one where his road wound
15 under the shelter of woods, or up swelling hills, muffled with hedgerows and long meadow-grass and thick corn; and where at every turn he came upon some fine old country-seat nestled in the valley or crowning the slope, some homestead with its long length of barn and its cluster of golden ricks, some grey steeple looking

20 out from a pretty confusion of trees, and thatch, and dark-red tiles. It was just such a picture as this last that Hayslope Church had made to the traveller as he began to mount the gentle slope leading to its pleasant uplands, and now from his station near the green, he had before him in one view nearly all the other typical features
25 of this pleasant land. High up against the horizon were the huge conical masses of hill, like giant mounds intended to fortify this region of corn and grass against the keen and hungry winds of the north; not distant enough to be clothed in purple mystery, but with sombre greenish sides visibly specked with sheep, whose
30 motion was only revealed by memory, not detected by sight; wooed from day to day by the changing hours, but responding with no change in themselves — left forever grim and sullen after the flush of morning, the winged gleams of the April noonday, the parting crimson glory of the ripening summer sun. And directly
35 below them, the eye rested on a more advanced line of hanging woods, divided by bright patches of pasture or furrowed crops, and not yet deepened into the uniform leafy curtains of high summer, but still showing the warm tints of the young oak, and the tender green of the ash and lime. Then came the valley, where
40 the woods grew thicker, as if they had rolled down and hurried together from the patches left smooth on the slope, that they might take the better care of the tall mansion which lifted its parapets and sent its faint blue summer smoke among them. Doubtless there was a large sweep of park, and a broad, glassy
45 pool in front of that mansion, but the swelling slope of meadow would not let our traveller see them from the village green. He saw instead a foreground which was just as lovely — the level sunlight lying in transparent gold among the gently-curving stems of the feathered grass and the tall red sorrel, and the white umbels
50 of the hemlocks lining the bushy hedgerows. It was that moment in summer when the sound of the scythe being whetted makes us cast more lingering looks at the flower-sprinkled tresses of the meadows.

He might have seen other beauties in the landscape if he had
55 turned a little in his saddle and looked eastward, beyond Jonathan Burge's pasture and woodyard towards the green corn-fields and

walnut-trees of the Hall Farm ; but apparently there was more interest for him in the living groups close at hand. Every generation in the village was there ; from old "Feyther Taft" in his brown worsted nightcap, who was bent nearly double, but seemed
60 tough enough to keep on his legs a long while, leaning on his short stick, down to the babies with their little round heads lolling forward in quilted linen caps. Now and then there was a new arrival ; perhaps a slouching laborer, who, having eaten his supper,
65 came out to look at the unusual scene with a slow bovine gaze, willing to hear what any one had to say in explanation of it, but by no means excited enough to ask a question. But all took care not to join the Methodists on the green, and identify themselves in that way with the expectant audience, for there was not one of
70 them that would not have disclaimed the imputation of having come out to hear the "preacher-woman"—they had only come out to see "what war a-goin' on, like." The men were chiefly gathered in the neighborhood of the blacksmith's shop. But do not imagine them gathered in a knot. Villagers never swarm ; a
75 whisper is unknown among them, and they seem almost as incapable of an undertone as a cow or a stag. Your true rustic turns his back on his interlocutor, throwing a question over his shoulder as if he meant to run away from the answer, and walking a step or two farther off when the interest of the dialogue culminates.
80 So the group in the vicinity of the blacksmith's door was by no means a close one, and formed no screen in front of Chad Crange, the blacksmith himself, who stood with his black brawny arms folded, leaning against the doorpost, and occasionally sending forth a bellowing laugh at his own jokes, giving them a
85 marked preference over the sarcasms of Wiry Ben, who had renounced the pleasures of the Holly Bush for the sake of seeing life under a new form. But both styles of wit were treated with equal contempt by Mr. Joshua Rann. Mr. Rann's leathern apron and subdued griminess can leave no one in any doubt that he is
90 the village shoemaker ; the thrusting out of his chin and stomach, and the twirling of his thumbs, are more subtle indications, intended to prepare unwary strangers for the discovery that they are in the presence of the parish clerk. "Old Joshway," as he is

irreverently called by his neighbors, is in a state of simmering
95 indignation; but he has not opened his lips except to say in
a resounding bass undertone, like the tuning of a violoncello,
"Sehon, King of the Amorites: for His mercy endureth forever;
and Og, the King of Basan: for His mercy endureth forever," —
a quotation which may seem to have slight bearing on the present
100 occasion, but, as with every other anomaly, adequate knowledge
will show it to be a natural sequence. Mr. Rann was inwardly
maintaining the dignity of the Church in the face of this scandal-
ous irruption of Methodism, and as that dignity was bound up
with his own sonorous utterance of the responses, his argument
105 naturally suggested a quotation from the psalm he had read the
last Sunday afternoon.

The stronger curiosity of the women had drawn them quite to
the edge of the green, where they could examine more closely the
Quaker-like costume and odd deportment of the female Metho-
110 dists. Underneath the maple there was a small cart, which had
been brought from the wheelwright's to serve as a pulpit, and
round this a couple of benches and a few chairs had been placed.
Some of the Methodists were resting on these, with their eyes
closed, as if rapt in prayer or meditation. Others chose to con-
115 tinue standing, and had turned their faces towards the villagers
with a look of melancholy compassion, which was highly amusing
to Bessy Cranage, the blacksmith's buxom daughter, known to
her neighbors as Chad's Bess, who wondered "why the folks were
a-makin' faces a that 'ns." Chad's Bess was the object of pecul-
120 iar compassion, because her hair, being turned back under a cap
which was set at the top of her head, exposed to view an orna-
ment, of which she was much prouder than of her red cheeks —
namely, a pair of large round ear-rings with false garnets in them,
ornaments contemned not only by the Methodists, but by her own
125 cousin and namesake, Timothy's Bess, who, with much cousinly
feeling, often wished "them ear-rings" might come to good.

II.

In the following, from "A Midsummer Trip to the West Indies," by Lafcadio Hearn,¹ may be found examples of most of the methods of describing colors and sounds, besides some passages that will give an idea of the general method of treating material objects. The selection also furnishes illustrations of the choice and presentation of striking details, and of the use of various devices for stimulating the imagination. The entire work from which this extract is taken will repay study. It is, however, of the "impressionist" order, in both choice of facts and manner of expression, and those who attempt to imitate it are very likely to come to grief. Students are especially cautioned against the seductive qualities of the style. Its faults might be easily copied, but its many excellences are personal to the author, and any attempt to imitate them would result only in mannerisms.

In the description of the statue, lines 141-175, notice exactly what is given and what is not. How much more might be successfully given? How does the author make up for the omission of details that would be necessary in a matter-of-fact description?

A long, narrow, graceful steel steamer, with two masts and an orange-yellow chimney, taking on cargo at Pier 49, East River. Through her yawning hatchways a mountainous piling up of barrels is visible below; there is much rumbling and rattling of steam-winch⁵es, creaking of derrick booms, groaning of pulleys as the freight is being lowered in. A breezeless July morning, and a dead heat: 97° already.

The saloon deck gives one suggestion of past and of coming voyages. Under the white awnings long lounge-chairs sprawl¹⁰ here and there, each with an occupant smoking in silence, or dozing with head drooping to one side. A young man, waking as I pass to my cabin, turns upon me a pair of immense black eyes — creole eyes. Evidently a West Indian.

¹ From *Harper's Magazine*. Copyright, 1888, by Harper & Brothers.

The morning is still gray, but the sun is dissolving the haze.
15 Gradually the gray vanishes; and a beautiful pale vapory blue—
a spiritualized Northern blue—colors water and sky. A cannon-
shot suddenly shakes the heavy air: it is our farewell to the
American shore; we move. Back floats the wharf, and becomes
vapory, with a bluish tinge. Diaphanous mists seem to have
20 caught the sky color; and even the great red storehouses take a
faint blue tint as they recede. The horizon now has a greenish
glow. Everywhere else the effect is that of looking through very
light blue glasses.

We steam under the colossal span of the mighty bridge; then,
25 for a little while, Liberty towers above our passing, seeming first
to turn toward us, then to turn away from us, the solemn beauty
of her passionless face of bronze. Tints brighten; the heaven is
growing a little bluer. A breeze springs up.

Then the water takes on another hue; pale green lights play
30 through it. It has begun to sound. Little waves lift up their
heads as though to look at us—patting the flanks of the vessel,
and whispering to one another.

Far off, the surface begins to show quick white flashes here and
there; and the steamer begins to swing. We are nearing Atlan-
35 tic waters. The sun is high up now, almost overhead; there are
a few thin clouds in the tender-colored sky—flossy, long-drawn-
out, white things. The horizon has lost its greenish glow; it is
a spectral blue. Masts, spars, rigging, the white boats and the
orange chimney, the bright deck lines and the snowy rail, cut
40 against the colored light in almost dazzling relief. Though the
sun shines hot, the wind is cold; a vast and viewless presence
that fans one into drowsiness. Also the somnolent chant of the
engines—*do-do-hey! do-do-hey!*—lulls to sleep.

Toward evening the glaucous sea tint vanishes—the water
45 becomes blue. It is full of great flashes, as of seams opening
and reclosing over a white surface. It spits spray in a cease-
less drizzle. Sometimes it reaches up and slaps the side of the
steamer with a sound as of a great naked hand. The viewless
breath waxes boisterous. Swinging ends of cordage crack like
50 whips. There is an immense humming that drowns speech—a

humming made up of many sounds : whining of pulleys, whistling of riggings, flapping and fluttering of canvas, roar of nettings in the wind. And this sonorous medley, ever growing louder, has rhythm — a *crescendo* and *diminuendo* timed by the steamer's regular swinging, like a great voice crying out, "*Whoh-oh-oh! Whoh-oh-oh!*" We are nearing the life-centres of winds and currents. One can hardly walk on deck against the ever-increasing breath — yet now the whole world is blue, not the least cloud is visible ; and the perfect transparency and voidness about us make the immense power of this invisible medium seem something ghostly and awful. The log, at every revolution, whines exactly like a little puppy ; one can hear it, through all the roar, full forty feet away.

It is nearly sunset. Across the whole circle of the bay we have been steaming south. Now the horizon is gold-green. All about the falling sun this gold-green light takes vast expansion. Right on the edge of the sea is a tall gracious ship, sailing sunsetward. Catching the vapory fire, she seems to become a phantom — a ship of gold mist ; all her spars and sails are luminous, and look like things seen in dreams.

Crimsoning more and more, the sun drops to the sea. The phantom ship approaches him, touches the curve of his glowing face, sails right athwart it ! Oh, the spectral splendor of that vision ! The whole great ship in full sail instantly makes an acute silhouette against the monstrous disk ; rests there in the very middle of the vermilion sun. His face crimson high above her topmasts — broadens far beyond helm and bowsprit. Against this weird magnificence her whole shape changes color ; hull, masts, and sails turn black — a greenish black.

Sun and ship vanish together in another minute. Violet the night comes ; and the rigging of the foremast cuts a cross upon the face of a full moon.

* * *

The village of Mont Rouge itself lies so far below these "stations of the cross" that it almost gives you vertigo to look at it ; but thousands of feet further down you see magnificent valleys unfolding in blue and green and gold to the sea. On the neighboring

heights all around you are votive chapels and places of prayer; the mountain-tops are crowned with statues. Above the fort a gigantic Christ overlooks the streets of St. Pierre from the forest
90 summit; and from Mont Orange a great white virgin watches the harbor — patron of mariners — Notre Dame de la Garde — outstretching her hands in ghostly welcome to all the ships that sail.

Then, thrice daily, from the towered white Cathedral, huge bells roll out a carillon. Sometimes, on great holidays, the
95 chimes are wonderfully rung; the ringers are African. When they make the Bourdon speak, the effect is startling; all the city vibrates to a weird sound difficult to describe — an enormous moan, quivering, abyssmal, producing unfamiliar harmonies as the voices of the smaller bells are caught up and interblended by
100 it. A trained musician might protest against so strange a manner of ringing the chimes; but he could not possibly deny that it has impressiveness; it is wild, barbaric, incantatory — it is a monstrous musical conjuration.

Behind the cathedral, higher than the peaked city roofs, and at
105 the feet of the green mountain, the dead sleep, guarded by a wall whose every jointure is being attacked by vigorous little weeds; whose every stone is made green by a microscopic and velvety moss. Most of the tombs are covered with small square black and white tiles, exactly set after the fashion of the squares upon a
• chess-board; at the foot of each stands a black cross, bearing at
110 its centre a little white plaque, on which the name is graven in plain and tasteful lettering. Oh, how pretty the little tombs are! It is almost like a toy cemetery. Here and there, again, are tiny little marble chapels — little shrines built over the dead — con-
115 taining Madonnas, and white Christs, and little angels, while flowering creepers climb around the pillars. Death seems luminous here; everything is bright and white and neat; the air is heavy with jasmine scent and the odors of roses; and the palm — emblem of immortality — lifts its head a hundred feet above the
120 walls. There are rows of them, these beautiful symbolic trees; two of them guard the gate; the others spring from between the tombs, white-stemmed, outspreading huge parasols of verdure far above the cathedral towers.

Behind all this the savage forest seems trying to descend from
125 the height to invade the sleep of the dead. It is perpetually
thrusting green hands over the wall, pushing vast serpent roots
underneath, and it is no easy task to keep it back. Some day
things will change, perhaps, in the little city of St. Pierre; there
may be less money, less zeal, less remembrance of the lost. Then
130 all the green, embattled host will move forward, slowly, irresistibly,
sacrilegiously; creepers will prepare the way, hiding the pretty
tombs, pulling away the checkered tiling; then come the giants,
rooting deeper — very deep — feeling among the dust of hearts,
groping for the bones; and all that has been hidden away so long
135 shall be restored to nature — absorbed into the rich juices of her
verdure, revitalized in her bursts of color, resurrected in her up-
liftings of emerald and gold before the great sun.

* * *

The Savanna itself, the great green place with its shadowy rows
of tamarinds, is pleasant to see, and is made romantic by the
140 marble memory of Josephine.

I went to look at the white dream of her there, the wonderful
statue, executed by master-sculptors, erected by the Creoles of
the colony. It is absolutely lovely!

Sea winds have bitten it; tropical rains have streaked it; some
145 sombre microscopic growth has darkened the exquisite hollow of
the throat. And yet, such is the human loveliness of the figure
that you fancy you are gazing at a living presence, that it almost
seems to you it would not be folly to speak to her. Perhaps
the profile is less human — statuesque to the point of revealing
150 the chisel. But when you look straight up into the sweet creole
face you can believe she lives; all the wonderful West Indian
charm of the woman is there.

She is standing just in the centre of the Savanna, robed in the
fashion of the Directory, with gracious arms and shoulders bare
155 to the winds; one white hand leans upon a medallion sculptured
with the eagle profile of Napoleon. Seven tall palms stand in a
circle about her, lifting their comely heads into the blue glory of
the tropical day. Within their enchanted ring you feel that you
are treading sacred soil, the holy ground of artist and poet.

- 160 Here, in the silence, all historical gossip is hushed ; the recollections of Memoir writers vanish away ; here you do not care to know how rumor avers that she lived, or spoke, or laughed, or wept ; only the bewitchment of her lives under the thin shadowing of these feminine palms, the soft creole grace, the whole spell
 165 of womanly sweetness. Over blue spaces of summer sea, through the vast splendor of azure light, she looks forever yearningly back to the dear, silent, drowsy place of her birth — back to emerald, old-fashioned Trois-Islets, always with the same half-dreamy, half-plaintive smile, unutterably touching.
- 170 And everybody loves her ; you will not think it foolish for them to love her, once you have looked into her face. . . . There is not one black or brown or yellow mother in all this antiquated, earthquake-shaken city who does not teach her baby to love "Manzelle 'Fifine," the pretty white creole girl who became the
 175 bride of an emperor.

III.

The next selection, from the "Spectator," No. 2, shows how short presentations of character may be made. In each case it will be profitable to note not only what methods of presentation are used, but in what order they are arranged. What would be the effect of changing this order? In every case where actions, words, history, etc., are given and not interpreted, decide just what traits of character each reveals. Decide whether each portrayal is circumstantial or dynamic.

- The first of our society is a gentleman of Worcestershire, of ancient descent, a baronet, his name Sir Roger de Coverly. His great-grandfather was inventor of that famous country-dance which is called after him. All who know that shire, are very well
 5 acquainted with the parts and merits of Sir Roger. He is a gentleman that is very singular in his behaviour, but his singularities proceed from his good sense, and are contradictions to the manners of the world, only as he thinks the world is in the wrong. However, this humour creates him no enemies, for he does nothing

10 with sourness or obstinacy ; and his being unconfined to modes and forms, makes him but the readier and more capable to please and oblige all who know him. When he is in town, he lives in Soho-square. It is said he keeps himself a bachelor by reason he was crossed in love by a perverse beautiful widow of the
15 next county to him. Before this disappointment, Sir Roger was what you call a fine gentleman ; had often supped with my Lord Rochester and Sir George Etherege, fought a duel upon his first coming to town, and kicked Bully Dawson in a public coffee-house for calling him youngster. But being ill used by the above-
20 mentioned widow, he was very serious for a year and a half ; and though, his temper being naturally jovial, he at last got over it, he grew careless of himself, and never dressed afterwards. He continues to wear a coat and doublet of the same cut that were in fashion at the time of his repulse, which, in his merry humours,
25 he tells us, has been in and out twelve times since he first wore it. . . . He is now in his fifty-sixth year, cheerful, gay, and hearty ; keeps a good house, both in town and country ; a great lover of mankind ; but there is such a mirthful cast in his behaviour, that he is rather beloved than esteemed ; his tenants grow rich, his
30 servants look satisfied ; all the young women profess love to him, and the young men are glad of his company ; when he comes into a house, he calls the servants by their names, and talks all the way up stairs to a visit. I must not omit, that Sir Roger is a justice of the quorum ; that he fills the chair at a quarter-session
35 with great abilities, and three months ago gained universal applause by explaining a passage in the game act.

The gentleman next in esteem among us, is another bachelor, who is a member of the Inner Temple ; a man of great probity, wit, and understanding ; but he has chosen his place of residence
40 rather to obey the direction of an old humoursome father, than in pursuit of his own inclinations. He was placed there to study the laws of the land, and is the most learned of any of the house in those of the stage. Aristotle and Longinus are much better understood by him than Littleton or Coke. The father sends up
45 every post questions relating to marriage-articles, leases, and tenures. in the neighborhood ; all which questions he agrees with

an attorney to answer and take care of in the lump. He is studying the passions themselves, when he should be inquiring into the debates among men which arise from them. He knows the argument of each of the orations of Demosthenes and Tully, but not one case in the reports of our own courts. No one ever took him for a fool, but none, except his intimate friends, know he has a great deal of wit. This turn makes him at once both disinterested and agreeable ; as few of his thoughts are drawn from business, they are most of them fit for conversation. His taste of books is a little too just for the age he lives in ; he has read all, but approves of very few. His familiarity with the customs, manners, actions and writings of the ancients, makes him a very delicate observer of what occurs to him in the present world. He is an excellent critic, and the time of the play is his hour of business ; exactly at five he passes through New-Inn, crosses through Russel-Court, and takes a turn at Will's till the play begins ; he has his shoes rubbed and his periwig powdered at the barber's as you go into the Rose. It is for the good of the audience when he is at a play, for the actors have an ambition to please him.

The person of next consideration, is Sir Andrew Freeport, a merchant of great eminence in the city of London ; a person of indefatigable industry, strong reason, and great experience. His notions of trade are noble and generous, and (as every rich man has usually some sly way of jesting, which would make no great figure were he not a rich man) he calls the sea the British Common. He is acquainted with commerce in all its parts, and will tell you it is a stupid and barbarous way to extend dominion by arms ; for true power is to be got by arts and industry. He will often argue, that if this part of our trade were well cultivated, we should gain from one nation ; and if another, from another. I have heard him prove, that diligence makes more lasting acquisitions than valour, and that sloth has ruined more nations than the sword. He abounds in several frugal maxims, amongst which the greatest favourite is, "A penny saved is a penny got." A general trader of good sense, is pleasanter company than a general scholar ; and Sir Andrew having a natural unaffected eloquence, the perspicuity of his discourse gives the same pleasure that wit

would in another man. He has made his fortune himself ; and
85 says that England may be richer than other kingdoms, by as plain
methods as he himself is richer than other men ; though at the
same time I can say this of him, that there is not a point in the
compass but blows home a ship in which he is an owner.

Next to Sir Andrew in the club-room sits Captain Sentry, a
90 gentleman of great courage and understanding, but invincible
modesty. He is one of those that deserve very well, but are very
awkward at putting their talents within the observation of such
as should take notice of them. He was some years a captain,
and behaved himself with great gallantry in several engagements
95 and at several sieges ; but having a small estate of his own, and
being next heir to Sir Roger, he has quitted a way of life in which
no man can rise suitably to his merit, who is not something of a
courtier as well as a soldier. I have heard him often lament, that
in a profession where merit is placed in so conspicuous a view,
100 impudence should get the better of modesty. When he has talked
to this purpose, I never heard him make a sour expression, but
frankly confess that he left the world because he was not fit for it.
A strict honesty, and an even, regular behaviour, are in themselves
obstacles to him that must press through crowds, who endeavour
105 at the same end with himself, the favour of a commander. He
will, however, in his way of talk, excuse generals for not disposing
according to men's desert, or inquiring into it : for, says he,
that great man that has a mind to help me, has as many to break
through to come at me, as I have to come at him ; therefore, he
110 will conclude, that the man who would make a figure, especially
in a military way, must get over all false modesty, and assist his
patron against the importunity of other pretenders, by a proper
assurance in his own vindication. He says it is a civil cowardice
to be backward in asserting what you ought to expect, as it is a
115 military fear to be slow in attacking when it is your duty. With
this candour does the gentleman speak of himself and others.
The same frankness runs through all his conversation. The mili-
tary part of his life has furnished him with many adventures, in
the relation of which he is very agreeable to the company ; for he
120 is never overbearing, though accustomed to command men in the

utmost degree below him ; nor ever too obsequious, from a habit of obeying men highly above him.

But that our society may not appear a set of humourists unacquainted with the gallantries and pleasures of the age, we have
125 among us the gallant Will Honeycomb, a gentleman who, according to his years, should be in the decline of his life, but having ever been very careful of his person, and always had a very easy fortune, time has made but very little impression, either by wrinkles on his forehead, or traces in his brain. His person is
130 well turned, of a good height. He is very ready at that sort of discourse with which men usually entertain women. He has all his life dressed very well, and remembers habits as others do men. He can smile when one speaks to him, and laughs easily. He knows the history of every mode, and can inform you from which
135 of the French king's wenches our wives and daughters had this manner of curling their hair, that way of placing their hoods; whose frailty was covered by such a sort of petticoat, and whose vanity to show her foot made that part of the dress so short in such a year ; in a word, all his conversation and knowledge has
140 been in the female world. As other men of his age will take notice to you what such a minister said upon such and such an occasion, he will tell you when the Duke of Monmouth danced at court, such a woman was then smitten, another was taken with him at the head of his troop in the park. In all these important
145 relations he has ever about the same time received a kind glance or a blow of a fan from some celebrated beauty, mother of the present Lord Such-a-one. If you speak of a young commoner that said a lively thing in the house, he starts up, "He has good blood in his veins : Tom Mirabel begot him : the rogue cheated
150 me in that affair : that young fellow's mother used me more like a dog than any woman I ever made advances to." This way of talking of his very much enlivens the conversation amongst us of a more sedate turn ; and I find that there is not one of the company, but myself, who rarely speak at all, but speaks of him as
155 that sort of man who is usually called a well-bred gentleman. To conclude his character, where women are not concerned, he is an honest, worthy man.

I cannot tell whether I am to account him whom I am next to speak of as one of our company ; for he visits us but seldom ;
160 but when he does, it adds to every man else a new enjoyment of himself. He is a clergyman, a very philosophic man, of general learning, great sanctity of life, and the most exact breeding. He has the misfortune to be of a very weak constitution, and consequently cannot accept of such cares and business as preferments
165 in his function would oblige him to : he is, therefore, among divines, what a chamber-counselor is among lawyers. The probity of his mind, and the integrity of his life, create him followers, as being eloquent or loud advances others. He seldom introduces the subject he speaks upon : but we are so far gone in
170 years, that he observes, when he is among us, an earnestness to have him fall upon some divine topic, which he always treats with much authority, as one who has no interests in this world, as one who is hastening to the object of all his wishes, and conceives hope from his decays and infirmities. These are my ordinary
175 companions.

CHAPTER IV.

EXPOSITION.

Definition.—By the term exposition, we understand those processes that are associated with the cognate verb, to expound. Any composition that aims to explain, to define, to classify, or in any way to make clear the meaning of a general term or proposition is exposition.

Relation of Exposition to Other Forms of Discourse.—Exposition stands midway between narration and description on the one hand, and argumentation and persuasion on the other. It resembles the latter group in the subjects with which it deals, but has some affinities with the former in method of presentation.

Exposition is distinguished from narration and description by dealing with generalizations. An individual name cannot, even in the loose popular use of language, be expounded or explained. It may, however, be described, or a narrative may be written about it. Thus, one may take as subjects for exposition such terms as "man," "English soldier," "the scientific spirit"; but on the specific terms "Oliver Cromwell," "the scientific spirit of Charles Darwin," one can write, not exposition, but description or narration.¹

¹ In some of their forms exposition and description shade into each other, and a line of demarcation cannot be drawn in such a way as to avoid all difficulties. Some writers on rhetoric include under exposition the analytical treatment of any complex subject, general or individual. The distinction implied by Professor Genung in his definition of exposition as "invention dealing with generalizations," and adopted here, certainly rests on an important difference, and is more definite and more easy to apply. The other view is possible, however; composition is governed by the same principles, no matter what name is given to it.

Confusion sometimes arises from the fact that the same term may be either general or particular, according to the way in which it is viewed. Thus, "the presidents of the United States" would be a subject for exposition only so far as the author considered them in their official capacity, — that is, as a class, the essential characteristic of which is incumbency of the presidential office. Looked at as so many men, they would be subjects for description, or might suggest narration, for example biography.

The fact that exposition often employs specific cases as illustrations may also be confusing. "The scientific spirit of Charles Darwin" is a subject for description ; but a writer on "the scientific spirit" in general, may expound his subject by showing its workings in case of this particular man. The evident purpose of a description will show whether it is written for itself, or as a means of exposition. See pages 179, 185, sec. 2.

Exposition deals with propositions in order to explain them, or to make clear their exact meaning ; argumentation to prove their truth or falsity ; and persuasion to give them an influence on life and conduct. By bearing these purposes in mind, the three forms may readily be distinguished. As will be seen later, exposition is an important aid to both the others.

Where Found. — Exposition is one of the most common forms of discourse. It is found as an accessory to other kinds of composition whenever any explanation is given, whether of a term or of a proposition. It is especially valuable in connection with argumentation, where no valid conclusions could be reached if the terms of the proposition and of the proof were not made clear and definite.

As a form by itself, exposition is found in most text-books, for example, the one in hand ; in treatises, such as works on law, etc. ; in review articles, and many other essays found in current periodicals.

It is usual to class as works of exposition those popular essays that, while they contain different kinds of discourse, seem to be of the nature of commentaries on life in general, or

on some particular characteristic of men or of the times. So far as these aim to change existing customs, or otherwise to influence action, they resemble persuasion ; but the expository element usually predominates. They will be discussed briefly after more typical forms have been treated.

Exposition of Terms.—The subjects of exposition may be either terms or propositions. The ways of expounding a term will be considered first.

The exposition of a term may vary in completeness, from the brief explanation given by an appositional word, to a treatise of many volumes. All the processes that strictly pertain to exposition of terms may, however, be grouped under two heads, — definition and division.

I.

The Process of Definition. — Definition, as the derivation of the word implies, is the fixing of the limits of an idea. It may be figured as the drawing of a line that shall include everything denoted by a term, and exclude everything else. In a looser sense, anything that gives a fairly complete idea of the meaning of a term is spoken of as a definition.

Need of Exact Definitions. — Words are useful only as they call up the same idea in the mind of both writer and reader. Whenever the meaning of a term may not be known, or whenever it may be understood in a sense different from that which it is intended to bear, it should be defined. Since most matters of controversy involve the use of general terms, upon a clear understanding of which the fruitfulness of the discussion depends, exact definitions are especially useful in argumentation, and some forms of persuasion. General terms are also used in conveying most information except the very simplest ; so that expressions must often be defined in description, narration, and exposition.

Difficulty of Framing Exact Definitions. — Probably few persons who have not given particular thought to the subject realize how loose and inexact language really is. Words, instead of being single symbols for single ideas, as the Arabic figures are symbols for quantity, have many meanings; and the same idea may be symbolized in many ways. Moreover, the meanings of words are not learned by careful study, but by observing them as used by others. A meaning is guessed at from the context, or is gained by unconsciously comparing different passages in which the word is used, and eliminating senses that seem to be inconsistent. In the vocabulary of any person, the proportion of words that have been "looked up" in a dictionary is very small indeed. This natural process of acquiring a vocabulary is not conducive to exactness. Either the full extent of a meaning is not known, or a word is stretched to cover a related idea.

Some of the most familiar words in the language are among the most difficult to define. General terms in constant use become charged with associations, different for each person, that do much to obscure their real force. Nouns like "religion," "republic," adjectives like "noble," "cowardly," verbs like "educate," "worship," mean widely different things to different persons.

Denotation and Connotation. — Every general name stands for two sorts of ideas: (1) a number of objects, any one of which may bear the name; (2) a number of qualities or attributes, which must be possessed by any object to which the name may be applied. These are called the denotation and the connotation of the term, respectively. Thus, the word "man" denotes all human beings; and connotes the characteristics common to all men, such as a vertebrate structure, the power of locomotion, of articulate speech, etc.

Roughly speaking, the denotation and the connotation vary inversely to each other; that is, as a term connotes more attri-

butes, it will denote fewer individuals. For example, the term "blackbird" connotes more than the word "bird," — blackbirds have more characteristics in common than have all birds; but there are fewer blackbirds than birds of all kinds, — the denotation is less. If we take the term "red-winged blackbird" the connotation is still further increased, and the denotation decreased.

The attributes connoted by any general term may be of two kinds: those common to the class and not found outside of it; and those common to the class and also to individuals of some other classes. An example of the former is called a *proprium*; of the latter an *accidens*. Besides these, each individual has many characteristics not common to the entire class; but with these connotation has nothing to do.

Propria are most common in mathematics. It is a *proprium* of an equilateral triangle that it has three, and but three, equal angles. This is true of no other figure whatever. Outside mathematics, *propria* are harder to find. The power of rational thought is believed by some to be a *proprium* of man.

It is an *accidens* of an equilateral triangle that its angles number three, since this is true of other kinds of triangles. The power of locomotion is an *accidens* of man, since he shares it with the lower animals and with some plants.

Logical Definition. — Theoretically, the exact limits of a term could be shown by giving a list of all the essential attributes that it connotes. An object possessing all these characteristics would certainly be included in its denotation. Practically, such a list would be impossible, except for the simplest classes. The same end is reached by means of what is called a logical definition, which substitutes the connotation of a more general term for the greater part of the list of attributes. Such a definition contains two parts, known technically as the *genus* and the *differentia*. The *genus* is the name of a class that includes the denotation of the term defined; the *differentia* is some char-

acteristic that distinguishes the objects denoted by this term from all others in the genus.

In order to define a plane triangle by giving all its attributes, it would be necessary to say :

It is a surface with definite boundaries.

If between any two points in this surface a straight line be drawn, the line will lie wholly within the surface.

It is bounded by three straight lines.

Any figure that has all these characteristics is a triangle. A logical definition would read :

Genus.

Differentia.

A triangle is a plane figure bounded by three straight lines.

The advantage of the genus as a summary of characteristics is evident, even in case of this simple mathematical conception. In defining most terms the saving by the use of a genus is far greater. What would become of Carlyle's definition, "Man is a tool-using animal," if instead of the last word the author had been obliged to give a list of the essential attributes of animals?

The word genus is not here, as in science, used to signify a division of a certain fixed grade, but for any class that includes the term being defined. In the following examples, it will be noticed that the term defined in one becomes the genus in the next.

Term defined.

Genus.

Differentia.

- | | | |
|-------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Biology | is the science | that treats of living organisms. |
| 2. Botany | is that branch of biology | that treats of plants. |
| 3. Briology | is that branch of botany | that treats of mosses. |

In the definition of any term it is generally best to use the next largest class as the genus. If this class is not familiar, one more inclusive may be chosen.

Thus, the definition of briology given above is preferable to the statement, "Briology is that branch of *science* that treats of mosses," both because it guides the mind more surely to the exact thought, and because the latter might possibly be taken as a loose explanation of the term botany. See page 183, sec. 2. On the other hand, in writing for average readers, it might be wise to say, "A kangaroo is an animal possessing, etc.," rather than "A kangaroo is a marsupial possessing, etc.," because the term "marsupial" is not universally understood. But for scientific men the latter form would be preferable.

In choosing a differentia, where a choice is possible, preference should be given to the characteristic that is most obvious, or most important in relation to the purpose for which the definition is framed. It is advantageous to have the differentia a proprium. This is, however, not essential, so long as it is not found in other members of the same genus. But one differentia is necessary, but more are often desirable for clearness or force.¹

In Sartor Resartus, when Carlyle wishes to emphasize the idea of work as a duty, and man's power through work, he says, "Man is a tool-using animal." A few pages later, when he dwells on the idea of human weakness, he quotes Swift's humorous definition, "Man is a forked, straddling animal with bandy legs." A definition of value to a psychologist is, "Man is a rational animal"; another, of use to one studying the philosophy of language, is, "Man is an animal possessing the power of articulate speech." From the classification in a work on zoölogy, we may say, "Man is a mammal (more remotely an animal) having four incisors in each jaw, the great toe with a flat nail, teeth even, and an erect posture."

These definitions are, with the exception of Swift's, perhaps equally accurate; but they could not be used interchangeably.

¹ It should be noted that the differentia may be the fact that two or more characteristics coexist. When this is the case, the characteristics are often named as if they were differentia.

To sum up what has been said : a logical definition is in correct form when the genus includes all the objects denoted by the term to be defined ; when the differentia is possessed by each of these objects, but by no others in the genus ; and when the terms in the definition are readily understood by those for whom it is intended. Further light will be thrown on the subject of logical definition by the study of classification, page 187.

Difficulty of Framing Logical Definitions. — Although the principles on which logical definition rests, and the form of the definition, are so simple, there are comparatively few terms outside the stricter sciences of which satisfactory logical definitions can be framed. One reason for this is that the meanings of general terms are often vague and indeterminate.

The following definitions of rhetoric, taken from modern textbooks on that subject, differ so widely as, in some cases, to have little in common.

"Rhetoric is the art of efficient communication by language."
(A. S. Hill.)

"Rhetoric is the science that discusses the means whereby thoughts may be forcibly presented." (Waddy.)

"Rhetoric is the study which teaches us how to invent thought, and how to express it most appropriately in words." (Kellogg.)

"Rhetoric is the art of expressing our thoughts with skill."
(Genung.)

In the usage of a time slightly antedating that of the works just quoted, the meanings of the word differ still more widely. Says Whately :

"Of rhetoric various definitions have been given by different writers ; who, however, seem not so much to have disagreed in their conceptions of the nature of the same thing, as to have had different things in view while they employed the same term. Not only the word Rhetoric itself, but also those used in defining it, have been taken in various senses ; as may be observed with respect to the word 'Art,' in Cic. *de Orat.*, where a discussion is introduced as to the applicability of that term to Rhetoric ;

manifestly turning on the different senses in which 'Art' may be understood. . . .

"In the present day, however, the province of Rhetoric, in the widest acceptation that would be reckoned admissible, comprehends all 'Composition in Prose'; in the narrowest sense it would be limited to 'Persuasive Speaking.'

"I propose in the present work to adopt a middle course between these two extreme points; and to treat of 'Argumentative Composition' *generally and exclusively.*"

Almost every critic has his notions of what is and what is not *poetry*; and as personal tastes and prejudices enter largely, these conceptions are often not even consistent with themselves. It always has been and always will be impossible to frame a definition of such a term to which thinking people in general will agree.

It often happens that the only logical definition of a term that can be found will be worthless to many persons because the genus, or more often the differentia, is unfamiliar. Such a definition is useful only to a select class of readers.

This is true of many of the definitions based on scientific classification. The obvious differences between plants, or animals, of different families are sometimes not common to the whole class, and the only true differentia are minute anatomical peculiarities. Find obvious differentia, and frame logical definitions of a horse or a hen.

For these and other reasons the logical definition, without accessories or explanations, is not of the direct use in ordinary affairs that might be expected. It is, however, invaluable as a test of accuracy and consistency in thought, and without it progress in the exact sciences would be almost impossible.

Definition in its Larger Sense. — In order to give the strict limits of a general term, it is necessary to name all the essential attributes that it connotes, or to give a logical definition. As has been seen, however, cases where the demand for an explanation can be fully met by a definition in the logical form are comparatively rare. The word definition is loosely applied to

an explanation of a term by various processes, the most important of which will be discussed in the following sections.

By Synonyms.—One of the most common ways of explaining a term is by giving another term similar in meaning. This method is brief, but inexact. There are very few perfect synonyms in the English language, and a word is especially valuable for those shades of meaning peculiar to itself. These a synonym cannot express. Dictionaries employ this mode of definition largely, and the ludicrous errors sometimes made by foreigners and others who increase their vocabulary by "reading the dictionary" are due to this fact.

Examples of this method of definition abound throughout any dictionary. The following are taken at random from Webster.

"Ask — to *request*, to *petition*; to *require*, *demand*, *expect*, or *claim*."

"Speak — to *pronounce*; to *declare*, to *proclaim*, to *celebrate*; to *address*, to *accost*; to *exhibit*, to *make known*."

"Great — *big*, *grand*, *immense*, *enormous*, *expanded*" (and many others).

It is obvious that only a meagre knowledge of the meanings of these words can be gained from these synonyms. For example, nothing shows that "to accost," and "to exhibit," are not as common meanings of "speak" as is "to pronounce." Should we attempt to use interchangeably the words "great" and "grand," "great" and "big," "great" and "expanded," we should make sad blunders.

By Examples.—An idea of the meaning of a general term may often be conveyed by mentioning one or more objects that it denotes. This plan will be found useful when the examples are familiar, but their classification is not. Its advantage is that it uses definite, concrete things to explain what is general or abstract. Its disadvantage is that it does not give the exact limits of a term; at most, it can enable a reader only to recognize the typical members of the class denoted.

Thus, if we are given Henry and Webster as examples of orators, we may be able to infer that the term includes Calhoun, Phillips, and others of like rank. But we have nothing to show how great a degree of genius in public speaking is necessary to entitle a man to be called an orator. It may be noted that this process of arriving at a meaning is similar to that by which a child learns most new words.

By Comparison with Other Terms. — This method is closely related to that of giving synonyms, but goes much further. By instituting a comparison between different terms, exact shades of meaning may be brought out and emphasized by contrast. The comparison may be made between a familiar and an unfamiliar term for the sake of elucidating the latter ; or between two familiar terms for the sake of making clear their exact differences. It is perhaps most valuable in cases of the latter kind. In order to show delicate shades of meaning, it is usually best to take words that resemble each other in signification. This has the advantage of concentrating the attention on the peculiarities of each. The fact of comparison is also a mental stimulus, and the exposition will gain a force similar to that given by a metaphor or a simile.

Any work that discriminates between synonyms will furnish abundant examples of this kind of exposition. In the beginning of the present chapter it was thought best to distinguish carefully between exposition, and other forms of discourse with which it might be confounded. See page 170.

In speaking of the well-known passage in 1 Corinthians, xiii., Professor Drummond says :

"Paul begins by contrasting love with other things that men in those days thought much of. . . . He contrasts it with eloquence. . . . We have all felt the brazenness of words without emotion, the hollowness, the unaccountable unpersuasiveness, of eloquence behind which lies no love.

"He contrasts it with prophesy. He contrasts it with mysteries. He contrasts it with faith. He contrasts it with charity. Why

is love greater than faith? Because the end is greater than the means. And why is it greater than charity? Because the whole is greater than the part. Love is greater than faith, because the end is greater than the means. What is the use of having faith? It is to connect the soul with God. And what is the object of connecting man with God? That he may become like God. But God is Love. Hence Faith, the means, is in order to love, the end. Love, therefore, obviously is greater than faith. It is greater than charity, again, because the whole is greater than a part. Charity is only a little bit of Love, one of the innumerable avenues of Love, and there may even be, and there is, a great deal of charity without Love. It is a very easy thing to toss a copper to a beggar on the street; it is generally an easier thing than not to do it. Yet Love is just as often in the withholding. We purchase relief from the sympathetic feelings roused by the spectacle of misery at the copper's cost. It is too cheap — too cheap for us, and often too dear for the beggar. If we really loved him, we would either do more for him, or less."

In like way the contrast between love and sacrifice or martyrdom is enlarged upon. By no other process could the author so well show the exact meaning of a term that, because so familiar, is difficult for most readers fully to understand.

Instead of comparing a word with another English term, its derivation or history may be given, or attention called to any change of meaning that it has undergone.

This might profitably be done with the word *charity*. It is the Greek original of this word that is translated *love* in the passage expounded by Professor Drummond, quoted above; and this in the King James version is rendered *charity*. The term has now departed widely from its Greek significance; but a comparison with the original would call attention to the emotional attitude in all truly charitable acts.

In the following passage an attempt is made, by means of half-humorous translations, to fix in mind a somewhat confusing series of terms. The subject is the New Calendar, adopted during the French Revolution

"Four equal Seasons, Twelve equal Months of Thirty days each ; this makes three hundred and sixty days ; and five odd days remain to be disposed of. The five odd days we will make Festivals, and name the five *Sansculottides*, or Days without Breeches. Festival of Genius ; Festival of Labour ; of Actions ; of Rewards ; of Opinion : these are the five *Sansculottides*. Whereby the great Circle, or Year, is made complete : solely every fourth year, whilom called Leap-year, we introduce a sixth *Sansculottide* ; and name it Festival of the Revolution. Now as to the day of commencement, which offers difficulties, is it not one of the luckiest coincidences that the Republic herself commenced on the 21st of September ; close on the Vernal [?] Equinox ? Vernal Equinox, at midnight for the meridian of Paris, in the year whilom Christian 1792, from that moment shall the New Era reckon itself to begin. *Vendémiaire, Brumaire, Frimaire* ; or as one might say, in mixed English, *Vintagearious, Fogarious, Frostarious* : these are our three Autumn months. *Nivose, Pluviose, Ventose*, or say, *Snowous, Rainous, Windous*, make our Winter season. *Germinal, Floréal, Prairial*, or *Buddal, Floweral, Meadowal*, are our Spring season. *Messidor, Thermidor, Fructidor*, that is to say (*dor* being Greek for gift) *Reapidor, Heatidor, Fruitidor*, are Republican Summer. These Twelve, in a singular manner, divide the Republican Year. Then as to minuter subdivisions, let us venture at once on a bold stroke : adopt your decimal subdivision ; and instead of the world-old Week, or *Se'ennight*, make it a *Tennight*, or *Décade* — not without results. There are three Decades, then, in each of the months ; which is very regular ; and the *Décadi*, or Tenth-day, shall always be the 'Day of Rest.' And the Christian Sabbath, in that case ? Shall shift for itself !"

By Incomplete Logical Definition. — Under this head are included those methods of explanation that refer the term to its class, or give its peculiarities, but that are not in the strict logical form.

1. A term is frequently referred to its genus without any differentia being given. Expressions such as, "The mallard is

a kind of duck," "The banyan is a tree," are examples of this kind of definition. Such explanations in no sense mark the limits of a term, but they are often sufficient to give point to an allusion or to furnish a general idea which can be developed at greater length in various ways.

2. Somewhat more definite are those explanations in which some obvious or striking characteristic is given in connection with the genus. These differ from true logical definitions in that the attributes mentioned are not true differentia, but may be found in other members of the same genus, or not in all objects denoted by the term defined.

Examples are, "The zebra is a striped horse," or Plato's famous "Man is a biped without feathers." Not all striped horses are zebras, and the plucked chicken conformed to Plato's test. But either of these definitions might for many purposes be better than one strictly logical in form, but having for a differentia some obscure anatomical fact that could be known only to the scientist.

3. There are also many so-called definitions, more or less epigrammatic in nature, that cannot well be classified. These are generally more valuable for what they suggest than for what they definitely express. Examples are, "The style is the man himself," or "The true university is a collection of books."

Logical Definitions Amplified. — Even when a term is logically defined, some further explanation is often necessary. This may be given in some of the ways mentioned in the preceding section, or by amplifying the definition itself.

1. A logical definition may be amplified by explaining its terms. As this process calls for more definitions it is liable to confuse the reader and to distract his mind from the main idea.

Professor Jevons defines logic as "the science of the laws of thought." He then, in the following paragraph, defines the expressions "law of thought" and "science":

"By a 'law of thought' we mean a certain uniformity or agreement which exists, and must exist, in the modes in which all persons think and reason, so long as they do not make what we call mistakes, or fall into self-contradiction and fallacy. The laws of thought are natural laws with which we have no power to interfere, and which are of course not to be in any way confused with the artificial laws of a country, which are invented by men, and can be altered by them. Every science is occupied in detecting and describing the natural laws which are inflexibly observed by the objects treated in the science. The science of astronomy investigates the uniform or similar way in which the heavenly bodies, and in fact all material substances, tend to fall toward each other as a stone falls toward the earth, or to move round each other under the influence of this tendency. The universal law of gravitation is thus the natural law, or uniformity, treated in physical astronomy.

"In chemistry the law of equivalent proportions describes the well-ascertained fact that each chemical substance enters into combination with every other chemical substance only in certain definite proportions; as when exactly eight parts by weight of oxygen unite with one part of hydrogen to form water, or sixteen parts of oxygen and six parts of carbon unite to form carbonic acid in the ordinary burning of a flame or fire. Whenever we can detect uniformities or similarities we so far create science and arrive at natural laws. But there may be, and are, many things so fickle, complicated and uncertain that we can never be sure we have detected laws that they will uniformly obey; in such cases no science, in the proper sense of the word, is possible. There is no such thing, for instance, as a real science of human character, because the human mind is too variable and complicated a subject of investigation. There are no two persons so much alike that you may be sure of one acting in all circumstances as the other would; it thus becomes impossible to arrange persons in classes so that all who are in the same class shall act uniformly in the same manner in any given circumstances.

"But there is a science of human reason or thought apart from the many other acts of mind which belong to human character,

because there are modes in which all persons do uniformly think and reason, and must think and reason."

2. Examples may be selected, and it may be shown how the definition does or does not apply to each. This method is simple, and if the examples are well chosen will often give the most satisfactory results in popular discourse.

The following will illustrate this procedure in case of a definition that, while in the logical form, is really of the epigrammatic nature mentioned above.

"The peculiarity of ill-temper is that it is the vice of the virtuous. . . . There are two great classes of sins — sins of the Body and sins of the Disposition. The Prodigal Son may be taken as a type of the first, the Elder Brother of the second."

The discourse continues at some length to show how one of these men had, the other had not, the vice of ill-temper.

"Look at the Elder Brother, moral, hard-working, patient, dutiful — let him get all credit for his virtues — look at this man, this baby, sulking outside his own father's door. . . . Judge of the effect upon the prodigal. . . . Analyze, as a study in temper, the thunder-cloud itself as it gathers upon the Elder Brother's brow — etc."

Another excellent example of this method of explanation is found in the treatment of the word "science" in the quotation from Professor Jevons, above. Here it is shown how there may be a science of astronomy or of chemistry, but not of human character.

3. A logical definition may be supplemented by what is called logical description. This consists in giving several characteristics that the term connotes. They may or may not be differentia, but they should be common to the whole class, and should be important or obvious. Sometimes, when several differentia are given, no one is specially combined with the genus to make a definition in the strict logical form.

EXAMPLE. — "A Bird is an air-breathing, egg-laying, warm-blooded, feathered Vertebrate, with two limbs (legs) for perching, walking, or swimming, and two limbs (wings) for flying, or swimming. Organized for flight, it is gifted with a light skeleton, very contractile muscular fibre, and a respiratory function of the highest development.

"The skeleton is more compact than those of reptiles and mammals, at the same time that it is lighter, and the bones are harder and whiter. . . . All birds always have four limbs, while every other vertebrate class shows exceptions. The fore limbs are fitted for flight. They ordinarily consist of nine separate bones, and from the hand, forearm, and humerus are developed the primary, secondary, and tertiary feathers of the wing. . . .

"Birds have neither lips nor teeth, epiglottis nor diaphragm. . . . It is a peculiarity of all birds, though not confined to them, that the generative products and the refuse of digestion are all discharged through one common outlet."

The difference between logical description and description proper lies in the fact that one gives general, the other particular, characteristics. In describing any one bird, it would be unnecessary to say that it was feathered, or that its fore limbs were adapted to flight.

II.

Division. — Definition has to do only with the line separating a class from all that lies outside. Division, on the other hand, considers only what a class includes, and divides it into subclasses. The two processes are thus supplementary to each other.

Of the following paragraphs, the first is a definition, the second and third give a division of the subject. The main use of the definition is to give a test by which the reader may know what is and what is not botany; in other words, to distinguish botany

from other sciences. The division presupposes a knowledge of the definition, and gives the departments of botany.

"Botany is the name of the science of the vegetable kingdom in general, that is, of plants.

"Plants may be studied as to their kinds and relationships. This study is *systematic botany*. An enumeration of the kinds of vegetables, so far as known, classified according to their various degrees of resemblance or difference, constitutes a general *system of plants*. A similar account of the vegetables of any particular country or district is called a *flora*.

"Plants may be studied as to their structure and parts. This is *structural botany*, or *organography*. The study of the organs or parts of plants in regard to the different forms and different uses that the same organ may assume—the comparison, for instance, of a flower-leaf or a bud-scale with a common leaf—is *vegetable morphology*, or *morphological botany*. The study of the minute structure of the parts, to learn by the microscope what they themselves are formed of, is *vegetable anatomy*, or *histology*; in other words, it is *microscopical structural botany*.

"The study of the actions of plants or of their parts, of the ways in which a plant lives, grows, and acts, is the province of *physiological botany*, or *vegetable physiology*."

Classification.—Classification is the name applied to the most complete and exact processes of division. The principles of classification given below are taken with slight change from Professor Minto's "Manual of Logic."

1. Every classification should be made on the ground of differences in some one attribute common to all the members of the whole to be divided. This does not mean that the same class may not be divided in different ways, but that each division must be on one fundamental principle.'

Thus, mankind may be divided according to race into Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, Malaysian, and American; according to social progress into enlightened, civilized, half-civilized, and barbaric; and according to many other principles, such as

religion, physical peculiarities, etc. The same classification could not, however, include the terms Caucasian, Mongolian, and half-civilized, since the same principle is not applied throughout.

The principle of division must be an attribute common to all members of the class divided. All men belong to some race, and have skins of some color ; it is probable that all men have some religious belief ; so that a classification based on these lines would be possible. But not all men belong to a political party, and a classification of mankind in general could not be made on this basis.

2. The basis of a classification should be an attribute admitting of important differences. By this is meant that the differences between subdivisions should be important with respect to the purposes for which the classification is made. The choice of attributes that make the differences between subdivisions unimportant, causes what is known as hair-splitting, a process rarely profitable.

3. The subdivisions should be mutually exclusive, and taken together should include all the objects in the class divided, and no more. Classes are said to cross each other when the same objects are included in both.

An illustration of classes crossing each other is the division of mankind into Caucasian, Mongolian, etc., and half-civilized, given above. Here the fault comes from a failure to follow one principle throughout. In the division into Caucasians, Mongolians, etc., and Celts, a subdivision of a term is given as of equal rank with it.

Often the nature of the subject makes it impossible fully to satisfy the requirements of this principle. The lines between subdivisions are not always capable of being definitely fixed. For example, literature may be classified into poetry and prose ; but there are many productions that might fairly be treated under either head. It is a mistake to suppose that there is no essential difference between classes unless the boundary line

can be plainly marked. In almost all subjects except mathematics, many important classes will be found that shade into each other. In the natural sciences an artificial line of demarcation is generally agreed upon ; as, for example, the line between animal and vegetable life in the lower forms ; but in other subjects it is often best to leave the limits indeterminate. Most of the classifications in this book will furnish illustrations of such indefinite separation.

The second part of this principle requires that all parts of the term divided should be accounted for in the classification. Divisions in which this is not done will be treated under the head of partition.

4. The classes in any scheme of division should be of the same rank. It is possible for classes not to cross each other, and still to give a wrong idea of their relative importance.

Thus, the departments of the United States government might be given as the executive, the judicial, the senate, and the house of representatives. This violates the rule, since the last two classes, taken separately, are of lesser rank than the first two.

Where great exactness is not required, it is often found convenient to disregard this rule, but a division in which it is not observed should strictly be called partition rather than classification.

The common division of the parts of speech is a case in point. Prepositions and conjunctions are not coördinate in rank with nouns and adjectives ; but for elementary study the strictly logical classification would be needlessly confusing.

5. The process of classification is a fascinating one for some minds, while for others it is difficult and distasteful. There is danger, therefore, of classifying too much or too little. A division may be based on fanciful or unessential distinctions, or the subdivision may be made more minute than

the purpose of the classification necessitates. On the other hand, both clearness and accuracy may be sacrificed by neglecting to think out and express important divisions of a subject. Only general cautions are possible; but a writer can usually tell in which direction his tendency lies, and can then guard against excess.

Partition. — Exact classification is necessary to the working out of a complete, systematic scheme of ideas. It is often desirable, however, to select some part of a class for treatment, and to disregard the other subdivisions. Division which does this is called partition. It differs from classification in two respects: the subdivisions given do not necessarily include the whole of the subject; and the principle of the division may not be an attribute common to the whole class.¹

Writers on the politics of the United States sometimes speak of but two classes of voters, Democrats and Republicans. This is not a classification, since there are voters who belong to other political parties, or to none.

In speaking of men, to make the classes those who have had a scientific training and those who have had a classical training would be a partition of the term. It could not be a classification, since some men have had no training, in the sense in which the word is used; the principle of division is not an attribute common to all the members of the class.

Partition is of use either in developing a theme from a general subject, or in selecting the particular phase of an idea that is applicable for any purpose. It must be distinguished

¹ Some writers have used the word "partition" to mean, not the separation of a class into groups of individuals, but of individuals into their component parts; as, a human body may be separated into head, neck, trunk, and limbs. The more common definition of the term, at least in late text-books, is the one given here. Students who are familiar with the other sense of the word should not allow themselves to be confused by its two uses.

from the giving of examples, which are single concrete objects, or instances. The subdivisions in partition are general terms.

In partition only those subdivisions that are important for the purpose in hand may be referred to; or the setting of these may be shown by mentioning a few others.

The definition and the classification of botany, quoted on page 187, are followed by a paragraph indicating a partition of the subject for the purpose of the work introduced.

"This book is to teach the outlines of structural botany and of the simpler parts of the physiology of plants. . . . Particularly, this book is to teach the principles of the structure and relationship of plants, the nature and names of their parts and their modifications, and so to prepare for the study of systematic botany."

III.

Exposition of a Proposition.—What has already been said has to do with the exposition of general terms. General propositions are also subjects for exposition. A proposition, if it conforms to the essential requirements of grammar and rhetoric, will be clear if all the terms that compose it are understood.

The form of proposition that for accuracy and uniformity is preferred by logic, consists of two terms, subject and predicate, united by a copula, — that is, by some form of the verb "to be." Such a proposition is expounded by expounding its subject and its predicate, — the copula needing no explanation. In ordinary discourse, however, it is the exception rather than the rule to throw sentences into this form. A writer may find it an advantage to analyze the predicate of a general proposition into the copula and the term that it affirms of the subject, — as, Wood burns, Wood *is* combustible. To express this separation in his finished discourse would often seem an affectation.

A proposition not in the strict logical form may be ex-

pounded by exposition of the terms that compose it, including the predicate. The exposition of a verb is likely to be more difficult than that of a substantive, but the processes are largely the same. Sometimes it is advisable to expound a verb by explaining the cognate noun, but if this is done the different offices of the two parts of speech must be kept distinct.

In a looser sense, a proposition may be expounded in a variety of ways, foremost of which is the repetition of the idea, or of a part of it. This repetition may be simply a restatement in other words; or it may be the obverse of a proposition, or a denial of its negative; or a series of statements which taken together cover the same ground as the original proposition. A proposition may also be expounded by examples, by analogy, and in other ways that will suggest themselves in specific cases. A proposition is often amplified at the same time that it is expounded.

The following examples of the exposition of a proposition, as well as others which the student may find in his reading, will repay careful study. Note the fitness of certain methods to certain forms of composition. Thus, definition of terms seems especially suited to discourse in which strict logical thought predominates, as argumentation. Repetition by particulars, analogy, etc., are especially adapted to persuasion, or to any form of popular discourse.

BY EXPOUNDING TERMS.

"Would municipal ownership and operation of lighting works and street railroad lines be preferable to private ownership and operation in cities of the United States of 25,000 or more inhabitants?

"1. 'Municipal operation' to mean direct absolute management by the cities themselves, through their officials.

"2. 'Lighting works' to mean gas works and electric light plants.

"3. 'Street railroad lines' to include all those means of transportation on rails which are organized exclusively for urban and suburban traffic."

The exposition of a logical definition by expounding its terms is practically the same as this process, since a definition is really a proposition. See the example, page 184.

BY REPETITION IN VARIOUS GENERAL FORMS.

"Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the modelers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: the soul of the whole world's history, it may justly be considered, were the history of these."

BY REPETITION IN THE FORM OF EXAMPLES.

"'Whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away.' The wisdom of the ancients, where is it? It is wholly gone. A schoolboy to-day knows more than Sir Isaac Newton knew. His knowledge has vanished away. You put yesterday's newspaper in the fire.' Its knowledge has vanished away. You buy the old editions of the great encyclopedias for a few pence. Their knowledge has vanished away. Look how the coach has been superseded by the use of steam. Look how electricity has superseded that, and swept a hundred almost new inventions into oblivion. One of the greatest living authorities, Sir William Thompson, said the other day, 'The steam-engine is passing away.' 'Whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away.' At every workshop you will see, in the back yard, a heap of old iron, a few wheels, a few levers, a few cranks, broken and eaten with rust. Twenty years ago that was the pride of the city. Men flocked in from the country to see the great invention; now it is superseded, its day is done. And all the boasted science and philosophy of this day will soon be old."

IV.

Forms of Exposition.—Under the head of exposition must be classed various forms of literature differing widely in scope, purpose, and method. Any composition that has for its object to explain or make clearer any general term or proposition, or to apply any general principle, is exposition. Some kinds of composition—for instance the editorial and the book review—are classed as exposition because this form of discourse predominates in the typical articles of that class, though in some examples it may be wholly wanting.

Editorial Articles.—One of the most common forms of exposition is the editorial article, as found in daily and weekly newspapers and other periodicals. Editorials that are purely exposition consist mainly of comments on occurrences, generally the application of some assumed principles of conduct, politics, etc., to specific events reported in the news columns of the paper. The object of this application is mainly didactic; and while there may be a desire to influence the conduct of the reader there is seldom a direct appeal, and the production can hardly be called persuasion.

Editorials vary in length from the single brisk paragraph to the careful discussion of some subject in a column or more. The first-named form, the editorial paragraph, is worthy of separate consideration. Its object is to call attention to some event of the day, and to comment upon it in a brief and pointed manner. The paragrapher must select the most important or salient features of the occurrences that are recounted at greater length in the news columns, and in connection with the briefest possible statement of each, if any statement is necessary, he must give an equally brief comment or hint of some application or meaning. These paragraphs should be keen and apt, and are often humorous. No better practice in seizing and happily expressing the very gist of

things can be found than writing a half-dozen such comments on the events of each day. The faults most to be guarded against are flippancy, and the choice of trivial facts and unimportant comments that will make a brilliant remark, rather than more important matters that do not suggest so witty a treatment. Taste counts for much in this sort of writing, and unfortunately even the better newspapers furnish examples of bad as well as of good taste.

Long editorials rarely consist of the stricter forms of exposition, — logical definition and exact division. They are usually written to keep before the public mind the significance of facts by showing how these facts exemplify certain principles. Such articles frequently contain much argumentation ; narration and description are also found, but generally for purposes of explanation.

Examples of editorials can always be found in any daily paper. It will be profitable to compare different articles on some important occurrence, in order to see the possible diversity of treatment. The selections reprinted in *Public Opinion* may be useful for this purpose. Many papers clip editorial paragraphs on any important event, and print them under one heading, with proper credit. These will also repay study, though not all are to be imitated.

Popular Essays. — Another form of composition, a step more complex and comprehensive than the editorial, is found in the short expository essays of the popular magazines. They are intended for readers who need to be interested as well as instructed. For this reason, exact definitions and discriminations are avoided, and the favorite methods of treatment are likely to be exemplification and analogy, the examples, and objects of comparison being chosen for their own interest, as well as for aptness of illustration.

In many respects this form of essay is similar to the editorial. It frequently differs, however, in the point of view. The

editorial almost always has its origin in current facts, and expounds theories or principles to which these facts are pertinent. The essay takes any general term or principle of interest, and finds facts, either near or remote, to aid in its exposition.

Titles of articles of this class, taken at random from current magazines, are "Good Taste," "The Mental Characteristics of the Japanese," "What is Gambling?" "Politics as a Career," "Shakespeare and Puritanism," "School Ethics."

Since a student's compositions for practice in exposition are largely of this class, a few cautions may profitably be given.

In choosing a subject, a writer should consult (1) his own capabilities; (2) the interest of the subject; (3) the need of an exposition. The materials for exposition cannot be obtained, like those for narration and description, simply by the use of the senses. They are the product of thought on the part of either the author or some one else. The mental processes by which they are gained vary in depth and complexity from those of the small boy who writes a composition on "The Horse," to those used by Mill or Spencer in evolving new systems of metaphysics. But thinking must always be done by some one, and a writer should be too independent simply to repeat the results of another person's thought-processes. Such a repetition will be valuable only when it is superior to the original in some respect of form, such as clearness or brevity.

1. It would seem self-evident that a writer should not choose a theme of which he knows nothing, or on which he can originate nothing; but the subjects often selected by students, and perhaps sometimes suggested by teachers, seem to indicate that such a caution is not entirely unnecessary. In spite of threadbare newspaper jokes, many commencement programs still announce essays on such subjects as "True Greatness," or "The Power of Ideals." The probability that the

ordinary high-school senior can really think out for himself any new ideas on such topics, is very small.

2. In order for an essay to be popular it must have a subject interesting to the ordinary reader. Subjects will be interesting in exposition for the same reasons as in narration. (See page 60.) Those that are novel, and those that are concerned, closely or remotely, with human life, are most commonly chosen.

3. A writer should consider the need of expounding a subject. A term may be too simple to need exposition, or all that is necessary may have been said before. This is an additional objection to such subjects as are mentioned in the paragraph on the writer's capabilities. "True Greatness," and "The Value of an Education" have already been discussed as far as is profitable.

From what has been said it will be evident that subjects for practice exercises in exposition are not plentiful. They may be found, however, if the writer is willing to take up an idea whose importance is proportioned to his abilities.

After having chosen a subject for exposition, the author must frequently narrow it to a small part of its possible inclusion. This is generally done by partition, the processes of which are often not given to the readers.

The title of an essay already referred to is "Good Taste"; but the theme might be stated as "Good Taste in Literature as affected by the Study of Classic Models." The process of narrowing the subject to this small compass is not expressed, but no reader is deceived by the title.

After choosing the subject and narrowing it to appropriate limits the writer must, in his treatment, be guided so largely by circumstances that few general rules can be given. It has already been said that exemplification and comparison are better adapted for essays of this kind than are more concise methods. One type of popular essay—that in which the

author's personality openly enters — is reserved for discussion under a separate heading.

Short Technical Essays. — Closely related to the form of exposition last discussed, but differing somewhat in subject and in manner of treatment, is the short technical essay. This may be found in encyclopedias and in the technical magazines. Its object is purely didactic, and it takes no pains to interest those who are not attracted by the subject-matter. One of its chief characteristics is conciseness. Logical definition and exact classification are more likely to be found in discourse of this kind than in popular magazine articles.

Among the best examples of such essays are many articles in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* on subjects of law, philosophy, science, literature, etc. ; for example, see such titles as "Poetry," "Mammalia," "Theism." Some of these articles are divided into two parts, one purely historical, the other expository. Other examples, on the average shorter than those in the *Britannica*, may be found in the technical magazines of philosophy and of the sciences.

Monographs. — The word "monograph" is applied to productions, somewhat longer than those treated in the last section, which embody the results of original research on the part of the author. As the derivation of the word implies, a monograph treats but one subject, and that only a limited one. Not all monographs can be classed as exposition ; but this form of discourse generally occupies a prominent place, and in those on scientific, philosophical, and similar subjects it predominates.

In exposition of this kind all general terms about the meaning of which any doubt could exist must be defined. The definitions may not always be in the logical form, but they should always be exact. The mere hints at meaning that are often used in popular exposition will not suffice. Classifications should be made complete, even if not all the subdivisions are

treated. In this way the exact field covered by the production will be indicated, and its relation to other fields shown.

Monographs are too extended and require too much preparation to be available as practice exercises. The theses which all institutions require of candidates for higher degrees, and which many require for graduation, are of this type.

1. In choosing a subject for a thesis a student should bear in mind that he is expected to make a genuine contribution to knowledge. If he has a specialty he will naturally select some phase of that ; if not he will generally do best to take some subject connected with his favorite branch of study. Before making a decision he should use all reasonable means to find out the amount and nature of the research that will be required. Subjects that at first sight seem fascinating often call for work that, either because of the quantity or the kind, becomes the most distasteful drudgery long before it is finished.

A student should also be guided in his choice of a subject by the work that others have done before him. A theme already treated by another with equal ability and equal opportunities for research should hardly be chosen. In almost any department of knowledge there are multitudes of untouched problems, any one of which is worth the time of an investigator.

A final caution, and perhaps the one most commonly disregarded, is not to choose too large a subject. Fields seriously proposed in the first flush of enthusiasm and ignorance are frequently reduced by an experienced adviser to one tenth or one twentieth of their original size, and then prove more than can be dealt with to best advantage. One who has not prepared a discourse of this kind can hardly realize how much time and labor must often be expended on some point that in the finished thesis will perhaps be expressed in a single clause or phrase.

2. The work upon a subject after it has been chosen will naturally resolve itself into two parts, — the observation of facts, and the drawing of generalizations from them, or the applica-

tion of principles to them. The first of these may be carried on in the field, the laboratory, or the library. In any case the process should be at bottom the same. The student of history or philosophy should treat the statements of others as observed material. By comparing authorities, by finding where they are in substantial agreement, though they seem to disagree, by noting their essential differences and the reasons why these differences exist, and by deciding whether another theory, the resultant of the others, can be held, one may do as truly original work as he can with a microscope or a dissecting-knife; but the danger of falling into mere compilation is far greater.

In taking notes in a library, nothing should be omitted that can be of any possible value. It is unsafe to trust the memory with details to be associated with a brief note. Put everything down plainly. Cite authorities by volume and page, that a doubtful point may be verified if necessary. It is also frequently of advantage not only to enclose by quotation marks sentences copied literally, but to denote by some special sign whether a passage has been taken down in language closely resembling that of the author, or has been entirely rewritten. Modern devices for note-taking, such as cards, and books with removable leaves, make it possible greatly to simplify the work of preparing a composition from notes; but each note must be complete in itself.

3. The plan of a thesis should be made as soon as a general survey of the field has been obtained. Subsequent work may then be carried on with reference to the plan, and the general significance of facts can often be seen, so that they can be observed more intelligently. In the finished production the plan should generally stand out with considerable distinctness. It will often be found best to divide the work into chapters or other numbered sections, and the subdivisions of these should be clearly indicated by mechanical means and otherwise. This will not only insure a clearer grasp of the subject by the writer,

but it will make it easier of comprehension by the reader, and will be especially valuable to those who wish to use the thesis as a work of reference, without reading all of it.

4. In such a production the citation of authorities is an important matter. When an author is young or unknown the value of his work may depend largely on the care with which he has given references, thus enabling others to verify any statements that they may question. References to books should be by volume and page, or chapter and section. If there is more than one edition of the work, the one referred to should be specified; and in such a case it is better to cite by section than by page, as the reference may then be of use to those having other editions. These suggestions seem too simple to repeat, but they are frequently disregarded.

Examples of monographs will be found in the Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, and in the corresponding series issued by Columbia College, and by the University of Wisconsin. Typical subjects are *The Germanic Origin of New England Towns*, *Local Government in Illinois*, *Methods of Historical Study*, *Present American Socialism*, *Bankruptcy*.

Treatises.—The treatise differs from the monograph in usually having a more comprehensive subject, and hence in presenting a system of ideas rather than a small part of such a system. It is characterized by completeness and exactness of both matter and treatment. The principles that apply in this kind of writing are much the same as those given in the section on the monograph. Since the discourse is much longer and more complex, the need of a carefully arranged and carefully indicated plan is proportionally greater.

Treatises are so exhaustive that they are of interest mainly to specialists. Examples are, Max Müller's "*Science of Thought*," James's "*Psychology*," Roscoe and Schorlemmer's "*Treatise on Chemistry*," Lyell's "*Principles of Geology*."

Text-books.—Text-books on science and similar branches of knowledge may be considered as treatises abridged or simplified for the use of pupils. In them, still more than in the treatise, the plan should be clearly marked, even to the lesser subdivisions. It is also necessary to use much exposition by exemplification and analogy, and in other ways to make perfectly clear the idea to be conveyed; but these methods should supplement stricter forms of exposition, not supplant them. The student is too familiar with text-books to render further comment necessary.

Book Reviews.—A form of composition that, while it might be classed under other headings, seems to call for separate consideration, is the book review. The most typical kind of book review is exposition pure and simple,—the testing of a work by principles established or assumed.

Before discussing this typical form it may be well to consider a kind of discourse sometimes spoken of as a review,—the book notice. This is usually shorter, and often cruder than a real criticism. Its object is to give a reader material for judging whether a new book is likely to interest him, and if so, where he can get it or find out more about it. To this end it gives the title, the name of the author, the publisher, and often the price, size, number of pages, binding, etc. It also gives in a few words the most striking characteristics of the work,—the scene or the temper of the plot, if a novel; the point of view and something of the style, if a history; the school represented or any strong marks of individuality, if a book of poems. It may also speak of the quality of the work, preferably by comparison with other works of the same author, or of other authors that are naturally suggested. This form of notice is generally confined to a single paragraph. Examples may be found in most literary periodicals, and in many daily papers.

A custom of English literary periodicals, apparently gaining favor in this country, is that of treating several works of the same kind

in one article, and instituting comparisons between them. They are taken up seriatim, and the remarks on any one — particularly on an unimportant one — often make little more than a notice.

The true book review aims at something more than giving matter-of-fact information, though when it deals with a new book the full title, author, publisher, price, and similar facts are given, either at the head of the article or in a footnote. As has been said, it is the application of principles. The reviewer has in mind a more or less definite idea of what a novel, or an epic, or a history should be ; and applying his tests to a certain work he decides whether it is to be praised or condemned, and to what extent. This is seldom done in a formal way, as a scientist applies tests to a new object ; but without such a process as a basis there can be no true criticism. A real review is written not so much for the book discussed as for the sake of literary art as a whole.

It would be impossible to settle by fixed rule the very delicate questions of taste that confront every editor of a great author's personal literary remains. Yet in the following paragraph, which begins a review of "The Reminiscences of Thomas Carlyle," edited by James Anthony Froude, Mr. Richard Holt Hutton applies such a rule with as much force as if it could be stated.

"There can be no doubt as to the permanent vitality of this book, or of the careless genius which produced it after this random fashion, at an age when Carlyle was looking back upon a long and laborious life. But there may be, I think, much doubt as to the manner in which Mr. Froude has exercised the absolute discretion entrusted to him by Carlyle as to the use he should make of these reminiscences. I do not think that Carlyle, with his great pride and his deep reserve, would ever have approved of the inclusion in this book of all the constant references to his wife, and to his love for her, poured out with the freedom of a diarist, though of a diarist who has formed for himself that semi-artificial manner which suggests a consciousness of audience. The rhapsodies on his 'noblest,' 'queenliest,' 'beautifullest,' and so forth,

natural enough to the old man in his desolation, should not, I think, have been given to the world as they were written. What is the proper sphere of privacy, if the half-remorseful self-reproaches of the tenderest love, accusing itself of inadequacy, are to be made public to all the world?"

One of the faults to be most carefully guarded against is that of making too prominent mere individual likes and dislikes. A person who reads of a new book wishes to know, not the opinion of a reviewer, particularly of an anonymous reviewer, but facts from which he can form his own opinions. Tastes differ, and so do ideas of what literature ought to be. Stories that a realist would admire might be disgusting to a romanticist, and *vice versa*. A reviewer should give to the one reasons for avoiding a new novel, to the other reasons why he might like it. He may at the same time make known his own belief in romanticism or realism, and may argue his case if he wishes ; but he should not indulge in simple praise or abuse, without making plain the standards that he applies. The tendency to give simply one's own estimates is especially strong, because the laws of criticism are in many ways so vague and indeterminate. So long as the canons of literary art are not definitely settled — and it is probable that they never will be — the task of the reviewer will be a difficult one, and he should approach it accordingly.

It is a corollary to what has just been said, that nothing should be given in a review that would interfere with the pleasure of a subsequent reader. In reviewing fiction one should never tell the story. Striking incidents may be referred to, if too much of the plot is not revealed.

The proper use of quotations in reviews is a difficult matter, and one that perhaps requires some comment. It is not easy to give a "fair and sufficient sample" of a piece of literature. Part of a connected work cannot be judged without the context ; and even in case of lyric poems, each short and complete in

itself, it is usually impossible to give an adequate idea of a volume by a reasonable number of selections. To choose the poorest is to expose the work to ridicule, and is justifiable only when all are hopelessly bad. To choose the best is likely to arouse false expectations, even if the rank of the selection is plainly stated. But it is by his best and his poorest that an author should be judged, and to make mediocre selections is perhaps the most unfair of all. If any quotations are given it is best to make them as numerous as space will allow, and to indicate clearly the rank of each as compared with the work as a whole.

The style and temper of book reviews differ so much that quoted examples might give an erroneous idea. The student should read a considerable number of the best, such as may be found in *The Critic*, *The Literary World*, *The Dial*, *The Nation*, and similar periodicals.

Criticism of the Subject-Matter. — In reviewing works by specialists in any department of knowledge, it is necessary to pay much more attention to the subject-matter than to the literary style. Such works are usually reviewed by other specialists in the same department. Thus a new treatise on chemistry would be reviewed by some chemist, a new history of the United States by some qualified student of American history. The comments of such a discussion are more intelligent than could be given by a critic of general qualifications; but they are more likely to be unfair, since specialists are divided into schools and parties, and bestow praise or blame according as their pet theories are supported or attacked. This is not so serious a matter as might be supposed, for those who are interested in such articles know of the disagreements in their own line of study, and take the criticisms with proper allowance. There is a growing sentiment that such reviews, if not indeed all reviews, should be signed; and even when they are pub-

lished anonymously the fact that they appear in a certain journal will often give the initiated a hint of their authorship. Reviews of this kind are often really essays on scientific subjects, and are governed by the same rules as is other exposition of the same class.

Reviews of this sort, on books dealing with subjects of popular interest, sometimes become essays which express ideas merely suggested by the book reviewed. This was more common formerly than it is now, and is more common in England, where reviews are somewhat formidable affairs, than in this country.

Many of Macaulay's essays are of this class. His essay on Milton takes the form of a review of the newly found treatise on the doctrines of Christianity, though that work is mentioned only in the introductory paragraphs, and the body of the essay considers Milton's literary and political characteristics in general.

Informal Essays.—This kind of writing is classed as exposition rather for convenience than because it uniformly shows the marks of this or any other principal form of discourse. Its chief characteristics are a subject of popular interest, often one chosen from current life; a discursive treatment that sometimes seems to violate the strict requirements of unity; and, frequently, the introduction of the author's personality, by the use of the pronoun "I" and by the adoption of a conversational manner. The charm of this kind of essay lies in its freedom from restraint, and in the opportunity that it gives for meeting the author as if on familiar terms. Besides its purely literary value it may be of use in moulding popular views of manners and the minor morals. It is often characterized by a gentle satire, which should never be allowed to become personal, or to pass into sarcasm.

Examples are found in the papers of the *Spectator*, the essays of Charles Lamb, Thackeray's "Roundabout Papers," and the

Breakfast-Table series by Dr. Holmes. Suggestive titles from the *Spectator* are "Female Headdress — Will Honeycomb's Notions of it," "Transmigration of Souls — Letter of a Monkey," "Letter on Catcalls — History of Them," "Hypocrisy — Various Kinds of it," "Proposal for a Newspaper of Whispers." Charles Lamb, in his best essays, chose subjects that were susceptible of a quaintly humorous treatment, rather than those that had any direct bearing on everyday life and action. Dr. Holmes dealt with problems similar to those discussed by Addison, but in a very different way.

The writing of essays of this sort is excellent practice, inasmuch as they require perfect ease and individuality of expression, and at the same time the observance of strict good taste. No literary rules can be given. The only caution is, "Be yourself," omitting only the expression of those characteristics that you would be better without. Such work is largely the product of moods, and should not be changed too readily on a subsequent revision; but moods that are likely to cause unfairness or exaggeration should be guarded against. The fads and foibles of college life will give subjects for genial essays planned to mould student opinion; while questions of greater importance—but not too great—may be treated in a manner serious at heart, but light and playful on the surface.

Conclusion.—As will be seen from the foregoing pages, exposition includes many various and complex pieces of literature. The kinds that have been discussed are rather types than definite classes, and it will frequently be difficult to classify a particular piece of exposition under any one of them. They will be useful, however, in giving a general idea of the subject.

ILLUSTRATIVE SELECTIONS.

The short extracts interspersed through this chapter will give a good idea of most of the processes of exposition. The forms of exposition are so many that they cannot all be illustrated here. It will be more profitable, as well as more

interesting, for the student to find and discuss a considerable number of editorial articles on current events than to analyze one or two reprinted examples, even though the latter might be of especial excellence. The same is true of book reviews. Text-books are already familiar to the student; but it will be excellent practice for him to note the plan of some such work, studying the analytical table of contents, if there is one, and carrying the analysis farther for himself. This subject of plan is a most important one in connection with exposition, argumentation, and persuasion, and no better introduction to it can be found than the analysis of some good text-book. Monographs are too long to be reproduced, and the same is true in a greater degree of treatises. It will be well for the student to make himself familiar, in a general way, with one or more of each.

Since most of the methods of exposition have been illustrated in the course of the preceding discussion, the following selections are chosen to show how exposition is actually found, usually mixed to some extent with other forms of discourse.

I.

The following is the opening of chap. I. of the "Seven Lamps of Architecture," by John Ruskin. It may be analyzed as follows :

- I. Architecture defined. Lines 1-52.
 1. Formal definition. Lines 1-3.
 2. Architecture distinguished from building. Lines 4-52.
 - (a) Building defined. Lines 4-19.
 - (b) Loose use of word architecture. Lines 19-26.
 - (c) Strict use of word architecture. Lines 27-31.
Examples (See page 185, sec. 2). Lines 31-41.
 - (d) Definition further amplified. Lines 41-52.

II. Architecture divided. Lines 53-62.

1. Devotional.
2. Memorial.
3. Civil.
4. Military.
5. Domestic.

[Each kind briefly defined.]

III. Partition of the subject of the chapter. Lines 63-71.

[General theme, implied, The Principles of Architecture.]

Sacrifice: the dominant principle in devotional and memorial architecture.

Note in this selection the natural order — first definition, then division ; note also that each subdivision is briefly defined. All the divisions are given, though but two are important for the chapter introduced by the selection. This helps to a better understanding of the chapter, though the real reason for it may be that all kinds of architecture are treated in the course of the volume. Analyze the formal definition into genus and differentia. Classify the methods used to amplify it.

ARCHITECTURE.

Architecture is the art which so disposes and adorns the edifices raised by man, for whatsoever uses, that the sight of them may contribute to his mental health, power, and pleasure.

It is very necessary, in the outset of all inquiry, to distinguish
5 carefully between Architecture and Building.

To build — literally, to confirm — is by common understanding to put together and adjust the several pieces of any edifice or receptacle of a considerable size. Thus we have church building, house building, ship building, and coach building. That one
10 edifice stands, another floats, and another is suspended on iron springs, makes no difference in the nature of the art, if so it may be called, of building or edification. The persons who profess that art are severally builders, ecclesiastical, naval, or of what-

ever other name their work may justify : but building does not
 15 become architecture merely by the stability of what it erects ; and
 it is no more achitecture which raises a church, or which fits it to
 receive and contain with comfort a required number of persons
 occupied in certain religious offices, than it is architecture which
 makes a carriage commodious, or a ship swift. I do not, of
 20 course, mean that the word is not often, or even may not be legiti-
 mately, applied in such a sense (as we speak of naval archi-
 tecture), but in that sense architecture ceases to be one of the fine
 arts, and it is therefore better not to run the risk, by loose nomen-
 clature, of the confusion which would arise, and has often arisen,
 25 from extending principles which belong altogether to building,
 into the sphere of architecture proper.

Let us, therefore, at once confine the name to that art which,
 taking up and admitting, as conditions of its working, the neces-
 sities and common uses of the building, impresses on its form
 30 certain characters venerable or beautiful, but otherwise unneces-
 sary. Thus, I suppose, no one would call the laws architectural
 which determine the height of a breastwork or the position of a
 bastion. But if to the stone facing of that bastion be added an
 unnecessary feature, as a cable moulding, *that* is Architecture.
 35 It would be similarly unreasonable to call battlements or machi-
 colations architectural features, so long as they consist only of an
 advanced gallery supported on projecting masses, with open inter-
 vals beneath for offence. But if these projecting masses be carved
 beneath into rounded courses, which are useless, and if the head-
 40 ings of the intervals be arched and trefoiled, which is useless,
that is Architecture. It may not be always easy to draw the line
 so sharply, because there are few buildings which have not some
 pretence or colour of being architectural ; neither can there be
 any architecture which is not based on building, nor any good
 45 architecture which is not based on good building ; but it is per-
 fectly easy, and very necessary, to keep the ideas distinct, and to
 understand fully that Architecture concerns itself only with those
 characters of an edifice which are above and beyond its common
 use. I say common ; because a building raised to the honour of
 50 God, or in memory of men, has surely a use to which its archi-

tectural adornment fits it ; but not a use which limits, by any inevitable necessities, its plan or details.

Architecture proper, then, naturally arranges itself under five heads :

55 Devotional ; including all buildings raised for God's service or honour.

Memorial ; including both monuments and tombs.

Civil ; including every edifice raised by nations or societies for purposes of common business or pleasure.

60 Military ; including all private and public architecture of defence.

Domestic ; including every rank and kind of dwelling-place.

Now, of the principles which I would endeavour to develope, while all must be, as I have said, applicable to every stage and
65 style of the art, some, and especially those which are exciting rather than directing, have necessarily fuller reference to one kind of building than another ; and among these I would place first that spirit which, having influence in all, has nevertheless such especial reference to devotional and memorial architecture — the
70 spirit which offers for such work precious things, simply because they are precious ; etc.

II.

The following essay from the *Easy Chair*, by George William Curtis,¹ is very popular in method of presentation, and in parts approaches the familiarity of the personal essay. Observe how the author draws on history and literature, ancient and modern, for his material. Make a plan of the essay — and of each of the succeeding selections — similar to that given for Selection I. Formal definitions and classifications are wanting. Why? Classify the means of definition that are used. Has the essay any persuasive bearing? What other forms of discourse does it contain, and for what is each used?

¹ From *Harper's Magazine*, by permission.

HONOR.

These are very precious words of Lovelace :

" I could not love thee, dear, so much,
Loved I not honor more."

And Francis First's message to his mother after Pavia, " All is
5 lost but honor," is in the same key. Yet honor has been as much
travestied as liberty, and the crimes committed in its name are as
many. Falstaff's is a sharp antistrophe : " What is in that word
honor? What is that honor? Air." But for that whiff of air
how many noble lives have been sacrificed !

10 Alexander Hamilton knew his own time, and he decided that
his refusal of Burr's challenge would be regarded as cowardly,
and destroy his prestige and influence. We may say that a
morally greater man would nevertheless have dared to refuse it,
but we must also consider that Hamilton knew the popular
15 estimate of his own standard of life, and would naturally test his
conduct by that standard. He was a soldier and a man of the
world of the eighteenth century. Dr. Nott, the echoes of whose
famous sermon on Hamilton's death still linger in tradition, might
have declined to fight and been justified. He was a clergyman,
20 and popular feeling excused him from resorting to the field of
honor. But it is very doubtful if it would have excused Hamilton.

He might have urged that Burr had no right to make his de-
mand. But Hamilton knew that he had spoken most strongly of
Burr, and he knew that Burr knew it. He thought Burr an un-
25 principled and dangerous fellow, and he said so plainly. But
there was the familiar preface to Hamilton's explanation of the
charges against him as Secretary of the Treasury. Could he take
the lofty height of moral principle? Or could he stand upon the
technical punctilio of the duel? His honor, by which he meant
30 the consistency of his life and the standards that he acknowledged,
seemed to him to allow him no alternative, and he was slain by
the necessity of what is unquestionably a false sense of honor.

A man's honor, in the sense that we may attribute to the lines
of Lovelace, is his most precious possession. But it is something

35 which is wholly in his own keeping, and is not at the mercy or whim of another. He can soil it, but except himself the whole world cannot smirch it. If a man had told Dr. Channing that he lied, or had dashed a glass of wine in his face, the honor of Dr. Channing would still have remained unsullied, not because he was
40 a minister, but because of a reason which is equally applicable to all other men — because of his moral rectitude and courage. That a ribald tongue railed at him for lying when he had spoken the truth could not affect him except with pity or wonder. Even if the charge were true and he had told a lie, he would, indeed, have
45 soiled his own honor, but the railer would not have touched it.

This view assumes that honor is something else than notoriety, which in turn is something very different from fame or character. Notoriety is current familiarity with a man's name, which is given by much mention of it arising from any kind of conduct. Reputation is favorable notoriety as distinguished from fame, which is
50 permanent approval of great deeds or noble thoughts by the best intelligence of mankind. But honor is absolutely individual and personal. It is conscious and willing loyalty to the highest inward leading. It is that quality which cannot be insulted. This is the
55 sublime instinct of which Lovelace sings. I could not so much love thee, Lucasta, purest of the pure, if I did not love purity more. *Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas.*

The ordinary talk about honor is a parody of this spiritual loyalty. A man seizes another by the nose at a public table, or
60 he slaps his face in the street, or he tells him in the sacred precincts of the club that he lies, or he posts him as a coward, or he insults his wife or daughter — such a man invites summary retaliation, and he generally gets it. But there is no question of honor involved. "Suppose your nose pulled at the opera," said a gentle-
65 man at the club discussing the ethics of honor, — "your nose, you know," he said with horror, and unconsciously holding his own forward, — "what could be a more unspeakable insult?" "Yes," answered his protagonist; "but does a man carry his honor in his nose?" Nature has provided instincts and weapons for the
70 defense of our noses. But she has not made the nose the citadel of honor, nor has she left honor at the mercy of a sot who may

choose to drench it with wine. There was a quarrel the other day between two men, one of whom had said that the way in which the other had done something was not the way of a gentleman ;
 75 the other replied that he would not stand being called ungentlemanly. There was a closing and grappling, and then one whipped out a pistol and began firing at the other, who took to the street, and most naturally but inconsiderately dodged behind innocent citizens in the street to avoid the bullets. The pursuer fired as
 80 opportunity served, while the pursued dashed into a hotel to borrow a pistol to return the broadside. Stanley might have seen such a performance in the Mmjumbo regions on the banks of Lake Nyanza or the regions of the Zambesi, but what had it to do with honor? Is that what Lovelace loved more than Lucasta? Is
 85 that what King Francis — more 's the pity if this were the thing — did not lose at Pavia !

Our honor is solely in our own keeping. To have your nose pulled is not to be dishonored, but so to behave that it deserves pulling. But, Alcibiades of the clubs, remember that it is not
 90 the pulling of the nose that makes the dishonor.

" The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
 But in ourselves, that we are underlings."

And Cassius also says what bears a very different interpretation from that which he designed :

95 " Well, honor is the subject of my story.
 I cannot tell what you and other men
 Think of this life ; but, for my single self,
 I had as lief not be, as live to be
 In awe of such a thing as I myself."

100 Fear of yourself, fear of your own rebuke, fear of betraying your consciousness of your duty and not doing it — that is the fear which Lovelace loved better than Lucasta ; that is the fear which Francis, having done his duty, saved, and justly called it honor.

III.

The next selection, an essay on Vitality, from Tyndall's "Fragments of Science," is a little abstruse, partly on account

of the subject, partly on account of the metaphysical questions that it suggests. Make a plan as the first step in the study of the essay. Is anything else expounded than the term "vitality"? Note and classify the methods of exposition used. To what extent are other forms of composition — especially argumentation — found in the essay?

VITALITY.

The origin, growth, and energies of living things are subjects which have always engaged the attention of thinking men. To account for them it was usual to assume a special agent, free to a great extent from the limitations observed among the powers of
 5 inorganic nature. This agent was called the *vital force*; and, under its influence, plants and animals were supposed to collect their materials and to assume determinate forms. Within the last few years, however, our ideas of vital processes have undergone profound modifications; and the interest, and even disquietude,
 10 which the change has excited are amply evidenced by the discussions and protests which are now common regarding the phenomena of vitality. In tracing these phenomena, through all their modifications, the most advanced philosophers of the present day declare that they ultimately arrive at a single source of power,
 15 from which all vital energy is derived, and the disquieting circumstance is that this source is not the direct fiat of a supernatural agent, but a reservoir of what, if we do not accept the creed of Zoroaster, must be regarded as *inorganic* force. In short, it is considered as proved that all the energy which we derive from
 20 plants and animals is drawn from the sun.

A few years ago, when the sun was affirmed to be the source of life, nine out of ten of those who are alarmed by the form which this assertion has latterly assumed would have assented, in a general way, to its correctness. Their assent, however, was more
 25 poetic than scientific, and they were by no means prepared to see a rigid mechanical signification attached to their words. This, however, is the peculiarity of modern conclusions: that there is no creative energy whatever in the vegetable or animal organism,

but that all the power which we obtain from the muscles of man
30 and animals, as much as that which we develop by the combustion
of wood or coal, has been produced at the sun's expense. The
sun is so much colder that we may have our fires ; he is also so
much colder that we may have our horse-racing and Alpine climb-
ing. It is, for example, certain that the sun has been chilled to
35 an extent capable of being accurately expressed in numbers, in
order to furnish the power which lifted this year a certain number
of tourists from the vale of Chamouni to the summit of Mont
Blanc.

To most minds, however, the energy of light and heat presents
40 itself as a thing totally distinct from ordinary mechanical energy.
But either of them can be derived from the other. Wood can be
raised by friction to the temperature of ignition ; while by prop-
erly striking a piece of iron a skillful blacksmith can cause it to
glow. Thus, by the rude agency of his hammer he generates light
45 and heat. This action, if carried far enough, would produce the
light and heat of the sun. In fact the sun's light and heat have
actually been referred to the fall of meteoric matter upon his sur-
face ; and whether the sun is thus supported or not, it is perfectly
certain that he *might be* thus supported. Whether, moreover, the
50 whilom molten condition of our planet was, as supposed by eminent
men, due to the collision of cosmic masses or not, it is perfectly
certain that the molten condition *might be* thus brought about.
If, then, solar light and heat can be produced by the impact of
dead matter, and if from the light and heat thus produced we can
55 derive the energies which we have been accustomed to call *vital*,
it indubitably follows that vital energy may have a proximately
mechanical origin.

In what sense, then, is the sun to be regarded as the origin of
the energy derivable from plants and animals? Let us try to give
60 an intelligible answer to this question. Water may be raised from
the sea-level to a high elevation, and then permitted to descend.
In descending it may be made to assume various forms — to fall
in cascades, to spurt in fountains, to boil in eddies, or to flow
tranquilly along a uniform bed. It may, moreover, be caused to
65 set complex machinery in motion, to turn millstones, throw shuttles,

work saws and hammers, and drive piles. But every form of power here indicated would be derived from the original power expended in raising the water to the height from which it fell. There is no energy *generated* by the machinery ; the work per-
70 formed by the water in descending is merely the parcelling out and distribution of the work expended in raising it. In precisely this sense is all the energy of plants and animals the parcelling out and distribution of a power originally exerted by the sun. In the case of the water, the source of the power consists in the
75 forcible separation of a quantity of the liquid from a low level of the earth's surface, and its elevation to a higher position, the power thus expended being returned by the water in its descent. In the case of the vital phenomena, the source of power consists in the forcible separation of the atoms of compound substances
80 by the sun. We name the force which draws the water earthward 'gravity,' and that which draws atoms together 'chemical affinity'; but these different names must not mislead us regarding the qualitative identity of the two forces. They are both *attractions*; and, to the intellect, the falling of carbon atoms against
85 oxygen atoms is not more difficult of conception than the falling of water to the earth.

The building up of the vegetable, then, is effected by the sun, through the reduction of chemical compounds. The phenomena of animal life are more or less complicated reversals of these pro-
90 cesses of reduction. We eat the vegetable, and we breathe the oxygen of the air ; and in our bodies the oxygen, which had been lifted from the carbon and hydrogen by the action of the sun, again falls toward them, producing animal heat and developing animal forms. Through the most complicated phenomena of
95 vitality this law runs : the vegetable is produced while a weight rises, the animal is produced while a weight falls. But the question is not exhausted here. The water employed in our first illustration generates all the motion displayed in its descent, but the
100 *form* of the motion depends on the character of the machinery interposed in the path of the water. In a similar way, the primary action of the sun's rays is qualified by the atoms and molecules among which their energy is distributed. Molecular forces deter-

mine the form which the solar energy will assume. In the separation of the carbon and oxygen this energy may be so conditioned
105 as to result in one case in the formation of a cabbage, and in another case in the formation of an oak. So also, as regards the reunion of the carbon and the oxygen, the molecular machinery through which the combining energy acts may in one case weave the texture of a frog, while in another it may weave the texture of
110 a man.

The matter of the animal body is that of inorganic nature. There is no substance in the animal tissues which is not primarily derived from the rocks, the water, and the air. Are the forces of organic matter, then, different from those of inorganic matter?
115 The philosophy of the present day negatives the question. It is the compounding, in the organic world, of forces belonging equally to the inorganic, that constitutes the mystery and the miracle of vitality. Every portion of every animal body may be reduced to purely inorganic matter. A perfect reversal of this process of
120 reduction would carry us from the inorganic to the organic ; and such a reversal is at least conceivable. The tendency, indeed, of modern science is to break down the wall of partition between organic and inorganic, and to reduce both to the operation of forces which are the same in kind, but which are variously com-
125 pounded.

Consider the question of personal identity in relation to that of molecular form. Twenty-six years ago Mayer, of Heilbronn, with that power of genius which breathes large meanings into scanty facts, pointed out that the blood was 'the oil of the lamp of life,'
130 the combustion of which, like that of coal in grosser cases, sustains muscular action. The muscles are the machinery by which the dynamic power of the blood is brought into play. Thus the blood is consumed. But the whole body, though more slowly than the blood, wastes also, so that after a certain number of years it is
135 entirely renewed. How is the sense of personal identity maintained across this flight of molecules? To man, as we know him, matter is necessary to consciousness ; but the matter of any period may all be changed, while consciousness exhibits no solution of continuity. Like changing sentinels, the oxygen, hydrogen, and

140 carbon that depart seem to whisper their secret to their comrades that arrive, and thus, while the non-Ego shifts, the Ego remains intact. Constancy of form in the grouping of the molecules, and not constancy of the molecules themselves, is the correlative of this constancy of perception. Life is a *wave* which in no two
145 consecutive moments of its existence is composed of the same particles.

Supposing, then, the molecules of a human body, instead of replacing others, and thus renewing a preëxisting form, to be gathered first hand and put together in the same relative positions
150 as those which they occupy in the body. Supposing them to have the selfsame forces and distribution of forces, the selfsame motions and distribution of motions — would this organized concourse of molecules stand before us as a sentient, thinking being? There seems no valid reason to believe that it would not. Or, supposing
155 a planet carved from the sun, set spinning round an axis, and revolving round the sun at a distance from him equal to that of our earth, would one of the consequences of its refrigeration be the development of organic forms? I lean to the affirmative. *Structural* forces are certainly in the mass, whether or not those
160 forces reach to the point of forming a plant or an animal. In an amorphous drop of water lie latent all the marvels of crystalline force; and who will set limits to the possible play of molecules in a cooling planet? If these statements startle, it is because matter has been defined and maligned by philosophers and theologians,
165 who were equally unaware that it is, at bottom, essentially mystical and transcendental.

Questions such as these derive their present interest in great part from their audacity, which is sure, in due time, to disappear. And the sooner the public dread is abolished with reference to
170 such questions the better for the cause of truth. As regards knowledge, physical science is polar. In one sense it knows, or is destined to know, everything. In another sense it knows nothing. Science understands much of this intermediate phase of things that we call nature, of which it is the product; but
175 science knows nothing of the origin or destiny of nature. Who or what made the sun, and gave his rays their alleged power?

Who or what made and bestowed upon the ultimate particles of matter their wondrous power of varied interaction? Science does not know : the mystery, though pushed back, remains un-
 180 altered. To many of us who feel that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the present philosophy of science, but who have been also taught, by baffled efforts, how vain is the attempt to grapple with the inscrutable, the ultimate frame of mind is that of Goethe :

185 " Who dares to name His name,
 Or belief in Him proclaim,
 Veiled in mystery as He is, the All-enfolder?
 Gleams across the mind His light,
 Feels the lifted soul His might,
 190 Dare it then deny His reign, the All-upholder?"

IV.

The first three selections illustrate what might be called exposition for its own sake ; the fourth shows how exposition is used as a necessary adjunct to argumentation. This extract is the first section of John Henry Newman's " Essay on the Miracles of Scripture compared with those reported elsewhere as regards their Nature, Credibility, and Evidence." The plan of this essay, as given in the introduction, is as follows :

I propose to attempt an extended comparison between the Miracles of Scripture and those elsewhere related, as regards their nature, credibility, and evidence. I shall divide my observations under the following heads :

1. On the Idea and Scope of a Miracle.
2. On the antecedent Credibility of a Miracle, considered as a Divine Interposition.
3. On the Criterion of a Miracle, considered as a Divine Interposition.
4. On the direct evidence for the Christian Miracles.

It will be seen from this outline that the essay contains much of both exposition and argumentation. The exposition naturally precedes and prepares the way for the arguments. The first section, as is indicated by the title, is almost pure exposition. To what extent does argumentation enter in this section? Note the direction that the exposition takes, as determined by its office. How does this selection differ in scope and direction from an exposition of miracles given for its own sake, *e.g.*, an encyclopedia article? Is the author expounding the simple term "miracle" throughout the whole of the essay? If not, where does he begin the consideration of a more complex term? What is this term? Is there a classification of miracles? A partition? What is the principle, or basis, of the classification or partition as the case may be?

THE IDEA AND SCOPE OF A MIRACLE.

A miracle may be considered as an event inconsistent with the constitution of nature, that is, with the established course of things in which it is found; or, again, an event in a given system which cannot be referred to any law, or accounted for by the
 5 operation of any principle in that system. It does not necessarily imply a violation of nature, as some have supposed — merely the interposition of an external cause, which, we shall hereafter show, can be no other than the interposition of the Deity. And the effect produced is that of unusual or increased action in the parts
 10 of the system.

It is then a relative term, not only as it presupposes an assemblage of laws from which it is a deviation, but also as it has reference to some one particular system; for the same event which is anomalous in one, may be quite regular when observed in con-
 15 nection with another. The Miracles of Scripture, for instance, are irregularities in the economy of nature, but with a moral end; forming one instance out of many, of the providence of God, that is, an instance of occurrences in the natural world with a final cause. Thus, while they are exceptions to the laws of one system,

20 they may coincide with those of another. They profess to be the evidences of a Revelation, the criterion of a divine message. To consider them as mere exceptions to physical order, is to take a very incomplete view of them. It is to degrade them from the station which they hold in the plans and provisions of the Divine
25 Mind, and to strip them of their real use and dignity; for as naked and isolated facts they do but deform an harmonious system.

From this account of a Miracle, it is evident that it may often be difficult exactly to draw the line between uncommon and strictly miraculous events. Thus the production of ice might have seemed
30 at first sight miraculous to the Siamese ; for it was a phenomenon referable to none of those laws of nature which are in ordinary action in tropical climates. Such, again, might magnetic attraction appear, in ages familiar only with the attraction of gravity. On the other hand, the extraordinary works of Moses or St. Paul
35 appear miraculous, even when referred to those simple and elementary principles of nature which the widest experience has confirmed. As far as this affects the discrimination of supernatural facts, it will be considered in its proper place ; meanwhile let it suffice to state, that those events only are connected with our
40 present subject which have no assignable second cause or antecedent, and which, on that account, are from the nature of the case referred to the immediate agency of the Deity.

A Revelation, that is, a direct message from God to man, itself bears in some degree a miraculous character ; inasmuch as it sup-
45 poses the Deity actually to present Himself before His creatures, and to interpose in the affairs of life in a way above the reach of those settled arrangements of nature, to the existence of which universal experience bears witness. And as a Revelation itself, so again the evidences of a Revelation may all more or less be
50 considered miraculous. Prophecy is an evidence only so far as foreseeing future events is above the known powers of the human mind, or miraculous. In like manner, if the rapid extension of Christianity be urged in favor of its divine origin, it is because such extension, under such circumstances, is supposed to be incon-
55 sistent with the known principles and capacity of human nature. And the pure morality of the Gospel, as taught by illiterate fisher-

men of Galilee, is an evidence, in proportion as the phenomenon disagrees with the conclusions of general experience, which leads us to believe that a high state of mental cultivation is ordinarily
60 requisite for the production of such moral teachers. It might even be said that, strictly speaking, no evidence of a Revelation is conceivable which does not partake of the character of a Miracle ; since nothing but a display of power over the existing system of things can attest the immediate presence of Him by whom it was
65 originally established ; or, again, because no event which results entirely from the ordinary operation of nature can be the criterion of one that is extraordinary.

In the present argument I confine myself to the consideration of miracles, commonly so called ; such events, that is, for the
70 most part, as are inconsistent with the constitution of the physical world.

Miracles, thus defined, hold a very prominent place in the evidence of the Jewish and Christian Revelations. They are the most striking and conclusive evidence ; because, the laws of matter
75 being better understood than those to which mind is conformed, the transgression of them is more easily recognized. They are the most simple and obvious ; because, whereas the freedom of the human will resists the imposition of undeviating laws, the material creation, on the contrary, being strictly subjected to the
80 regulation of its Maker, looks to Him alone for a change in its constitution. Yet Miracles are but a branch of the evidences, and other branches have their respective advantages. Prophecy, as has been often observed, is a growing evidence, and appeals more forcibly than Miracles to those who are acquainted with the
85 Miracles only through testimony. A philosophical mind will perhaps be most strongly affected by the fact of the very existence of the Jewish polity, or of the revolution effected by Christianity, while the beautiful moral teaching and evident honesty of the New Testament writers is the most persuasive argument to the
90 unlearned but single-hearted inquirer. Nor must it be forgotten that the evidences of Revelation are cumulative, that they gain strength from each other ; and that, in consequence, the argument from Miracles is immensely stronger when viewed in conjunction

with the rest than when considered separately, as in an inquiry of
95 the present nature.

As the relative force of the separate evidences is different under different circumstances, so again has one class of Miracles more or less weight than another, according to the accidental change of times, places, and persons addressed. As our knowledge of
100 the system of nature, and of the circumstances of the particular case varies, so of course varies our conviction. Walking on the sea, for instance, or giving sight to one born blind, would to us perhaps be a miracle even more astonishing than it was to the Jews ; the laws of nature being at the present time better understood
105 than formerly, and the fables concerning magical power being no longer credited. On the other hand, stilling the winds and waves with a word may by all but eye-witnesses be set down to accident or exaggeration without the possibility of a full confutation ; yet to eye-witnesses it would carry with it an overpowering evidence
110 of supernatural agency by the voice and manner that accompanied the command, the violence of the wind at the moment, the instantaneous effect produced, and other circumstances, the force of which a narrative cannot fully convey. The same remark applies to the Miracle of changing water into wine, to the cure of demoniacal possessions, and of diseases generally. From a variety of
115 causes, then, it happens that Miracles which produced a rational conviction at the time when they took place, have ever since proved rather an objection to Revelation than an evidence of it, and have depended on the rest for support ; while others, which
120 once were of a dubious and perplexing character, have in succeeding ages come forward in its defence. It is by a process similar to this that the anomalous nature of the Mosaic polity, which might once be an obstacle to its reception, is now justly alleged in proof of the very Miracles by which it was then supported.
125 It is important to keep this report in view, as it is no uncommon practice with those who are ill-affected toward the cause of Revealed Religion to dwell upon such Miracles as at the present day rather require than contribute evidence, as if they formed a part of the present proof on which it rests its pretensions.
130 In the foregoing remarks, the being of an intelligent Maker has

been throughout assumed ; and, indeed, if the peculiar object of a Miracle be to evidence a message from God, it is plain that it implies the admission of the fundamental truth, and demands assent to another beyond it. His particular interference it directly
135 proves, while it only reminds of His existence. It professes to be the signature of God to a message delivered by human instruments, and therefore supposes that signature to some degree already known, from His ordinary works. It appeals to that moral sense and that experience of human affairs which already bear witness
140 to His ordinary presence. Considered by itself, it is at most but the token of a superhuman being. Hence, though an additional instance, it is not a distinct species of evidence for a Creator from that contained in the general marks of order and design in the universe. A proof drawn from an interruption in the course of
145 nature is in the same line of argument as one deduced from the existence of that course, and in point of cogency is inferior to it. Were a being who had experience only of a chaotic world suddenly introduced into this orderly system of things, he would have an infinitely more powerful argument for the existence of a designing
150 Mind, than a mere interruption of that system can afford. A Miracle is no argument to one who is deliberately, and on principle, an atheist.

Yet, though not abstractly the more convincing, it is often so in effect, as being of a more striking and imposing character. The
155 mind, habituated to the regularity of nature, is blunted to the overwhelming evidence it conveys ; whereas by a Miracle it may be roused to reflection, till mere conviction of a superhuman being becomes the first step toward the acknowledgment of a Supreme Power. While, moreover, it surveys nature as a whole, it is not
160 capacious enough to embrace its bearings, and to comprehend what it implies. In miraculous displays of power the field of view is narrowed ; a detached portion of the divine operations is taken as an instance, and the final cause is distinctly pointed out. A Miracle, besides, is more striking, inasmuch as it displays the
165 Deity in action ; evidence of which is not supplied in the system of nature. It may then accidentally bring conviction of an intelligent Creator ; for it voluntarily proffers a testimony which we

have ourselves to extort from the ordinary course of things, and forces upon the attention a truth which otherwise is not discovered, 170 except upon examination.

And as it affords a more striking evidence of a Creator than that conveyed in the order and established laws of the Universe, still more so does it of a Moral Governor. For, while nature attests the being of God more distinctly than it does His moral 175 government, a miraculous event, on the contrary, bears more directly on the fact of His moral government, of which it is an immediate instance, while it only implies His existence. Hence, besides banishing ideas of Fate and Necessity, Miracles have a tendency to rouse conscience, to awaken to a state of responsi- 180 bility, to remind of duty, and to direct the attention to those marks of divine government already contained in the ordinary course of events.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENTATION.

I.

Definition.—Argumentation is that form of discourse the object of which is to convince the reader¹ of the truth or falsity of a proposition.

The expression "truth or falsity of a proposition" makes a convenient rather than an exact distinction. To prove a proposition is to disprove its opposite, and *vice versa*. Thus every conclusive argument may be said to prove one proposition and to disprove another.

Argumentation is distinguished from exposition by the fact that it deals with the truth of a proposition, not with its meaning; and from persuasion in that it appeals purely to the intellect and not to the will. In practice it is often closely related to both these forms.

Where Found.—It is by processes akin to those of argumentation that men arrive at a great part of their knowledge, and that they determine their actions in the affairs of life. As a form of discourse, however, argumentation is used in addresses before the courts and before legislative bodies; and in debates between the believers in opposing theories, or between contestants who argue for practice, as in a literary

¹ In this as in other chapters the words "reader" and "writer" will generally be used, though argumentation is perhaps more often spoken than written. -

society. Mixed with a large proportion of exposition it is employed by writers on science, philosophy, theology, and similar subjects — particularly by those who put forward new theories. As an accessory to persuasion it is found in political speeches, sermons, etc. The suggestions given in the succeeding pages will mostly have direct reference to these more formal pieces of composition ; but it should not be forgotten that the processes of argument used in these discourses are essentially the same as those by which we reason concerning the weather, the probability of a good recitation, and similar everyday matters.

Propositions. — As has already been said, every piece of argumentation must concern itself with the truth or falsity of some proposition. It is impossible to argue concerning a term, such as "football" or "William Shakespeare" or "beneficial to the United States." But when any one of these terms becomes the subject or the predicate of a sentence, one may discuss the truth of the statement thus made. "Football is a sport that should be encouraged," "William Shakespeare wrote Hamlet," "A protective tariff has proved beneficial to the United States," are propositions for or against which arguments may be brought.

The propositions with which argumentation deals may be either particular or general. Thus, of the examples given in the last paragraph, the first is general, the last two are particular.

Forms of Propositions. — In writing argumentation an author must have clearly and definitely in mind the proposition that he supports or opposes before he can reason accurately concerning it. As was said in the preceding chapter,¹ the form of proposition preferred by logic consists of two terms, subject and predicate, united by a copula. In cases where there is danger of confusion or of hidden ambiguities, it is well to analyze a proposition into these three elements. In the majority of cases the copula is implied in the predicate verb.

¹ See page 191.

Thus, in the sentence, "A clear sunset promises fair weather," the word "promises" contains both the copula and part of the predicate. That is, it performs the grammatical office of predication, and at the same time tells the nature of the relation between a "clear sunset" and "fair weather." In this sentence all three elements might be separately expressed by saying, "A clear sunset *is* a promise of fair weather." But many propositions cannot be so readily cast into this stereotyped form.

As themes for serious argumentation short simple sentences are the exception rather than the rule. "It is rarely that we have the opportunity of making a perfectly simple statement about a 'thing' which can be expressed by a perfectly unqualified name, — as 'man' or 'humanity'; we find it safer as a rule to confine the extent of our assertions somewhat, and thus we render them complex in form. There are comparatively few statements that we can make with any safety about 'all men' except such as are already too familiar to be much required; but we may often find occasion to speak of 'all men who possess such and such a peculiarity,' or 'all except those who, etc.,' whereby our sentence becomes more complex and the assertion more limited in range."¹

The student will find his work simplified if he remembers that every single proposition, no matter how long or involved, consists of two terms, one of which is affirmed or denied of the other. The expression "single proposition" is intended to exclude compound sentences in which the ideas expressed in the clauses are not closely connected, but have a somewhat remote time relation or place relation. Such propositions are rarely the theme of argument, and when they are they should be divided. All simple and all complex sentences, and compound sentences in which the connection of thought is close, have really but two terms, connected by a copula expressed, or implied in a verb.

¹ Sidgwick, "Fallacies," page 57.

In simple sentences, as, "Birds fly," "Man is mortal," the existence of but two terms is readily seen. The essential structure is the same in a complex sentence like the following.

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons."

Here the copula is implied in the verb "shall be apportioned." The sentence may be made to read :

"The apportionment of representatives and direct taxes among the several states which may be included within this Union / shall be / according to, etc."

In this sentence both subject and predicate have a considerable number of modifiers of all kinds ; yet each term stands as a unit. It is excellent practice to analyze involved sentences into the two terms of which each is composed, rearranging them if necessary. Where the copula is united with the verb—as in the sentence just quoted—the process often differs from that of grammatical analysis.

All arguments tend to prove something that may be asserted ; and the statement of the proposition for the private use of the writer should be in the declarative form. The matter under discussion may, however, be brought before the reader in an interrogative sentence, or in some conventional form, such as that of a resolution.

"A protective tariff is beneficial to the United States," "Is a protective tariff beneficial to the United States?" "Resolved, that a protective tariff is beneficial to the United States," are equally good ways of stating the same question.

Ambiguities. — In no other form of discourse are obscurities and ambiguities so likely to produce bad results as in argumentation. Loose thought is always accompanied by a loose use

of language; and, while the converse statement is not quite true, a loose use of language offers every encouragement to loose thought. It is easy for a really astute reasoner to mislead not only others, but himself, by the use of vague and ambiguous statements.

Lack of clearness in propositions may arise from either the structure of the sentence or the meanings of words. Ambiguities of the former class may generally be removed by careful attention to the simpler principles of grammar and rhetoric. They will usually disappear if the proposition is analyzed into its three elements, as advised in the last section.

Ambiguities in the use of words are harder to deal with. Careful exposition must be employed, both to discover and to remove them.

An ambiguous or careless use of words may conceal the fact that the subject and the predicate are substantially identical, or that the terms of the proposition contradict each other. This is most likely to be the case when one of the terms, at least, is not thoroughly familiar, or when the apparent novelty of the idea draws the mind away from the exact meaning.

An example of the former sort of confusion is the statement, "Cork floats because of its speciosity." Another is the verdict of a coroner's jury that the man before them came to his death "by the stoppage of the vital functions."¹ Both these expressions are meaningless repetitions.

In the question, "Can one individual be at the same time another individual,"² an examination of the terms will show a direct contradiction of language. This fault is most common in long and involved statements so placed in a discourse that no especial attention is directed to them.

Probably the greatest danger from ambiguity in the statement of a proposition is that the ambiguous words may be

¹ Quoted by Sidgwick.

² *Ibid.*

employed in different senses in the proof. This is most liable to happen when the words are familiar, and when the different meanings resemble each other.

No one is deceived by the old equivocation, "Light comes from the sun. Feathers are light. Therefore feathers come from the sun." But when we say, "Virtue is essential to happiness. Therefore all men must desire virtue, since all desire happiness," the different meanings of "desire" and "happiness" are not so readily distinguished.

Attitude of the Reader.—In planning argumentative discourse, a writer should take into consideration the probable attitude of those for whom he writes, toward the proposition that he maintains.

1. A body of readers may, at the outset of an argument, be favorably disposed toward the proposition, though they have not as yet fully accepted it. In such a case the office of the argument is largely to corroborate ideas already formed, but held, it may be, on insufficient evidence; or, when the discourse has a persuasive element, to strengthen and vivify a belief that is held in an apathetic way.

2. Readers, while still open to conviction, may have conceived a more or less strong disbelief in a proposition. One who supports such a thesis must overcome this opposition, and also bring enough proof in addition to throw the preponderance in his side of the scale.

3. Readers may approach the discussion of a question without any prepossession in favor of either side. This absence of preconceived notions may be brought about in two different ways:

(1) It may be the result of indifference, or of a simple desire to learn something new. It is in this attitude of mind that the ordinary reader accepts the statements of his morning paper, or of a history or a biography; or that a student listens to the

lectures of his instructors. The writer who addresses himself to persons in this state of mind labors, it is true, to secure their intellectual assent to his propositions; but his aim can perhaps be better described as instruction than as conviction. His discourse will consist mostly of narration, description, or exposition, according to the nature of his subject; and the arguments that he offers in support of his position will seem almost gratuitous to those who are ready to accept his statements without question. Composition for occasions where this relation exists between writer and reader will receive but little attention in the present chapter.

(2) The absence of a preconceived opinion may be due to a determination on the part of the reader to be impartial, or to hold judgment in abeyance until all sides of the question are presented. This attitude of conscious impartiality is often assumed as a matter of duty—for example, by a judge or a jurymen. In such cases personal beliefs and prejudices are deliberately waived, and only the arguments are considered in reaching a decision.

Human nature is such, however, that in matters of personal belief perfect judicial balance of mind is rare. It is exceedingly difficult to keep from some slight prejudices for or against any proposition that is understood. Even before the meaning is grasped the inclination may be warped by the knowledge of those who support each side, or even by the sound of the words in which the statement is expressed. In the case of fair-minded persons, however, this antecedent leaning toward one side or the other is slight except as it rests on an intelligent basis.

4. There may be persons who are so fixed in their opposition to a proposition that no amount of argument would change their views. Such persons are said to be "not open to conviction." There will be others who are already firmly convinced of the truth of the proposition. It is clearly useless to address

an argument to either of these classes of readers; except that those last named may have their beliefs quickened as a preliminary to a persuasive appeal.

Burden of Proof and Presumption. — A question that should be decided at the outset of any work of argumentation is the position of the burden of proof and the presumption. By the burden of proof is meant the necessity or duty of proving the proposition in order to establish it. By the presumption is meant the probability antecedently existing that the proposition is true. The two are correlatives; they are on opposite sides of a question, and the burden of proof is sometimes defined as the duty of overthrowing the presumption.

The presumption may be weak or strong, according to circumstances, and the burden of proof will be correspondingly light or heavy. In any case, a proposition having the presumption in its favor is supposed to be true until it is disproved. At the outset of an argument there is, therefore, an advantage in having the presumption and a disadvantage in having the burden of proof.

Whately remarks that the presumption is not always an advantage, since novel or striking statements will attract attention and thus secure for themselves a hearing; while those that are probable will prove uninteresting because they are more commonplace. This exception applies, if at all, to persuasion rather than to argumentation.

The question of the burden of proof and the presumption may be treated in two ways. These might be called the logical and the rhetorical, since they correspond to the differences between logic and rhetoric. Logic concerns itself only with the establishment of the truth, and implies the existence of but one person, the thinker. For the purposes of this science, therefore, the position of the burden of proof may be ascertained by inspection of the proposition. Rhetoric is concerned

with the communication of arguments to others, and implies not only a writer, but a reader. A treatment of the burden of proof and the presumption for the purposes of rhetoric — that is, as a guide in planning argumentative discourse — must be based on the attitude of the reader toward the proposition.

In practice, then, the burden of proof is the duty of proving the proposition in order to convince the reader; and the presumption is a preoccupation of the mind of the reader in favor of the proposition. It is obvious that where the attitude of the readers is of the first kind mentioned in the last section — *i.e.*, when they have a bias in favor of a proposition — the presumption is on the side of one who supports the proposition, and the burden of proof rests on his opponent. If the readers are opposed to the proposition exactly the reverse is true.

Since the position of the burden of proof depends on the attitude of the individual reader or hearer, it may be different for readers of the same article, or for different members of the same audience. Thus, in a debate between the advocates of a high and of a low tariff, each would have the presumption so far as his partisans were concerned, but with those who favored his opponents he would have the burden of proof.

When the readers of an argument are supposed to have no predisposition, the principles recognized by logic are also applicable in rhetoric. One class of rules is established for the regulation of legal procedures. The most familiar example is the presumption that a person accused of crime is innocent till he is found guilty. This is simply a working rule, depending for its existence on a general policy, and not at all on individual judgments as to the merits of the case. A judge may, as a man, feel entirely sure, even from the beginning of a trial, that the accused is guilty; and a juryman will probably be as well convinced of that fact when he retires to the jury room as when he has signed a verdict of conviction; but each must, in his official capacity, act on the assumption of innocence until

the legal form of procuring a verdict has been gone through with. The possible conflict between these two forms of presumption has often led to much confusion.

Another rule governing the burden of proof is that the presumption is always on the side of an existing institution. This is a little less arbitrary than the rule last discussed, since it is not established by law, but rests on the fact that existing institutions are sanctioned by the authority of those who founded them and those who have supported them. It is not, however, strong enough to have appreciable weight with any one whose personal presumptions are on the other side.

A Democrat does not feel the presumption that his party is in the right to be stronger or weaker because it does or does not at the time have control of national affairs ; though if he were asked to serve as judge of a debate on the relative merits of the two parties he would be bound to concede the advantage to the one in power. In arguing before an American audience the presumption that the government of the United States should be republican rather than monarchical would be almost overwhelming. This is partly because our institutions have existed in this form for so long, partly because few persons have desired to change them. The presumption in favor of the existing form of government in this country is, if possible, stronger than that in favor of a monarchy for England ; because a considerable number of Englishmen express a preference for a republic.

When the position of the burden of proof cannot be fixed by any of the rules just laid down, the statement is sometimes made that "he who affirms must prove." If this is taken to mean that the author of a statement must prove it in order to convince any one who is of a different opinion, then it simply repeats what has been said before. But if it means that by changing the wording of a question the burden of proof can be changed, it then amounts only to a rule of forfeiture. Such a presumption would disappear with the first valid argument,

however slight, made by the opposing side. It might be compared to the rule by which a ball team is awarded a game if its opponents do not reach the field on time.

It seems simpler to say that on many questions, when submitted to an impartial jury, there is really no burden of proof and no presumption.

Among such questions are those that involve matters entirely beyond human experience, as, "Is Mars inhabited?" ; those that are purely abstract, as, "Is it right to do evil that good may follow?" ; and those in which the authority of existing institutions is neutralized, *e.g.*, in case of an Englishman and an American arguing before an impartial jury as to the relative merits of republican and monarchical government.

In any case, the burden of proof and the presumption balance each other only in the minds of impartial readers. Any one who has formed the slightest opinion on a question has a presumption in favor of the side to which he inclines:

The burden of proof and the presumption are generally thought of only at the opening of a discussion. They may, however, be considered as present throughout a debate. The side that would be awarded the decision if the discussion stopped at any particular moment, has, at that moment, the presumption. If the other side succeeds in overcoming the preponderance of argument against it, the burden of proof and the presumption change places.

Place of the Proposition. — The attitude of the reader toward a proposition has much to do in determining in what part of an argumentative discourse the proposition should be stated. The general rule is to place it first. This is necessarily done in debates where both sides agree on a question to be discussed ; in deliberative bodies, where the proposition is brought forward in the form of a motion or a resolution ; and in courts of law, where the point of law or fact in question must be formally presented before it is argued. The advantage of

this method is that the reader at once knows what the writer intends to prove, and is better able to judge the exact force of the arguments. If the opposite order were adopted the reader could not distinguish the essential from the incidental features of the argument, and might overlook or forget what was most important.

There are a few exceptions to this general rule, mostly in forms of discourse that approach persuasion. If those for whom the argument is intended are so strongly prejudiced against the proposition that they will not give a fair hearing to those who support it, then the statement may be delayed till a favorable impression has been made. In this way a person may be led to give his assent to arguments before he sees to what ultimate conclusion they tend. The same treatment may more rarely be employed in case of a hackneyed or worn-out question. Here the statement of the proposition should be delayed only long enough to make sure of the attention of the readers.

It is sometimes advisable to employ the order of research or investigation in giving arguments. This will be discussed more fully under the head of induction. See page 260.

II.

Kinds of Arguments.— Having decided upon the best statement of a question, and having determined upon which side rests the burden of proof, the author should next consider the arguments by which the proposition is to be maintained. The classification of arguments is one of the most perplexing subjects with which the student has to deal. Of the classifications suggested, perhaps the most helpful for purposes of rhetoric is that of Whately, based on "the relations of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion." On this principle, arguments are divided into two classes, (1) those from cause

to effect (*a priori*); (2) those arising from other relations. The second class is again divided into arguments from sign and arguments from example.

Arguments from Cause. — The first class of arguments comprises such as "might have been employed not as arguments, but to account for the fact or principle maintained, supposing its truth to be granted." To these arguments Whately gives the name *a priori*. This appellation, as well as others given by writers who have borrowed his classification in whole or in part, is somewhat ambiguous. We can perhaps do no better than to take the simple descriptive name, and call them arguments from cause to effect, or, for brevity, simply arguments from cause.

The distinction between this class of arguments and all others is thus stated by Whately:

"The only decisive test by which to distinguish the arguments that belong to the one and to the other of these classes is to ask the question, 'Supposing the proposition in question to be admitted, would this statement here used as an argument serve to *account* for and explain the truth or not?' It will then be readily referred to the former or to the latter class, according as the answer is in the affirmative or the negative: as, *e.g.*, if a murder were imputed to any one on the grounds of his 'having a hatred to the deceased, and an interest in his death,' the argument would belong to the former class; because, *supposing* his guilt to be *admitted*, and an inquiry to be made how he can commit the murder, the circumstances just mentioned would serve to *account* for it; but not so with respect to such an argument as his 'having blood on his clothes,' which would therefore be referred to the other class."¹

The strength of this form of argument depends (1) on the adequacy of the given cause to produce the effect; (2) on the certainty with which it is known that the operation of this cause

¹ "Rhetoric," Part I., chap. II., par. 2.

was not interfered with by other causes. Where it is known that but one adequate cause existed, and that cause is uniform in its results, the argument is practically conclusive.

If we know that a tender plant was exposed, unprotected, to a temperature below the freezing-point, we are certain that it must have suffered ; or if a man swallowed a large dose of strychnine, and no remedial measures were employed, we do not need to ask whether he died. In order to be sure of our conclusions we must, however, know definitely that the plant was unprotected, and that the man took no antidote.

This form of argument is also valuable in cases where it is not conclusive, or indeed where it would have little weight if taken by itself. This is because we readily believe that which seems probable, while only the strongest proof will convince us of that which cannot be accounted for. The first step in support of any proposition should be to make it seem plausible, — that is, to account for it in case it is true.

The effect that a sense of probability has in determining our beliefs is not always clearly recognized, partly because we are so seldom asked to believe a statement that is wholly improbable, partly because it seems so natural not to take such a statement seriously. Accounts of marvelous cures by faith, of sea-serpents, and of living toads imprisoned for ages in solid stone, are as well authenticated by testimony as are many unquestioned facts of history or science. But only the most credulous persons feel that arguments in support of such stories are worth examining.

Writers of fiction recognize this fact. The introductions to stories like those of Jules Verne or H. Rider Haggard lay the scene in a time and place that make strange happenings seem plausible ; and the occurrences themselves are explained, often with an appearance of scientific accuracy, for the purpose of making it seem that they might have happened. Such a treatment is necessary to insure, not real belief, but even such temporary assent as will allow the reader to interest himself in the narrative.¹

¹ See page 75.

If real intellectual assent is desired, the argument from cause is even more necessary. It is almost impossible to convict a criminal, except on the most direct evidence, when no motive for the crime can be shown. A new theory in science — *e.g.*, the nebular hypothesis — must be shown to be plausible before the direct observations that support it will be accorded much weight as arguments.

Students should not be confused by the fact that a writer who uses an argument from cause to effect may first, as an investigator, have proceeded from effect to cause. A detective rarely starts with motives or causes and from these discovers that a crime has been committed. He first learns of the crime, investigates all the circumstances, and forms a theory as to the way in which it was committed ; he then looks about for causes or motives that might have led to such an act. These motives, when found, are used in support of the theory, and the argument is thus one from cause.

In an argument from cause the conclusion follows the premises chronologically.¹ It may therefore be used to predict future events provided causes adequate to produce them are known. It is in this way that we reason that the ignition of powder will produce an explosion ; or that an increase in the cost of a raw material will, other things being equal, increase the cost of goods manufactured from it. When applied to future events this argument is often stated in a hypothetical form : as, "If it freezes to-night, tender vines will be killed."

In considering this form of argument it is necessary to guard against an ambiguity that lurks in the word *because*. This is used in giving not only real causes, but mere signs, such as will be discussed in the next section.

The causes of fair or foul weather on any particular day are various meteorological conditions, wholly unknown to most persons, and but imperfectly understood by scientists ; but it is usual

¹ It is usual to say that a cause always precedes its effect, though, so far as we can measure time, they may coexist.

to say, "It will probably be fair to-morrow *because* the sunset is clear," or, "It will rain *because* there was no dew." These reasons are mere signs or indications, not in any sense causes.

Arguments from Sign.—The second great class of arguments—those that could not be used to account for a proposition if it were true—is divided into two sub-classes. The first of these is arguments from sign. Arguments from sign are indications that arise from the fact that one thing is necessarily or usually an accompaniment of another. If two things are always found together, the presence of one is proof of the presence of the other; and if they are usually, though not necessarily associated, the presence of one forms an indication, though not a certain indication, of the other.

1. A necessary circumstance of any effect is its cause; and it is by argument from sign that we reason from any fact to that which produced it. If there is but one cause adequate to produce an effect, then we may reason conclusively from the effect to the cause. If any one of several causes might have produced the same result, we can conclude only that one or more of these causes must have existed. Which of them acted in this particular case can be determined only by other arguments.

Water will freeze only as the result of cold; and on seeing ice we can conclude, definitely, that the temperature has been low. If we see fire, we cannot, however, tell with certainty how it was kindled, since it might have originated from friction, or an electric spark, or by spontaneous combustion, or through contact with another fire. To which of these we should incline in any particular case might be decided by other signs, as a partly burned match near by.

2. Inferences may also be drawn from one effect of a cause to another effect of the same cause. These effects may be either immediate or remote.

Of this class are most of the signs from which we predict the weather. A falling barometer and a storm are, partly at least, ultimate effects of the same cause.

3. The fact that one phenomenon is usually attendant on another may have been shown by long experience, though the causal relation between them is not understood. A valid argument from sign may be based on such a coincidence, though its strength is hard to estimate.

A striking example of this is the fact that, so far as known, all animals with horns and cloven hoofs are ruminants. Scientists have been unable to show any necessary connection between these characteristics, but there is good reason to believe that they always exist together.

Similar in force are those signs that depend on the customs of society. Crape on the door is accepted as an indication that some one within the house is dead ; though the causal connection between the two facts would be hard to trace.

4. When several signs point toward the same fact, though no one of them is conclusive, the argument is termed circumstantial evidence. The strength of this depends on the probability that the circumstances are all explained by one fact or set of facts, rather than that they merely happened to come together.

Theoretically, at least, circumstantial evidence cannot be absolutely conclusive, since any possible combination of circumstances might occur by chance. For this reason there is sometimes a hesitancy about trusting such proof in criminal cases, especially in matters of life or death. In ordinary affairs it is continually accepted without question.

Examples of circumstantial evidence are frequent in criminal prosecutions. One of the most remarkable instances in recent years may be found in the trial of the murderers of Dr. Cronin in Chicago in 1889. No one but the participants and the victim

was present at the commission of the crime, and all direct traces of the deed were well hidden. The evidence, however, showed hundreds, if not thousands, of circumstances that were readily explainable on the theory advanced by the prosecution, and on no other single hypothesis. No one circumstance was, by itself, of great importance. Any one of them might have been explained in some other way; but the probability that they all happened together by mere chance was practically infinitesimal.

The strength of the argument from sign depends on the uniformity with which the fact to be proved accompanies its sign. If it is known that the sign is always attended by the fact signified, the argument is conclusive. The intrinsic importance of the sign has nothing to do with the validity of the result.

In war between civilized nations a white flag signifies that those carrying it are, for the time, non-combatants. Any scrap of white cloth may, if properly displayed, show the character of a detachment of men, and so be sufficient to protect life. This sign depends for its force simply on the conventional usage of armies. In a war with savages, or with an enemy that is known to be unscrupulous, the meaning of a white flag might be doubtful. A single footprint in the sand was enough to convince Robinson Crusoe that there were other men than himself on his island, because he felt sure that this peculiar mark could have been made in no other way than by a human foot.

Perhaps the most serious danger in connection with the argument from sign is that of assuming that circumstances which have been found together in our limited experience will always be found together. When no relation of cause and effect can be shown, signs, though exceedingly valuable, must not be trusted too far.

A fallacy in the use of either the argument from cause or the argument from sign is that of supposing that a causal relation exists between two occurrences that merely chance to

come together. This fallacy is known, technically, as *post hoc, propter hoc*. It arises from the lack of a broad view, or from a tendency to overestimate the value of one's own experience.

Thus a politician, while his opponents are in power, tries to show that any evils which befall the country result from legislation, or from popular distrust of the government; or he strives to connect prosperity in any direction with the acts of his own party. In matters as complex as national affairs are, it is impossible to trace all the relations of cause and effect, and any claim, no matter how absurd, cannot easily be disproved. A cruder form of this fallacy underlies many popular superstitions and beliefs. A farmer, after planting his seed while the moon is in a certain phase, and receiving a good return, argues that the moon in some way influences his crops. He may then reason from cause, and predict the success of other crops planted under the same conditions. It is sometimes argued, from sign, that a man who walks with a stoop must be scholarly, or that a person who is troubled with corns must have worn tight shoes.

Testimony. — Testimony is classed by Whately as a form of the argument from sign; the existence of the testimony being a sign or accompanying circumstance of the facts testified to. This classification is undoubtedly the logical one, and should be constantly borne in mind. But since this important form of proof is governed largely by special principles, it will here be treated in a separate section.

At the outset it is necessary to divest the terms "testimony" and "witness" of their ordinary associations with courts of law. By testimony is meant any statement, spoken or written, in regard to the existence or non-existence of any fact. A witness is any one who gives testimony.

It is therefore on the testimony of our instructors and of historians that we know that George Washington lived; and on the testimony of the morning paper that we believe that a certain acci-

dent occurred in New York yesterday. When a friend tells us that it is ten o'clock, or that the postman has left a letter for us, he bears witness to these facts.

In the narrow sense of the term, testimony is the account given by witnesses of things observed with their own senses. This strict form of testimony will be discussed first.

The value or strength of testimony depends (1) on the honesty of a witness, (2) on his ability to observe, (3) on his ability to tell what he has observed.

1. The word "honesty" is used in opposition not only to flagrant disregard of the truth, which it is generally easy to discover, but to lesser faults of which the witness may be almost or quite unconscious. Human nature is such that for many persons it is well-nigh impossible to deliver "a plain, unvarnished tale." Even in a simple narrative the facts are changed or exaggerated for a more striking or artistic effect. When the witness testifies concerning himself, his friends, or his enemies, powerful motives for change exist. One of the most important requisites for a witness is that he should be unprejudiced.

Some kinds of testimony furnish in themselves almost certain proof that a witness is honest, and so are especially strong. Among these are testimony in favor of enemies, or against self-interest or the interest of friends; also testimony the force of which is not seen, so that no motive for dishonesty exists.

2. The power to observe is also an important requisite of a good witness. The ability to use the five senses accurately is not so common as is ordinarily supposed. A striking proof of this may be found by comparing the stories told by eye-witnesses of any exciting occurrence, — a fire, a railway collision, etc. Men of good intelligence, who had equally good opportunities for observation, will contradict each other flatly in matters of detail. The extent of such discrepancies is often surprising.

A few years ago, when Mayor Harrison was assassinated at his residence in Chicago late one evening, the morning papers published interviews with several members of his household. These persons differed, not only as to the number of shots fired, and the relative positions of the assassin and his victim when the shooting took place, but even as to the room in which the mayor died. All these witnesses were present and were undoubtedly wholly honest.

3. The ability to relate what has been observed is the third requisite of a good witness. It is not necessary that the testimony should be unobjectionable in literary form, but that it should be complete, and free from ambiguities. The cross-examination of an illiterate witness in court often brings out the fact that he has said something entirely different from what he intended.

The foregoing paragraphs will indicate ways of testing evidence by considering the character of the witness. The testimony itself should also be examined. If it is not perfectly clear, open, and straightforward, it is well to determine, if possible, whether the deviations were caused by inability on the part of the witness to word his story well, or whether they conceal trickery. Minor details also should be examined to see that there is no self-contradiction. If there are two or more witnesses, their testimony should also be compared. It has already been noted that different observers see the same thing differently, and a minute agreement between witnesses often points toward collusion. On the other hand, a disagreement in essentials shows that one testimony or the other must be false.

When no possibility of collusion exists, the strength of testimony is very greatly increased by each additional witness, since the chance that several persons would accidentally hit upon the same falsehood, or (except in cases of optical delusion, etc.) would make the same errors of observation, is very slight. It

must be remembered, however, that this statement applies only to true witnesses, not to those who report hearsay.

The failure of a witness to mention a thing is sometimes spoken of as negative testimony, and may be taken as an indication that the thing not mentioned did not exist. The strength of negative testimony depends on the probability that the fact in question would have been mentioned if it had existed.

If we wish to learn whether there was a fire in New York yesterday that destroyed a million dollars' worth of property, we consult the New York daily papers of this morning. If they make no mention of such a fire it is the strongest possible proof that nothing of the kind occurred, since any newspaper would be sure to devote considerable space to such an occurrence. If the destruction of a hundred dollars' worth of property is not mentioned, this is not conclusive, since small fires are often passed unnoticed.

The probability that an event will be mentioned does not, however, always depend on its importance. The fact that a morning paper did not report the theft of a million dollars in the city the day before would not show that such a crime was not committed, since it might have been committed and not discovered, or the discovery, if made, might have been kept secret by the advice of the authorities.

So far, in this discussion, testimony has been considered in the strict sense of statements in support of facts observed by the senses. But witnesses often testify, not to observed facts, but to inferences drawn from these. Such witnesses, especially when they speak on matters of a technical nature, are called authorities or experts, and their statements are spoken of as authority, or expert testimony.

Before an expert can speak as an authority he must (1) observe the facts as he would observe them before giving ordinary testimony; (2) consider and interpret these facts. His testimony, as that of an expert, concerns the interpretation.

Unlike ordinary witnesses, experts may testify to general truths. All authorities on science, law, etc., do this.

An expert should have, besides all the qualities that are demanded in an ordinary witness, a special knowledge of the department of thought in which he testifies, and the ability to form correct judgments.

Before an engineer says that a structure is unsafe he (1) inspects the structure, and (2) interprets, in the light of accumulated knowledge and experience as an engineer, the simple facts thus gained. Any person of fair ability could have made as accurate an observation of the size of the building, the position, dimensions, and material of the beams, etc. ; but to the untrained mind these would give no idea of the safety of the structure. A similar process is carried on by a physician who examines a patient to determine his sanity. An authority in history observes all the details that he can find on a disputed point ; he is then enabled by training, and by historical knowledge already acquired, to draw a conclusion more valuable than that of an ordinary reader.

Experts in many subjects, medicine, for example, are liable to be warped and biased by their own pet theories, and those of the school to which they belong. It is generally possible to find authorities on both sides of any important question, as may be seen in almost any criminal case where an attempt is made to prove the accused insane. This is so common that the term "expert witness" has fallen somewhat into disrepute.

The words "expert" and "authority" are generally used only in connection with men who are qualified to speak on certain subjects because of special research. But many statements with regard to common affairs are of the same nature as expert testimony.

When a person says " We had better go home, for it is going to rain," his mental processes are similar to those of the engineer or the physician referred to above. He observes certain signs, and

in the light of past experience decides that they indicate rain. He also observes the conditions in which he and his companions are placed, and decides, also by the aid of knowledge previously acquired, that the wisest course is to go home. Such statements are to be tested by exactly the same processes as are those of an expert scientist.

Arguments from Example.—The third class of arguments or, in Whately's scheme, the second subdivision of the second class,¹ are arguments from example. By examples are meant cases or instances from which are drawn conclusions applying to something else. This argument is based on the assumption that what is true of the examples will be true of the whole class to which they belong; or that things that resemble each other in some particulars will also have a resemblance in others. The argument may thus take two forms: one from particulars to general truths, the other from particulars to other particulars.

It must be remembered that this chapter deals only with examples as arguments and not with those used as illustrations. An example under a general principle may be a valid argument if its agreement with the principle is seen and admitted. If not, it assumes the point at issue and is worthless as proof, though it may be valuable as illustration.

The statement that a certain salt is soluble in water may be proved by showing that a verified sample of it is soluble. But if it is said: "Sensational novels should not be read by young persons, *e.g.*, H. Rider Haggard's works," the example is useful only as an illustration of what the writer considers sensational novels. It would be worthless as an argument to a reader who (1) denied that Haggard's works were sensational, or (2) held that it would do young people no harm to read them. It is no argument to those not already convinced, and so begs the question.

¹ See page 239.

When the argument from example is used in support of some general law, its strength depends on the probability (1) that some general law exists, (2) that the cases chosen are "fair and sufficient samples" of their class.

By the examination of one or more specimens of aluminum it may be concluded that the metal is of a light color and has a specific gravity of 2.6. But if all the specimens examined happen to be thin discs it cannot be concluded that aluminum is always in that form. In one case there is undoubtedly a general law, *i.e.*, the metal will surely have some uniform color and specific gravity; but it would be absurd to expect it always to occur in pieces of the same shape.

In arguing that college-bred men are more likely than others to prove successful in the professions, it would be necessary to use great care to secure typical examples. Neither the most brilliant nor the dullest men could fairly be cited for or against the proposition. The difficulty of finding fair examples is so great that arguments on questions of this kind are rarely conclusive or profitable. Probably the only method that could be at all fair would be that of averaging a large number of cases, thus getting an artificial "typical example."

The argument from particulars to a general conclusion is likely to be strongest when it is applied to the proof of some law of nature. There is reasonable certainty that the laws of the physical universe are uniform; and we can argue from one specimen of a metal to all of its class, or from one case in which a natural law acts to its operation in all similar cases. When we attempt to generalize on human affairs, the chance for certainty is much less. Men do not act alike under given conditions, and their affairs of business or pleasure do not turn out alike, even when all visible circumstances are the same.

Concerning the strength of the argument from one particular case to another little can be said, except that it depends on the probability that because the cases are alike in some respects

they will be alike in the one in question. The force of this probability varies with many circumstances for which no rules can be given. The most satisfactory and conclusive form of this argument is that in which there is an obvious relation of cause and effect between the known and the unknown circumstances.

If we find difficulty in driving a nail into one piece of close-grained wood, we may expect a similar experience when we try to drive a nail into another close-grained block ; or, conversely, if we have observed this correspondence of phenomena once we may infer that a given piece of wood is close-grained, if a nail is driven into it with difficulty. So we may argue that if *A*, a man of mature age and excellent ability, completed his college course in three years, *B*, a man of equal maturity and ability, can do the same. Here the particulars in which the two men agree are obviously causes of the result inferred. It would be foolish to draw the same conclusion from the fact that *B* resembled *A* in height, color of hair, or place of birth.

It should be noted that this kind of argument can be analyzed into two parts : (1) an argument from a particular case to a general truth ; (2) an argument (cause or sign) from this general truth to another particular case.

Thus we may be said to infer from one or more experiments that a close grain in wood is always a reason why a nail will not penetrate easily, and from this cause we argue to the same result in another case. Or, if a nail is driven with difficulty into any piece of wood, we argue, by sign, that a close grain is the cause.

In practice, however, we do not seem to take these two steps, but to move directly from one specific case to another.

Arguments of this kind, in which the relation of cause and effect is definitely known, may be as strong as the corresponding arguments from cause or from sign, the strongest of them being practically conclusive. Weaker arguments from example

may be considered to imply the existence of an unknown causal relation. When no hint of the nature of this relation exists, it is usual to rely most strongly on examples that resemble the case under consideration in the most particulars. The greater the number of points of resemblance, the greater the chance that one may be causally connected with what is to be proved. This is a very crude method of argument, but one to which we are often forced in deciding everyday affairs.¹

If we are shown a new fruit and find that in form, color, mellowness, and aroma it resembles other pleasing fruits, we may conclude that it will be equally pleasing to the taste. This is more probable than it would be if the specimen were hard, coarse-looking, and of a disagreeable odor; but it is by no means certain. A raw quince is really less palatable than a turnip.

An interesting form of the argument from example is that in which conclusions are drawn, not from the resemblances between two things, but from the resemblances between the respective relations of two sets of things; or, as Whately expresses it, from a "resemblance of ratios."²

The stock example of this argument is the comparison of a seed and an egg. The two may be unlike in every visible respect, but resemble each other in their relations to parent bird and parent plant respectively; and also in their relations to offspring in each case.

The parables of Christ are arguments of this class. The Kingdom of Heaven is not really "like unto a grain of mustard seed." The real similarity is between the development of the small seed to the great plant, and the development of the Kingdom from obscure beginnings till it overspreads the earth.

¹ For a careful discussion of the force of this common argument, see Mill's "Logic," especially the chapter on Analogy.

² This argument is treated by Whately under the name of "analogy." This word has been given a special meaning by almost every writer on logic since the days of Aristotle. For this reason it will be avoided here, though it fills a vacant place in the nomenclature of the subject.

When the question at issue is one that is concerned essentially with resemblances, arguments of this kind may, as Mill points out, be as strong as any other arguments from example. In the majority of cases, however, they are used mainly for illustration and enforcement. In estimating their value the chief caution is not to be led into supposing that a comparison is really instituted between the things mentioned.

Another form of the argument from example is that in which inferences are drawn from an individual of one kind or class to another of a different kind or class. When the relations of cause and effect can be seen this argument may be strong. In other cases it is weak, its strength depending, roughly, on the closeness of resemblance between the classes compared.

The argument that because one college has beaten another in football it can beat also in baseball is of this kind, and is manifestly weaker than the direct argument from example that another victory in football could probably be gained. It is somewhat stronger, however, than the argument that success in football would indicate success in an oratorical contest between the same colleges; because baseball and football resemble each other more closely than do football and oratory.

In the complex affairs of life it is often dangerous to trust any one form of argument fully; and the argument from example is perhaps the most dangerous of all. When cause and effect do not visibly enter, it depends on a probability which there are no data for correctly estimating. The only rules that can be given are to search for relations of cause and effect, and if these cannot be found, to use all possible means to test the conclusion by standards of common sense and to corroborate the argument by others from cause and from sign.

In spite of its disadvantages, the argument from example often furnishes the only means of deciding in everyday affairs. It is also very useful as a means by which other processes of

reasoning may be verified, much as if their conclusions were put to a practical test. In business, social, and political affairs the chances that some factor may be overlooked or incorrectly estimated are so great that conclusions wholly unsupported by example are received with great caution. "Promoters" of novel enterprises, and inventors seeking capital to develop their ideas, invariably find business men slow to invest. No matter how strong the arguments from cause and from sign, or how great the profits that may be figured out on paper, conservative holders of capital fear some unforeseen cause of failure, and prefer small returns in a business where they can see that others have already succeeded.

The argument from example derives both strength and weakness from the conciseness and definiteness of its premises: strength in that the argument is easily understood and easily held in mind; weakness in that the readers are likely to confuse simplicity of premise with simplicity of argument, and to feel that the conclusion must be as clearly true as are the individual facts cited to support it.

How these Arguments are Employed. — In assigning arguments to the classes just considered, care should be taken to see exactly what each part of the discussion proves. It is rare that all the arguments in a discussion bear directly on the main proposition. Often the principal points are stated in a very few words, and the greater part of the discourse is taken up in proving the facts on which these arguments depend. The authenticity of examples is established by testimony, or other arguments from sign; the existence of signs is shown by other signs, supplemented by arguments from cause and from example. The organization of an argumentative discourse may thus be very complex. In every case the student should try to find the connection, not between any argument and the main proposition, but between the argument and that which it immediately establishes.

Sometimes proof is in the form of a chain of reasoning, *i.e.*, the first proposition proved is taken as a premise for the next, and so on until the desired conclusion is reached. A student can pick out such a chain from his geometry by starting with any theorem and tracing back, step by step, through the propositions on which it depends until he reaches the axioms. A chain of reasoning, if it starts with unquestioned facts, and if it contains no flaw, is very conclusive. A single fallacy, however, will destroy the whole argument. On the other hand, if a number of arguments bear directly on a proposition, one or more may be false without affecting the force of the others.

In classifying arguments some trouble will be saved by remembering that, as stated in the last section, some arguments from one particular case to another may be treated in either of two ways.

III.

Induction and Deduction. — The division of arguments into those from cause, from sign, and from example seems to be the most useful for purposes of rhetoric. No treatise would be complete, however, without mention of the time-honored classification into deductive and inductive.

Deduction. — Deduction is a process of reasoning that proceeds from a general reason or premise to a conclusion less general. The conclusion of every deductive argument is contained in the premises.

The typical form of the deductive argument is the syllogism. This consists of two premises, and a conclusion drawn from them. Its form may be seen from the stock example, quoted since the time of Aristotle :

- (1) All men are mortal.
- (2) Socrates is a man.
- (3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

The two premises are known respectively as major and minor. The major premise is always a statement concerning all the members of a class, as (1) in the example above, where the characteristic "are mortal" is affirmed of "all men." The minor premise asserts that an individual, or a smaller group, belongs to the general class treated in the major premise; as, "Socrates is a man," that is, he belongs to the class "all men." The conclusion affirms that what is true of all the class is true of the individual or the group under consideration.

A syllogism contains three terms, known respectively as minor, major, and middle. The minor term is that of which something is affirmed in the conclusion, and is found in the minor premise (Socrates). The major term is that which the conclusion affirms of the minor term, and is found in the major premise (mortal). The middle term is found in both premises, and forms the connecting link between them (all men—man).

Writers on logic recognize a large number of forms, or, as they are called, modes and figures of the syllogism, depending on the character of the proposition, whether affirmative or negative, and the arrangement of the terms. These are mostly convertible one into another, and the simple form illustrated above is sufficient for the purposes of this work.

The advantage of the syllogistic form of reasoning is that it is absolutely conclusive if the premises be granted. If a syllogism is in proper form and the terms are used in the same senses throughout, the conclusion can be overthrown only by attacking one or both of the premises.

In actual discussion, very few arguments are expressed in complete syllogisms. It will generally be found that one premise is so evidently true that it may better be implied than expressed. A syllogism with one premise omitted is called an enthymeme.

In the very simple example given above, we might omit either premise, and say, "Socrates is mortal because he is a man," or, "All men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal."

Although it would be ridiculously long and tiresome to express all deductive arguments in full syllogisms, it is always desirable to recognize exactly what the suppressed premise is. Probably in nine false enthymemes out of ten, the weakness lies in the premise that is not expressed; either because the author purposely puts forward what is strongest, or because he expresses what he has most clearly in mind, and has not himself definitely considered the other statement necessary to his conclusion.

There is a certain plausibility in the argument, "College athletics should be discouraged, because they take time that might otherwise be spent in study." When the enthymeme is examined, however, it will be found that the major premise is, "Anything which takes time that might be spent in study should be discouraged." When this statement is expressed it is seen to be too sweeping.

A defective enthymeme may sometimes be answered simply by stating the argument in the full syllogistic form. If the suppressed premise is obviously absurd, no further argument is necessary.

Induction. — Induction is the converse of deduction. It is the process of arguing from the less to the more general,—from particular facts or instances to laws and principles that underlie or include them. It is by induction that most, if not all, of our ultimate knowledge is obtained. Thus, we know that "all men are mortal" only through the observation of individuals through long ages. Most of the premises of deductive arguments are derived directly or indirectly by induction. Thus, though deduction is the more certain *process*, the results reached are generally no more certain than are those of induction, since they cannot be stronger than the premises.

Inductive reasoning is sometimes divided into two classes, perfect and imperfect. In the former the conclusion is simply the sum of the specific instances by which it is supported. It can be used only with reference to classes every member of which can be examined.

The statements, "All the presidents of the United States have been born east of the Mississippi River," "No president of the United States has served more than two terms," would be based on perfect induction — that is, on the examination of the facts in the case of each of the men who have held the office. Such a conclusion has no weight with reference to cases not examined, *e.g.*, it might not be true of the next president.

This process really adds nothing to our knowledge, but puts it in a more convenient form for use. If each of the specific instances is correctly observed, the results are conclusive.

In imperfect induction (usually denoted by the word induction alone) the conclusions are larger than the number of observed instances. By this process we reason from the known to the unknown, and thus really add to the sum of knowledge.

This is the process by which the laws of science are established. A number of specimens of a substance are examined, and the induction is made that the substance will always have the characteristics found to be common to these. The "law" of gravitation was discovered and stated after its operation in a limited number of cases had been observed. Induction is also used to support conclusions less definite than the laws of physical science. It is sometimes remarked that the sons of poor parents generally make the best students at college. This assertion is based on the observation of a number of instances, in the majority of which it has been found to be true.

It must be remembered that no matter how great practical certainty the conclusions of imperfect induction may have, they are never theoretically certain.

There are few things of which we are more sure than that "all men are mortal." Yet there is theoretically no certainty that a man may not be born who will never die; and we can never attain this theoretical certainty, since we can never examine the cases of all men, past, present, and future.

It is impossible to lay down fixed rules by which the value of an inductive conclusion can be measured. All that can profitably be said on the subject in this work has been given in the discussion of argument from example, page 250.

Use of this Classification. — The terms inductive and deductive are perhaps not so valuable for giving the names of classes to which individual arguments may be referred as they are for designating two different modes of thought-procedure in supporting a proposition.

The deductive order is from its nature the one to be employed in passing from unquestioned principles to definite conclusions regarding their application. In order for it to be effective it is necessary that the supporter of a proposition and those whom he addresses should agree as to the general principles that are the premises of the argument. It would be used by a minister of the gospel in an attempt to convince the members of his church that certain acts or policies follow naturally from their common creed; or by a political speaker in addressing the members of his own party. It is, as will be seen later, of use in oratory where the object is to enforce a truth already held, at least in germ. It is the natural method of the teacher, or one who speaks with a measure of authority.

The inductive method is adapted to a different set of circumstances. It may be considered as the transfer of a process of investigation to the domain of argument. It requires no common ground between the writer and the reader except the power and the disposition to observe accurately and to draw the most plausible conclusions from the observations. It is therefore adapted to cases where there are radical differences as to fun-

damentals. It might be used by a Christian minister in reasoning with those who denied the fundamental truths of Christianity, or by a political speaker in trying to convince his opponents. In these cases a deductive argument might also be used if both writer and reader agreed on some general principles that could be taken as premises; but if there were no common first principles, induction would be the only possible method of procedure.

It is an advantage of induction that its premises are particular facts, and therefore tangible and easily grasped by the ordinary mind. There are, on the other hand, some disadvantages. It is not, as a process, so definite and satisfying as deduction. There are no fixed rules by which the weight of the conclusion drawn from certain premises can be measured, and an opponent may refuse to be convinced by proof that ought to be practically conclusive. Then, too, the inductive process is long, and, in its simple form, may require the reader to keep many cases or instances in mind before he sees their bearing. It is therefore, except in its simplest forms, ill adapted to popular discourse.

The last-mentioned objection to the inductive order may be overcome, largely, at least, by early putting forward a hypothesis. By a hypothesis is meant a theory that seems to fit the few facts first observed, and that is held tentatively and tested by other cases. If the hypothesis is stated as a universal law, one contradictory instance is enough to disprove it. If it is a general, but not a universal, statement, each instance in which it is found to be false weakens the force of the conclusion, but does not necessarily overthrow it. Every case in which the hypothesis holds good adds to the plausibility of the theory. By stating a hypothesis after a few specific instances have been given, and corroborating it by other cases given afterward, the writer will make it possible for the reader to follow even a long argument without much difficulty.

IV.

Direct and Indirect Arguments. — Another classification of arguments, valuable for purposes of rhetoric, is that into direct and indirect. The former, as the name indicates, proceed at once to the support of an assertion. The latter prove a proposition by disproving one that is inconsistent with it, or by replying to arguments that are or might be brought against it.

If a choice must clearly lie between two alternatives, or if one, and but one, of a limited number of propositions must be true, it is possible to prove the truth of one by disproving all the others. The danger of this method of reasoning is that some alternative may be overlooked.

When an indirect argument takes the form of a reply to arguments offered by an opponent, it is known as refutation. Refutation, however complete, does not offer absolute proof, since there may be valid reasons not advanced by the opponent who is answered. Victory in debate often indicates superior skill, not the possession of the truth.

Sometimes the supporter of a proposition may himself put forward arguments on the opposite side and then reply to them. This is sometimes necessary when the objections to his position are obvious, and their effect must be removed from the minds of his readers before he can secure attention to positive arguments. In other cases this method offers a good opportunity for trickery. A writer may put forward and answer so many worthless objections to his position that the valid arguments against him will be lost sight of.

One important form of indirect argument is known as *reductio ad absurdum* (reducing to an absurdity). By this process the arguments offered in support of any proposition are shown to be equally useful in proving some affirmation that is plainly false. In its strict form one premise of a syllogism, or

more commonly of an enthymeme, is joined with another premise, the truth of which must be admitted. If the resulting conclusion is absurd the fault is shown to lie in the premise borrowed from the argument attacked. Arguments that can be answered by a *reductio ad absurdum* are sometimes said to prove too much.

The *reductio ad absurdum* is likely to be especially effective in debate. It appeals to the almost universal feeling :

" 'T is the sport to have the engineer
Hoist with his own petar."

This feeling is so strong that the argument is often over-estimated, and treated as if it disproved a proposition instead of merely overthrowing a single argument in its favor.

In order to answer the argument, "College athletics should be discouraged because they take time that might be spent in study," we might offer the parallel argument, "Eating should be discouraged because it takes time that might be spent in study." Here the suppressed major premise is, " Things that take time that might be spent in study should be discouraged." Joining this with the obvious truth, " Eating takes time that might be spent in study," we get a conclusion that is absurd. Since the syllogism is in correct form and the minor premise is unquestionable, the fault must lie with the major premise. It must be remembered that this argument, striking as it is, answers only one objection to college athletics. There may or may not be other reasons why they should be discouraged.

When the proposition to be attacked offers two alternatives, neither of which can be held, the situation is called a dilemma. Dilemmas are often lurking-places for obscure fallacies ; either because there are really more than two alternatives, or because words may, in the antithetical sentences used to express the argument, be employed in different senses with little chance of detection. The deceptive character of dilemmas may be

shown by the fact that they are often answered by mas that seem equally plausible.

Several examples of dilemmas have come down to old logicians, of which the following is perhaps the most quoted :

" A young rhetorician applied to an old sophist to art of pleading, and bargained for a certain reward when he should gain his first cause. The master su ward, and the scholar endeavored to elude his claim by ' If I gain my cause I shall withhold your pay because award will be against you ; if I lose I may withhold shall not yet have gained a cause.' ' On the contrary master, ' if you gain your cause you must pay me, since pay me when you gain a cause ; if you lose it you must pay me because the judge will award it.' "

Direct arguments have the advantage of being more natural than indirect, and are generally less liable to the dangers of confusion and quibbling. In popular discourse, however, indirect arguments are often more forcible. This is partly because they have more of the nature of an attack, and appeal to the innate human love for a conflict ; partly because they give more opportunity for ridicule and irony. They may also be briefer.

V.

Order of Arguments. — In argumentation, even more perhaps than in other forms of discourse, order is of great importance. Except in the simplest works of argumentation it is difficult for ordinary readers to follow the line of thought and test each step with sufficient care to be sure of the conclusions. If the arrangement of arguments is not the most lucid and suggestive possible, this difficulty is greatly increased. In cases where the reader is in an attitude of hostility to the proposition supported, a proper arrangement of arguments may do much

to lighten the burden of proof. Unfortunately, cases vary so greatly that only general suggestions for the order of arguments can be given. Even these will sometimes conflict ; and when they do, the writer must choose between them according to his own best judgment, paying especial attention to the mental attitude of his readers and the change that he wishes to produce in their minds.

1. Of the three classes of arguments, from cause, from sign, and from example, the argument from cause should generally come first. This is because it creates a sense of plausibility in the reader's mind, and makes him less coldly critical of evidence that is presented afterward.

We are much more likely to believe that a man committed a certain crime if we can see that he had a motive for committing it ; or to believe that a certain tariff policy is best for the United States if we can see *why* it will be beneficial.

Unless very strong, the argument from cause will have little force if placed at the end of a discussion. If the readers have already accepted the proposition, it is useless. If not, they have already made up their minds that the direct evidence is insufficient, and any proof that the proposition *might be* true has little weight.

Of the two other forms of argument, that from example should generally be placed last. This is because the argument from example is useful as a check on other arguments, and shows that the proposition supported is not mere idle theory, since at least one actual case under the same or similar conditions may be found. A single example placed first may be useful as an illustration, but hardly as an argument.

The argument from sign will naturally take a middle position. This is fitting, since in cases where all three kinds of arguments are employed it generally furnishes most of the essential part of the proof. Thus, in a cause in court, the

propositions of fact maintained really rest on the testimony as to their truth. But arguments from cause may make them plausible, and arguments from example may show a similar result under similar conditions.

2. When deductive and inductive arguments are both employed to support the same proposition, the order will depend on the attitude of the readers. If they are not unfriendly to the proposition, the deductive arguments may well come first, and these may be corroborated by induction. If the readers are hostile, deductive arguments are not so well adapted to the opening of a discussion, because persons give their assent but grudgingly to principles laid down by an opponent; and because, if the premises are simple, unquestioned truths, the bare deduction gives too much of the impression of an attempt to carry the point by storm. The inductive beginning, starting from simple cases, is, as it were, more modest. If it is thought advisable not to state the proposition first, inductive arguments may be carried to some length before the conclusion to which they point becomes evident.

3. In many cases it is advisable that indirect arguments should precede direct. They are more striking and so attract the attention of the reader more readily. In a debate they naturally take their cue from something that has been said by an opponent, and so bend the reader's mind in the desired direction rather than change its course abruptly. There is, however, an objection to giving the first part of an argument to refutation. This will be discussed later.

4. Theoretically, the best order of arguments as regards strength is to begin with a strong and especially with a striking argument in order to make a favorable impression, and to close with the strongest argument of all, as a climax. This will put the weaker arguments in the middle. Practically, this order is hard to obtain. When arguments from cause, from sign, and from example are used, those from sign will often be the

strongest, but they will, as has been seen, naturally come in the middle.

While it is very desirable that arguments be arranged in a climax, it is still more desirable that they be arranged in what seems the most natural order, so that there may be no difficulty in following them and no appearance of artifice.

When the natural order of arguments is an anticlimax, strength may be gained by recapitulating them in the opposite order from that in which they were first given. This is a natural and an effective way of summarizing. A recapitulation should, however, be in the same order that the arguments were first given, or in exactly the reverse order. A rearrangement in the summary would at once suggest artifice.

Debate. — Most of what has already been said applies to all arguments, whether an opponent is to be taken into consideration or not. Some further suggestions may be given with regard to the management of debates, whether delivered orally or carried on in writing, as through the medium of a newspaper or a magazine.

1. An important requisite for a debater is the quality of fairness. This is true not only from an ethical but from a rhetorical standpoint. Nothing wins the confidence of an audience more quickly than does an apparently fair and magnanimous spirit toward an opponent; and nothing, except arguments, gives the impression that a speaker has a strong case so quickly as does apparent willingness on his part to concede much to the other side.

2. It is generally not only politic but necessary to make concessions to one's opponents. There are unanswerable arguments on both sides of any question not the very simplest. A debate is won, not by annihilating all the arguments of an opponent, but by bringing so many positive arguments as to outweigh those that cannot be answered. Many debates are lost by spending too much time in attempted refutation, instead

of freely conceding that some points on the other side are unanswerable.

3. Arguments may be refuted by proving the opposite of conclusions to which they tend, or by attacking them directly. The methods employed in the latter procedure have been discussed under the head of indirect arguments (since to attack your opponent's position directly is to support your own indirectly). As has been said, the attack on arguments may be made striking and entertaining, and is therefore well adapted to a popular audience. It is often not conclusive, however, since it overthrows only the arguments, not necessarily the conclusion ; while a direct argument supports exactly what a writer wants believed, and of course opposes its opposite. Ordinary readers are too likely to lose sight of this and to feel that the overthrow of a debater proves that his side of the question is wrong. Direct arguments may also fit more naturally into the general plan of the composition, so that the force of an opponent's arguments may be made to disappear without going out of the way to answer them — almost without referring to them.

It is somewhat difficult to determine what position refutation should occupy in a debate. The most emphatic parts of any composition are the beginning and the end ; and there is clearly an advantage in having these occupied by one's own arguments. Replies to an opponent would then be placed in the middle of a discourse.

It seems natural, however, for a speaker or writer who follows another to refer by way of opening to what has just preceded. If this is not done it will sometimes seem strange, and an audience may conclude that the debater is afraid of the points that have been made against him. When the preceding speaker has left a strong impression, it is best to reply to his arguments, wholly or partly, at the outset. In other cases it will be well to speak of his points, and to indicate that they

will be answered later. It would ordinarily be a poor plan to begin an oral debate without referring in some way to the speaker who had just closed.

When a promise is made to answer an argument at some later time, it should be carefully kept. The trick of postponing a question and neglecting to take it up is a common one, but when discovered it always reacts to the disadvantage of the speaker who uses it.

ILLUSTRATIVE SELECTIONS.

Selections chosen to illustrate the methods of argumentation are almost necessarily taken from discourse of a somewhat formal character. It must not be forgotten that argumentative processes, often abridged and disguised, are constantly used with reference to everyday affairs. Students are urged to examine their own management of arguments, and that of their friends, in dealing with such matters as the weather, the chances of an athletic victory, the probable place where a missing article was lost, etc. The demonstrations in geometry should be studied as an illustration of the most exact processes of reasoning; and the argumentative passages in other textbooks, *e.g.*, those on history or natural science, should be picked out and analyzed.

In the great majority of cases where argumentation is used in regard to matters of government, religion, etc., there is at least an implied persuasive element; and all persuasion worthy of the name contains argumentation. The selections that immediately follow, and those that illustrate the next chapter, will therefore supplement each other.

I.

The first selection is a speech delivered by Franklin before the Constitutional Convention. The question was whether salaries should be paid to government officials, especially to the president.

This speech really has a persuasive object, and as persuasion the theme may be stated: "Amend the draft of the constitution now before you, by abolishing the provision for salaries." The persuasive element is, however, implied, not expressed. The hearers are assumed to have such patriotic intentions that they will do whatever is for the best interest of the country, and no appeal to motive is necessary. See page 302. Viewed as a work of argumentation the speech has as its theme: "Salaries would be an evil." The plan is as follows:

Introduction. Lines 1-13.

Body. Lines 14-123.

I. Avarice when combined with ambition is a dangerously strong stimulus to action. (Cause.) Lines 14-39.

1. It leads to fierce struggles for place. (Sign.) Lines 14-21. Seen in the British government. (Example.) Lines 21-26.

2. It leads bad men to strive for and secure office. (Sign.) Lines 27-39.
(No arguments given to establish this fact.)

II. Salaries will tend to increase. Lines 40-74. (Proved by arguments from cause, lines 40-45.) This will lead to evils. (Cause.)

1. May produce contentions and civil wars. Lines 45-51. Discontent and oppression tend to increase each other. (Cause.) Lines 51-60.

2. A tendency towards monarchy. Lines 60-67. Natural tendency aided by "sowing seeds of contention." (Cause.) Lines 67-74.

III. Refutation. Probable objections answered.

1. Officers can be found who will serve without salary.

Case of high sheriff in England.

" counselor in France.

" committees of Quakers.

" general of the colonial armies.

(Examples.)

Lines 75-123.

2. Saving of salaries is not a point urged.

Conclusion. Summary. Lines 123-129.

Since the discussion is in regard to the advisability of a future action, the principal arguments are those from cause. Subordinate points are supported largely by examples; and examples are used with especial force in the latter part, which is virtually a refutation of objections that might be brought. The words "cause," "sign," "example," in the outline given above, indicate the relation of the arguments that they follow to the propositions that they immediately prove; not necessarily their relation to the main question. Thus, the violent stimulus to action that springs from a combination of avarice and ambition is a *cause* of the evils that Franklin feared. The fierce struggles that this combination of motives produces is a *sign* that it is a strong stimulus. And the fact that such struggles arise is shown by the *example* of the British government. This last example cannot be connected directly with the main proposition.

An analytical outline should be made for each selection studied; and care must be taken to see just what each argument immediately proves.

The brevity and conciseness of this speech should be noticed. How could the argument be enlarged upon? Would a fuller presentation add to the effectiveness of the speech, or detract from it? Note the choice of examples. Try to find a reason why each was chosen. Explain the order of examples, lines 75-123.

SIR,

It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan, for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first
5 reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the executive branch, I happen to differ ; and, as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty, that I hazard it. The committee will judge of
10 my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine. I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries ; I see none in refusing them, but, on the contrary, great advantages.

Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence in
15 the affairs of men. These are *ambition* and *avarice* ; the love of power and the love of money. Separately, each of these has great force in prompting men to action ; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men a post of *honor*, that
20 shall at the same time be a place of *profit*, and they will remove heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true source of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the nation, distracting its counsels, hurrying
25 it sometimes into fruitless and mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace.

And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable preëminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best
30 of characters ? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your government, and be your rulers. And these, too,
35 will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation ; for their vanquished competitors, of the same spirit and from the same motives, will perpetually be endeavoring to distress their

administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people.

40 Besides these evils, Sir, though we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find, that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations ; and there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more
45 to them. Hence, as all history informs us, there has been in every state and kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the governing and the governed ; the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in
50 dethroning of the princes, or enslaving of the people. Generally, indeed, the ruling power carries its point, and we see the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes, the greater need the
55 prince has of money to distribute among his partisans, and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred, who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharaoh, — get first all the people's money, then all their lands, and then make them
60 and their children servants forever. It will be said that we do not propose to establish kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind to kingly government. It sometimes relieves them from aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance
65 of equality among citizens ; and that they like. I am apprehensive, therefore, — perhaps too apprehensive, — that the government of these States may in future times end in a monarchy. But this catastrophe, I think, may be long delayed, if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction, and tumult,
70 by making our posts of honor places of profit. If we do, I fear that, though we employ at first a number and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside ; it will only nourish the foetus of a king (as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very ably expressed it), and a king will the sooner be set over us.

75 It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the executive department, without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high sheriff of a
 80 county in England is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive, and therefore not sought for. But yet it is executed, and well executed, and usually by some of the principal gentlemen of the county. In France, the office of counselor, or member of their judiciary parliaments, is more honorable.
 85 It is therefore purchased at a high price ; there are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three per cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore, as legal interest is there at five per cent, they in fact pay two per cent for being allowed to do the judiciary
 90 business of the nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burthen of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not, however, mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our judiciary department. I only bring the instance to show, that the pleasure of doing good and serving their country, and
 95 the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds, to give up a great portion of their time to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.

Another instance is that of a respectable society, who have made the experiment and practiced it with success, now more than
 100 a hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them that they are not to go to law, but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences. In doing this,
 105 they are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it was never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites. And indeed, in all cases of public service, the less the profit, the greater the honor.

110 To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen the greatest and most important of our offices, that of general of our armies,

executed for eight years together, without the smallest salary, by a patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise ; and this, through fatigues and distresses, in common with the other
115 brave men, his military friends and companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the United States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful counsel, for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our
120 laws are duly executed? Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake, and execute well and faithfully, the office in question.

Sir, the saving of the salaries, that may at first be proposed, is
125 not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. Therefore it is that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted, I must be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly, and done my duty.

II.

The following remarks on the Shakespeare-Bacon controversy are taken from Prof. Hiram Corson's "Introduction to Shakespeare."¹ In Selection I. the most common arguments are those from cause and example. In this essay those from sign predominate. Determine fully why, in each instance. What other arguments than those from sign are used? What others might be used? What is the attitude of the readers to whom Professor Corson evidently addresses himself? What kind of arguments would appeal most strongly to readers who inclined to a different opinion? Look up the arguments that have been used in this controversy, and see if Professor Corson's treatment could be supplemented so as to make it more effective for all classes of persons.

The tone or manner of this selection has some advantages

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and some disadvantages. These can best be considered in connection with persuasion (though the discourse is almost purely argumentation). After the next chapter has been studied, return to this essay and consider the matter of tone carefully.

Lady Bab. Did you ever read Shikspur?

Mrs. Kitty. Shikspur? Shikspur? Who wrote it?

Garriek's High Life below Stairs.

The question which was raised, some years ago, and which has been discussed ever since, as to the authorship of the Shakespeare Plays, is one which no more calls for an answer than a question which might be raised by some bumptious quidnunc, 5 as to whether the Canterbury Tales were not written by John Gower, or the Faerie Queene, by Sir Walter Raleigh, or the Dunciad by Dean Swift, or Tam O'Shanter, by some Scottish philosopher, or other.

There's not a particle of evidence to begin with, of a kind even 10 to raise the faintest suspicion, that William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon, Gentleman, was not the author of the Plays and Poems attributed to him. The question as to the authorship of these wonderful products of dramatic genius, started with the mere assumption that a man circumstanced as was William 15 Shakespeare, and with no scholastic training, could *not* have written the Plays; and Lord Bacon was, accordingly, selected from the many great men of the time, as having the most august intellect, and *ergo*, as being the most likely to have produced the plays. The assumption, of course, involved the idea that great 20 *intellectual* ability, of a signally analytic and inductive order, would, of itself, be equal to the production of works which exhibit the most signally synthetic and intuitive order of mind which has yet been known among men.

The *learning* which the Plays exhibit it has been thought 25 impossible for a man in Shakespeare's position to have possessed. When the transcendent power of the Plays is considered, the learning, strictly speaking, which is secreted in them, is surprisingly little. The Plays bear more emphatic testimony than do

any other masterpieces of genius, to the fact that great creative
 30 power may be triumphantly exercised *without* learning (I mean
 the learning of the schools). But the knowledge and the wisdom
 with which they are gloriously illuminated, are the greatest possible
 which man has yet, in his whole history, shown himself
 capable of possessing — just that kind of knowledge and wisdom
 35 which Shakespeare, assuming the requisite constitutional receptivity,
 was most favorably circumstanced to acquire. A notion prevails
 in these days of a diseased analytic consciousness that the only
 way to *know* in any given direction, is to make a large number
 of observations in that direction, and when one has, say,
 40 a flour barrel full of jottings, to turn them out on the floor, and
 to get down on hands and knees and sort 'em into some result.

But there is such a thing as a *direct perception of truth*; and
 of a kind of truth which can never be attained by the mere grubbing
 and delving intellect, however great that intellect may be.
 45 This direct perception of truth is an attribute of man's spiritual
 nature. When a man's spiritual nature is adequately quickened,
 and in the requisite harmony with the constitution of things (and
 there can be no artistic or creative power in any one who is not
 to a greater or less degree, so conditioned), he takes cognizance
 50 of the workings of nature and of the life of man, *by direct assimilation*
of their hidden principles — principles which cannot be reached
 through an observation, by the natural intelligence, of the
 phenomenal. He may thus become possessed of a knowledge,
 or rather wisdom, far beyond his conscious observation and
 55 objective experience. By direct assimilation of hidden principles,
 I mean, that assimilation which results from the response of spirit
 to spirit. All spirit is mutually attractive, as all matter is; and
 if it is not "cabined, cribbed, confined," but free in its activity,
 it goes forth to respond to all manifestations of spirit made through
 60 the phenomena of nature and of human life. It is this spirit of
 freedom of spiritual activity which distinguishes what we call
 genius from what is understood as mere talent. Genius finds its
 way by its own light, where mere intellect would be lost in
 darkness.

65 In all other works of genius with which I am acquainted, I

discover no such evidences of a direct perception of truth as I discover in the works of Shakespeare. By a direct perception of truth I mean, an immediate grasp of truth, without any conscious induction or deduction. Women have this direct perception, in
70 some respects, more than men. And every great genius has united in himself the masculine and the feminine nature. And here is a remarkable fact to be noticed, in regard to Shakespeare — all the knowledge and wisdom which he was circumstanced to acquire directly from his own environment, is quite unerring : but his
75 mere book-knowledge, wherever it appears, in his works, is more or less incorrect. Indeed, such was the creative force of the man, that all knowledge outside of the range of his own experience, he used with a grand audacity. Of the time and place of persons, and things, and events and customs, he appears to have been
80 quite regardless. He knew that such great men as Galen, and Alexander, and Cato, once lived, that Galen was a celebrated physician, Alexander, a famous conqueror, and Cato (the Censor), an eminent patriot, and soldier, and statesman ; but he introduces them all into one of his greatest plays, — perhaps the most perfect
85 as a work of dramatic art, — *Coriolanus* ! The period of the legendary *Coriolanus* was the 5th century before Christ ; his victory over the Volscians, at *Corioli*, being placed at 450 B.C. Alexander was born nearly 150 years later ; Cato, more than 250 years later ; and Galen, more than 600 years later.

90 The *Winter's Tale* exhibits false geography, and a jolly jumble of times and events and persons. The great poet was too much occupied with his dramatic creation, to trouble himself with the mere matters of scholarship. Accordingly, *Bohemia* is made a maritime country (as it is, also, in the original novel,
95 "*Pandosto, or the Triumph of Time*," by Robert Greene) ; *Whitsun pastorals* and *Christian burial*, and numerous other features of the Elizabethan age, are introduced into pagan times ; *Queen Hermione* speaks of herself as daughter of the Emperor of *Russia* ; her statue is represented as executed by *Julio Romano*,
100 an Italian painter of the 16th century ; a puritan sings psalms to hornpipes ; and to crown all, messengers are sent to consult the oracle of *Apollo*, at *Delphi*, which is represented as an island !

This lovely romantic drama, which, with all this gallimaufry, invites a rectified attitude toward the True and the Sweet, was
105 one of the latest, if not the latest, of the poet's compositions. But it does n't appear that his indirect knowledge improved much with years. Such examples of jumble and anachronism abound throughout the Plays. And there is not a single Play, whatever be its time and place, which does not reflect, in every act, almost,
110 some features of the age of Elizabeth.

Learning, indeed! If Shakespeare had n't possessed something infinitely better than learning (and I would add, something infinitely better than a great analytic, inductive, deductive, and classifying intellect, such as that possessed by Lord Bacon), we
115 should not now be enjoying such a noble dramatic heritage as we are. And if John Shakespeare had had the means to send William to Oxford or Cambridge, and William had gone through, or been driven through, the curriculum of either of these Universities, what a misfortune it might have been to mankind! He
120 might have been schooled in, and might afterwards have adhered to, those laws of dramatic art which, in the absence of such schooling, he rendered obsolete for all time, and, by the wonderful dramatic art which he himself developed, wrought a complete revolution in the drama.

125 It may be said, too, that there is nothing in the Plays to which Shakespeare could have been helped, by either of the Universities in his time, so far as his creative power was concerned. That might have been seriously impaired. His scholarship, if he had been a university man, would have been more correct, but a
130 more correct scholarship would not have contributed anything to the dramatic excellence of the Plays, or to the triumphant organization which they exhibit.

If Shakespeare did not write the Plays attributed to him, certainly Lord Bacon did not write them. That Bacon was one of
135 the most august of human intellects is freely conceded. But vast as is the range of powers exhibited in his works, there is no evidence in them that he possessed the *kind* of powers required for the composition of the Shakespeare Plays. The evidence is of the strongest kind that he was strangely deficient in such

140 powers. His spirituality appears to have been in inverse proportion to his intellectual power. And his intellectual power was not of the creative order. In fact, intellectual power, however great, cannot be, of itself, creative. It must be united with spiritual power. Bacon's mind was signally analytic, inductive, deductive, 145 judicial; the mind which produced the Shakespeare Plays was as signally intuitive (by reason of its spiritual temperament), and as signally synthetic (taking in everything which was presented to it, in its completeness, and in all its relations).

It is universally admitted that the author of the Shakespeare 150 Plays, whether that author were William Shakespeare, or Lord Bacon, or Sir Walter Raleigh, or Queen Elizabeth, was the greatest physiologist of human passion of whom we have any record in human history. This, I say, is universally admitted. And he was not only the greatest physiologist of human passion, but the 155 most *artistic* physiologist of human passion; by which I mean, that passion, in its evolution, he always presents in its relation to the constitution of things. That constitution is never violated. The power of self-assertion declines as the passion develops; and you can put your finger on the place, in any tragedy, where a 160 great passion passes into fate, after which its subject is swept helplessly along.

Herein consists the moral proportion of the Plays, namely, that they move in harmony with the constitution of things. And this moral proportion could not have been secured by the rules of the 165 ancients nor by any other outside rules. It was secured by the artist's deep sense of the constitution of things — by his spiritual harmony with the constitution of things.

To return from this digression, what *must* this greatest physiologist of human passion have been? Certainly, one who had, 170 himself, a deeply passionate nature; one who could sympathetically reproduce within himself all the passions which are depicted in the Plays. And if all the Plays had perished, and only the Rape of Lucrece, the Venus and Adonis, and the Sonnets, had been preserved, these works would, alone, have testified 175 to his profoundly passionate nature; or, if all his works had been lost, with the exception of Antony and Cleopatra, this

Play would have sufficiently testified to his profoundly passionate nature.

The works of Francis Bacon bear an emphatic testimony to his
 180 having been the coldest of mankind. No one, certainly, of the
 great Elizabethan men, who has left a sufficient record of himself,
 by which he may be judged, was so deficient in sympathetic
 warmth as Lord Bacon. And yet this man wrote *Romeo and*
Juliet ! (See his essay "Of Love.") This man was the creator
 185 of a *Cordelia*, a *Desdemona*, a *Miranda*, a *Perdita*, a *Hermione*,
 and, more surprising still, of a *Cleopatra* ! This man, we are
 asked to believe, wrote dramatic blank verse which has never
 been equalled on this earth as a manifestation of feeling and of
 perfect dramatic identification — verse which no mere metrical
 190 skill nor metrical sensibility, even, could have produced. But
 see "The Translation of certain Psalms into English Verse. By
 Right Honourable Francis Lord Verulam, Viscount of St. Alban,"
 and dedicated "To his very good friend, Mr. George Herbert,"
 who translated part of the *Advancement of Learning*, into Latin.
 195 (The psalms are i., xii., xc., civ., cxxv., cxxxvii., cxlix.) The trans-
 lation was published in 1625, in Quarto two years after the publi-
 cation of the First Folio edition of the great Plays. This doggerel,
 Lord Bacon thought it worth while to publish, in his 65th year,
 though he ignored the authorship of what are regarded as the
 200 greatest productions of human genius ! The credulity of those who
 are suffering from the dry rot of doubt is something wonderful.

III.

The next selection is an argument on the location of the
 World's Fair of 1893, delivered by Chauncey M. Depew before
 a committee of the United States Senate. This address should
 really be ranked as persuasion, since the theme is, "Vote for
 New York as the place of the Fair"; but in matter, and, except
 for one or two slight touches, in manner, it is pure argumen-
 tation.

This selection will illustrate most that has been said regard-
 ing indirect arguments. In this contest New York had to meet

several other cities, each of which was able to present a strong case, and of one which eventually secured the Fair. Consider carefully the manner and the position of the refutation. Note how much is said in reply to the claims of other cities, and how it is interwoven with the arguments in favor of New York in such a way as to leave a single impression on the mind of the reader. The attitude toward opponents taken in this address may be compared with that shown in the last selection.

This speech illustrates a very important sort of argumentation, — the presentation of a practical business question by a business man. Note the kind of arguments that are employed, and the terse, definite statements of facts and conditions on which they are based.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee: The New York Delegation expresses its thanks to the Committee for according to it a hearing on a day when so many could attend. We are here to the number of over a hundred. Most of the delegates
5 leave large business interests and pressing duties at home, and they fairly represent the activities and enterprise of New York City and State. The object of their visit is to impress upon you the claims of New York for the World's Fair of 1892.

Any American who visited the great exhibition at Paris last
10 summer was impressed with the fact that there was a great necessity upon the people of the United States in the near future to have one which would be equal, if not better. It was in all respects the most superb collection of the evidences of the development of different nations in their arts, industries, and mechanical
15 work which has ever been gathered. The nations of Continental Europe, of Asia, of Africa, of Great Britain and her dependencies round the globe, Mexico and the South American republics, in their buildings and in their exhibits presented superb illustrations of their products and skill.

20 The United States alone was utterly deficient in any adequate representation of its resources, its inventions, or its mechanical powers. The impression left upon the representatives of the

different peoples of the earth was that America might have vast area, great population, and free institutions, but that for commercial purposes, in the interchange of commodities which the world needed, or in supplying those which were required by its different markets, she was unequal to the competition with older nations. The main attraction of the American exhibit was petrified wood from Arizona. An English delegate, desiring to alleviate my mortification, said : " Your country's exhibit of petrified wood is unequalled in this Fair." The effect of this has been to do incalculable injury to our commercial future. The commissions appointed by the several governments and the several merchants from all parts of the globe carried back to their people accounts of the products and manufactures, which cannot fail to be enormously beneficial to the countries which were properly represented, and injurious to the United States. It will take a quarter of a century, by the ordinary methods of trade, to place the United States properly before the world.

The largest manufacturing nation is compelled in the most marked and the quickest way to exhibit its resources and skill. This can only be done by an international fair in the United States, so comprehensive as to fitly present all that we have and all that we can do, and so broadly national and hospitable as to invite and secure the attendance of every other nation. So that at the threshold of this discussion we must dismiss the fallacy which has been urged by the advocates of St. Louis and Chicago, that this is a national and not an international fair. Unless international, there is no purpose in holding it. The marvelous development of transportation lines and methods of rapid communication within the United States has put into the possession of every market so intelligently the products and opportunities of every other market, that no purely national fair would either add to our information or to our prosperity.

It is in this sense of an international fair, held for the purpose of impressing upon the world the fact that we can supply the articles needed for its necessities and its luxuries, as well and as artistically made, and as cheaply sold as they can be purchased anywhere else, that New York becomes the only place where such

- 60 an exhibition can be successfully held. All the visitors from abroad will come first to New York. If, in addition to the 3000 miles of ocean travel, there is presented to them the further necessity of breaking bulk, and traveling with their goods a thousand miles into the interior, it would deter many of them from coming.
- 65 The experience and the expense of the carrying of goods and of persons among the older nations of the world is such as to make them dread great distances of land travel, carrying with them valuable and bulky goods. It has been urged that, because only 125,000 Americans visited the Fair at Paris, and possibly
- 70 not more than 75,000 foreigners would visit the Fair in America, they are not to be considered as an important element in the success of the undertaking.

- But, while there will probably be 30,000,000 of visitors to the Exposition, whose gate money will pay its expenses, and whose
- 75 presence will attract the merchant and the manufacturer, and the artist to exhibit, the 100,000 foreigners who may be there will represent hundreds of millions of people, to whom they are to carry a favorable or an unfavorable report of the commercial opportunities of the United States. We have had recently in
- 80 Washington two congresses, one the Pan-American, the other the Maritime, which numbered less than 100 delegates to each, and yet the one was the expression of the statesmanship and the commercial aspirations of Mexico and the South American republics, and the other represented authoritatively the position upon ques-
- 85 tions affecting the great highways of commerce upon the ocean, the opinions to be crystallized into international law, of all the maritime nations of the globe. So the commissioners from the various States, and the keen-eyed merchants who bring their wares, will carry back to every port which a steamer can enter
- 90 or where a flag can float, the story of the vast resources, of the wonderful inventions, of the unequalled mechanical skill, of the enormous surplus of manufactured products to be stimulated by opportunity, which the world wants and which America wants to sell.
- 95 No fair has ever been successful unless held in the metropolis of the nation which authorized the exhibition. When, freed from

sectional ambitions or jealousies at home, we view with impartial eye the situation abroad, we all admit that exhibitions held for Great Britain at Liverpool or Manchester, for France at Lyons
100 or Marseilles, for Italy at Florence or Naples, for Germany at Dresden or Leipzig, would be failures ; while it has been demonstrated from past experience that exhibitions held at the metropolis of any country, like London or Paris, are successful in attracting all that there is of the country in which the city is
105 located, as well as all the world besides.

I saw two years ago an attempted Universal Exposition at Liverpool, which, though excellent in every way, attracted little attention even in Great Britain ; while two local exhibitions, held within the past three years in London, one called " The Health-
110 eries " and the other called " The Italian," were almost equal to the French Fair of last summer in attendance, in value and variety of exhibits, and in results. This was due to the great resident population within cheap and quick transit, and the vast number of strangers always present in London and who make part of the
115 daily crowd at the fairs.

No one will dispute that New York is the metropolis of this continent. Its population, its resources, the representative character of its business, the fact that three fourths of the imports of the country come to its harbor, all make it such.

120 There is not a cotton or woolen mill, a furnace, forge or factory, a mine at work or projected in the United States, which does not have its principal office in the city of New York. There is no project of any kind, whether to build a railroad, to bring agricultural territory into settlement and market, to develop the resources
125 of the New South, to open iron or coal veins in Virginia, Tennessee, or Alabama, which does not pass all other places and come to New York. If it is unsuccessful there, it goes nowhere else. The conventions of all the trades, which are annually held for mutual benefit, take place in New York, and are all closed with an annual
130 banquet, which I invariably attend. A panic in New York is the paralysis of the country. Prosperity in New York means immense freight upon the railways, and enormous production from farm and factory and mine. New York does not influence, but simply

records as the barometer the conditions of trade and production
135 all over the country.

To make a fair successful, a population immediately in contact is absolutely necessary. The French Fair had its thirty millions of visitors, and its 200,000 a day, because it was in the midst of a great resident population, which for a few cents, and with the
140 least loss of time, could repeatedly visit the Exhibition. St. Louis and Chicago present the most fallacious of arguments in their famous "circles of population." A circle about St. Louis of 500 miles to the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, may have twenty-seven millions. A similar circle about Chicago, to
145 the North Pole and the Pacific Ocean, may have twenty-five millions. A similar circle about New York may have twenty-two millions. A similar circle about Washington may have twenty millions; and, without much difficulty, by this process of calculation we shall have within these circles, for the purposes of this
150 Fair, three or four hundred millions of people, and yet not include over one half of the present located population of the United States.

A similar circle drawn with Peekskill as a center — a village upon the Hudson where I was born — takes in the Hudson River
155 and the Mohawk valleys, with their continuous villages and cities and unequalled scenery, includes New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, New Haven, Hartford, and Baltimore, and presents a compact population which in wealth, in ability to travel, in appreciation of exhibitions and determination to visit them, is unequalled
160 anywhere in the country. But then, Peekskill is deficient in hotel accommodations and in internal lines of travel necessary to carry vast masses to a fair ground and to take them comfortably away. Besides, Peekskill is not here asking for the Fair. The success of an exhibition is in populations in contact with the Fair. Take
165 a point centrally located at Jersey City, and draw about it a radius of equal diameter and extent to a line drawn from a point at Lake Michigan around the boundaries of Chicago, and you have a larger population than there is in the city of Chicago. You cross the river by ferry, and you have on the island of Manhattan the
170 city of New York, with 600,000 more people than there are in

Chicago. You cross to Long Island by the Brooklyn Bridge, and a circle again thrown out, covering again the same territory on Long Island as is included in the boundaries of Chicago, has more population than there is in Chicago. So that, within what
175 might properly be called the city of New York there are three Chicagos and a half.

Then, taking Central Park as a center, within a radius of 200 miles, including the points from which people can come in the morning and to which they can go back at night, there are
180 8,000,000 of people. The lunch-basket and dinner-pail brigade — the real supporters of a fair, who can get there for a minimum of five cents and a maximum of \$2 — to the number of not less than 8,000,000 are tributary to the New York Exhibition. That of itself makes it a phenomenal success, and can be met by no
185 similar fact from any other place on the American continent.

The transportation question is one little understood, because it has been little studied. The success of the Paris Exposition was largely due to its location upon a park which had been reserved for military purposes in the heart of Paris, and was accessible
190 from populous centers by a ten to twenty minutes' walk and by every line of transportation in the city. On any important day there will be present at the Exhibition at the time it closes 200,000 people. It is absolutely essential that an exhibition be closed at a specified hour, when the curtains are drawn over the booths and
195 the ropes across the avenues inside the grounds. Then 200,000 hungry, tired, cross people, many with babies and young children, are discharged from the various exits, wild to get to their homes and lodging-houses or to catch outgoing trains and steamboats.

A steam railroad, conducting its ordinary business, could run
200 every five minutes a train of ten cars, carrying sixty people each, or 6000 an hour. A cable road could do about the same on a headway of two minutes; surface roads not quite so well. It would not be possible, in any place where they think of locating the Fair in either St. Louis or Chicago, to discharge over 25,000
205 people an hour, and that would take for your 200,000 people eight hours. The first day of the block would be the last of the Fair.

The location of New York upon an island makes it wonderfully adapted to the easy distribution of large masses of people. The
210 Museum buildings in the Central Park are in the center of population and the locations outside of the Park will be in easy and near connection by electric roads. There are seven lines of horse-cars, two lines of elevated roads, and two lines of steam railroads connected with the ground. These carry New York Central trains
215 to the interior of the State and the West, Harlem trains up the territory back of the Hudson, and New Haven, Boston and Albany, and New York and New England trains to New England. In addition, a twenty minutes' walk, or, with the transportation that would be provided, a ten minutes' ride to the river on either
220 side, furnishes the piers and docks where steamboats and ferries can bear them up and down the Hudson, to Staten Island, to Long Island, up the Sound and across to Jersey City to the network of roads which run out from there to all parts of the country.

225 Few of the promoters of this great enterprise have contemplated the enormous responsibility which the city assumes which undertakes to make it successful. The French Exposition cost, in round numbers, ten millions of dollars. Of this five millions were contributed by the government of France and the city of Paris, and
230 four millions raised by a lottery, and the rest by the sale of concessions, the grounds being entirely contributed by the city. With the differences of cost of labor and material we must add 30 per cent. It would be unsafe to begin a Fair unless at least twelve millions of dollars were pledged. So far as I have been able to
235 ascertain, Chicago and St. Louis have each about four millions which might be called available. New York has a guarantee fund of five millions of dollars, subscribed under a contract which is binding upon the subscribers and their estates.

The Committee on Legislation have unanimously adopted a bill
240 asking the Legislature to authorize the city of New York to expend ten millions of dollars in buildings and grounds. There is no doubt about this authorization. Part of it will go for the completion of the Museum of Natural History and of the Museum of Art to the completion of both of which the city is already pledged.

245 This will furnish fifty-two acres of floor-room in fire-proof buildings. These buildings will be connected, through the subway which adjoins them, by an electric road, and over it a promenade can be built which will present a horticultural garden of unrivaled beauty ; while in the grounds north of the Park, which comprise
250 Morningside and Riverside parks and lands already promised, there are several hundred acres for a machinery hall and such other structures as may be required for the purposes of the Exhibition. New York, therefore, comes here, not only as the metropolis of the country, not only as the gateway of the con-
255 tinent, not only with the unequaled location where the ships can sail to the docks adjoining the Exhibition, but with the money pledged which makes the Fair an unquestioned success.

Besides, New York has in her two museums art treasures exhibiting the progress of civilization for thousands of years,
260 which have cost \$5,000,000 and are of priceless value. These could not be transported to any other place. Then the wealth and opportunity of a century have accumulated in New York in private collections, treasures gathered from the monuments and tombs of the ancients, from the sales of rare collections in Europe
265 and the dispersion of galleries and art treasures, which, in the aggregate, are not equaled in any city in the world. All these, in the fire-proof buildings of the Museum of Art, would be available for the purposes of this Exhibition to make it a phenomenal triumph.

The Exhibition will be held from May to November. During
270 that period at Washington, at St. Louis, at Chicago, it is a question of pajamas and palm-leaf fans. But an exhibition requires comfortable clothing, and the disposition and the physical power to move fast and far. St. Louis admits the phenomenal heat of the Democratic Convention of 1884, which put an end to National
275 conventions being held within her borders. Chicago claims that Lake Michigan is her refrigerator and her reservoir. While gasping for breath one midnight in the great Lake City, with my pajamas hanging on the bed-post, I remarked to my Chicago friend : "What is the matter with the refrigerator?" He said :
280 "In every well-regulated household there are occasions when the hired man neglects to put the ice in the box."

During the months of July and August the sweltering foreigner, wishing to see the inhabitants of these cities, would find them in New York and the sea-coast adjacent. New York has become the
285 largest watering-place in the world. The ante-bellum Southerner, if he passed the White Sulphur Springs, went to Saratoga, to the White Mountains, to Sharon Springs ; but the New South comes to New York, where it can drive in Central Park, stand on the Brooklyn Bridge on moonlight nights, sail up and down the un-
290 equaled Bay and the unrivaled Hudson, go to Coney Island or Long Branch and take a plunge in the surf, and enjoy the forty theatres and one hundred concert halls that furnish amusement in the evening.

Twenty-five thousand strangers, fifty thousand at the outside,
295 would be the limit at St. Louis. The Republican Convention last June in Chicago, which brought possibly a hundred thousand, crowded the town to the extent of discomfort, — I remember it crowded me, — while the Centennial of the Inauguration of George Washington last April in New York brought there a million of
300 visitors, who were amply accommodated and made scarcely a visible addition to the enormous crowds which are the normal characteristic of the metropolis. At Coney Island, at Long Branch, at Rockaway, at Long Beach, at the innumerable places of resort within an hour of the city, a million of people can be
305 comfortably accommodated over night, with the attractions of surf and air unequaled anywhere upon the coast, and unknown in the interior. The exhibition fails in one of its objects unless it is educational. American artisans, mechanics, and working men and women can there see the best results in metals, in wood and
310 in textile fabrics from the shops and looms of the world. Expensive transportation will prevent their visiting a fair, but steamships in which they can be cheaply carried and housed will bring them from all along the Atlantic coast to the gates of the New York Fair.

315 The Southern Society in New York has more members than there are in any club in any city in the South. The Ohio Society of New York numbers more citizens of Ohio than any club in the cities of that State, and has just furnished one of its members to

be Ohio's next United States Senator. The same is true of the
 320 Pacific coast, and of the West and Northwest. There are in New
 York more Irish than in Dublin, more Germans than in any city
 in Germany save two ; and Italians enough to make one of the
 group of cities third in population in Italy. New York with her
 harbor, her Hudson and East Rivers, her Brooklyn Bridge and
 325 Bartholdi Statue of Liberty, her museums, parks and theatres, her
 race-courses and her seaside resorts, is alone the most attractive
 exhibition on the American continent.

Politics have been suggested. The bugaboo of Tammany with
 the tiger's head, the shining teeth, the whisking tail and the
 330 polished claws stands on a National platform facing the Repub-
 lican party. Well, I have lived all my life right under those
 claws, and every once in a while we pull them. The idea is that
 some of the ten millions or more expenditure which this Fair is to
 create may get into the hands of Tammany, and enable it to hold
 335 the State of New York during the next four years, and to carry it
 in 1892. But under the bill which we have drafted, the expen-
 diture of the money is left entirely in the hands of the corporators
 named in the bill on your desk — 103 men, of whom 60 are Repub-
 licans, and the rest are Democrats of all shades. But they are all
 340 gentlemen of honor and integrity, who would assume the respon-
 sibilities of this trust as a public duty.

While there has been some chaff and ridicule and raillery and
 pleasantry in the discussion of the claims of Washington and
 St. Louis, of Chicago and New York, I can say for New York
 345 that there has been no feeling other than the warmest, the kindest,
 and the most respectful for those other cities and their ambitions.
 We appreciate the public buildings and the unequaled situation of
 Washington ; the history, the location, the Mississippi valley, and
 the future of St. Louis ; and the marvelous growth, expansion
 350 and development, not only in commerce and trade, but in all the
 elements which constitute a great city in art and culture, of
 Chicago.

Wherever the Fair may go, New York, so far as so great a city
 can, will do her best to make it a success. But if this committee
 355 will dismiss all claims of locality, all efforts to add to the pros-

perity of a city or section, and look at the whole country, its needs and opportunities for the World's Fair, and the place where the whole country would be most benefited by the Exhibition, the decision cannot fail to be New York.

360 If the Government should to-day appropriate to every family in the United States the money which would carry them to one place, with the distinct understanding that they could select no other, the vote, with an unanimity unequaled in the expression of desire, from Maine to the Gulf, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, among
365 farmers, ranchmen, mine-men, merchants, artisans, professional men, journalists, artists, would be "Take me to New York."

CHAPTER VI.

PERSUASION.

Definition. — Persuasion is that form of discourse the aim of which is to influence the will of the hearer.

By some writers on rhetoric, persuasion is treated as a subdivision of argumentation, or, more rarely, both forms are considered under the name of persuasion. They are, it is true, closely related; but one is intended to influence the intellect, to induce men to believe, the other to influence the will, to induce them to act.

Although persuasion is thus admitted to a place coördinate with the other kinds of discourse, it differs from them in one particular. It is distinguished by its object, not necessarily by its form. A piece of composition may, as a whole, be classed as persuasion, and yet it may be entirely made up of narration, description, exposition, and argumentation.

If only the test of appealing to the will be applied, persuasion may be either spoken or written. The typical form of persuasion is, however, the oration; and in discussions of the subject it is customary to consider it only as a form of spoken discourse.

The Psychology of Persuasion. — Since it will be necessary throughout this chapter to use some of the terms of mental science, it may be well to review briefly the simple classifications involved. According to all metaphysicians there are three great divisions of the mental faculties — the intellect, the feelings, and the will. Under the intellect are included all those powers with the exercise of which we connect the ideas of understanding, reason, and, in its narrow sense, thought.

The feelings include the emotions, — the appetites, desires, affections, etc. The will has control of the initiation and continuance of all action not purely automatic. By some authorities the desires are classed with the will, but most late writers place them among the feelings, and they will be so considered here.

The intellect is moved by the presentation of arguments and explanations, or of facts that furnish material for reasoning. The feelings are stimulated from without by the presentation of certain classes of facts. These facts are presented by means of narration and description, sometimes, perhaps, by exposition. Fortunately, as it seems, the will, on which rests the responsibility for all our actions, is not normally susceptible to direct outside influence, but must be reached through one or both of the other faculties. It is most closely connected with the feelings, as is indicated by the fact that the desires are classed sometimes with one, sometimes with the other ; but the intellect also assists in bringing about any action that can fairly be called rational.

Action based solely on feeling is blind and unguided, and its character will depend wholly on the chance nature of the emotions that are aroused. It is best illustrated by the workings of a mob. Action based solely on reason probably does not exist, though in some persons certain emotions may be so constant that to convince the understanding will be sufficient to influence the will.¹

Motives. — When an emotion tends to influence the will it is known as a motive. The subject of motives is a complicated one, and their consideration belongs to philosophy, especially to ethics. They are divided, primarily, into good and bad. Good motives are classed, generally, under three headings : (1) duties to ourselves, (2) duties to our fellowmen, (3) duties to God. Under (2) are included duties to family, to country, etc. By those who deny the existence of a personal deity, the motives

¹ See page 302, sec. 1.

commonly assigned to the third group are classed under the second.

This classification belongs rather to ethics than to rhetoric. But it is of interest to the orator because it distinguishes one class of motives, the bad, to which he cannot with self-respect appeal. It also furnishes a clue to the distinction of good motives into higher and lower. The lowest motives not wholly bad are to be found among those arising from duty to self ; the highest among those arising from duty to God.

Motives vary in strength according to the character of the persons addressed and the circumstances under which they are presented. Calling, nationality, condition in life, etc., as well as time and occasion, must be taken into account in estimating what motives will be most effective in influencing any particular man or group of men.

In general, those motives that are concerned with self-interest are likely to have the greatest potency. Says Dr. Campbell : "Of all relations, personal relation, by bringing the object very near, most enlivens that sympathy which attacheth us to the concerns of others. Interest in the effects brings the object, if I may say so, into contact with us, and makes the mind cling to it as a concern of its own. Sympathy is but a reflected feeling, and therefore, in ordinary cases, must be weaker than the original. Though the mirror be ever so true, a lover will not be obliged to it for presenting him with the figure of his mistress, when he hath an opportunity of gazing on her person. Nor will the orator place his chief confidence in the assistance of his social and sympathetic affections, when he hath it in his power to arm the selfish." In this passage the word "selfish" is not used in a sense that necessarily implies low morality. But it must be owned that with the average man low personal motives often overpower those of a higher nature ; and that with all men, when no moral questions are involved, the appeal to self will be the quickest, if not the only, way of arousing action

Although it is sometimes possible for an orator to win temporary success by appealing to low motives, it does not follow that such a course is in the long run best, either from an ethical or from a rhetorical standpoint. The advisability of appealing to low motives in order to secure high actions can hardly be discussed here. This and similar questions are complicated by the fact that the motives which incite to any important act are generally so numerous and complex that a complete analysis of them is difficult or impossible.

The average business man probably wants to make money, partly to gratify his own desire for luxury and power, partly that he may provide the better for his family, partly that he may aid those less fortunate in life than himself, partly that he may support public worship. But in expending money for any of these purposes his motives are not unmixed. If he is liberal to his children he may be moved in part by pure love for them, in part by a desire to have them outshine those of his neighbors. He may support the church, partly because of purely religious motives, partly for the social position, business advantage, or reputation for liberality that such a course will bring. Some of these motives are high, some low, and some perhaps wholly bad. The exact share of each in bringing about the actions that result could not be estimated even by the man himself. Probably he is unaware that some of them exist.

The Mechanism of Persuasion. — Says Dr. Campbell: "In order to persuade there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is, to satisfy their judgment, that there is a connection between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion that he excites."

This quotation gives an idea of the elements of persuasive discourse and their respective uses. The ultimate aim of the orator is to influence the will; but in order to do this he

must address himself to both the intellect and the feelings. A man may be thoroughly convinced that certain acts would lead to certain results, but he will not perform these acts unless he feels that the results are desirable, either for his own sake, or for that of his fellowmen or his God. He may desire any end very strongly ; but so long as he retains his self-control he will not pursue on this account any course of action unless he is convinced that it will lead to this end.

The nature and relative importance of these elements of an oration will be discussed in the following sections.

When a campaign speaker tries to induce his hearers to vote in favor of a certain party, he aims to convince their intellects that the success of this party is for the best interests of the country, and to arouse their feelings of patriotism or love of good government to such an extent that they will act on these beliefs. The same process is to be employed whenever the will is to be influenced, no matter how formal or informal the manner and occasion. One boy persuades another to go fishing with him (1) by arousing the desire for a certain kind of pleasure, (2) by showing that this pleasure will be yielded by the trip proposed.

The Intellectual Element of Persuasion. — As has already been said, the address to the intellect is the foundation upon which all reasonable persuasion rests. This address will generally take the form of argumentation or exposition. The former will be used to prove the advisability of the course of action proposed ; the latter to explain either the action itself or some matters connected with it. When used as accessories of persuasion, both argumentation and exposition must be carefully adapted to the places they occupy. It must be remembered that the intellect alone does not initiate action. Any process that convinces the intellect at the expense of repressing the emotions defeats its own end, so far as persuasion is concerned. For this reason long and involved arguments that require strict and continued attention are to be avoided. It is true that a

friendly audience may be moved by the very exactness and conclusiveness of a short argument expressed in the form of a full syllogism, or even of a mathematical demonstration ; but hostile hearers are likely to resent any such attempt to carry their intellects by storm, and any audience will fail to respond to such an argument unless it is so short and simple as to be taken in almost at a glance.

The natural method of presenting a deductive argument in persuasion is by means of short enthymemes. More effective than these are inductive arguments,¹ especially those from example. These deal with concrete cases, and so stimulate the mind to a vigorous grasp of ideas. These arguments are less conclusive and more liable to fallacies than are other forms. But in persuasion it is often necessary that the hearers should take the speaker's word for many things, and often an orator can do no more than to make his case seem plausible. As a matter of expediency, as well as of right, an orator should never abuse the confidence which he wishes an audience to repose in him.

When exposition is used in persuasion it should be as brief and striking as truth and clearness will admit. Among the methods of expounding terms that may be employed to advantage are the use of synonyms; examples, and comparisons, especially those in which a strong antithesis is brought out. Definitions should be brief and suggestive, rather than in the logical form.

- Propositions may be expounded by repetition in other words, and by the use of examples.

In general, such methods should be employed in the use of both argumentation and exposition as will avoid overtaxing the intellect and so weakening the force of the emotions. Although the separate presentations of ideas should usually be brief, it does not follow that conciseness is necessarily a characteristic of the whole. A greater amount of repetition and illustration

¹ Subject to the limitations discussed on page 261.

by means of stories, anecdotes, striking special cases, etc., is allowable than is the case when argumentation and exposition are used alone. These repetitions, if skillfully managed, may be made to appeal to both the intellect and the feelings.

In adapting the intellectual parts of his discourse to the exigencies of the occasion, an orator should consider the peculiar habits, temperament, training, and beliefs of his hearers. Two things must be sought for,—interest and clearness. The former will be lost if unnecessary statements are made, or if the method of presentation is dull or tedious; the latter may be sacrificed by too great conciseness, or by talking over the heads of the audience or in a manner with which they are not familiar. Since an orator cannot know the individual peculiarities of each of his audience, and could not adapt his discourse to each of them if he did, it follows that he must appeal mainly to such impulses as are common to all. More specific motives may be appealed to in proportion as the members of the audience have had similar training or possess similar aims.

If an orator is to maintain a proper degree of interest, he must estimate the state of mind of his hearers, not only at the first of his discourse, but so long as he is speaking. Says Professor Robinson: "Each new thought, and each new phase of thought, arouses in his [the hearer's] mind new questions, which, although unspoken, the orator must recognize and solve. Every oration is in reality a dialogue, in which the doubts and objections of the auditor are so many silent interrogatories to which the orator audibly replies. To do this without monotony, to put the same idea in varied forms suited to the changing disposition of the hearer without apparent repetition, taxes all the arts of rhetoric."

The foregoing remarks apply especially to what may be called typical persuasion. If the action of a motive is assured and little but an appeal to the intellect is necessary, longer and more formal arguments may be given. See page 302, sec. 1.

The Emotional Element. — The appeal to the emotions is really the vital part of all persuasion. An analytic discussion of this subject could be given only after a thorough study of mental science; and the full possibilities of such an appeal can be understood only by one who has a thorough and sympathetic knowledge of men. Two important considerations may be noted here.

1. An emotion may so usurp the mind that for the time being feelings of a different character cannot exist. Emotions are naturally divided into groups, the members of which resemble each other more or less closely. Members of the same group may coexist without difficulty, and may even suggest one another. Thus the mind may at the same time be imbued with an æsthetic appreciation of the beauties of nature and a feeling of reverence for the Divine Being. A person may at the same time feel personal chagrin, anger, and a desire for revenge. States of mind that are of different classes are not likely to coexist, even if they are in no sense opposites. Personal chagrin and deep reverence for God are not likely to hold the mind with equal power at the same time.

When an orator finds his hearers dominated by an emotion that interferes with the achievement of his object, he should rarely attempt to allay the feeling directly, or even to arouse its exact opposite. Let him incite any strong emotion of a different nature, and that which was dominant will disappear. Humor is a most successful counter irritant in such cases. Many a speaker has overcome the initial hostility or contempt of an audience by getting them to enjoy a good joke.

2. Emotions already in possession of the mind may be turned in other directions more readily than other emotions can be aroused. Some feelings move naturally to their opposites. This is illustrated by the frequency with which humor and pathos, the sublime and the ridiculous, are mentioned together. A speaker may easily take advantage of this fact, and by

changing from an emotion to its opposite, intensify the effect of both. Instances of this method are found in almost any oration that has "dramatic qualities."

Emotions may also be readily transferred to a different object from that which aroused them, and still retain their general character. The knowledge of this fact is often of the greatest use to an orator. When he cannot directly arouse the emotion that he desires, he may excite some similar feeling, or the same feeling in connection with some other object, and readily effect a transference. A preacher often leads to feelings of reverence and devotion to God by first calling up the emotions that center around the home. A political speaker may arouse feelings of resentment at personal injury, and deftly turn them into patriotic resentment at a nation's wrongs. This can often be done when the direct statement of patriotic considerations would be but coldly received.

One great advantage of this method of treatment is that it enables an orator to appeal first to low or selfish desires, and in the end to incite to high and noble action.

While feelings may sometimes be excited by general considerations, especially such vague ideas as are associated with dominant states of mind, they are usually aroused by specific facts. For this reason narration and description are the forms of discourse most used in the emotional part of persuasion.

Of the two, narration is perhaps the more important. A story or an anecdote is easily told and easily followed by an audience. It may be so planned that it accumulates force that is all expended in a telling stroke when the *dénouement* is reached. It also offers more opportunity for humor than does description; and humor is valuable both as a means of displacing undesirable emotions and as the first step toward some other feeling. When used simply as an appeal to the emotions, not as furnishing the material for argument, narration should almost always be highly organized; that is, it should have a

plot, in which all the details have a part, and a decided *dénouement*, often with an element of surprise. The separate narratives should not be too long, the length that is allowable being determined largely by the skill of the speaker as a storyteller.

Description is also very useful in reaching the feelings, though it is more difficult to manage than narration. The suggestive and dynamic forms will be used, rarely the circumstantial. Since description is especially hard to follow in spoken discourse, long passages with much detail should be avoided. Description is probably most effective in persuasion when it is incidental to a narrative.

In impassioned oratory, after the feelings are already aroused, a speaker may make a direct appeal to motives, or an exhortation. This may be considered as persuasion in form as well as in object. It is not used very frequently, and needs to be managed with great care. If a hearer is not in such a state of mind that he yields to it readily, it is likely to repel him.

Relative Proportions of the Two Elements. — The relative proportions of the intellectual and the emotional elements in persuasion will be determined by a variety of considerations. Among these are the mental habits of the hearers, the attitude of the hearers toward the speaker and his theme, and the nature of the end sought.

1. If the hearers are persons with whom certain motives are known to be continuously present, it is necessary only to convince their intellects that the action proposed is in accordance with these fixed desires. Thus a judge may be supposed to be influenced so uniformly by love of truth and justice that it is necessary only to prove a case just in order to receive a favorable decision. A thorough business man usually has so strong a desire for money that, in the absence of adverse motives of a different nature, he can be persuaded to invest his money in a certain way by showing him that such an invest-

ment will surely be the most profitable. When motives can thus be assumed, persuasion may consist almost entirely of exposition and argumentation. Indeed, an attempt to appeal directly to such motives is often disastrous. A judge would resent an open attempt to arouse his feelings of justice. Arguments before the courts often contain an appeal, but it is addressed to other feelings than those supposed to be essential to a judicial mind, or its nature is in some way concealed.

When the motives on which the desired action depends are not known to be continuously present, or when they may be overbalanced by other motives, the emotional element must be more prominent. Allowance should be made for the temperament of the hearers. This will be easy if but one person or a few persons are addressed. In general, uncultured persons yield to their feelings more readily than do cultured, natives of warm countries more readily than those of colder countries, Celts more readily than Anglo-Saxons. In any case, the feelings should be aroused only so far as is necessary to insure action. To go beyond this is to invite recklessness rather than deliberation. Besides, an ebullition of feeling is likely to be followed by a reaction. This is often noticed, in both individuals and communities, after periods of great religious excitement.

2. The attitude of the hearers toward the speaker and his theme will have an influence in determining the relative amount of the emotional element. Hostility toward the speaker personally, or blind antagonism to the object he proposes, must generally be overcome through the feelings. Calmer opposition, based on difference of belief, must be met by convincing the intellect.

When the hearers agree with the speaker, but do not act because of laziness or apathy, the appeal to the feelings must preponderate. This is the case when a minister addresses persons of his own faith, and urges them to more righteous lives.

3. The nature of the end proposed will have its influence on the proportions of the two elements in the discourse. The lighter and more trivial the action appears, the more can the emotion be depended upon to produce action, even in opposition to judgment. Men who are habitually exact and conscientious in important matters will act in defiance of their own knowledge regarding health or even morality, when trivial pleasures are concerned.

When some action will surely be taken, but it is uncertain what it will be, the advocate of any particular plan or end can depend largely on the address to the intellect. In such cases the hearer can generally be interested with little difficulty. The determination to act largely implies the existence of a motive, and it is necessary only to show that some particular course of procedure is advantageous. When the hearers must be aroused before they will take action at all, the appeal to the feelings must be more prominent.

Relative Positions of the Two Elements.—No definite rules can be given for determining the relative positions of the intellectual and the emotional elements in an oration. Generally speaking, the intellectual should precede the emotional: first, because, unless the hearers have their emotions aroused when the speaker begins, he must interest them through their intellects; second, because, since action is brought about through motives, it is desirable to close with something of the nature of an appeal. To begin with an address to the feelings would often repel the audience; and exposition or argumentation coming last would dispel any emotions that might previously have been aroused. This rule is, however, very general; and it is always best, especially when addressing a cultured audience, to combine the two elements so far as is possible. The appeal to the feelings will be more effective if it is not recognized as such; and the argumentative and expository passages will seem less dry if the emotions are stimulated at the same time as the intellect.

The best way of beginning an oration depends largely on the attitude of the hearers. If they are not unfriendly, and the subject is one in which their interest can be readily aroused, the speaker can pass from a brief introduction to the intellectual part of his discourse. This is a natural and dignified method of procedure. If they are in any degree hostile, or even apathetic, it must be his first duty to arouse interest, overcome prejudice, and thus prepare the way for a fair hearing. Interest can often be aroused by an entertaining anecdote. Such an introduction should always be pertinent to the rest of the discourse. Some speakers attract attention by a funny story, to which they attach their main discourse by a link so weak that the audience at once feel themselves the victims of artifice.

Interest may often be aroused by giving some application of the theme and so showing its importance. When the subject is a hackneyed one, on which the audience feel that nothing new can be said, any novel presentation will do much to overcome apathy.

A hostile prejudice on the part of the audience may be overcome in various ways. If the feeling is so strong that it has an element of personal opposition, the speaker may dwell on the points in which his sentiments and beliefs accord with those of his audience, or on any of his actions that show his loyalty, patriotism, or devotion to a common cause. This must be done carefully in order to avoid the appearance of egotism. Direct reference on the part of the speaker to himself and his affairs is not so common in modern orations as in those of former times, but it is more allowable in persuasion than in other forms of discourse. Often it takes the form of an apology, or an explanation why the address is delivered.

The following introduction to Ruskin's lecture on war in "The Crown of Wild Olive" is of this apologetic nature. Note that the speaker evidently expected apathy rather than opposition. He

is therefore able to pass quickly and easily to the main line of thought in his discourse. The lecture was delivered at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.

"Young soldiers : I do not doubt but that many of you came unwillingly tonight, and many in merely contemptuous curiosity, to hear what a writer on painting could possibly say, or would venture to say, respecting your great art of war. You may well think within yourselves, that a painter might, perhaps without immodesty, lecture younger painters upon painting, but not young lawyers upon law, nor young physicians upon medicine — least of all, it may seem to you, young warriors upon war. And, indeed, when I was asked to address you, I declined at first, and declined long ; for I felt that you would not be interested in my special business, and would certainly think there was small need for me to come to teach you yours. Nay, I knew that there ought to be no such need, for the great veteran soldiers of England are now men everyway so thoughtful, so noble, and so good, that no other teaching than their knightly example, and their few words of grave and tried counsel should be either necessary for you, or even, without assurance of due modesty in the offerer, endured by you.

"But being asked, not once nor twice, I have not ventured persistently to refuse ; and I will try, in very few words, to lay before you some reason why you should accept my excuse and hear me patiently. You may imagine that your work is wholly foreign to and separate from mine. So far from that, all the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war," etc.

Often a speaker can produce a kindly feeling toward himself, and indirectly toward his cause, by an appearance of candor, and by showing an interest in the audience and its comfort, or in the everyday affairs of its members.

The paragraph given below constituted Lincoln's introductory remarks to the audience on the occasion of a debate with Senator Douglas. Notice the apparent interest of the speaker in the comfort of his audience, the compliment to his opponent, and the indirect, and therefore modest, reference to his own abilities.

The conversational style, descending even to contemporary slang at the end, aids in establishing free and easy relations with the audience.

"Fellow-citizens : I do not rise to speak now, if I can stipulate with the audience to meet me here at half-past six, or at seven o'clock. It is now several minutes past five, and Judge Douglas has spoken over three hours. It will take me as long as it has taken him. That will carry us beyond eight o'clock at night. Now every one of you who can remain that long, can just as well get his supper, meet me at seven, and remain an hour or two later. The Judge has already informed you that he is to have half an hour to reply to me. I doubt not but you have been a little surprised to learn that I have consented to give one of his high reputation and known ability this advantage of me. Indeed, my consenting to it, though reluctant, was not wholly unselfish, for I suspected, if it were understood that the Judge was entirely done, you Democrats would leave and not hear me ; but by giving him the close I felt confident you would stay for the fun of hearing him skin me."

When the audience reassembled at seven o'clock Mr. Lincoln continued with the passage that follows. As he had already been made acquainted with his audience, so to speak, he was enabled to begin somewhat abruptly. The main object of the sentences quoted is to outline the discussion, and to give an assurance of fairness in treatment. Notice the unassuming way in which all personal prejudices and sectional feeling are disclaimed.

"The repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and the propriety of its restoration, constitute the subject of what I am about to say.

"As I desire to present my own connected view of this subject, my remarks will not be specifically an answer to Judge Douglas ; yet as I proceed, the main points he has presented will arise, and will receive such respectful attention as I may be able to give them.

"I wish further to say that I do not propose to question the patriotism, or assail the motives of any man or class of men, but rather to confine myself strictly to the naked merits of the question.

"I also wish to be no less than national in all the positions I may take, and when I take ground which others have thought, or

may think, narrow, sectional, or dangerous to the Union, I hope to give a reason which will appear sufficient, at least to some, why I think differently.

"As this subject is no other than part and parcel of the larger general question of domestic slavery, I wish to *make* and to *keep* the distinction between the *existing* institution and the *extension* of it, so broad and so clear, that no honest man can misunderstand me, and no dishonest one successfully misrepresent me.

"In order to a clear understanding of what the Missouri Compromise is, a short history of the preceding kindred subjects will be proper."

When the audience differ from the speaker on matters of belief, he can make no headway till he has convinced their intellects. The argumentative and expository parts of the discourse should therefore be placed near the first. If the hearers are disposed to be fair and candid, these elements may come at the very first; if not, they may be preceded by an appeal to motives of fairness.

The Character of a Persuasive Speaker.— Since the time of Aristotle, writers on rhetoric have mentioned certain characteristics that an orator should have, or at least should be supposed to have by those whom he addresses. The reputation of the author is more important in persuasion than in other kinds of discourse, because of the emotional element involved. It has already been seen that emotions of different kinds interfere with one another. If the speaker's personality calls forth feelings of distrust, resentment, ridicule, etc., his discourse cannot arouse other emotions that will be effective to his end. It has also been seen that the orator will often need, in order to avoid long and tedious arguments, to ask his hearers to take statements on trust. This an audience will not do, unless its confidence in the speaker is complete.

The qualities for which an orator should desire a reputation are stated in various ways, but they are mainly two—ability

and honesty. No one is likely to be persuaded by a speaker whom he thinks to be a dunce ; and he will give his assent but grudgingly to even the most plausible appeals of an orator whom he thinks capable of using his abilities "to make the worse appear the better reason."

It is often remarked that an orator should desire a reputation for ability in all lines except oratory. Most hearers resent the thought of being readily susceptible to persuasive influences. They therefore steel their minds against the attacks of a speaker who has a reputation for eloquence, though they willingly allow themselves to be carried away by the address of a man whom they think plain in speech, but able and honest. The trick of disclaiming any oratorical ability, and warning one's hearers against the eloquence of an opponent is an old one, but it is still often effective.

Kinds of Oratory.—The forms that persuasion takes are classified in different ways. One of the oldest divisions was into sacred and profane ; and each of these was again subdivided according to the occasion on which the discourse was delivered, and the nature of the end that was sought. A more useful classification is based on the nature of the discourse itself.

1. Persuasion has been defined as that form of discourse the end of which is action ; and the typical form is that in which the action desired is definite and not too remote. Most that has been said on the subject in the foregoing sections applies primarily to this typical form. This sort of persuasion includes addresses in the courts, the object of which is to secure favorable decisions ; speeches in deliberative assemblies for the purpose of securing the passage or defeat of certain measures ; political addresses, for the purpose of influencing voters to cast their ballots in favor of particular candidates or measures ; and those sermons, the aim of which is either to induce men to enter upon the Christian life, or to persuade

those who profess Christianity to perform certain duties in a manner consistent with their principles. These differ from one another only in purpose and occasion.

2. Besides this form of oratory there are other spoken discourses which have a persuasive element, but which propose a less immediate end. Among these are those sermons that incite to morality in general without suggesting any particular line of action; eulogies on public men; and many of the speeches at anniversaries, installations, etc. Orations of this class usually resemble those of the more typical form in diction. They appeal to both the intellect and the emotions, and try to convert feeling into motives which shall be continuously present; but they do not propose any definite action. Sometimes they close with exhortations to certain lines of habitual conduct, but more commonly the hearer is left to make his own application of the thoughts that have been suggested to him.

Oratory of this sort is often spoken of as "inspiring," and its temporary effect on the emotions may be great; but if no immediate chance for action presents itself, this effect is likely to be but temporary. Many a Fourth of July orator has filled his audience with sentiments of intense patriotism which were entirely forgotten before the festivities of the day were over. Of the thousands of hearers who praise "good sermons" of this general type every Sunday, few show the results in their daily work during the succeeding week.

The conviction that oratory of this class is not of great ultimate value seems to be gaining ground; and such discourses are perhaps less frequent than they were half a century ago. The old-fashioned Fourth of July oration is not so common; ministers of the gospel are likely to be more definite in their exhortations to good works; and addresses at the inauguration of college presidents, and on similar occasions, often present the results of scholarly research, and are entirely free from a hortatory, or even an emotional element.

3. Certain anomalous forms of spoken discourse, which contain something of an address to the emotions and are expressed in a more or less highly wrought diction, may be considered with persuasion for want of a better classification. Among these are the ordinary after-dinner speech, and especially the school and college oration. The latter is a form of composition that has developed under peculiar conditions. Its object is practice or display, rather than the production of any definite effect, either by conveying information or arousing action. Indeed, the real meaning of the word "oration" is sometimes so far lost sight of that students speak as if the only difference between an oration and an essay were one of diction, and consider as a good oration-subject anything that can be treated in poetic phrases. Nothing could be further from the truth than this view. There may be impassioned narration and description, and lively exposition and argumentation; but if a speaker is to claim for his production the title of an oration, he must aim to produce at least a temporary effect on the wills of his hearers.

The college orator is often speaking for a prize, rather than as the result of burning convictions; and under any circumstances he is not likely to be in a position to persuade his hearers to immediate action. The persuasive element in his orations will, at best, only place them in the class discussed in the last section; but it should never be absent. If the subject is a man, the theme may be "Emulate his Good Qualities," or "Avoid his Mistakes." If the subject is historical, the hearers may be rendered more patriotic. Such a theme will rarely be expressed in a direct exhortation, but it should be continually present to the writer's mind, and should dominate his whole discourse. In the existence of such an imperative theme, rather than a mere didactic intention, lies the essential difference between an oration and an essay.

Style.—The popular conception of the diction of oratory seems to be that it is necessarily high-wrought, impassioned,

and indeed bordering on the bombastic. It is not easy to determine just why this erroneous notion exists. It may be due in part to the faults of those discourses most commonly known as orations, — student efforts, Fourth of July speeches, and the like. It may also be explained in part by the fact that the highest eloquence is never recognized as such by those who hear it. If a speaker succeeds in persuading his hearers to act, they usually feel that they have been listening only to "plain common sense." They apply the word "eloquent" to those methods that gratify the desire for the melodramatic, but that have little or no effect on action.

A complete discussion of the diction of oratory would include the whole subject of style, since persuasion makes use of narration, description, exposition, and argumentation in all their forms. A few general considerations may be noticed, based on two facts: (1) that the aim of persuasion is to arouse motives; (2) that persuasion is spoken discourse.

1. It may be laid down as the first requisite of the oratorical style that it should not seem strange or out of place. It should always impress the hearers as the natural way in which a sincere man would discuss the questions at issue. It will therefore vary greatly with the subject and the circumstances. The address of a lawyer in a case of pig-stealing, and a eulogy pronounced on the death of a statesman, may both be persuasion; but they should differ widely in style. The one would be expressed in simple language, perhaps the colloquial language of the locality; the other would use a style dignified, and, if need be, impassioned.

It is equally bad for the tone of a discourse to be higher or lower than fits the subject and the occasion. The former fault gives the impression that the orator is shallow and vain, or at least impractical; the latter, either that he is incapable of high thoughts, or that he is insulting the audience by descending to what he thinks to be their level. Either will make him appear

contemptible to his hearers; and, as has already been seen, emotions like contempt crowd from the mind most motives such as an orator wishes to arouse.

Since the emotions are not readily excited when the intellect is overtaxed, the intellectual elements of the discourse should be in a form that will be readily understood. Some of the most successful popular orators have sacrificed ease, and even grammatical correctness, for the sake of clearness and force.

In order to attain its end most successfully, the address to the emotions should be in language that is vivid and picturesque. Among the most important devices for obtaining these qualities may be mentioned the use of specific terms and the mention of details of suggestive power. In oration-writing the chief temptation seems to be to make the style too high-flown, and in working for picturesqueness the author must be careful that he does not produce bombast.

2. The diction of oratory will be influenced to some extent by the fact that the discourse is to be heard, not read, by those for whom it is intended. This fact makes necessary a style that cannot fail to be understood at once. Short sentences should be employed to a considerable extent. Long sentences, when they are used, should be simple in structure. Periodic sentences, and those that express a climax, are effective if well delivered.

Since a hearer cannot readily review a spoken discourse, an orator should employ enough repetition to make sure that his meaning is grasped. The same idea may be presented in a variety of ways, each differing slightly from the others. Not only is there more need of this in spoken than in written discourse, but a skillful speaker can indulge in it much more freely than can a writer, without wearying those of his hearers who are quick enough to catch the idea at its first statement.

Above all, an orator should fit the style of his writing to the style of his delivery. The more perfectly the two harmonize,

the more effective is the impression conveyed. Few orators, even among the greatest, could exchange orations and achieve satisfactory results. Style of delivery, except when changed by long training, is usually the spontaneous product of the speaker's character and temperament. When, as is often the case, a young writer adopts as his model in literary style some orator who is his opposite in temperament, the result is likely to be disastrous. Many college orations fail for this reason. Effectiveness in delivery should always be kept in mind during the writing of an oration, and the work should be constantly tested by reading aloud. When the discourse is extemporaneous, diction, except as it is hampered by embarrassment, is likely to fit itself to delivery.

ILLUSTRATIVE SELECTIONS.

Attention has already been called to the fact that the selections given to illustrate argumentation and those that here follow supplement each other. The opening paragraph of the selection from Franklin (page 272) may be studied in connection with what has been said on the introduction in persuasion. The argument by Professor Corson (page 276) has some emotional elements, the probable effect of which on an audience might profitably be discussed.

The selections here given should be supplemented by the study of other orations, both ancient and modern. The works of the classic orators are useful as models from which universal principles may be derived, but the practical methods of treatment most effective with a modern audience must be learned from speakers of the present century; a great change has come over oratory, even since the days of Burke. Persuasion of the first class — that which aims to produce definite action — may be studied to advantage in the works of Lincoln, Beecher, Wendell Phillips, and others. The men named, in most of

their addresses, are simpler and better adapted for elementary study than are Webster, Calhoun, and the contemporary British orators. In persuasion of the second class — especially in what may be called occasional oratory — American literature is especially rich. Many of the eulogies pronounced in Congress upon public men, of the nominating speeches in our conventions, and of the addresses delivered on other formal and informal occasions, are models of their kind.

In each of the selections here given, the student should note carefully the part taken by each of the forms of discourse. Kinds of arguments and methods of exposition should be studied, and, if possible, a reason should be assigned why each is used in its particular place. The persuasive theme should be determined and stated as the first step in analysis. The relation of subordinate ideas to this main theme may then be seen and indicated in an analytic plan similar to that used for exercises in argumentation.

I.

The first selection is the first half, or thereabouts, of the speech delivered by Henry Ward Beecher in Manchester, when in 1863 he went to England to urge a more tolerant attitude toward the Northern States. This was the first of a series of addresses delivered in the principal cities of the Kingdom. The feeling of sympathy with the Confederacy was very strong in the manufacturing districts of England at this time, and the meetings that Beecher addressed were often interrupted.

The introduction to this speech furnishes a good example of the methods that may be employed in gaining a hearing before an audience that is wholly or partly hostile. The opposition in this case was little greater than any speaker may be called upon to meet on occasions of great excitement; this selection is therefore a more profitable subject of study than the oft-quoted introduction to the speech at Liverpool, where the

audience was virtually a mob. All the introductions to the speeches of this series will well repay study.

The interruptions of the audience are indicated in the text, and show by their frequency the intensity of feeling on the part of both friends and enemies, and by their nature the temper of the audience. Note (line 3) that the speaker meets interruption at the outset with determination, almost defiance; later, when he has won the sympathy of his audience to a considerable extent, he adopts a different method (line 193). What would have been the probable effect of taking the opposite attitude in each of these instances?

Observe the way in which Mr. Beecher passes from the interruption (line 3) to the idea of freedom of speech, then to freedom in general, and to "civil and religious liberty." Is there any confusion of meanings here that would be improper in a debate? Is there anything unfair in the way in which Mr. Beecher uses the terms in this speech? Observe the way in which nearness of relationship between England and America is shown, and the compliments paid to England and to Manchester; also the assertions of independence (lines 63, 140) which prevent the praise of England from being taken as mere flattery. This continued alternation of conciliation and independence, almost defiance, is one of the most striking features of the oration. Find all the instances of it.

The address referred to (line 1) was voted to Mr. Beecher before he began to speak. The Prince of Wales (line 110) had recently visited the United States and had been honored in many ways.

There is no decided break between the introduction of this speech and the body. Why? The speaker's object is implied, however (lines 135-7). This may be taken as the end of the introduction. What is the theme of the oration? What is the theme of the argumentative part, so far as can be seen from the extract given? Classify the arguments used. Pick out

the exposition and note its method. Do the same with the narration. This selection shows admirably how individual points may be argued in persuasion. As it is but a small part of Mr. Beecher's presentation of the whole problem, and as he was forced to adapt his discourse to circumstances as they arose, it does not show to advantage the best way of planning the argumentative part of an oration.

Note the way in which the speaker repeats the simple idea that increase in the value of slaves fastened the system upon the South (lines 360-7). Find other cases of the repetition of an idea. Mr. Beecher is a master of this process.

Mr. Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen: The address which you have kindly presented to me contains matters both personal and national. (Interruption.) My friends, we will have a whole night session, but we will be heard. (Loud cheers.) I have not
5 come to England to be surprised that those men whose cause cannot bear the light are afraid of free speech. (Cheers.) I have had practice of more than twenty-five years in the presence of tumultuous assemblies opposing those very men whose representatives now attempt to forestall free speech. ("Hear.") Little
10 by little, I doubt not, I shall be permitted to speak to-night. ("Hear.") Little by little I have been permitted in my own country to speak, until at last the day has come there, when nothing but the utterance of speech for freedom is popular. (Cheers.)

You have been pleased to speak of me as one connected with
15 the great cause of civil and religious liberty. I covet no higher honor than to have my name joined to the list of that great company of noble Englishmen from whom we derived our doctrines of liberty. (Cheers.) For although there is some opposition to what are here called American ideas, what are these American
20 ideas? They are simply English ideas bearing fruit in America. We bring back American sheaves, but the seed-corn we got in England — ("Hear"); and if, on a larger sphere, and under circumstances of unobstruction, we have reared mightier harvests, every sheaf contains the grain that has made Old England rich for a
25 hundred years. (Great cheering.) I am also not a little gratified

that my first appearance to speak on secular topics in England is in this goodly town of Manchester, for I would rather have praise from men who understand the quality praised, than from those who speak at hazard and with little knowledge of the thing
30 praised. ("Hear.") And where else, more than in these great central portions of England, and in what town more than Manchester, have the doctrines of human rights been battled for, and where else have there been gained for them nobler victories than here? (Cheers.) It is not indiscriminate praise therefore: You
35 know what you talk about. You have had practice in these doctrines yourselves, and to be praised by those who are illustrious is praise indeed. (Cheers.)

Allusion has been made by one of the gentlemen — a cautionary allusion, a kind of deference evidently paid to some supposed
40 feeling — an allusion has been made to words or deeds of mine that might be supposed to be offensive to Englishmen. ("Hear.") I cannot say how that may be. I am sure that I have never thought, in the midst of this mighty struggle at home, which has taxed every power and energy of our people — ("Oh," and cheers)
45 — I have never stopped to measure and to think whether my words spoken in truth and with fidelity to duty would be liked in this shape or in that shape by one or another person either in England or America. (Cheers.) I have had one simple, honest purpose, which I have pursued ever since I have been in public life, and
50 that was with all the strength that God has given to me to maintain the cause of the poor and of the weak in my own country. (Cheers.) And if, in the height and heat of conflict, some words have been over sharp, and some positions have been taken heedlessly, are you the men to call one to account? ("Hear.") What
55 if some exquisite dancing-master, standing on the edge of a battle, where Richard Cœur de Lion swung his axe, criticised him by saying that "his gestures and postures violated the proprieties of polite life?" (Laughter.) When dandies fight they think how they look, but when men fight they think only of deeds. (Cheers.)
60 But I am not here either on trial or on defense. ("Hear, hear.") It matters not what I have said on other occasions and under different circumstances. Here I am before you, willing to tell

you what I think about England or any person in it. (Cheers.)

Let me say one word, however, in regard to this meeting, and the
65 peculiar gratification which I feel in it. (Cheers.) The same
agencies which have been at work to misrepresent good men in
our country to you, have been at work to misrepresent to us good
men here ; and when I say to my friends in America that I have
attended such a meeting as this, received such an address, and
70 beheld such enthusiasm, it will be a renewed pledge of amity.
(Cheers.) I have never ceased to feel that war, or even unkind
feelings between two such great nations, would be one of the
most unpardonable and atrocious offenses that the world ever
beheld — (cheers); and I have regarded everything, therefore,
75 which needlessly led to those feelings out of which war comes, as
being in itself wicked. (Cheers.) The same blood is in us.
(Cheers.) We are your children, or the children of your fathers
and ancestors. You and we hold the same substantial doctrines.
We have the same mission amongst the nations of the earth.
80 Never were mother and daughter set forth to do so queenly a
thing in the kingdom of God's glory as England and America.
(Cheers.) Do you ask why we are so sensitive, and why we have
hewn England with our tongue as we have? I will tell you why.
There is no man who can offend you so deeply as the one you
85 love most. (Loud cheers.) Men point to France and Napoleon,
and say he has joined England in all that she has done, and why
are the press of America silent against France, and why do they
speak as they do against England? It is because we love Eng-
land. (Cheers.)

90 I well remember the bitterness left by the war of our Inde-
pendence, and the outbreak of the flame of 1812 from its embers.
To hate England was in my boyhood almost the first lesson of
patriotism ; but that result of conflict gradually died away as
peace brought forth its proper fruits : interests, reciprocal visits,
95 the interchanges of Christian sympathy, and coöperative labors
in a common cause lessened and finally removed ill-feelings. In
their place began to rise affection and admiration. For when we
searched our principles, they all ran back to rights wrought out
and established in England ; when we looked at those institutions

100 of which we were most proud, we beheld that the very foundation stones were taken from the quarry of your history ; when we looked for those men that had illustrated our own tongue, orators or eloquent ministers of the gospel, they were English ; we borrowed nothing from France but here a fashion and there a ges-
105 ture or a custom, while what we had to dignify humanity — that made life worth having — were all brought from Old England. (Cheers.) And do you suppose that under such circumstances, with this growing love, with this growing pride, with this gladness to feel that we were being associated in the historic glory of Eng-
110 land, it was with feelings of indifference that we beheld in our midst the heir-apparent to the British throne? (Cheers.) There is not reigning on the globe a sovereign who commands our simple, unpretentious, and unaffected respect, as does your own beloved queen. (Loud cheers.) I have heard multitudes
115 of men say that it was their joy and their pleasure to pay respect to the Prince of Wales, even if he had not won personal sympathy, that his mother might know that through him the compliment was meant to her. (Loud cheers.) It was an unarranged and unexpected spontaneous universal outbreak of popular enthu-
120 siasm; it began in the colonies of Canada, the fire rolled across the border, all through New England, all through New York and Ohio, down through Pennsylvania and the adjacent States ; nor was the element quenched until it came to Richmond. I said, and many said — the past of enmity and prejudice is now rolled below
125 the horizon of memory : a new era is come, and we have set our hand and voices as a sacred seal to our cordial affection and coöperation with England. (Cheers.) Now (whether we interpret it aright or not, is not the question) when we thought England was seeking opportunity to go with the South against us of
130 the North, it hurt us as no other nation's conduct could hurt us on the face of the globe ; and if we spoke some words of intemperate heat, we spoke them in the mortification of disappointed affection. (Cheers.) It has been supposed that I have aforetime urged or threatened war with England. Never ! This I have
135 said — and this I repeat now, and here — that the cause of constitutional government, and of universal liberty as associated with

it in our country, was so dear, so sacred, that rather than betray it we would give the last child we had ; that we would not relinquish this conflict, though other States rose, and entered into a
 140 league with the South ; and that, if it were necessary, we would maintain this great doctrine of representative government in America against the armed world — against England and France. (Great cheering, some disturbance.)

Let me be permitted to say, then, that it seems to me the darkest
 145 days of embroilment between this country and America are past. (Cheers.) The speech of Earl Russell at Blairgowrie, the stopping of those armed ships, and the present attitude of the British government — (renewed cheering) — will go far towards satisfying our people. Understand me ; we do not accept Earl Russell's
 150 doctrine of belligerent rights nor of neutrality, as applied to the action of the British government and nation at the beginning of our Civil War, as right doctrine, but we accept it as an accomplished fact. We have drifted so far away from the time when it was profitable to discuss the questions of neutrality or belliger-
 155 ency, and circumstances with you and with us are so much changed by the progress of the war, that we now only ask of the government strict neutrality, and of the liberty-loving people of England moral sympathy. Nothing more ! We ask no help and no hindrance. (Resumed cheers.) If you do not send us a man,
 160 we do not ask for a man. If you do not send us another pound of powder, we are able to make our own powder. (Laughter.) If you do not send us another musket or another cannon, we have cannon that will carry five miles already. (Laughter.) We do not ask for material help. We shall be grateful for moral
 165 sympathy — (cheers) ; but if you cannot give us moral sympathy we shall still endeavor to do without it. All that we say is, let France keep away, let England keep hands off ; if we cannot manage this rebellion by ourselves, then let it not be managed at all. (Cheers.)

170 We do not allow ourselves to doubt the issue of this conflict. It is only a question of time. For such inestimable principles are at stake, — of self-government, of representative government, of any government at all, of free institutions rejected because

they inevitably will bring liberty to slaves unless subverted ; of
175 national honor, and fidelity to solemn national trusts, — for all
these war is waged ; and if by war these shall be secured, not one
drop of blood will be wasted, not one life squandered. The suf-
fering will have purchased a glorious future of inconceivable
peace and happiness ! Nor do we deem the result doubtful.
180 The population is in the North and West. The wealth is there.
The popular intelligence of the country is there. There *only* is
there an educated *common people*. (Cheers.) The right doc-
trines of civil government are with the North. (Cheers and a
voice, "Where's the justice ?") It will not be long before one
185 thing more will be with the North — victory. (Loud cheers.)
Men on this side are impatient at the long delay ; but if we can
bear it, can't you ? (Laughter.) You are quite at ease — ("Not
yet") ; we are not. You are not materially affected in any such
degree as many parts of our own land are. (Cheers.) But if
190 the day shall come in one year, in two years, or in ten years
hence, when the old stars and stripes shall float over every State
of America — (loud cheers and some disturbance from one or two)
— O let him [the chief disturber] have a chance ! (Laughter.)
I was saying, when interrupted by that sound from the other side
195 of the hall, that if the day shall come, in one or five or ten years,
in which the old honored and historic banner shall float again
over every State of the South ; if the day shall come when that
which was the accursed cause of this dire and atrocious war —
slavery — shall be done away — (cheers) ; if the day shall have
200 come, when through all the gulf states there shall be liberty of
speech, as there never has been — (cheers) — when there shall
be liberty of the press, as there never has been ; when men shall
have common schools to send their children to, which they never
have had in the South ; if the day shall come when the land shall
205 not be parcelled into gigantic plantations, in the hands of a few
rich oligarchs — (loud cheers) — but shall be divided to honest
farmers, every man owning his little — (renewed cheers) ; in
short, if the day shall come when the simple ordinances, the frui-
tion and privileges, of civil liberty, shall prevail in every part of
210 the United States — it will be worth all the dreadful blood, and

tears, and woe. (Loud cheers.) You are impatient, and yet God dwelleth in eternity, and has an infinite leisure to roll forward the affairs of men, not to suit the hot impatience of those who are but children of a day, and cannot wait or linger long, but
 215 according to the infinite circle on which He measures time and events ! He expedites or retards as it pleases Him ; and yet if He heard our cries or prayers, not thrice would the months revolve but peace would come. Yet the strong crying and prayers of millions have not brought peace, but only thickening war. We
 220 accept the Providence ; the duty is plain. (Cheers and interruption.)

I repeat, the duty is plain. (Cheers.) So rooted is this English people in the faith of liberty, that it were an utterly hopeless task for any minion or sympathizer of the South to sway the popular
 225 lar sympathy of England, if this English people believed that this was none other than a conflict between liberty and slavery. *It is just that.* (Loud cheers.) The conflict may be masked by our institutions. Every people must shape public action through their laws and institutions. We often cannot reach an evil
 230 directly, but only circuitously, through the channels of law and custom. It is none the less a contest for liberty and against slavery, because it is primarily a conflict for the union. It is by that union, vivid with liberty, that we have to scourge oppression and establish liberty. Union, in the future, means justice, liberty,
 235 popular rights. Only slavery has hitherto prevented union from bearing such fruit.

Slavery was introduced into our country at a time and in a manner when neither England nor America knew well what were the results of that atrocious system. It was ignorantly received
 240 and propagated on our side ; little by little it spread through all the thirteen states that then were : for slavery in the beginning was in New England, as really as now it is in the Southern States. But when the great struggle for our independence came on, the study of the doctrines of human rights had made such progress
 245 that the whole public mind began to think it was wrong to wage war to defend our rights, while we were holding men in slavery, depriving them of theirs. It is an historical fact that all the

great and renowned men that flourished at the period of our revolution were abolitionists. Washington was ; so was Benjamin
250 Franklin ; so was Thomas Jefferson ; so was James Monroe ; so were the principal Virginian and Southern statesmen, and the first abolition society ever founded in America was founded not in the North, but in the Middle and a portion of the Southern States. Before the War of Independence, slavery was decaying in the
255 North, from moral and physical causes combined. It ceased in New England with the adoption of our constitution (1787). It has been unjustly said that they sold their slaves and preached a cheap emancipation to others. Slavery ceased in Massachusetts as follows : When suit was brought for the services of a slave,
260 the Chief Justice laid down as law, that our Declaration of Independence, which pronounced all men "equal," and equally entitled to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," was itself a bill of emancipation, and he refused to yield up that slave for service. At a later period New York passed an Emancipation
265 Act. It has been said that she sold her slaves. No slander was ever greater. The most careful provision was made against sale. No man travelling out of the State of New York after the passage of the Emancipation Act was permitted to have any slave with him, unless he gave bonds for his reappearance with him. As a
270 matter of fact the slaves were emancipated without compensation on the spot, to take effect gradually, class by class. But after a trial of half a score of years the people found this gradual emancipation was intolerable. ("Hear, hear.") It was like gradual amputation. They therefore, by another act of legislation, de-
275 clared immediate emancipation — ("Hear"), and that took effect ; and so slavery perished in the State of New York. (Cheers.) Substantially so it was in New Jersey and in Pennsylvania ; never was there an example of States that emancipated slaves more purely from moral conviction of the wrong of slavery.
280 I know it is said that Northern capital and Northern ships were employed in the slave trade. To an extent it was so. But is there any community that lives, in which there are not miscreants who violate the public conscience ? (Cheers.) Then and since, the man who dared to use his capital and his ships in this infa-

285 mous traffic hid himself, and did by agents what he was ashamed to be known to have done himself. ("Hear.") Any man in the North who notoriously had part or lot in a trade so detested, would have been branded with the mark of Cain. (Cheers.) It is true that the port of New York has been employed in this in-
290 fernal traffic, but it was because it was under the influence either of that "Democratic" party that was then unfortunately in alliance with the Southern slavery — ("Hear, hear") — or because it was under the dark political control of the South itself. For when the South could appoint our marshals, — could, through the national
295 administration, control the appointment of every Federal officer, our collectors, and every custom-house officer, — how could it be but that slavery flourished in our harbors? For years together New York has been as much controlled by the South, in matters relating to slavery, as Mobile or New Orleans. But, even so,
300 the slave trade was clandestine. It abhorred the light : it crept in and out of the harbor stealthily, despised and hated by the whole community. Is New York to be blamed for demoniac deeds done by her limbs while yet under possession of the devil? She is now clothed and in her right mind. (Cheers.) There was
305 one Judas ; is Christianity therefore a hoax? ("Hear.") There are hissing men in this audience ; are you not respectable? (Cheers and laughter.) The folly of the few is that light which God casts to irradiate the wisdom of the many. ("Hear.")

And let me say one word here about the Constitution of America.
310 It recognizes slavery as a *fact* ; but it does not recognize the *doctrine* of slavery in any way whatever. It was a fact ; it lay before the ship of state, as a rock lies in the channel of the ship as she goes into harbor ; and because a ship steers round a rock, does it follow that the rock is in the ship? ("Hear, hear.") And
315 because the Constitution of the United States made some circuits to steer round that great fact, does it follow that therefore slavery is recognized in the Constitution as a right or a system? ("No.") See how carefully that immortal document worded itself. In the slave laws the slave is delared to be — what? Expressly, and by
320 the most repetitious phraseology, he is denuded of all the attributes and characteristics of manhood, and is pronounced a

"chattel." ("Shame.") Now, you have just that same word in your farming language with the *h* left out, — "cattle." ("Hear, hear.") And the difference between cattle and chattel is the difference between quadruped and biped. (Laughter.) So far as animate property is concerned, and so far as inanimate property is concerned, it is just the difference between locomotive property and stationary property. ("Hear, hear.") The laws in all the Slave States stand on the radical principle that the slave is not for purposes of law any longer to be ranked in the category of human being, but that he is a piece of property, and is to be treated to all intents and purposes as a piece of property; and the law did not blush, nor do the judges blush nowadays who interpret that law. ("Hear.") But how does the Constitution of the United States, when it speaks of these same slaves, name them? Does it call them chattels or slaves? Nay, it refused even the softer words *serf* and *servitude*. Conscientiously aware of the dignity of man, and that *service* is not opposed to the grandeur of his nature, it alludes to the slaves barely as *persons* (not chattels) held to *service* (not servitude). ("Hear" and cheers.) Go to South Carolina and ask what she calls slaves, and her laws reply "They are things"; but the old capitol at Washington suddenly reverberates, "No, persons!" (Cheers.) Go to Mississippi, the State of Jefferson Davis, and her fundamental law pronounces the slave to be only a "thing"; and again the Federal Constitution sounds back, "Persons"! Go to Louisiana and its constitution, and still that doctrine of devils is enunciated — it is "chattel," it is "thing." Looking upon those for whom Christ felt mortal anguish in Gethsemane, and stretched himself out for death on Calvary, their laws call them "things" and "chattels"; and still in tones of thunder the Constitution of the United States says "Persons"! The Slave States, by a definition, annihilate manhood; the Constitution, by a word, brings back the slave to the human family. (Cheers.)

What was it, then, when the country had advanced so far towards universal emancipation in the period of our national formation, that stopped this onward tide? Two things, commercial and political. First, the wonderful demand for cotton throughout

the world, precisely when, from the invention of the cotton gin, it
 360 became easy to turn it to service. Slaves that before had been
 worth from three to four hundred dollars began to be worth six
 hundred dollars. That knocked away one-third of adherence to
 the moral law. Then they became worth seven hundred dollars,
 and half the law went — (cheers and laughter) ; then eight or nine
 365 hundred dollars, and then there was no such thing as moral law
 — (cheers and laughter) ; then one thousand or twelve hundred
 dollars, and slavery became one of the beatitudes. (Cheers and
 laughter.) The other cause, which checked the progress of
 emancipation that had already so auspiciously begun, was political.
 370 [These political causes are treated at some length.]

II.

The following address by Hon. J. J. Ingalls, delivered in the United States Senate on the death of Senator Beck, is of the second class of oratory, and illustrates one of the many directions that a memorial oration may take. What is the theme? Is there any part of the oration that has no direct bearing on the theme? Does the discourse lack unity?

Compare the diction of this address with that of the selection from Beecher. To what extent is the difference due to the subject and the occasion? Would either discourse be improved by adopting something of the diction of the other? Compare, also, Lincoln's Gettysburg address.

Study carefully the use made of figures, and the figures themselves.

How does the use made of repetition differ from that made by Mr. Beecher? Comment on amount and manner of repetition.

A comparison of this selection with other memorial orations will be profitable.

Mr. President : Rugged, robust, and indomitable, the incarnation of physical force and intellectual energy, Senator Beck seemed a part of nature, inseparable from life and exempt from

infirmity. Accustomed for many sessions to the exhibition of his
5 prodigious activity, his indefatigable labors, his strenuous conflicts, I recall the emotion with which I saw him a few months ago stand painfully in his place and announce with strange pathos that for the first time in twenty years he found himself unable to participate in debate. It was as if a torrent had paused midway
10 in its descent, or a tempest had ceased suddenly in its stormy progress. He lingered for awhile, as the prostrate oak, to which he has been appropriately compared by his late colleague, retains its verdure for a brief interval after its fall, or as the flame flickers when the candle is burned out; but his work was done. It was
15 the end.

Estimated by comparison with his contemporaries, and measured by the limitations which he overcame, his career cannot be considered otherwise than as extraordinary and of singular and unusual distinction. An alien, and not favored by fortune, he
20 conquered the accidents of birth and the obstacles of race, scaled the formidable barriers of tradition, and rose by successive steps to the highest social and political station.

In a great State, proud of its history, of the lineage of its illustrious families, of the honor of its historic names, of the achievements of its warriors and statesmen, whose renown is the imperishable heritage of mankind, this stranger surpassed the swiftest
25 in the race of ambition and the strongest in the strife for supremacy. His triumph was not temporary, the brilliant and casual episode of an aspiring and unscrupulous adventurer, but a steadfast and permanent conquest of the judgment and affections of an exalted constituency. Nor was the recognition of his superiority confined to Kentucky. Though he never forgot his nativity, nor the associations of his youth, he was by choice and preference, and not from necessity, an American. In his broad
30 and generous nature patriotism was a passion, and allegiance a sacred and unalterable obligation. A partisan by instinct and conviction, there was nothing ignoble in his partisanship. He transgressed the boundaries of party in his friendships, and no appeal to his sympathy or compassion was ever made in vain.
40 He has departed. His term had not expired, but his name

has been stricken from the rolls of the Senate. His credentials remain in its archives, but an honored successor sits unchallenged in his place. He has no vote nor voice, but the consideration of great measures affecting the interests of every citizen
45 of the republic is interrupted, with the concurrence and approval of all, that the representatives of forty-two Commonwealths may rehearse the virtues and commemorate the career of an associate who is beyond the reach of praise or censure, in the kingdom of the dead.

50 The right to live is, in human estimation, the most sacred, the most inviolable, the most inalienable. The joy of living in such a splendid and luminous day as this is inconceivable. To exist is exultation. To live forever is our sublimest hope. Annihilation, extinction, and eternal death are the forebodings of despair.
55 To know, to love, to achieve, to triumph, to confer happiness, to alleviate misery, is rapture. The greatest crime and the severest penalty known to human law is the sacrifice and forfeiture of life.

And yet we are all under sentence of death. Other events may or may not occur. Other conditions may or may not exist. We
60 may be rich or poor; we may be learned or ignorant; we may be happy or wretched; but we all must die. The verdict has been pronounced by the inexorable decree of an omnipotent tribunal. Without trial or opportunity for defense; with no knowledge of the accuser or the nature and cause of the accusation; without
65 being confronted with the witnesses against us, we have been summoned to the bar of life and condemned to death. There is no writ of error nor review. There is neither exculpation nor appeal. All must be relinquished. Beauty and deformity, good and evil, virtue and vice, share the same relentless fate. The
70 tender mother cries passionately for mercy for her first born, but there is no clemency. The craven felon sullenly prays for a moment in which to be aneled, but there is no reprieve. The soul helplessly beats its wings against the bars, shudders, and disappears.

75 The proscription extends alike to the individual and the type. Nations die and races expire. Humanity itself is destined to extinction. Sooner or later, it is the instruction of science, that

the energy of the earth will be expended, and it will become incapable of supporting life. A group of feeble and pallid survivors in some sheltered valley in the tropics will behold the sun sink below the horizon and the pitiless stars glitter in the midnight sky. The last man will perish, and the sun will rise upon the earth without an inhabitant. Its atmosphere, its seas, its light and heat will vanish, and the planet will be an idle cinder uselessly spinning in its orbit.

Every hour some world dies unnoticed in the firmament; some sun smoulders to embers and ashes on the hearthstone of infinite space, and the mighty maze of systems sweeps ceaselessly onward in its voyage of doom to remorseless and unsparing destruction.

With the disappearance of man from the earth all traces of his existence will be lost. The palaces, towers, and temples he has reared, the institutions he has established, the cities he has builded, the books he has written, the creeds he has constructed, the philosophies he has formulated — all science, art, literature, and knowledge — will be obliterated and engulfed in empty and vacant oblivion.

" The great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit shall dissolve,
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind."

There is an intelligence so vast and enduring that the flaming interval between the birth and death of universes is no more than the flash of fire-flies above the meadows of summer: a colossal power by which these stupendous orbs are launched in the abyss, like bubbles blown by a child in the morning sun, and whose sense of justice and reason cannot be less potential than those immutable statutes that are the law of being to the creatures He has made, and which compel them to declare that if the only object of creation is destruction, if infinity is the theatre of an interrupted series of irreparable calamities, if the final cause of life is death, then time is an inexplicable tragedy, and eternity an illogical and indefensible catastrophe.

No, Mr. President, this obsequy is for the quick and not for the dead. It is not an inconsolable lamentation. It is a strain

115 of triumph. It is an affirmation to those who survive, that as our departed associate, contemplating at the close of his life the monument of good deeds he had erected, more enduring than brass and loftier than the pyramids of kings, might exclaim with the Roman poet, *Non omnis moriar*; so, turning to the silent
120 and unknown future he could rely with just and reasonable confidence upon that most impressive and momentous assurance ever delivered to the human race, "He that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die."

III.

The following address of Lord Erskine is an excellent illustration of the way in which the intellectual and the emotional elements may be combined in persuasion. It contains no argument that is not so presented as to have an effect on the feelings; and every appeal to the feelings rests closely on argument.

This speech was delivered in prosecuting a certain Mr. Williams for the publication of Thomas Paine's "Age of Reason." Lord Erskine had always been an advocate of the liberty of the press, and had previously defended Paine for the publication of "The Rights of Man." It was thus necessary that he guard against the appearance of inconsistency. The way in which he does this should be carefully studied.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the address is its perfect adaptation to the circumstances, both immediate and general. When reading it the student should keep the history of the period well in mind.

Like most of Lord Erskine's speeches, this selection is worthy of minute analysis. Note carefully the kinds of arguments used and the forms in which they are presented; also the motives that are appealed to, and the manner of the appeal. What word best describes the method of the address?

Gentlemen of the jury : The charge of blasphemy, which is put upon the record against the publisher of this publication, is not an accusation of the servants of the crown, but comes before you sanctioned by the oaths of a grand jury of the country. It stood for trial upon a former day ; but it happening, as it frequently does, without any imputation upon the gentlemen named in the panel, that a sufficient number did not appear to constitute a full special jury, I thought it my duty to withdraw the cause from trial, till I could have the opportunity of addressing myself to you who were originally appointed to try it.

I pursued this course from no jealousy of the common juries appointed by the laws for the ordinary service of the court, since my whole life has been one continued experience of their virtues ; but because I thought it of great importance that those who were to decide upon a cause so very momentous to the public, should have the highest possible qualifications for the decision ; that they should not only be men capable from their educations of forming an enlightened judgment, but that their situations should be such as to bring them within the full view of their country, to which, in character and in estimation, they were in their own turns to be responsible.

Not having the honor, gentlemen, to be sworn for the king as one of his counsel, it has fallen much oftener to my lot to defend indictments for libels than to assist in the prosecution of them ; but I feel no embarrassment from that recollection. I shall not be bound to-day to express a sentiment or to utter an expression inconsistent with those invaluable principles for which I have uniformly contended in the defence of others. Nothing that I have ever said, either professionally or personally, for the liberty of the press, do I mean to-day to contradict or counteract. On the contrary, I desire to preface the very short discourse I have to make to you, with reminding you that it is your most solemn duty to take care that it suffers no injury in your hands. A free and unlicensed press, in the just and legal sense of the expression, has led to all the blessings, both of religion and government, which Great Britain or any part of the world at this moment enjoys, and it is calculated to advance mankind to still higher

degrees of civilization and happiness. But this freedom, like every other, must be limited to be enjoyed, and, like every human
40 advantage, may be defeated by its abuse.

Gentlemen, the defendant stands indicted for having published this book, which I have only read from the obligations of professional duty, and which I rose from the reading of with astonishment and disgust. Standing here with all the privileges belonging
45 ing to the highest counsel for the crown, I shall be entitled to reply to any defence that shall be made for the publication. I shall wait with patience till I hear it.

Indeed, if I were to anticipate the defence which I hear and read of, it would be defaming by anticipation the learned counsel
50 who is to make it; since, if I am to collect it from a formal notice given to the prosecutors in the course of the proceedings, I have to expect that, instead of a defence conducted according to the rules and principles of English law, the foundation of all our laws, and the sanctions of all justice, are to be struck at and insulted.
55 What gives the court its jurisdiction? What but the oath which his lordship, as well as you yourselves, has sworn upon the Gospel to fulfil? Yet in the King's Court, where his Majesty is himself also sworn to administer the justice of England — in the King's Court — who receives his high authority under a solemn oath to
60 maintain the Christian religion as it is promulgated by God in the Holy Scriptures, I am nevertheless called upon as counsel for the prosecution to "produce a certain book described in the indictment to be the Holy Bible." No man deserves to be upon the rolls, who has dared as an attorney to put his name to such a
65 notice. It is an insult to the authority and dignity of the court of which he is an officer, since it calls in question the very foundations of its jurisdiction. If this is to be the spirit and temper of the defence; if, as I collect from that array of books which are spread upon the benches behind me, this publication is to be
70 vindicated by an attack of all the truths which the Christian religion promulgates to mankind, let it be remembered that such an argument was neither suggested nor justified by anything said by me on the part of the prosecution.

In this stage of the proceedings, I shall call for reverence to

75 the Sacred Scriptures, not from their merits, unbounded as they are, but from their authority in a Christian country ; not from the obligations of conscience, but from the rules of law. For my own part, gentlemen, I have been ever deeply devoted to the truths of Christianity ; and my firm belief in the Holy Gospel is
80 by no means owing to the prejudices of education, though I was religiously educated by the best of parents, but has arisen from the fullest and most continued reflections of my riper years and understanding. It forms at this moment the great consolation of a life, which, as a shadow passeth away ; and without it, I
85 should consider my long course of health and prosperity, too long perhaps and too uninterrupted to be good for any man, only as the dust which the wind scatters, and rather as a snare than as a blessing.

Much, however, as I wish to support the authority of Scripture
90 from a reasonable consideration of it, I shall repress that subject for the present. But if the defence, as I have suspected, shall bring them at all into argument or question, I must then fulfil a duty which I owe not only to the court, as counsel for the prosecution, but to the public and to the world, to state what I feel
95 and know concerning the evidences of that religion, which is denied without being examined, and reviled without being understood.

I am well aware that by the communications of a free press, all the errors of mankind, from age to age, have been dissipated and
100 dispelled ; and I recollect that the world, under the banners of reformed Christianity, has struggled through persecution to the noble eminence on which it stands at this moment, shedding the blessings of humanity and science upon the nations of the earth.

It may be asked, then, by what means the Reformation would
105 have been effected, if the books of the reformers had been suppressed, and the errors of now exploded superstitions had been supported by the terrors of an unreformed state ? or how, upon such principles, any reformation, civil or religious, can in future be effected ? The solution is easy : let us examine what are the
110 genuine principles of the liberty of the press, as they regard writings upon general subjects, unconnected with the personal repu-

tations of private men, which are wholly foreign to the present inquiry. They are full of simplicity, and are brought as near perfection, by the law of England, as perhaps is attainable by
115 any of the frail institutions of mankind.

Although every community must establish supreme authorities, founded upon fixed principles, and must give high power to magistrates to administer laws for the preservation of government, and for the security of those who are to be protected by it;
120 yet as infallibility and perfection belong neither to human individuals nor to human establishments, it ought to be the policy of all free nations, as it is most peculiarly the principle of our own, to permit the most unbounded freedom of discussion, even to the detection of errors in the constitution of the very government
125 itself; so as that common decorum is observed, which every state must exact from its subjects and which imposes no restraint upon any intellectual composition, fairly, honestly, and decently addressed to the consciences and understandings of men. Upon this principle I have an unquestionable right, a right which the
130 best subjects have exercised, to examine the principles and structure of the constitution, and by fair, manly reasoning, to question the practice of its administrators. I have a right to consider and to point out errors in the one or in the other; and not merely to reason upon their existence, but to consider the means of their
135 reformation.

By such free, well-intentioned, modest, and dignified communication of sentiments and opinions, all nations have been gradually improved, and milder laws and purer religions have been established. The same principles which vindicate civil contro-
140 versies, honestly directed, extend their protection to the sharpest contentions on the subject of religious faiths. This rational and legal course of improvement was recognized and ratified by Lord Kenyon as the law of England, in the late trial at Guildhall, where he looked back with gratitude to the labors of the reform-
145 ers, as the fountains of our religious emancipation, and of the civil blessings that followed in their train. The English constitution, indeed, does not stop short in the toleration of religious opinions, but liberally extends it to practice. It permits every

man, even publicly, to worship God according to his own conscience, though in marked dissent from the national Establishment, so as he professes the general faith, which is the sanction of all our moral duties, and the only pledge of our submission to the system which constitutes the state.

Is not this freedom of controversy and freedom of worship sufficient for all the purposes of human happiness and improvement? Can it be necessary for either, that the law should hold out indemnity to those who wholly abjure and revile the government of their country, or the religion on which it rests for its foundation? I expect to hear in answer to what I am now saying, much that will offend me. My learned friend, from the difficulties of his situation, which I know from experience how to feel for very sincerely, may be driven to advance propositions which it may be my duty with much freedom to reply to ; and the law will sanction that freedom. But will not the ends of justice be completely answered by my exercise of that right, in terms that are decent, and calculated to expose its defects? Or will my argument suffer, or will public justice be impeded, because neither private honor and justice nor public decorum would endure my telling my very learned friend, because I differ from him in opinion, that he is a fool, a liar, and a scoundrel, in the face of the court? This is just the distinction between a book of free legal controversy, and the book which I am arraigning before you. Every man has a right to investigate, with decency, controversial points of the Christian religion ; but no man consistently with a law which only exists under its sanctions has a right to deny its very existence, and to pour forth such shocking and insulting invectives as the lowest establishments in the gradation of civil authority ought not to be subjected to, and which soon would be borne down by insolence and disobedience, if they were.

The same principle pervades the whole system of the law, not merely in its abstract theory, but in its daily and most applauded practice. The intercourse between the sexes, which properly regulated, not only continues but humanizes and adorns our natures, is the foundation of all the thousand romances, plays, and novels, which are in the hands of everybody. Some of

them lead to the confirmation of every virtuous principle ; others, though with the same profession, address the imagination in a manner to lead the passions into dangerous excesses ; but though the law does not nicely discriminate the various shades which
190 distinguish such works from one another, so as to suffer many to pass, through its liberal spirit, that upon principle ought to be suppressed, would it or does it tolerate, or does any decent man contend that it ought to pass by unpunished, libels of the most shameless obscenity, manifestly pointed to debauch innocence
195 and to blast and poison the morals of the rising generation? This is only another illustration to demonstrate the obvious distinction between the work of an author who fairly exercises the powers of his mind in investigating the religion or government of any country, and him who attacks the rational existence of every
200 religion or government, and brands with absurdity and folly the state which sanctions, and the obedient tools who cherish, the illusion. But this publication appears to me to be as cruel and mischievous in its effects, as it is manifestly illegal in its principles ; because it strikes at the best—sometimes, alas !—the
205 only refuge and consolation amidst the distresses and afflictions of the world. The poor and humble, whom it affects to pity, may be stabbed to the heart by it. They have more occasion for firm hopes beyond the grave than the rich and prosperous, who have other comforts to render life delightful. I can conceive a
210 distressed but virtuous man, surrounded by his children looking up to him for bread when he has none to give them ; sinking under the last day's labor, and unequal to the next, yet still, supported by confidence in the hour when all tears shall be wiped from the eyes of affliction, bearing the burden laid upon him by
215 a mysterious Providence which he adores, and anticipating with exultation the revealed promises of his Creator, when he shall be greater than the greatest, and happier than the happiest of mankind. What a change in such a mind might be wrought by such a merciless publication ! Gentlemen, whether these remarks are
220 the overcharged declamations of an accusing counsel, or the just reflections of a man anxious for the public happiness, which is best secured by the morals of a nation, will be soon settled by an

appeal to the passages in the work that are selected by the indictment for your consideration and judgment. [Here the speaker
225 read passages from the work in question.]

Gentlemen, it would be useless and disgusting to enumerate the other passages within the scope of the indictment. How any man can rationally vindicate the publication of such a book, in a country where the Christian religion is the very foundation of the
230 law of the land, I am totally at a loss to conceive, and have no ideas for the discussion of. How is a tribunal whose whole jurisdiction is founded upon the solemn belief and practice of what is here denied as falsehood, and reprobated as impiety, to deal with such an anomalous offense? Upon what principle is it even
235 offered to the court, whose authority is contemned and mocked at? If the religion proposed to be called in question is not previously adopted in belief and solemnly acted upon, what authority has the court to pass any judgment at all of acquittal or condemnation? Why am I now or upon any other occasion to submit
240 to his lordship's authority? Why am I now or at any time to address twelve of my equals, as I am now addressing you, with reverence and submission? Under what sanction are the witnesses to give their evidence, without which there can be no trial? Under what obligations can I call upon you, the jury representing
245 your country, to administer justice? Surely upon no other than that you are sworn to administer it, under the oaths you have taken. The whole judicial fabric, from the king's sovereign authority to the lowest office of magistracy, has no other foundation. The whole is built, both in form and substance, upon the
250 same oath of every one of its ministers to do justice, as God shall help them hereafter. What God? And what hereafter? That God, undoubtedly, who has commanded kings to rule, and judges to degree justice ; who has said to witnesses, not only by the voice of nature but in revealed commandments, "Thou shalt not bear
255 false testimony against thy neighbor"; and who has enforced obedience to them by the revelation of the unutterable blessings which shall attend their observance, and the awful punishments which shall await upon their transgression.

But it seems this is an age of reason, and the time and the

260 person are at last arrived that are to dissipate the errors which have overspread the past generations of ignorance. The believers in Christianity are many, but it belongs to the few that are wise to correct their credulity. Belief is an act of reason, and superior reason may, therefore, dictate to the weak. In running the mind
265 over the long list of sincere and devout Christians, I cannot help lamenting that Newton had not lived to this day, to have had his shallowness filled up with this new flood of light. But the subject is too awful for irony, I will speak plainly and directly. Newton was a Christian ; Newton, whose mind burst forth from the fetters
270 fastened by nature upon our finite conceptions ; Newton, whose science was truth, and the foundations of whose knowledge of it was philosophy ; not those visionary and arrogant presumptions which too often usurp its name, but philosophy resting upon the basis of mathematics, which, like figures, cannot lie ; Newton, who
275 carried the line and rule to the uttermost barriers of creation, and explored the principles by which all created matter exists and is held together. But this extraordinary man, in the mighty reach of his mind, overlooked, perhaps, the errors which a minuter investigation of the created things on this earth might have taught
280 him. What shall then be said of Mr. Boyle, who looked into the organic structure of all matter, even to the inanimate substances which the foot treads upon ? Such a man may be supposed to have been equally qualified with Mr. Paine to look up through nature to nature's God ; yet the result of all his contemplations
285 was the most confirmed and devout belief in all which the other holds in contempt, as despicable and drivelling superstition. But this error might, perhaps, arise from a want of due attention to the foundations of human judgment, and the structure of that understanding which God has given us for the investigation of
290 truth. Let that question be answered by Mr. Locke, who to the highest pitch of devotion and adoration was a Christian — Mr. Locke, whose office was to detect the errors of thinking, by going up to the very fountains of thought, and to direct into the proper track of reasoning the devious mind of man,
295 by showing him its whole process, from the first perceptions of sense to the last conclusions of ratiocination ; putting a rein

upon false opinion, by practical rules for the conduct of human judgment.

But these men, it may be said, were only deep thinkers, and
 300 lived in their closets, unaccustomed to the traffic of the world, and
 to the laws which practically regulate mankind. Gentlemen, in
 the place where we now sit to administer the justice of this great
 country, the never-to-be-forgotten Sir Mathew Hale presided ;
 whose faith in Christianity is an exalted commentary upon its
 305 truth and reason, and whose life was a glorious example of its
 fruits ; whose justice, drawn, from the pure fountain of the Chris-
 tian dispensation, will be, in all ages, a subject of the highest
 reverence and admiration. But it is said by the author, that the
 Christian fable is but the tale of the more ancient superstitions of
 310 the world, and may be easily detected by a proper understanding
 of the mythologies of the heathens. Did Milton understand those
 mythologies ? Was he less versed than Mr. Paine in the super-
 stitions of the world ? No ; they were the subject of his immortal
 song ; and, though shut out from all recurrence to them, he poured
 315 them forth from the stores of a memory rich with all that man ever
 knew, and laid them in their order as the illustration of real and
 exalted faith, the unquestionable source of that fervid genius which
 has cast a kind of shade upon most of the other works of man :

320 " He pass'd the flaming bounds of place and time :
 The living throne, the sapphire blaze,
 Where angels tremble while they gaze,
 He saw, but blasted with excess of light,
 Closed his eyes in endless night."

But it was the light of the body only that was extinguished : " The
 325 celestial light shone inward, and enabled him to justify the ways
 of God to man." The result of his thinking was, nevertheless,
 not quite the same as the author's before us. The mysterious
 incarnation of our blessed Saviour, which this work blasphemes
 in words so wholly unfit for the mouth of a Christian, or for the
 330 ear of a court of justice, that I dare not, and will not, give them
 utterance, Milton made the grand conclusion of his " Paradise
 Lost," the rest from his finished labors, and the ultimate hope,
 expectation, and glory of the world :

335 " A virgin is his mother, but his sire,
 The power of the Most High ; he shall ascend
 The throne hereditary, and bound his reign
 With earth's wide bounds, his glory with the heavens."

The immortal poet having thus put into the mouth of the angel the prophecy of man's redemption, follows it with that solemn and
 340 beautiful admonition, addressed in the poem to our great first parent, but intended as an address to his posterity through all generations :

 " This having learned, thou hast attained the sum
 Of wisdom ; hope no higher, though all the stars
 345 Thou knew'st by name, and all th' ethereal powers,
 All secrets of the deep, all nature's works,
 Or works of God in heaven, earth, air, or sea,
 And all the riches of this world enjoy'dst,
 And all the rule, one empire ; only add
 350 Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add faith,
 Add virtue, patience, temperance, add love,
 By name to come call'd charity, the soul
 Of all the rest ; then wilt thou not be loth
 To leave this paradise, but shalt possess
 355 A paradise within thee, happier far."

Thus, you find all that is great, or wise, or splendid, or illustrious amongst created things ; all the minds gifted beyond ordinary nature, if not inspired by its universal Author for the advancement and dignity of the world, though divided by distant
 360 ages and by clashing opinions, yet joining as it were in one sublime chorus, to celebrate the truths of Christianity ; laying upon its holy altars the never-fading offerings of their immortal wisdom.

Against all this concurring testimony, we find suddenly, from
 365 the author of this book, that the Bible teaches nothing but "lies, obscenity, cruelty, and injustice." Had he ever read our Saviour's Sermon on the Mount, in which the great principles of our faith and duty are summed up ? Let us all but read and practise it, and lies, obscenity, cruelty, and injustice, and all human wicked-
 370 ness will be banished from the world !

Gentlemen, there is but one consideration more, which I cannot possibly omit, because I confess it affects me very deeply. The

author of this book has written largely on public liberty and government ; and this last performance, which I am now prosecuting, has, on that account, been more widely circulated, and principally among those who attached themselves from principle to his former works. This circumstance renders a public attack upon all revealed religion from such a writer infinitely more dangerous. The religious and moral sense of the people of Great Britain is the great anchor which alone can hold the vessel of state amidst the storms which agitate the world ; and if the mass of the people were debauched from the principles of religion, the true basis of that humanity, charity, and benevolence, which have been so long the national characteristic, instead of mixing myself, as I sometimes have done, in political reformations, I would retire to the uttermost corners of the earth, to avoid their agitation ; and would bear, not only the imperfections and abuses complained of in our own wise Establishment, but even the worst government that ever existed in the world, rather than go to the work of reformation with a multitude set free from all the charities of Christianity, who had no other sense of God's existence than was to be collected from Mr. Paine's observations of nature, which the mass of mankind have no leisure to contemplate, which promises no future rewards to animate the good in the glorious pursuit of human happiness, nor punishments to deter the wicked from destroying it even in its birth. The people of England are a religious people, and, with the blessing of God, so far as it is in my power, I will lend my aid to keep them so.

I have no objections to the most extended and free discussions upon doctrinal points of the Christian religion ; and though the law of England does not permit it, I do not dread the reasonings of deists against the existence of Christianity itself, because, as was said by its divine author, if it be of God, it will stand. An intellectual book, however erroneous, addressed to the intellectual world upon so profound and complicated a subject, can never work the mischief which this indictment is calculated to repress. Such works will only incite the minds of men enlightened by study, to a closer investigation of a subject well worthy of their deepest and continued contemplation. The powers of the mind are given

410 for human improvement in the progress of human existence. The changes produced by such reciprocations of lights and intelligencies are certain in their progression, and make their way imperceptibly, by the final and irresistible power of truth. If Christianity be founded in falsehood, let us become deists in this
415 manner, and I am contented. But this book has no such object, and no such capacity ; it presents no arguments to the wise and enlightened ; on the contrary, it treats the faith and opinions of the wisest with the most shocking contempt, and stirs up men, without the advantages of learning, or sober thinking, to a total
420 disbelief of everything hitherto held sacred ; and consequently to a rejection of all the laws and ordinances of the state, which stand only upon the assumption of their truth.

Gentlemen, I cannot conclude without expressing the deepest regret at all attacks upon the Christian religion by authors who
425 profess to promote the civil liberties of the world. For under what other auspices than Christianity have the lost and subverted liberties of mankind in former ages been reasserted ? By what zeal, but the warm zeal of devout Christians, have English liberties been redeemed and consecrated ? Under what other sanctions,
430 even in our own days, have liberty and happiness been spreading to the uttermost corners of the earth ? What work of civilization, what commonwealth of greatness, has this bald religion of nature ever established ? We see, on the contrary, the nations that have no other light than that of nature to direct them, sunk in barbarism,
435 or slaves to arbitrary governments ; whilst under the Christian dispensation, the great career of the world has been slowly but clearly advancing, lighter at every step from the encouraging prophecies of the gospel, and leading, I trust, in the end to universal and eternal happiness. Each generation of mankind can see but
440 a few revolving links of this mighty and mysterious chain ; but by doing our several duties in our allotted stations, we are sure that we are fulfilling the purposes of our existence. You, I trust, will fulfil yours this day.

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